



United Nations

Specialised Training Materials

United Nations Infantry Battalion

for Contingent Commanders, Staffs and Unit
Leaders for United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations

The United Nations (UN) Specialised Training Materials (STM) for Infantry Battalion Contingent Commanders, Staffs and Unit leaders for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations has been developed by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) in consultation with Member States and UN offices.

This version has been released for use by Member States in their pre-deployment training for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. However, this STM will be regularly updated so that it is fully responsive to the needs on the ground. Therefore, we strongly suggest checking for updated versions before a training programme is conducted.

The latest version can be found online at the Peacekeeping Resource Hub: <http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community>. A link to receive your comments and suggestions for improvement can be found in the resource hub at the same location.

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Integrated Training Service

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Background

Since the Security Council first established a peacekeeping mission, the operational environment has evolved significantly, growing both in size and complexity. During this period, military units have continuously gained in prominence and today they are a key element for mandate implementation in several Peacekeeping Operations. While Military Unit performance, has sometimes become the yardstick against which the success of mission is measured, it is arguable also that military units' proper employment is one of the most challenging aspects by both for mission leadership and unit commanders.

The Department of Peace Operations has developed a suite of specialised training materials (STM) and packages to prepare specific military units for their deployment in UN Missions. There are also STMs on Protection of Civilians (POC), Child Protection and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence. These protection aspects are included in this material alongside Force Protection and other enabling military activities in support of other mission partners.

Nevertheless, experience has also shown that these protection tasks, despite their distinct nature, generate significant overlap. This is particularly true at the tactical level, where the assessment of protection threats, as well as the planning for and response to a complex protection crisis, is likely to simultaneously involve elements from the POC, Child Protection and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence realms. In order to reflect these realities and prepare peacekeepers for the multi-dimensional realities on the ground, this training package aims to demonstrate the complex linkages between protection tasks, and provide training guidance on how to prevent, deter and respond to interrelated threats.

Aim

According to the 2017 United Nations Cruz report, the Peacekeeping environment that features armed groups, terrorists, organised crime, street gangs, criminal and political exploitation, and other threats against UN forces and civilian populations. "The era of "Chapter VI-style" peacekeeping is over, but the United Nations and Troop/Police, Contributing Countries are, by and large, still gripped by a "Chapter VI Syndrome. If the United Nations and T/PCCs do not change their mindset, take risks, and show a willingness to face these new challenges, they will be consciously sending troops into harm's way." The UN Infantry Battalion (UNIBAT) is the predominant force structure in a UNPKO mission that will establish a safe and secure environment.

The report states that “hostile forces do not understand a language other than force. To deter and repel attacks and to defeat attackers, the United Nations needs to be strong and not fear to use force when necessary. To improve security, missions should identify threats to their security and take the initiative, using all the tactics, to neutralise or eliminate the threats. Missions should go where the threat is, in order to neutralise it.” The UNIBAT is the UN force of choice that will counter hostile forces.

The STM provides troop-contributing countries with a training package that combines conceptual, legal, and operational aspects to support the tactical planning of Infantry units to operate in Peacekeeping Operations. This package includes small exercises, as well as, a larger capstone scenario-based exercise, which can be run at the end of the training to strengthen the understanding of the planning processes at the tactical level of Peacekeeping Operations. The training package is designed for application in both pre-deployment and in-mission training.

Target audience

The target audience of this package are military decision-makers, leaders, and staffs at the tactical level from Sector Headquarters to company level. The materials may lend themselves to a wider audience. The audience for this STM package includes personnel identified as military decision-makers, and staff officers (including Force Headquarters), who during their UN deployment may be assigned to, employ, coordinated, or perform missions with UNIBAT. Additionally, it is noted that the military leadership from member states at their national peacekeeping training institutions, course directors, and instructors of military schools will benefit from these materials and from the training guidance.

Structure of the training materials

Module 1: Conceptual Framework

Module 2: Legal Framework

Module 3: Operational Framework

- Annex A: Lessons- Power Point Slide Presentations
- Annex B: Tabletop Exercise (TTX); Scenario-based Exercise (SBE)
- Annex C: References
- Annex D: Effects Based Operations (MDMP)
- Annex E: IED and Explosive Awareness Training

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Contact person

For any proposal of update, improvements, or any questions pertaining to these training materials, please contact the project leader Mr. Rafael Barbieri (barbieri@un.org) or write to peacekeeping-training@un.org.

Any relevant update will be posted and explained on the Peacekeeping Resource Hub website (<http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community>). Instructors are encouraged to check this site regularly.

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Instructor Guidance



General considerations for instructors

This package of materials is not a course, but rather a compendium of critical training content for comprehensive contingent military tactical planning in UN Peacekeeping. No training material can cover the entire complexity arising from tactical planning. This training package should therefore be viewed as the baseline to underpin contingent training efforts for military units, particularly, Infantry Battalions. However, when designing the materials, trainers need to be prepared to adapt them to the needs of their audience. As a result, the duration of lessons and exercises delivered in the package may vary.

Concerning necessary competencies for participants to benefit from this training package, it is recommended that personnel receiving this training be proficient in basic military tasks and technical skills (individually and collectively) at the tactical level. As such, it is expected that a battalion staff officer be fully capable to perform staff officer duties. It is also critical for all participants to have received the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) as a pre-requisite before this training. The CPTM contains fundamental principles, concepts, and ideas to UN Peacekeeping, which should be well grasped by trainees before participating in this STM.

The CPTM can be downloaded from: <http://research.un.org/revisedcptm2017>

Instructor Profile

This training material is best presented by instructors who master the CPTM and have previous experience working in a UN Peacekeeping Mission (preferably in a mission with a POC mandate). Also, having Infantry command and planning experience at the tactical level is important. Specific knowledge on the actual mission where trainees are to be deployed is advisable, to be able to deliver a targeted course based on real experience. Finally, instructors should be familiar and capable of facilitating scenario-based exercises.

Scenario Based Exercises (SBE) / Tabletop Exercise (TTX) Considerations

Contained in the STM is a TTX. This exercise is a scenario and situational driven learning activity to help consolidate learning outcomes and help reinforce the lesson "Take Away". TTXs provide a learning environment tailored to facilitate discussions. They are set in an informal learning environment where the target audience can discuss the principles and concepts when operating in a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation using a hypothetical scenario and specific situations. The exercise will help participants to understand the manifestation of integrating into a Peacekeeping Operation that is focused on the Protection of Civilians, force protection, and implementing the array of tasks that support the mandate by assisting in creating a safe and secure environment in the area of operations.




Methodology: Using their national problem-solving doctrine, methodology, military decision-making processes, and troop leading procedures, participants will analyse situations, tasks and present courses of action based on threats presented. The effectiveness of a TTX is derived from building blocks from lesson learning activities, energetic involvement by facilitators and participants. Facilitators / Instructors should highlight the complexity, threats and political environment when operating in support of Peacekeeping Operations. Also, they should assist participants in bridging gaps in the transition from standard military operations to Peacekeeping Operations. It is important that instructors emphasize that C2, the support structure, risk assessments of threats and coordination with the various actors in a UNPKO can be challenging.

Training Characteristics

Training will vary for different units in different troop contributing countries, based on priorities and resources. However, some fundamental training characteristics should be respected when delivering a course:

- Training should be interactive and encourage **trainees'** participation
- To help reinforce practical discussions, the training should bring in actual examples and anecdotes from UNPKO missions
- Training methodology should be based on learning activities and practice
- Training should emphasise the political nature of a UN Mission and address how best to leverage and interact with all components
- Training should be evaluated

Symbols legend

	Interactive presentation or small exercises to engage the participants
	Suggested film segment to illustrate the content
	Note to the instructor to highlight aspects of the materials or point towards additional materials.

Abbreviations / acronyms

For all practical purpose, throughout the Specialised Training Material documents, lessons, and slides, we will use the abbreviation/ acronym “UNIBAT” to refer to the United Nations Infantry Battalion Unit both in singular and in the plural forms.

Module 1



Conceptual Framework

Module 1 at a Glance

Aim

The aim of this module is to familiarise participants with the:

- PKO environment and characteristics of the infantry
- Military component operations and how they fit into the UN Mission concept
- Protection of Civilians (POC) conceptual framework
- Force Protection (FP), risk mitigation measures for UN forces
- UNIBAT organisation, structure, core tasks, enabling tasks, UN support and logistic framework
- Understanding reserve and quick reaction forces; and how they support UN PKO
- Introduction to crowd control, the handling of detainees, military peacekeeping-intelligence (MPKI), and peacekeeping-intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (PKISR)

Overview

Module 1 provides an overview of the conceptual framework related to the UNIBAT operating in a UNPKO to support and contribute towards the successful achievement of the Mandate. It also examines the UNIBAT support to the POC and FP strategies, their contributions, and characteristics of the peacekeeping environment and how the infantry fits into the UN Mission framework.

Introduction

Slide 1



Key Message: United Nations Military Infantry Battalions (UNIBAT) contribute decisively and in support of the successful achievement of the Mission's Mandate. To date, Infantry Battalions have deployed to Peacekeeping Operations in many of the UN Missions. To

The aim of Module 1 is to provide you an overview of UNIBAT to employ them in an appropriate manner and to familiarize you with the conceptual framework of how best the UNIBAT supports UN Missions.

For all practical purpose, throughout the Specialised Training Material documents, lessons, and slides, we will use the abbreviation/ acronym "UNIBAT" to refer to the United Nations Military Infantry Battalions; both in singular and in the plural forms.

It should be emphasised that the aim of these modules / lessons provides UN Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) with a comprehensive training package that combines the Conceptual, Legal, and Operational Frameworks for the employment of UNIBAT, starting here with the Conceptual Framework. This Specialised Training Material (STM) will also help mainstream aspects of Protection of Civilians and Gender into the frameworks and materials. The STM includes learning exercises and discussions, as well as references to a more comprehensive scenario-based exercise / Tabletop Exercise (TTX), which can be

run at the end of a course to help strengthen our understanding how better to employ UNIBAT in a UN Peacekeeping environment. This training package is designed for application in both pre-deployment and in-mission training.

Slide 2

Module 1 Content

- Introduction and Overview
- Military Component Operations
- UNIBAT Organisation, Tasks, and Logistics
- Force Protection of Civilians
- Force Protection
- Quick Reaction and Reserve Forces
- Handling detainees
- ISR Overview

UNIBAT conducts its mission in compliance with peacekeeping principles and ethos in mind; however, given these principles we need to adjust our mind-set to face the lethality on the ground. There have been several studies and reports that show we must change our mind set to face the new challenges in a modern peace operational environment. The Protection of Civilians (POC) has been a matrix for success in a UN Mission, and we must better understand how best to employ our infantry units to best support this part of the mandate. In Module 1, in the Conceptual Framework, we will cover these lessons.

Lesson 1.1



Overview / Introduction

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson




For an interactive start to this Lesson, ask the participants if they have had experience in a UNPKO. Ask them to tell the group about their specific challenges with command and control, logistics, security, tasking orders, and the employment.



Note to instructor – recommend that lesson 1.1 be presented by a trainer who has some personal experience operating in a UNIBAT, a Sector or Force HQs working in a UNPKO. The instructor should also encourage questions from the participants and aim for an interactive discussion. All participants should be encouraged to contribute to the group discussions and learning activities. The instructor should review the United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM) Second Edition January 2020. Learning involves some words, terms and phrases that may be unfamiliar and/or seem awkward. Reassure learners: “Don’t let new language get in the way of learning”. “As you move through the training, review the definitions of key words; and ask your instructor to clarify definitions, abbreviations, and acronyms.”

Slide 3



As UNIBATs are a special asset creating effects that contribute to the achievement of mandate objectives, it is crucial that military decision-makers, staff officers, and tactical level unit leaders who employ, or work with UNIBATs must be aware of the operational environment, and capabilities of UNIBAT. We will give a brief overview of the characteristics of the UNIBAT in the current complex UNPKO environment. This means from this point forward we should try to be in the mind-set of wearing the Blue Beret that represents the UN in a complex peacekeeping environment.

The UNIBAT is fully integrated into the mission and force concepts, as well as the tactical, operational, and strategic frameworks. The UNIBAT has its own unique characteristics that add a dimension in the accomplishment of the Mission's mandate. It is important to understand that the UNIBAT is deployed as part of the military structure of the UN Mission that may have key roles and supporting tasks.

Slide 4



Content

- Peacekeeping environment
- Facing the challenges
- Infantry in peace operations
- UN Infantry Battalion (UNIBAT) characteristics

Here are the subject areas we will be covering. It is important to understand up front that, UNIBAT do not operate in total isolation but work in close coordination with other United Nations mission components, agencies and stakeholders including host nation security forces.

Slide 5

Learning Outcomes

- Explain the current peace operational environment and how we must face the challenges
- Explain why the protection of civilians is important
- Describe the importance of infantry in peace operations
- Describe UNIBAT characteristics

At the end of the lesson our aim is for you to be able to assimilate the essential roles and responsibilities and how the UNIBAT fits into the UN Mission. We must first understand the PKO environment and what infantry skills, and characteristics assist in support of the mission's security. Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements:

- Explain the current peace operational environment and how we must face the challenges
- Explain why the Protection of Civilians is important
- Describe the importance of infantry in peace operations
- Cite characteristics of an UNIBAT

Slide 6



Here is a UN vehicle after sustaining an IED attack. IEDs have become the leading cause of casualties for the United Nations. Their improvised nature makes them easy to construct and emplace.



- *Ask the class what are and what they think about the characteristics of the current UNPKO environment. This discussion should take 10 minutes*
- *If this goes well; ask them to give a mission example; however, if the students are quiet, prompt them by asking what current missions they know of, what is happening on the ground, IEDs, and current threats, and spoilers to mandates*
- *Follow up by saying that there is a consistent increase in peacekeeper fatalities due to violent acts that have drastically increased over the past years. These numbers go beyond a normal or acceptable level of risk, and they are likely to rise even higher if we do not change our posture and mindset*

Slide 7



It is important that we have a general understanding of the characteristics of conflicts and threats that may fester even after a UNPKO has been established. Contemporary armed conflicts are characterised by several trends, including the following:

- Today we see fewer country-versus-country or international armed conflicts. Most ongoing conflicts are internal conflicts over power and resources, social and economic inequality, or ethnic or religious divides. While they often have regional implications, these conflicts are in many cases played out within national borders
- Intra-state conflict often involves state and non-state actors with different capabilities and resources. Militarily weaker parties' resort to asymmetric means, which can include aspects of terrorism or guerrilla warfare
- While international armed conflicts between states typically have just two or a small number of parties, intra-state conflicts often see many non-state armed groups involved, especially in situations where they further split into competing factions. The larger number of parties to conflict complicates conflict resolution processes

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- Conflicts often spill over across borders – causing influxes of weapons or refugees. Especially the ready availability of weapons now contributes to the ability of armed groups to sustain battle for longer periods
- Intra-state conflict, even if originally triggered by political grievances such as in South Sudan, can easily take on an ethnic or sectarian dimension. Often manipulated in this way by leaders, conflicts along ethnic and sectarian lines are highly charged and difficult to resolve, leaving a lasting imprint on society
- Current conflicts are characterised by strongly affecting civilians, directly targeting them, or indirectly causing loss of life or livelihoods and denying their basic rights. A common characteristic of current conflicts is the frequent occurrence of abuses violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and the disrespect for life and physical integrity of civilians (and civilian objects). Some of the protracted conflict situations the world witnesses today affect civilians through the urbanization of conflict and long besiegement
- Children continue to be disproportionately affected by armed conflict. They are recruited and used as child soldiers, abducted, sexually abused, and killed and maimed. Attacks on schools and hospitals as well as the denial of humanitarian access further impact children negatively in war. Specific protection concerns must therefore be considered to ensure the safety and security of children. Further details on child protection will appear later in the module
- Parties to conflict are increasingly using sexual violence as a strategic tool of war. Women and girls are the primary target for rape and other forms of sexual violence, but men and boys are also targeted. More details on conflict-related sexual violence will be covered later

Slide 8



PKO Environment

- Increased UN risks and fatalities
- Hostile forces disregard for UN
- Complex array of actors / threats
- IED rich environment
- Need to protect civilians




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The United Nations has had so many casualties caused by acts of violence in recent years. Overall, the United Nations and Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries need to adapt to a new reality: The blue helmet and the United Nations flag no longer offer “natural” protection. Peacekeeping environments now feature armed groups, terrorists, organised crime, street gangs, criminal and political exploitation, and other threats. The era of “Chapter VI-style” peacekeeping is over.

Last, is because of the lack of internal security in the area and the lack of the government to enforce the rule of law, civilians are in danger; and there is a void that the UN must fill to protect civilians from hostile groups or predators. The norm in the security council when a mandate is directed is to include the task to protect civilians; “use all necessary means” up to and including the use of deadly force...”

Additionally, a series of thematic resolutions on POC, Conflict-related Sexual Violence and Children and Armed Conflict have been adopted. In short, if we as a UN Mission fail to protect civilians, we fail in saving lives, and both in the mission and the world perception of the UN. The next slide will go into more detail.

Slide 9

Peacekeeping Environment
How conflict affects civilians

- **Intentional and unintentional victims of physical harm**
- **Abuse of basic human rights**
- **Loss of homes, livestock, access to education, access to healthcare**
- **Women and children suffer disproportionately**
- **Social fabric destroyed**

The Key Message: The predominant UN Missions of today and the future will focus on the POC because of the horrendous consequences conflicts have on civilians.

This slide Civilians constitute most casualties in warfare. Civilians can become the victims because they are intentionally targeted, but they can also suffer as an unintended consequence of violence.

Violent conflict can lead to violations and abuses of basic human rights of civilians, including the rights to life and physical integrity.

Beyond the immediate physical consequences of violent conflict, civilians are also affected because they often lose their homes and become displaced; lose their livestock or means to earn income; lose access to education, healthcare, and other basic services if schools, hospitals, and other important infrastructure are destroyed.

Women and children suffer disproportionately because of armed conflict, violations, and abuses, including through the pervasive levels of sexual violence and abuses.

Conflict also spreads hate and destroys the social fabric of communities for many years. This makes it hard to reconcile communities and create sustainable peace.

In summary, civilians suffer terrible consequences from armed conflict, in a variety of ways. And the consequences often do not stop when the violence stops, they have a lasting impact on communities and individuals.

Slide 10

Host Government

- Relationship and willingness to support mandate a predominant factor in PKO environments
- Primary responsibility to protect civilians according to international law
- May lack capability or willingness to carry out responsibility
- Peacekeepers assume obligation to protect civilians


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Key Message: Because POC is so prevalent in UN mandates that we should understand responsibilities. The primary responsibility to protect civilians from physical violence rests with the host State. Often the host government is dysfunctional and is not fully behind the mandate, so it is even more important that the UNPKO is not only mandated with a Protection of Civilians task but provided with the means and capabilities to do so.

Before we go to our next topic, it is important to note that we should explain POC responsibilities. The capabilities of a host nation to be able to implement POC is a predominant factor contributing to the PKO Mission Concept (MC). Let us go into more detail.

The primary responsibility to protect civilians from physical violence rests with the host State. Protection of civilian's mandates are without prejudice to the primary and sovereign responsibility of the host State. This is consistent with their obligations under international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law and standards; that will be covered in Module 2. The first step in implementing a Protection of Civilians' mandate is to support the government to uphold their responsibility, which should also ensure a sustainable impact of a mission's actions. In situations of armed conflict, non-state parties to conflict also have a responsibility to protect civilians in the areas they control.

However, host governments in many missions lack the capability or willingness to protect their citizens, sometimes the host government can be the attacker. In these situations, and where deployed, peacekeepers assume the obligation to act unilaterally and protect civilians.

 *Note to Instructor – Some participants will be aware of the responsibility to Protect. This will be discussed later in the POC planning lesson in module 3.*

Slide 11

Facing the New Challenges – Gen Santos Cruz

- We must change our mindset
- Adaptive & committed leadership
- Action vs inaction
- Hostile forces understand force, if need to, use it
- Projecting strength = security
- Principles of peacekeeping do not restrict initiative
- Appropriate force to be proactive, preemptive
- All levels have plans to protect civilians

In a 2017 UN report, Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz concluded these recommendations. In short, the report stated that if we do not change our mindset, take risks, and show a willingness to face the new challenges in the PKO environment, **we will be consciously sending our troops into harm's way.** The report urged that we must look at ways to improve in these areas:

- Our UN leadership must demonstrate initiative, commitment, and determination to adapt. Through our UN military, police, and civilian personnel in the field and in our political behaviour, we must actively seek solutions rather than waiting for casualties
- Improve our operational behaviour. Fatalities rarely occur because of troops and leadership acting. The UN is most often attacked because of inaction. Operational behaviour on the ground is based on risk assessments to each situation and the threat environment. The interpretation of mandates, rules of **engagements and other documents need to support “taking action”** and not used to justify inaction
- The UN should use force when required. Hostile forces do not understand a language other than force. To deter and repel attacks and to defeat attackers, we need to be strong and not fear the use force when necessary. Many UN Missions remain risk averse and fail to understand projecting strength is security for UN Mission personnel and civilian population. The mission needs to identify threats

and take the initiative to neutralise or eliminate these threats. UN military units need to exploit night operations to take advantage of our technology. Waiting in a defensive posture gives freedom to hostile forces

- We should not see the UN principles as restrictions on initiative and the use of force. In high-risk areas, the UN should use overwhelming force, be proactive and pre-emptive. If the UN does not use force against hostile forces in the current UNPKO environment, our mandate is at risk; troops, police and civilians will be killed
- At all tactical and mission level we require integrated planning based on threat and risk mitigation to protect civilians

Slide 12



Now let us shift from the PKO environment and introduce the subject of this STM.



- *Ask the class why the Infantry are so important in peace operations and what make the Infantry special and suited to support a UN mandate*
- *Record about 5 key points on a “butcher char”t or white board so the class can view the progress*
- *If this goes well; ask them to give an example where infantry skills and value have succeeded or are beneficial in past or current UN Missions*
- *This discussion should take 10 minutes*

Slide 13

Infantry in Peacekeeping

- **Main land force for the mission**
- **Backbone of the military component**
- **Operational mobility / all terrain**
- **Focuses on small unit locations and engagement**
- **Daily close contact with population and stakeholders**
- **At the tactical level, ambassadors on the ground**

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The special characteristics of the Infantry operating in a PKO environment includes:

- The main land force in a mission
- It is the backbone of the military component in a UN Missions
- Has the primary role in support of the security framework of a mission
- Is unique because it is founded on small tactical units. While other units tend to focus on systems; the Infantry relies on the human dimension of the individual peacekeeper
- They place the highest value on small unit discipline and initiative
- Must be able to move almost anywhere under any conditions
- They are the first line of engagement with the population; in short, they are the ambassadors on the ground for the mandate

Slide 14

Infantry in Peacekeeping

- **Big part of the mission's security framework**
- **If needed- small arms firepower / maneuver to neutralize a high threat situation**
- **Isolated / disperse outposts in large land areas**
- **In the proximity of civilians**
- **Adapted for gathering human intelligence**

A continuation from the last slide:

- Daily the Infantry has the ability and capability to daily execute the tasks required to support the security portion of the mandate
- When required to protect the mandate and civilians from hostile forces, the Infantry has the capability to use / generate a volume of lethal well-aimed small arms fire to neutralise or defeat a hostile force
- Often, small tactical infantry units are isolated and dispersed from their headquarters and lines of logistical support. This isolation and the distances involved employing infantry units, breed independence and initiative in their leadership
- Because the Infantry is adapted as an all-terrain and weather land force that operates in proximity of the population, it is well suited to be the major human peacekeeping-intelligence (HUMINT) gather force in a UN Mission

Slide 15

UNIBAT

- UN Categorised as light, motorized, mechanized
- Modularity and flexible
- Task organised (tailored) for mission / tasks
- Battalion (UNIBAT) to company (INF COY)
- Operate 24 / 7 and self-sustaining
- Can deliver direct and indirect fire
- Suited for reconnaissance / human intelligence

Now let us specifically look at the UNIBAT and its characteristics. Normally, there are three types of UNIBAT: Light, Motorised and Mechanised. The UNIBAT is comprised of three or four self-sustaining Infantry Companies (INF COY) also referred to as Infantry Company Groups (ICG), capable of deploying and operating independently to execute tasks as directed in the battalion AOR.

The UNIBAT with organic and enabled capabilities, will execute operations from defensible, independent, and logistically self-sustaining Operating Bases (OB). The units have the capability to operate on a 24/7 basis and must be suitably equipped for the Operating Environment, including local climate and weather conditions. In self-defence or in the protection of the mandate within the ROE, it can deliver sustain direct and indirect fire.

Slide 16

Take Away Lesson 1.1

- UNPKOs are complex and lethal; we must adjust our mind set and how we project force, and protect civilians
- Infantry is the main force / backbone of the military component to implement the security portion of the mandate
- Infantry has close contact with population and are the daily ambassadors of the mandate
- Mobile and flexible; UNIBAT has unique characteristics that set it apart from other units

Summary

- UNIBATs are a special asset creating effects that contribute to the achievement of mandate objectives
- Peacekeeper fatalities have drastically increased over the years. If we do not change our mindset and face new challenges, we will be sending our troops into harm's way
- POC is important to the success of a mission, we must have POC plans at all levels
- The UNIBAT must be integrated in the mission concept; it has unique characteristics that add a dimension in the accomplishment of the Mission's mandate. The infantry is the main land force and backbone of the military component and has a primary role in support of the security framework
- The Infantry relies on the human dimension of the individual peacekeeper on the ground. They must be able to move almost anywhere under any conditions. They are the first line of engagement with the population
- Mobile and flexible; has unique characteristics that set it apart from other units

Learning Activity

1.1

RESOURCES

N/A

TIME

Suggested time 10-15 min (dependant on the discussions).

PREPARATION

At the end of the lesson, you may want to choose some of the following questions for review. Ask the participants the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:

What do you see as the predominant threat to UNPKO operations? Can you explain what Gen Cruz would like UNIBAT commanders to embrace in a UNPKO to help mitigate risks to the force and the mission? What special capabilities do infantry bring to a UNPKO?

You are the UNIBAT commander. You are planning on providing security for UN assets supporting a host nation security force operation. What coordination arrangements should be made prior? What planning considerations should the UNIBAT staff make in terms of the POC? What considerations should be planned for if the Joint operations come an incident where they observe an attack on civilians?

Instructor Notes-Suggested Instructor Facilitating Comments:

Review the **lesson narrative on Gen Cruz's report about the threats to UN forces and ways to mitigate** facilitate the discussion. In reference to POC, giving that the primary responsibility to protect civilians from physical violence rests with the host nation, your coordination and planning should facilitate and encourage the host nation patrol to intervene when the situation arises. The UN will help provide in support activities and ensure host nation security forces acts within Human Rights framework.

Help explain that the UNIBAT forces maybe in a situation where the host nation government security forces lack the willingness to protect its civilian population, the UNIBAT force must plan contingencies to therefore be ready to act within their capability to protect the civilian population regardless of its political, religious, ethnic, or other affiliation.

Lesson 1.2



UN Military Component

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson



For an interactive start to the Lesson engage participants to seek their understanding of the UN Mission components, the command-and-control structure, and the functions of the military component of a UN Mission.



Instructor Notes: Recommend that instructors review the 2019 DPO/DOS policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines.

Slide 1



Lesson 1.2

UN Military Component (MC)

Before we get into more details about the UNIBAT it is important that we have a general understanding of the UN Mission components and the core functional of the military component (MC).

Slide 2

Content

- United Nations Mission Components
- Military Component (MC) role and responsibilities
- Coordination and unity of effort

Here are the topics we will be covering in this lesson.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Describe the components of a UN Mission
- Explain the roles and responsibilities of the MC
- Explain the importance of coordination and unity of effort

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on this slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This will help to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson.

Slide 4



This diagram shows a model of an ideal a multidimensional United Nations peace operation. Within this broader context, there exists a large effort from international, regional and local interlocutors and stakeholders for the success of the operation. The UN Mission is one part of the effort of stabilization. In practice, the operation is overly complex with many actors and sometimes competing agendas. However, in theory the ideal practice is unity of effort with clarity of roles / responsibilities The Security Council Resolution / Mandate is what drives the tasks, and responsibility of the UN Mission.

You may notice in the diagram there may be an UN Country Team (UNCT) also operating in the country / the AOR. In ideal practice, the UN Mission and UNCT should operate coordination with each other. Humanitarian activities are understood to fall largely outside the scope of integration. However, in an 'Integrated UN Presence' the Humanitarian Coordinator is part of the Mission's leadership as a Deputy SRSG, emphasizing the importance of a strategic partnership between the Mission and the UNCT.

Where a Mission and UNCT co-exist, they must work together and integrate their efforts in a way that is appropriate and tailored to the specific mandate. Coordination mechanisms must be set up, consisting at of a senior leadership forum and a shared analytical and planning capacity, as well as coordination mechanisms with the military component of a mission. This coordination should not be limited to the FHQ level, as many units in the area of operations, especially Sector Headquarters, require regular liaison with the regional offices of the UNCT.

Slide 5

Examples of UN Mission Core Functions

- Create a secure, stable environment
- Facilitate the political process
- Provide framework for UN, regional, international actors to pursue activities
- Protection of Civilians
- Monitor / observe cease fires and peace agreements
- Facilitating humanitarian assistances

The mandate dictates the functions and responsibilities for the UN Mission. Here are a few examples of core functions.

Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance.

Provide a framework for ensuring that United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner; it should be noted that in many mission areas regional UN Country Teams exist, that also support the UN efforts. To ensure a success of the mandate and for a unity of effort, it is important, that a coordination is done both by the mission and the UNCT.

In situations of internal armed conflict, civilians account for many casualties. Many civilians are forcibly uprooted within their own countries and have specific vulnerabilities arising from their displacement. As a result, most multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations are now mandated by the Security Council to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Protection of Civilians (POC) requires concerted and coordinated action among the military, police and civilian components of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation and must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of its core activities. United Nations humanitarian agencies working within the UNCT, and non-governmental organisation (NGO) also undertake a

broad range of activities in support of Protection of Civilians. Close coordination with these actors is, therefore, essential. Monitoring and observing cease-fires, and peace agreements.

Important in the core functions are the establishment of the necessary security conditions for the free flow of people, goods, and humanitarian assistance. By helping to fill the security and public order vacuum that often exists in post-conflict settings, multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations play a critical role in securing the peace process and ensuring that humanitarian and development partners can work in a safe environment.

Slide 6

Examples of Sub Tasks

- Support to law enforcement agencies
- Provide security - key govt installations / infrastructure
- Economic governance
- Support to Civil administration and elections
- Security Sector Reform (SSR)
- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
- Rule of law
- Capacity building
- Humanitarian assistance
- Assist Mine clearance actions

Here are a few UN Mission functions that one might say come under or are sub functions from the core functions. Of note, the MC supports these functions, normally by providing security or logistics:

- Operational support to national law enforcement agencies
- Provide security - key government installations and infrastructure
- Economic governance
- Support to Civil administration
- Election support
- Security Sector Reform
- Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
- Rule of law
- Capacity building
- Humanitarian assistance
- Assist Mine clearance

Slide 7




Key Message: MC is the chief agent that executes (builds) and maintains the Security Pillar and the UNIBAT is the key instrument in the toolbox.

This diagram displays the major pillar framework of a UN Mission. The mandate is always the foundation or base component and there are the Humanitarian Pillar, Security Pillar and Political Pillar or also known as lines of operation. These pillars form the structure of the UN Mission.

They all need to work in concert and be in sync to hold the structure. The MC has the bulk or predominant role in the secure pillar, and in the MC the UNIBAT is normally the work horse and main land force, in concert with the other lines of operation, execute the various tasks to implement a security strategy. We should note that the police component is also integrated in the security strategy. MC is the chief agent that executes (builds) and maintains the Secure Pillar and the UNIBAT is the key instrument in the toolbox.

The next slide will go into more detail about the components that executes the mission pillars and support the mission's operations.

Slide 8



Key Message: UN Peacekeeping Missions are complex entities, typically made up of thousands of personnel. It is important to keep in mind that every mission looks different. This is necessary to reflect the different environments and challenges faced by missions in the field. All in all, over 400 different tasks have been given to peacekeeping missions across the world, and different tasks require different configurations. All personnel implementing these tasks, whether they are uniformed or civilian, are peacekeepers.

Without going into too much detail, this is a rough overview of how missions are typically structured with the leadership and components.

The Head of Mission or Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) leads the mission and bears overall responsibility for the implementation of the mandate. The SRSG is also the highest UN authority on the ground, including non-mission actors.

Under SRSG, the Senior Mission Leadership Team, which normally comprises of two Deputy SRSGs, the Chief of Staff, the Director of Mission Support, the Head of the Military Component, and the Head of the Police Component.

In addition, the Chief Security Adviser reports directly to the SRSG to advise on any threats against mission personnel and equipment. Also, there is a Designated Official (DO) that

shall convene and chair the UN Security Management Team (SMT). They are responsible for the safety and security of the UN civilian staff.

The Senior Leadership Team of a field mission typically includes the Director of Mission Support, the two Deputy SRSGs, the Chief of Staff, and the Heads of the Military and Police Components. Each member of the Senior Leadership Team heads several units, divisions and sections making up the peacekeeping mission. This overview shows how many different actors are involved in a mission. Only if they all work together can a mission be successful.

Mission structures are important to ensure command and control. At the top, the Head of Mission/SRSG has the highest level of operational authority at the field level.

Note here in this model there is a Deputy SRSG (DSRSG) / Resident Coordinator (RC) / Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) position. In UN Missions with widespread in-country support a DSRSG/RC/HC is deployed alongside a United Nations Country Team (UNCT). They have the key responsibility for the humanitarian pillar.

This authority is partially delegated to the Heads of Components, including the Force Commander (FC); who heads up the MC; and Police Commissioner, or Head of Police Component (HOPC); the Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) is the head of support and administrative services.

The lead for the political pillar is the SRSG, along with the support of the substantive components. As each mission has its own mandate and tasks, the structure may vary.

For example, landmines were not a problem in Timor-Leste. The Peacekeeping Operation (UNMIT) had no mine clearance mandate, and therefore no Mine Action Service component. UNMIT was however mandated to give the Government electoral support, so it had an Electoral Affairs Unit. In South Sudan, on the other hand, UNMISS has no Electoral Affairs Unit but the Mine Action Service plays an important role, particularly in relation to implementation of the Protection of Civilians mandate.

Slide 9

MC Function

- Provide a secure environment for other elements to implement their strategy
- Provide space / opportunity for peacemaking and negotiations
- All benefit: political process, monitoring of human rights, national reconciliation, institution building, distribution of humanitarian assistance

Because the UNIBAT is part of the MC, let us now focus on the MC. We have stated that the MC is the agent for the Secure pillar. The UN Mission is assigned an area of operations AO. The primary function of the (MC) is to provide a secure environment in the AO so that other elements of the peace process can be implemented, including the political process, monitoring of human rights abuses or violations, national reconciliation and institution building, and the distribution of humanitarian assistance.

Military capability can be used to provide a secure environment and opportunity for peace-making and political negotiations to take place. The MC oversees their implementation, provides monitoring and liaison expertise, and serves as an interlocutor with local armed forces.

MC of UN Peacekeeping Operations require an interface between the military and civilian components. The extraordinarily complex and lethal environment in which the UN Peacekeeping Operations must operate in, drives us to have an increasing need for rapid and sustained military deployments.

Slide 10

What Makes up the MC

- Formed military units based on the force requirements
- Military advisors
- Military observers
- Military liaison officers
- Military staff officers

Here are the components that can make up the MC of a Mission:

Formed military units. Member States (TCCs) contribute military units such as sections, platoons, companies, or battalions. Each contribution is called a contingent. The UN uses military contingents of varying strengths and capabilities in its Peacekeeping Operations, depending on the mandate and specified by the force or operational requirements needed that include type of military formed units and equipment in operation and contingency plans. In such cases, military forces will be appropriately structured per force requirement to present a credible military force. Of note, units in the MC operate under their national doctrine and guiding principles. The units that serve as part of a UN Peacekeeping Operation, they must adhere to the mission SOPs and policies of the UN. The UNIBAT fall under this category.

Military advisers. In situations where a Peacekeeping Operation has not been authorised, but the Secretary-General has appointed a special representative or envoy to undertake political negotiations and provide good offices for peace-making or conflict prevention, a small number of military officers may be assigned to advise.

Military observers. UN military observers (UNMO) are military officers generally deployed to monitor and supervise any military arrangements that parties to a conflict may have agreed to, such as ceasefires or an armistice. The primary task of an UNMO is to monitor and report on the parties' observance and fulfilment of peace agreements. As UNMOs

are usually unarmed or just armed with a handgun for self-protection purpose only, UNIBAT usually provide force protection to UNMOs, if needed.

Military liaison officers (MLO). In peacekeeping environments, where security is being provided by a military force not under UN command, such as forces provided by members from a regional organisation, or a coalition force of allied States ("Coalition of the Willing"), or the host nations military force is working alongside a UNPKO, the UN will often exchange military liaison officers to maintain a link between the UN Peacekeeping Operation and the non-UN military force. Furthermore, the UN can deploy MLOs to liaise between the UN and the HN security forces to ensure a secure environment.

Military staff officers. Military officers assigned as a staff officer to the Mission Headquarters, Force Headquarters or Sector Headquarters.

Slide 11

Supporting Military Tasks

Providing a secure environment, by:

- Support POC strategies
- Provide security for other components
- Provide military expertise
- Observe and monitor
- Force Protection – Reduce / neutralize risks to the military force
- Support DDR
- Support SSR
- Enforcement of sanctions and agreements
- EOD support
- Engineering support to humanitarian efforts

Providing a secure environment is the predominant function of the MC. Military forces, as part of a UN Peacekeeping Operation, are often tasked with providing a secure environment to allow other aspects of the mission's mandate or peace process to be implemented. There are tasks that normally facilitate a secure environment.

A secure environment is generally a precondition for moving ahead on several elements of peace agreements, such as safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons, cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, the free flow of persons and goods and the delivery of humanitarian assistance and support of strategies for the Protection of Civilians. As part of the task of providing a secure environment, the MC may be asked to provide support to mission components that are best tailored for a military element / unit.

The MC in a Peacekeeping Operation be required to monitor and supervise, the observation and reporting, an arrangement such as a truce or ceasefire agreement, a demilitarised zone, or a buffer zone. Also, interposition operations may be authorised between conflicting States or between conflicting parties within a State, depending on the circumstances. It involves separation in which only UN personnel are allowed, forcing the parties to physically pull back from each other.

UN forces must reduce the risks associated with perpetrators that are hostile and manifest violence against military units and personnel. Force protection for UN military units include a robust presence, well planned, threat based, risk mitigated operations.

The MC makes a unique contribution to the POC concept of a peacekeeping mission. Military peacekeepers are authorised to use force to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence, giving them a special role to play in the POC concept. Along with other Mission components, the MC plays a significant role in preventing POC and, Child Protection, and to prevent sexual violence and CRSV threats from materializing. **Important elements in this context are the military's wide presence, proactive posture, and high operational readiness.** Military peacekeepers can gather information in areas where no other peacekeeper has access and report back to the mission. Military peacekeepers are often the first on scene to POC incidents.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). If a UN Peacekeeping mandate includes the supervision of a DDR programme, the military component will normally be involved. In Disarmament, normally, vetting, securing, and storing weapons. During, Demobilization, vetting personnel and providing outer security to the cantonment sites. In Reintegration, supporting with training to those combatants who will be reintegrated into the national security forces.

Security Sector Reform (SSR). Normally, is normally conducted by supporting member states and other organisations; however, the MC can help support in these efforts on a limited basis. An example is training and education.

Enforcement of sanctions. The enforcement of sanctions authorised by the Security Council, particularly arms and materiel embargoes, may be tasked to a military component of a Peacekeeping Operation. An example is MC maritime operations in Lebanon.

EOD. The military component can be responsible for explosives (UXO / IED) clearance / disposal, to facilitate, force protection (FP), the POC, and maintenance UN supply lines. The military will normally not undertake demining for humanitarian purposes, as these are civilian activities requiring long-term and sustainable solutions implemented by national authorities or UNMAS.

Engineering support to humanitarian operations. Good example of this is military engineer units building roads and bridges in Liberia. These operations are normally supervised and resourced by the civilian components.

Slide 12

Coordination and Cooperation

- Close coordination with all components
- Planning: Joint strategic, implementation, contingency, and POC
- Joint logistics and supply
- Civil – Military cells
- Public information strategy
- UNCT / Regional Offices / NGOs

Key message: The role of the MC in Peacekeeping Operations continues to evolve in response to new challenges and political realities. The military component must work in close cooperation with all components of the mission.

It is important to discuss how essential it is for the MC to coordinate and cooperate within the UN Mission framework with the other components. In Peacekeeping Operations, the MC interacts with all other mission components. The interaction with the political component includes joint strategic planning for mandate implementation, contingency plans, POC plans and adjusting the tasks of the MC to the changing political realities on the ground. The MC also interacts frequently with the administrative and support components of the mission, particularly on joint logistics and supply issues.

There are several mechanisms that may be used to ensure that the work of the MC is integrated into the efforts of the mission, here are a few examples:

- Strategic planning and coordination cell that includes military experts and is part of mission headquarter and an integrated civil-military coordination cell to harmonize activities with other civilian actors in a mission area, such as UNCT, UN development funds, programs and specialised agencies, humanitarian non-governmental organisations, international financial institutions, the donor community, and local civil society representatives

- The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) in Peacekeeping Operations to ensure that all mission components are integrated in an entity capable of collecting and analysing multi-source information to produce analysis and forward-looking assessments in support of military mission planning and decision-making
- The Joint Operations Centre (JOC) is a joint military, police and civilian entity which monitors situation reports and operational reports from all sources within a UN Peacekeeping Operation. The JOC collates reports received from all possible sources and ensures these are disseminated in accordance with the guidance of the HOM. During crises, the JOC
- The Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) is a joint uniformed/civilian organisation which provides functional interface and oversees and manages the routine receipt, analysis, and tasking of all requests from within the mission for logistics support

Public information is another area that requires close cooperation. Close coordination between the MC and other mission components is also necessary for DDR, humanitarian activities, monitoring of human rights violations, civil affairs and the restoration of law and order.

In conclusion, the role of the MC in Peacekeeping Operations continues to evolve in response to new challenges and political realities. The military component must work in close cooperation with all components of the mission.

Slide 13

Takeaway

- There are three functional / operational pillars that form a UN Mission- Humanitarian, Security, and Political
- The MC core function is to provide a secure environment so elements of the peace process can be implemented- political, human rights, national reconciliation, institution building, and the distribution of humanitarian assistance
- The role of the MC in peacekeeping operations continues to evolve in response to new challenges and political realities, and it must work in close cooperation with all components

Summary

These takeaways are part of the conceptual framework of a UN Mission and its components. We should have a general knowledge of the MC roles and how it fits into the mission structure. Let us take a few minutes to address this slide.

- There are three functional / operational pillars that form a UN Mission- Humanitarian, Secure, and Political
- The MC core function is to provide a secure environment so elements of the peace process can be implemented- political, human rights, national reconciliation, institution building, and the distribution of humanitarian assistance
- The role of the MC in peacekeeping operations continues to evolve in response to new challenges and political realities, and it must work in close cooperation with all components

Learning Activity

1.2

RESOURCES

N/A

TIME

Suggested time 10-15 min (dependant on the discussions).

PREPARATION

At the end of the lesson, you may want to choose some of the following questions for review. Ask the participants the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:

What are the three pillars of a UNPKO? Explain how the mission components complement each other and what can help harmonize efforts? Why is the UNIBAT an important asset in a UNPKO?

Instructor Notes-Suggested Instructor Facilitating Comments and answers:

The mandate is always the foundation and there are the Humanitarian Pillar, Secure Pillar and Political Pillar or the also known as lines of operation. These pillars form the structure of the UN Mission.

The components need to work in concert and be in sync to hold the structure. The MC has the bulk or predominant role in the secure pillar, and in the MC the UNIBAT is normally the work horse and main land force, in concert with the other lines of operation, execute the various tasks to implement a security strategy. We should note that the police component is also integrated in the security strategy. MC is the chief agent that executes (builds) and maintains the Secure Pillar and the UNIBAT is the key instrument in the toolbox. The mission implementation plan, the POC and FP strategies should be documents that facilitate the integration of the component's efforts to implement the mandate strategy.

Civil-military coordination should be a harmonize activity with other civilian actors in a mission area, such as UNCT, UN development funds, programs and specialised agencies, humanitarian non-governmental organisations, international financial institutions, the donor community, and local civil society representatives.

Lesson 1.3



UNIBAT Organisation, Tasks, and Support

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson



For an interactive start to this Lesson, ask the participants if they have had experience in a UNPKO and had worked in a UNIBAT, a Sector HQS. Ask them to describe the infantry and what tasks they performed.



Recommend that instructors review the UN DPKO Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

Overview:

In an environment in which UN peacekeeping missions take place, the primary contribution by the military component and the UNIBAT is to provide a secure environment for all other UN Mission components and UN / International agencies can contribute their effects in support of the mandate. We have discussed in earlier lessons about the PKO environment, FP, POC had the MC's responsibilities. In this lesson we drill down in more detail to the UNIBAT itself. This lesson is not to familiarize you with the infantry or give you a detailed doctrinal overview of the infantry modus operandi, instead, we want to discuss / show what is unique about a UNIBAT organisation, its operations in a PKO, and how the UN is integrated into the UN support framework.

Slide 1



This lesson provides you an overview of the proper employment of UNIBAT and how it can contribute towards successful achievement of the Mission's mandate. To date, UNIBATs have deployed to Peacekeeping Operations in most of our UN Peace Operations. The organisation and structure of UNIBAT and their complementarity employment with other UN forces and components are essential for their appropriate employment. The UNIBAT is the primary force / tool for the Mission to ensure a secure environment.

The understanding of this lesson will be relevant to be fully familiarised with the UNIBAT and how best to use their capabilities. Their nature, their flexible organisation, their characteristics, and their utility to be used to implement the MC's POC and FP security strategies.

Slide 2

Lesson Contents

- UNIBAT organisation / structure
- Command and Control C2
- Tasks, enabling tasks, Non-appropriate tasks
- UN support process and logistical framework

These are the topics we will cover during this lesson.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Describe the UNIBAT organisation and C2
- Describe UNIBAT staff sections and platoons that are unique to UNPKO
- Explain where / how the UNIBAT falls in the nesting of tasks in an UN Mission
- List Infantry COY enabling tasks
- Describe UN logistics / support to the UNIBAT

As a good training practice, let us review the learning outcomes of this lesson:

- Describe the UNIBAT organisation and C2
- Describe INF BAT staff sections and platoons that are unique to UNPKO
- Explain where / how the UNIBAT falls in the nesting of tasks in an UN Mission
- List UNIBAT COY enabling tasks
- Describe UN logistics / support to the INF BAT
- Explain the UN logistics support framework

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide; take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4

UNIBAT Organization

- Normally, 4 Companies (COYs) tailored / based on requirements
- Light, motorised, mechanised
- Air deployable- gives UNIBAT flexibility and utility
- UNIBAT HQs COY with enabling units for support
- Expansive AORs, Aviation support required




A tailored structure offers the FC flexibility to organise the force to support operations as they pertain to the mission, the threats, and the environment. The INF BAT is a flexible organisation, that has immense utility and can be employed by trucks, by foot, motorised, mechanised (armoured) and by air.

There are three general organisational structures/types of UNIBAT: Light INF BAT, a Motorised INF BAT (wheeled and / or very lightly armoured wheeled vehicles), and the Mechanised Inf BAT. This is a mechanised Inf BAT comprised of a mix of (wheeled) and (tracked/ armoured) fighting vehicles. Each type is comprised of three or four self-sustaining Infantry Company Groups (ICG), capable of deploying and operating independently to execute tasks as directed in the battalion AOR. The UNIBAT, with organic and enabled capabilities, will execute static and mobile operations from defensible, independent, and logistically self-sustaining Operating Bases (OB). The BAT must have the capability to operate on a 24/7 basis and must be suitably equipped for the Operating Environment, including local climate and weather conditions.

These structures provide the commander a wide range of options for tasks and missions. Also, in terms of task organizing enabling support units (sections, platoons, companies, and technological assets) both organic and TACON will give a multiplying effect that

helps support the unit. Example- In an IED or a high-risk environment, the UNIBAT may require specialised armoured / Counter-IED capabilities. Enablers, such as air support or tactical attack helicopters are vital for high effectiveness in a large AOR where mobility is important and fire support is critical in case of an ambush. If non-organic assets are routinely used, it is necessary to define a formal pre-planned support mechanism or agreement.

Slide 5



The structure of the UNIBAT will largely depend on the terrain and task for which it is employed. The required structure and capabilities of the UNIBAT will be specified in mission planning guidelines and agreements made in New York with the TCC. The UNIBAT normally, but not always, occupies a BAT base and maintain 3 or 4 Temporary Operating Bases (TOBs), each with the ability to deploy approximately 2 reinforced platoons simultaneously. In more detail the three general organisational structures/types of UNIBAT are:


- Light UNIBAT- comprised of three Inf COYs with approximately 622 personnel
- Motorised UNIBAT, shown on the slide- is motorised and comprised of four motorised COYs (wheeled) with approximately 872 personnel
- Mechanised UNIBAT- comprised of three mechanised Inf COYs (wheeled) and one mechanised Inf Coy (tracked) with approximately 872 personnel

Under the C2, operationally controlled or OPCON to FC and or a sector commander. The Battalion HQ- normally is a HQ comprised of sixty personnel, divided into two groups. The command groups- the Battalion Commander assisted by the Second-in-Command/ Executive Officer (2IC/XO), Battalion Senior Warrant Officer and Senior NCO in exercising his/her operational and administrative command responsibility. The Battalion Command

Group normally includes a Legal Officer (for managing legal affairs of the unit) and a Gender/Child Protection Officer as focal point.

Normally, Companies (COYs) are deployed in remote temporary bases. COYs operate very decentralised. The UNIBAT conducts detailed centralised planning and the COYs are given the resources and enablers to execute tasks in a very decentralised manner.

Slide 6



On this slide we will go into more detail to describe the UNIBAT HQs and staff and HQs Company. The Battalion Staff functions under the 2IC/XO. The Operations Officer, on behalf of the BAT 2IC, will coordinate functions of all other staff sections. The BAT HQ staff will be responsible for planning, organizing, staffing, directing, controlling, and sustaining all operational and administrative responsibilities of the battalion as per SOPs of the unit and mission planning documents. Because of the complex and diverse cultural operating environment in UNPKO, units should ensure adequate representation of women in the staff is encouraged. Staff officers should be qualified in their respective fields and should be capable of taking on additional responsibilities as per Unit SOPs. In addition to national military staff responsibilities, some important UN functions in a PKO are listed below:

The UNIBAT HQs and staff as it mirrors most INF BATs in TCC structures. There are, however, specialised staff members, sections that are unique to the UN. These elements, sections and platoons are highlighted on the slide.


- Military Peacekeeping-intelligence Staff Section (S2). Continuous access to timely, relevant, accurate, all-source MPKI is central to UNIBAT operational planning and decision-making processes. MPKI processes allow for the analysis of the physical,

human and information terrain in the UN Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR) and evaluates the likely behaviour of threat actors therein. This supports the planning and execution of UNIBAT tasks, risk management, and guides the establishment of security and force protection measures during operations. The S2 section at battalion level supports the Battalion Commander and staff with intelligence products. The S2 section is responsible for directing and coordinating the UNIBAT MPKI Cycle, incorporating direction, acquisition, analysis, and dissemination phases. The UN MPKI framework and focus has some differences and the S2 personnel and other staff members will need to be trained prior to deployment. An example is the detail analysis of vulnerable populations that help produce products to assist in the MDMP for POC strategies

- Public Information Officer (PIO). The Public Information Officer is the Outreach and Media Focal Point for the UNIBAT
- CIMIC Staff Section (S9). At a minimum, the CIMIC Staff Section. Humanitarian and CIMIC Focal Point for the UNIBAT. The S9 has a coordination and analysis function with the Infantry Battalion. It will coordinate its actions with other civilian mission components, such as Civil Affairs and Human Rights, and with Sector and Force Headquarters. The EP commander is in close coordination and works closely with the UN-CIMIC section. The S9, Outreach and Media focal point work closely to synchronise the Infantry battalion engagement plan and information management with external stakeholders. The S9 is responsible for coordination with other mission components, and to undertake appropriate outreach and engagement activities. The S9 and EP are important components of the UNIBAT Commander's outreach strategy and program.
- Legal Officer and legal section: Sensitize all ranks on the legal framework of Peacekeeping Operations. Ensure UN policy and guidance, including that pertaining to ROE, human rights, SEA, gender issues and host country law are understood and adhered to. Provide legal advice to the Battalion Commander in accordance with UNHQ Office of Legal Affairs policy and Mission SOPs
- Gender and Child Protection Focal Point. Each Unit should have a trained Military Gender and Protection Focal Point. This is to ensure the participation of women and girls in Early Warning Mechanisms and Protection of Civilians working groups.
- The Focal Point is responsible for coordinating and guiding implementation of Security Council (SC) Mandates on Women Peace and Security in the work of the UNIBAT, including the Protection of Civilians, CRSV and Child Protection. They will work to support the operational integration of gender and protection and coordinate with the Military Gender and Protection Adviser at Force HQ, the Sector Military Gender and Protection Adviser, the Engagement Platoon, and the local civilian Gender, POC, Child Protection and CRSV teams. At the UNIBAT level, **the responsibility of "Gender and Child Protection"** is performed by an officer under the supervision of XO/2IC and assistance from FHQs.

- National Investigation Officer (NIO). It is important that investigations into allegations of possible misconduct are thorough and conducted in a timely manner with sensitivity to any potential victims. Investigations can be carried out by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), or investigative entities in the mission including the Special Investigation Unit (SIU), Military Police, UNPOL and ad-hoc panels. Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs) do not conduct investigations. The responsibility for investigating an allegation of misconduct and taking subsequent disciplinary action rests with the TCC. TCCs must designate an NIO to investigate allegations of serious misconduct including SEA
- The Public Information Officer (PIO) assists the commander with media messaging and the dissemination of information to the public. The PIO staff officer must coordinate with sector HQs and UN Mission to ensure all messaging is in coordination with the UN public information strategy
- Engineer Platoon. The Engineer Platoon operates under the Operations Staff Section. It provides and coordinates field engineering support to all TOBs and OPs, provides and maintains water supply and waste water treatment systems, sets up solid waste (including hazardous) segregation areas, manages and provides electricity (static and generator based, including containment basins), maintenance of accommodation and allied infrastructure, provides EOD capability, emergency mine, IED and UXO clearance, and provides engineering assistance to CIMIC/welfare activities as part of engagement. The Engineer Officer will also act as “Engineer Adviser” to the Battalion Commander
- Engagement Platoon. This platoon is currently in development and not approved; however, it is important concept that we will include in the STM. The purpose of the UN-EP is to establish, support and promote sustained dialogue with influencers and leaders in local communities that reside within an Infantry battalion's area of responsibility. Constructed of men and women, the UN-EP can access a larger and more representative cross section of the community. The teams that comprise UN-EP units are more likely to produce accurate information because their diverse makeup lowers the chance of bias due to age, gender, culture, or religious affiliation. Bottom-up engagement, with a lower likelihood of bias, increases the importance of information sharing, particularly when addressing ethnic, gender, and socioeconomic issues. To address security, health, and environmental issues, community engagement needs to include men, women, boys, and girls. Short-term decisions and actions have long-lasting, often irreversible impacts on the environment and surrounding communities. Equal participation must be socialised during engagements to affect real outcomes from a community-based decision-making process. Effective engagement helps hold parties with a stake in creating a stable and secure environment accountable and ensures that outcomes genuinely reflect the community's need.

Slide 7



Here are the structure and tasks associated with the Engagement Platoon (EP). The EP is to enhance situational awareness in support of POC strategy by mapping the demography of the AO to identify vulnerable populations and groups.

An EP is to be established in each UNIBAT. The command-and-control structure of the EP includes an Officer in Charge, along with a 2IC. The OIC should at least be of the rank of Captain, while a Senior NCO is recommended for the 2IC post. At least one of these personnel shall be a woman. The EPs shall have a minimum of 50 per cent women.

The section will operate as teams, containing four personnel per team. Battalions with three companies will have four ET sections. Battalions with four companies will have five ET sections. The number of engagement teams accompanying a patrol will depend on the task and situation on ground. The teams can be made up of men and women from any branch of the military and any rank however, teams must have the appropriate rank structure to establish a C2 hierarchy. This is an especially important planning consideration because contributing countries may have less trained females than other contributing countries. Additionally, it should not be assumed that other contributing countries will have enough trained women and men to make up for another unit's deficiencies. These issues should be considered when the TCC is in the force generation process.

ETs are normally attached to Inf COYs to participate in patrolling. ETs are normally under the tactical control of the receiving COY for the period of their attachment.

"Engagement is the interaction of the UN Inf Bn with representatives of the population and other government and non-government actors within the AO to improve cooperation, and reporting. The intent of military engagement is to deconflict military activities with those of other actors in the AO, ensure the military does not negatively impact the local population and other actors, and that military operations are not affected by the activities of others.


Of note, in certain regions, the UNIBAT leadership could consider organizing some all-female ETs. Studies conducted by the UN from experience in operations in Cambodia, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Liberia, and the DRC, have demonstrated that female soldiers do not face the same cultural restrictions as their male counterparts, and are able to gain information from women and children. This ability to gain the trust of local populations should be considered a vital component of any Peacekeeping Operation. In fact, in Afghanistan, "Female Engagement Teams" were able to penetrate the conservative male-dominated society by regularly interacting with local women, gaining their trust until they were willing to share valuable information about areas where the Taliban were recruiting.

We will go into more detail about the importance of engagement later in Module 3 of this STM. As a preface here are some key points about the importance PKO engagement:

- The intent of military engagement is to deconflict military activities with those of other actors in the AO to ensure the military does not negatively impact the local population and other actors, and that military operations are not affected by the activities of others
- The UN Infantry Battalion must include engagement in its planning and operations to enhance the battalion's situational awareness. This will assist with minimizing the impact of civilian actions on military operations and minimizing the impact of military operations on the civilian population
- Engagement can improve force protection through better situational awareness and ensure that violations of UN policy or international law are recognised and reported
- Engagement with the host government, parties to the conflict and other armed groups may help improve the relationship between the Force and the local community
- Engagement should seek to deter and prevent violence and other Human Rights abuses and conduct advocacy of peaceful processes, inclusion of women in dialogue and conformity to international humanitarian law

- Collecting information from the local population can help identify the unique needs and risks of men, women, boys, and girls. Monitoring and analysing those risks can identify 'hot spots' that can be targeted by increased military presence to prevent escalations of violence

Slide 8



This slide portrays the hierarchy of roles starting with the UN Mission on the left to the UNIBAT COY in the bottom right on the slide. The Mission has three pillars of responsibilities for executing the mandate. As we discussed in the MC lesson, the MC's primary function is to provide support the Security pillar of the mandate, in short execute plans and operations that create a safe and secure environment, thereby creating the conditions necessary for the implementation of other elements of the mandate, like the monitoring of human rights, the Protection of Civilians, national reconciliation, Security Sector Reform, and institution building. Additionally, the MC supports the secure tasks associated with POC and FP strategies.


The FC delegates the C2 of the UNIBATs to Sector HQs (SHQ). A SHQ operates at the tactical level within its designated AOR, commanding and guiding subordinated UNIBATs and other units. The main responsibilities of the SHQ are to conduct AC2 and execute FHQ operations orders (OPORDs) or fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) in close cooperation with other mission components and partners in the sector.

A Combat Infantry Battalion in normal circumstances technically has two core / primary lines of operations: offensive and defensive. They are complex and can facilitate both the FP and POC strategies. These tasks in line with a PKO ROE can be applied appropriately and can be Imbedded in these two operational lines. There are enabling

tactical sub-tasks that are threat oriented and terrain oriented in achieving the end states. Also, there are specialised tasks that are tailored to PKO operations. We will discuss these in detail in Module 3. These associated / enabling tasks are shown on next slide next slide. A general understanding of these tasks will facilitate TCC planning and preparation, task-organisation, and the conduct of task-oriented training.

At the UNIBAT COY tactical level, the core tasks are defend and attack that support the Infantry **battalion's offensive and defensive operations**. Of note, a company may be attacking or conducting an ambush in support of a battalion defensive operation, while at the same time another company is defending a specific location. In short, the Infantry Coy has certain sub-tasks that facilitate the battalion core tasks.

Slide 9



The core or primary operational lines for the UNIBAT are Offensive and Defensive Operations, Tasks are defined, and measurable activity performed by a unit and the activity contributes to the mission accomplishment. In the UN and in accordance with most ROEs, the UNIBAT neutralises hostile groups or forces. Neutralise is the task that renders spoils to the UN mandate, hostile personnel or forces harmless. This can be done by show of force (presence alone).

Defensive Operation - here are enabling tasks that support:

- **Block** – A tactical task that denies a hostile force or group access to an area or prevents their advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach
- **Deny**- A task to hinder or prevent a hostile force from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, or facilities
- **Retain** – A tactical task to occupy and hold a terrain feature to ensure that it is **free of a hostile forces' occupation or use**
- **Secure** – A tactical task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed because of hostile action

Offensive Operations, here are tasks that support:

- Clear-A tactical task that requires the removal of all hostile forces and eliminate any organised resistance in a designated area
- FIX- A tactical task where a commander prevents a hostile force from moving from a specific location for a specific period
- Isolate- A tactical task that requires a unit to seal off a hostile force from their sources of support, deny their freedom of movement, and prevent them from having contact with other hostile forces
- Seize – to occupy physically and control a designated area; taking possession of a designated area by show of force or force
- Occupy – A tactical task that involves a force moving into an area so that it can control the entire area

These two tasks are condition-based tasks that support all the other tasks above. Reconnaissance is a task to visually observe or use other detection methods, to gain information about the activities and resources of potential hostile forces or potential spoilers to the mandate. In all missions or operations require situational awareness and intelligence prior during and after the activity. Also, reconnaissance is called recce, or recon. Reminder, in the UN we normally pursue a neutralise (render hostile personnel harmless). end state verses a destroy end state, A safe and secure environment were hostile forces or groups return to a state of peace and the intent of the mandate accomplishment (political and humanitarian goals achieved).

Slide 10

Special UNIBAT Designations / Roles
(Not tasks)

- QRF BN
- Reserve BN
- Rapid Deployment Battalion

These roles help focus the Battalion to prepare for a particular operation - via planning, rehearsals, C2, acquire recourses

The UNIBAT can be deployed in certain specialised roles. These roles help focus the units in honing their additional capabilities, planning efforts, key rehearsals and coordination with other units and special support requirements. Example, a QRF (typically directly under FHQ and designed to quickly deploy to any part of the Force AO may require non-organic transportation assets like aviation / helicopters.

A Reserve Battalion is normally assigned to the FHQ and in direct C2 of the FC and the UNIBAT designed to reinforce or cover new areas.

An infantry battalion does have national doctrine of the unit; however, they must ensure that UN-specific requirements are included in their training. The battalion might be required to support civil disturbance control, and this role requires special equipment and training.

The rapid deployment battalion (RDB) consists of a UNIBAT that a TCC will commitment to deploy within 60 days to any existing or new UN Peacekeeping Mission. From the date the United Nations formally requests the T/PCC to deploy, the T/PCC has 60 days to assemble the unit and be fully prepared to deploy from the port of embarkation.

Slide 11

Special Enabling Tasks in Support of the Mandate

- Patrolling
- Liaison and coordination
- Conduct convoy escort
- Cordon and search
- DDR support
- Observation point (OP)
- Check point (CP)
- Establish TOB

All MPKI and MDMP driven

On this slide we show some of the INF COY enabling tasks other than attack and defend that support battalion operations and macro battalion task. Leaders at all levels should understand on how COYs plan and execute some of the most common peacekeeping tasks. It is important to note that many of these tasks may have Force / Sector / BAT SOPs or formal Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Clear understanding of these tasks will facilitate TCC planning and preparation, task-organisation, and the conduct of task-oriented training for the COYs.

Slide 12



Inappropriate Missions / Tasks

Hostages Radisson Hotel, Bamako, Mali

Tasks for which the UNIBAT is not trained, equipped, or capable

- Hostage rescue operations
- Military assistance
- Personal Security Detachment tasks
- Special Forces (SF) type operations / tasks


In November of 2015, Islamist militants took hostages and killed many of them at the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, the capital city of Mali. Many UN officials and civilians were guests of the hotel. The UN / UNIBAT was asked to intervene to assist with a hostage rescue mission. In the end, the Malian commandos raided the hotel and liberated the surviving hostages. The lessons learned here were that the UN Mission Civilian leadership expected the UNIBAT to conduct an operation that they were untrained or equipped to perform the actual hostage rescue. Now having said that, our military leadership can counsel and provide guidance to the leaders, that the UNIBAT can support the overall operations with outer layers of security and providing enabling support enabling to the specialised units conducting the hostage rescue raid,

Here are some of the tasks or activities that the UNIBAT is not trained or equipped to perform. Of note, military assistance to host nation is not normally done; however, there are some UN Missions that have UNIBAT do some limited training of host nation security forces.

Also, under certain circumstances the UN provides support to the host nation security forces and the UNIBATs may provide this support. However, the UN policy, of Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) is applied. A UNIBAT that plans to or is already

providing support to non-UN security forces must therefore conduct a risk assessment by the UN Mission and components that involves providing or not providing such support. This assessment needs to consider the risk of the recipient entity committing grave violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law, or refugee law. Furthermore, the UN must consider whether there are any mitigation measures that can reduce the risk of violations (e.g., by increasing training or excluding problematic units from support). More information on the HRDDP is covered in Module 2 Legal Framework.

Slide 13




Logistical, Sustainment, Support

Key Message: It is imperative that the UNIBAT staffs understand what support the UN Mission expects the TCC to provide for themselves and what support the UN Mission will provide. More importantly, it is key to understand what the support coordination framework is for a UN Mission; likewise, it is a predominantly civilian run component that sets priorities at the mission level.

The UNIBAT staff must understand how to request support. Some aspects of support are uniquely challenging for the staffs given their size and nature of equipment. This lesson describes the UN Mission Logistical Framework and its consequences on the UNIBAT.

Slide 14



Key Message: UN Peacekeeping Missions are complex entities, typically made up of thousands of personnel and military units and the DMS is responsible for providing support to the military component. Also, it is important to understand the whole chain of Command in UN Missions and the relationship between DMS and FC being well harmonised.

The baseline expectation of the TCC and unit within a UN Mission and how the logistical framework can support a UNIBAT as codified in written agreements.

Once the unit arrives, they integrate into a complex UN Peacekeeping Mission, typically made up of thousands of personnel and many military units from multiple countries. The TCC, Head of mission, the Force Commander, and Director of Mission Support (DMS) all have a role in providing support to the unit. Operations can only be accomplished by logistic ready units. Both Operations and the Support Systems must be in synch with the unit for the mission to succeed.

This slide shows a generic UN Mission structure.

There is an operational line that leads back to the Force Commander. It is important to understand that the UNIBAT is OPCON to the Force Commander or Sector Commander. The Force Commander receives his guidance from the Head of Mission/Special

Representative of the Secretary-General (HOM/SRSG). The HOM/SRSG leads the UN Mission and bears overall responsibility for the implementation of the mandate.

Also, of note, there is a line to the National Support Element (NSE). In some cases, the troop contributing nation may elect to establish a NSE to enhance the sustainment of their sector's units supporting the mission. Support provided by the national NSE is coordinated directly with the NSE and not through the Director of Mission Support / Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS). This may apply to the UNIBATs especially, if they have specialised technical equipment. The composition of the NSE is up to the TCC based on their need's assessment.

There is a line to the Director or Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS). The DMS/CMS is responsible for coordinating support across the entire UN Mission of thousands of personnel mainly through contracted support, military logistics units (MLUs), and support from the HN. If special support arrangements have been agreed to in the MOU, or LOA then the DMS/CMS will likely be coordinating that support. (Examples: Catering on large bases, bulk fuel, bulk water, contract vehicle maintenance, etc.) Note: By UN policy the DMS/CMS has tasking authority over all "support units" for routine day-to-day tasking. This includes sometimes military aviation/ engineering assets; however, the DMS would coordinate with the FC because all military assets are OPCON to them. The DMS could however make changes to the daily tasks of other support units that could impact your UNIBAT activities. Close and continuous coordination with FC staff and DMS staff is essential.

Slide 15

UN Sustainment and Support

- Understand mission support concept and plan
- TCCs ensure home station preparation
- Primary support through national sources; expect to be self-sufficient
- Self sustainment requirements- per MOU / LOA
- Self sustainment period: Rations, water, petrol, oil, shelter first 90 days
- SUR is baseline, COE, unique equipment, sustainment and reimbursement addressed

As with any military unit in UN Peacekeeping, TCCs must prepare prior to deployment to ensure the best possible preparation of personnel and units.

The Mission Support Concept (MSC) underlines the DMS's role. Arrangements for logistics support are provided in the UN's Generic Guidelines for TCCs for Deploying Military Units to the UN Peacekeeping Mission, and in the UN's Contingent Owned Equipment Manual. At the component level, the Mission Support Plan is published under the authority of the DMS/CMS. The Mission Support Plan is the authoritative basis for the planning and management of logistics support in the UN Mission. The UNIBAT will receive sustainment beyond national logistics capabilities through the DMS. The UNIBAT CDR must understand what capabilities his unit is expected to be self-sufficient in accordance with the TCC handbook. Exceptions to this must be addressed specifically prior to deployment.

The battalions should expect to be almost completely self-sufficient for up to first 30-90 days depending on the agreements made in the MOU / LOA. When the unit is not capable of being self-sufficient, they will likely receive support through the National Supply System, especially for low density, highly specialised equipment, and supplies. Lastly the DMS/CMS will provide common support to the mission and unit based on the Mission In most cases, certain common classes of supplies will be provided by the Mission

and reimbursed by the TCC. Examples of this include bulk fuel and water. The unit should always deploy with the ability to self-sustain upon arrival.

The Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) is a starting point for analysing Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) and logistical support. Different TCCs may fill a Mission requirement, and each comes with their own equipment. The UN-TCC Memorandum of Understand (MOU) should capture any additional required support needs for the unit. If there is a requirement that is not captured in the SUR or MOU, the TCC must request assistance.

In accordance with the Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) Manual:

- Special minor equipment or consumables are not covered by the standard self-sustainment rates can be handled as “unique equipment”
- These items will be handled through bilateral, special case arrangements between the troop contributor and the UN. For instance, operational requirements, such as night vision devices and High Frequency communications may be reimbursed as negotiated with UN Headquarters
- The battalion's internal communications and information systems are provided by each TCC. Nevertheless, equipment for communications between the Mission Headquarters and the TCC. Sometimes it is provided as UN-Owned Equipment (UNOE)

Slide 16

UN Support Terms

- **Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA):**
 - HN to UN Mission Agreement
- **Wet Lease:**
 - Contingent is responsible for maintaining own equipment or through another contingent
- **Dry Lease**
 - Contingent deploys with equipment but UN sources the maintenance / support

There are some additional sustainment terms that you may see or hear in a UN Mission that may not be common in your national logistics system.

First, let us discuss the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). This high-level agreement between the HN and the UN defines the legal parameters on which the UN Mission and units are operating. It will contain rules by which each party will operate and may define support that the HN will provide to the UN. This could include provisions that impact the employment of MILEOD (Example: Airports). The SOFA might also define requirements for involvement of local law enforcement and the handling of IED components for intelligence and/or evidence.

Next, we will discuss more operational terms within support agreements to include Wet and Dry Lease. The term “Wet Lease” refers to a support agreement in which the TCC is responsible for its own maintenance. The TCC could deploy its own maintenance units, coordinate with another contingent to use their maintenance on a reimbursable basis or establish a contracted maintenance agreement. A “Dry Lease” means that the contingent deploys with its own equipment (contingent owned equipment) but the maintenance is provided by the UN. These terms are most often used to refer to vehicle maintenance and not specialised equipment.

Slide 17

Common Requests for in Mission Operational Support

- Additional truck transportation
- Heavy engineer assets
- Long range communications
- Counter IED / CREW
- Additional language assistants
- Aviation

Here are some of the most common support requirements that require coordination.

The acronym CREW stands for: Counter-Radio controlled improvised explosive device Electronic Warfare. The system is a vehicle-mounted electronic jammer designed to prevent the remote detonation of land mines and IED's.

Slide 18

Support to Remote Locations

- Specialised support arrangements are essential
- Early planning and preparation are essential
- Medical capabilities / Air CASEVAC



Many of the UNIBAT COYs are deployed deep into the Mission area of responsibility, potentially in isolation from other UN Forces and far from any logistical base. As such, they should not expect to live in hard-walled accommodations when on operations during their deployment, and should expect to provide for themselves most, if not all, of their life support requirements.

The UN meets the life support provisions stated in the applicable statement of unit requirements and MOU. In that perspective, specialised arrangements are essential to support these COYs and could include airdrop, air resupply, caches, riverine resupply, local resupply, etc. The CSS arrangement must be well prepared and planned.

In addition, because of these remote locations, efficient medical CASEVAC is an operational necessity. Note, a good reference for planning AIR CASEVAC is The Aviation UN Military Unit Manual.

Slide 19

Take Away

- FC / Sector HQs exercises OPCON over UNIBAT
- Close coordination/cooperation with HQs Staffs, civilian, support, and police components
- Offensive and Defensive Operations and Enabling Tasks supports a secure environment
- Inappropriate: hostage rescue
- DMS/CMS responsible for Mission support
- TCC is responsible for readiness and sustainment
- Infantry units are often remote- Air support and CASEVAC requires planning and training

Summary

Let us review. In this lesson we discussed the

- FC / Sector HQs exercises OPCON over UNIBAT
- Close coordination/cooperation with HQs Staffs, civilian, support, and police components
- The two UNIBAT primary operations are: Defensive and Offensive Operations and the Companies execute: Defend / Attack tasks and enabling tasks in support of the mandate providing a secure environment - the UNIBAT and MC all support FP and POC strategies
- Inappropriate: hostage rescue, personnel security
- DMS/CMS responsible for Mission support
- TCC is responsible for readiness and sustainment
- INF units are often remote- Air support and CASEVAC requires planning and training

Learning Activity

Lesson 1.3

RESOURCES:

TIME:

PREPARATION:

N/A

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Read each question below one at a time and then select a few participants to answer. Reinforce topics or discuss as needed.

1. Explain the command-and-control relationships between the Mission HQs, Force HQs, Sector HQs and the UNIBAT HQs (include key individuals).

Answer: The Special Representative of the UN, the Head of Mission (HOM) or Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) responsible for the overall mission and its personnel and operations; however, the Force Commander has Operational Control (OPCON) of the UNIBATs assigned to the mission and may delegate that to the Sector Commanders

2. What are the two UNIBAT COY core tasks that supports UNIBAT Offensive and defensive operations?

Answer: Attack and Defend

3. List several enabling tasks for Infantry COY that support PKO operations.

COYs normally support a UNIBAT-

Cordon and Search operations

Reconnaissance

Patrols

Establish observation point

Establish TOB

Establish check point

Conduct Convoy Escort

4. What national organisation may be established by a TCC that is not included within the UN Mission authority or structure that enhances the national support to their units?

Answer: National Support Element

5. Who is responsible for executing the Mission Support Concept and Mission Support Plan? What is the document signed between the UN Mission and the TCC defining capabilities, logistics, and requirements for the deploying unit?

Answer: The Director or Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) is responsible for coordinating support across the entire UN Mission of thousands of personnel mainly through contracted support, military logistics units (MLUs), and support from the Host Nation. Special support arrangements by the TCC and UN are codified in Memorandums of Understandings MOU, or Letters / Memorandums of Agreements LOA/ MOA. The DMS/CMS coordinates all that support. (Examples: Catering on large bases, bulk fuel, bulk water, contract vehicle maintenance, etc.) Note: By UN policy the **DMS/CMS has tasking authority over all “support units” for routine day-to-day tasking.** This includes sometimes military aviation/ engineering assets; however, the DMS would coordinate with the FC because all military assets are OPCON to them. The DMS could however make changes to the daily tasks of other support units that could impact your UNIBAT activities. Close and continuous coordination with FC staff and DMS staff is essential.

Lesson 1.4



Conceptual Framework for the Protection of Civilians

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

The aim of this lesson is to provide peacekeepers with information to familiarize them on the conceptual framework and principles of POC.



To help introduce the topic, consider playing the video “Mandated to Protect – Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations” from the start (00:03) to minute 04:06. This segment introduces the topic of POC.


The video can be found in the Annex of Module 1 as well as on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y8y8_GaxC3I

Background: The video was produced jointly by the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the Government of Australia and released in 2011. It discusses POC-related issues such as what the “Protection of Civilians” term means and what peacekeepers are mandated to do. At several junctures in this Module, the video will help illustrate and explain content.



Note to instructor – The language of the UN- learning involves some words, terms and phrases that may be unfamiliar and/or seem awkward. Reassure learners: “Don’t let new language get in the way of learning”. As you move through the training, review the definitions of key words and phrases. Also review, the DPO (DPKO) POC Policy referenced in this lesson.

Slide 1



Over the decades since the first Peacekeeping Operations were mandated after World War II, missions always had an inherent task to protect civilians. However, the change of peacekeeping from traditional operations towards multidimensional modern ones changed the outlook in this regard. In particular, the failures to prevent genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s brought POC to the centre of international attention. In the past years, every new Mission that was authorised by the Security Council was given a POC mandate. The aim of this lesson is to provide peacekeepers with information to familiarize them with the conceptual framework and principles of POC.

Slide 2

Content

- Introduction, definitions & terminology
- POC in peacekeeping
- Protection actors
- Coordination
- POC operational concept
- Learning Activity

Here is the content of the lesson.

Slide 3

Learning Objectives

- Explain the importance of POC
- Describe key POC definitions and principles
- Explain the different roles and coordination by protection actors
- Explain the UN operational approach to POC; include the tiers and responses

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson.

Slide 4

POC Mandate

- Majority UN missions have POC; 95 % of PKO personnel are in POC mandated UN missions
- The yardstick of success ; directly affects UN legitimacy
- DPO POC Policy

“All necessary action, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians”

Not all peacekeeping missions have a POC mandate; yet, in the past few years, new mandated missions authorised by the Security Council has been given a POC mandate. Additionally, since all the largest missions have a POC mandate, most peacekeeping personnel work in a mission with POC mandate.

Above everything else is the fact that failure to protect may result in the loss of civilian life, which is tragic and the most important consequence. But POC is increasingly also coming to define the success and reputation of UN Missions, meaning there are implications for the credibility and legitimacy of the United Nations and UN Peacekeeping involved.

While the Security Council's treatment of POC encompasses all measures aimed at limiting the effects of hostilities on civilians and civilian objects in situations of armed conflict, notable through promoting respect for relevant bodies of law and Security Council resolutions, Peacekeeping Operations are required, under the POC Mandate, to prioritize the Protection of Civilians under threat from physical violence.

In 2009, Security Council passed a resolution stating that all missions with a POC mandate must prioritize POC over other mandated tasks. DPO has published policies that support the conceptual framework.

To protect civilians, missions are provided with the authority to afford direct physical protection, including using force under certain conditions. POC in UN Peacekeeping is therefore narrower than the broad concept of POC in Armed Conflict and can be defined as follows:

“Without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the host state, integrated and coordinated activities by all civilian and uniformed mission components to prevent, deter or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians within the mission’s capabilities and areas of deployment through the use of all necessary means, up to and including deadly force.”

The meaning of key terms such as ‘civilians’ and ‘physical violence’ and the link to human rights violations, of the right to life and physical integrity, will be discussed later in this lesson

A comprehensive approach to the Protection of Civilians is one which considers and addresses the range of factors which influence and underpin threats to civilians in both the short- and long-term, including political, security and economic factors. Such an approach recognizes that the protection of civilians requires the coordination of the full range of capabilities available to the mission to achieve strategic protection objectives. An integrated approach to the Protection of Civilians requires the combined effort of all mission components: civilian, police and military, and where relevant and appropriate, coordination with other UN actors including the UN Country Team (UNCT). Integrated analysis and planning are critical to ensure that the mission is able to implement a comprehensive approach to POC.

Slide 5

Protection Mandates

- Promotion and protection of human rights
- POC / HR / CRSV / CP
- Based on IHL and HR law
- Operational area linkages and similar tactical level considerations
- There are special UN tasks associated with Child Protection and CRSV mandates

Key Message: Experience has shown that there are important parallels in the establishment and implementation of Protection of Civilians (POC), Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) and Child Protection (CP) mandates. There are special UN tasks associated with Child Protection and CRSV mandates. And yet all have similar tactical level actions / implementation considerations.

There are significant linkages between the three types of mandates. Regarding the establishment of the mandate, for instance, CRSV and CP are both mandated through (a) broader obligations under the POC mandate, and (b) through specific thematic Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), respectively.

The implementation of all three mandates on the ground creates significant overlap. Complex POC threats, for instance, will likely contain aspects of CRSV and CP as well as a result, a mission's operational response to such threats requires a holistic approach. Likewise, at the tactical level, a physical response to CRSV or CP threats can often follow a similar path to actions.

It is important to note that the implementation of CRSV and CP mandates contains aspects that do not apply to POC. From a conceptual perspective, these mandates are

broader than POC in peacekeeping and exceed the realm of physical protection. As political mandates they are mainstreamed through the mission and take effect at different levels. Activities beyond the scope of POC include, for instance, the negotiation of Action Plans with armed forces or groups and the support to monitoring and reporting mechanisms. This training package will not cover the aspects of CRSV and CP that are particular to their mandates and focus instead on the areas of intersection.

Slide 6



Definitions and Concepts

Before we get too involved with the lesson; let us take some time to understand the language of the UN and international community. It is important to have a common understanding of the definitions and terminology used in the POC.

Slide 7

Use of Force

The gradual use of a contingent's resources, which ranges from authoritative presence to the conduct of operations that may result in deadly action of current or potential perpetrators

Key Message: Force is the use of, or threat to use, physical means to impose one's will. In UN Peacekeeping, it is defined as the “gradual use of contingent's resources, which ranges from authoritative presence to the conduct of operations that may result in deadly action of current or potential perpetrators.”

The military, is authorised to use force in line with the Rules of Engagement -ROE (as discussed further in Module 2), and we should be familiar with the following terms:

- Deterrence – It is also useful to discuss deterrence as a use of force. Deterrence is defined as the display of willingness, capability, and readiness of peacekeepers to use force to prevent an individual or group from initiating a hostile act
- Proportional Force/Proportionality – The amount of force which is reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander or the individual soldier at the time, to decisively counter a hostile act or intent or to achieve an authorised objective in the mission-specific ROE
- Minimum force – The minimum degree of authorised force that is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances to achieve the authorised objective. A minimum

degree of force is applicable whenever force is used. Minimum force can be deadly force, in certain circumstances


- Non-deadly force – The level of force that is neither intended nor likely to cause death regardless of whether death results
- Deadly force – The level of force, which is intended, or likely to cause, death regardless of whether death results. The ultimate degree of force
- Necessity – Parties to an armed conflict may apply only the amount and kind of force necessary to defeat the enemy forces. The aim is to defeat the enemy at minimum cost in lives, property and materiel, but not to destroy the enemy as such. Military necessity can never justify the commission of a war crime.
- Distinction – Peacekeepers must distinguish between civilians and combatants
- Precaution – Peacekeepers must take care to avoid harm to the civilian population.

Slide 8

Civilian

Any person who is not or is no longer directly participating in hostilities or other acts of violence shall be considered a civilian, unless they are a member of armed forces or groups

In case of any doubt, the person is considered a civilian



Key Message: The distinction of civilians from combatants/fighters is critical for effective POC mandate implementation. Peacekeepers need to understand who they are mandated to protect, even though lines can become blurry in conflict or post-conflict situations.



Ask the class why is it important to identify civilians? Here are some possible answers that will help facilitate the discussions:

- The main reason peacekeepers need to distinguish civilians from combatants is to understand who they must seek to protect in order to implement their protection of civilian mandates
- This does not mean, that those who are not civilians are enemies of peacekeepers and it does not automatically justify the use of force against them- example, combatants who are placed hors de combat (out of action) because of capture or injury must not be the target of military attacks and be given appropriate medical and other care

In general, any person who is not or is no longer directly participating in hostilities shall be considered a civilian, unless he or she is a member of armed forces or groups. **Members of armed forces or groups that are hors de combat ('out of battle')** also enjoy protection under international humanitarian law.

In case of doubt, the individual or group of individuals shall be considered civilian and afforded the protection owed to civilians until determined otherwise. It is importance to understand the context in making this distinction. The distinction can only be made on a case-by-case basis.

The DPO Policy on POC discusses the distinction of civilians from fighters or combatants: Civilians may be in the possession of arms, without necessarily having a status of 'combatant'. **Under international humanitarian law, civilians who are in the possession of arms, for example, for the purpose of self-defence and the protection of their property but who have not been or are not currently engaged in hostilities are entitled to protection.**

Fighters or combatants from state security forces, affiliated proxies or non-state armed groups may, on the other hand, display no visible signs revealing their status, such as military fatigues. Missions shall therefore carefully analyse, determine, and disseminate appropriate guidance on the distinction between civilians and fighters or combatants encountered in their area of responsibility (AOR). In case of doubt, the individual or group of individuals shall be considered civilian and afforded the protection owed to civilians until determined otherwise.

Slide 9

Physical Violence

Violations to the right of life and physical integrity under national or international law, including by elements of state and non-state parties to an armed conflict

Actual or potential physical harm to civilians associated with lawful actions by state or international security forces

Key Message: Physical violence violates the right to life, physical integrity, or personal security of civilians.

Physical violence can occur in a variety of ways and from a variety of sources. This includes state and non-state parties to a conflict, but it can also occur in the context of lawful actions taken by state or international security forces.

Examples of physical violence include acts or attempts to kill, torture, or maim; forcibly displace, starve or pillage; acts of sexual violence including but not limited to rape and other forms of sexual assault against women, men, girls, or boys; recruit and use child soldiers; abduct or arbitrarily detain persons.

Even though UN Peacekeeping interprets POC mandates primarily as the prevention of or response to physical violence against civilians, some activities do not necessarily have a direct link to physical violence, such as the development of state institutions, the restoration of state authority, or the promotion of human rights.

Slide 10

Human Rights and Humanitarian Protection



Encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

This slide explains what protection means in the context of human rights and humanitarian action. Humanitarian action includes the neutral, impartial, and independent delivery of short-term, life-saving assistance (food, shelter, medical care etc.) and protection in times of crisis. Compared to POC in UN Peacekeeping, the humanitarian community has a different concept of protection. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance, defines it as follows:

“Protection broadly encompasses activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of all individuals in accordance with international law – international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law – regardless of their age, gender, social, ethnic, national, religious, or other background.”

Fundamentally, protection encompasses efforts pursued by humanitarian actors in all sectors to ensure that the rights of affected persons and the obligations of duty bearers under international law are understood, respected, protected, and fulfilled without discrimination. This is undertaken through advocacy, mainstreaming and specific and/or specialised protection activities, such as monitoring and reporting, as well as activities aimed at preventing or responding to specific protection risks (e.g., gender-based violence), violations (e.g., lack of access to documentation) and needs, including for

specific vulnerable groups. Activities can thus range from documentation, mine risk awareness training, or psychosocial care for survivors of abuse.

Human rights, meanwhile, follows a rights-based approach that seeks the protection of the full range of human rights of civilians. A broader discussion of human rights and international human rights will follow in Module 2.

While human rights and humanitarian actors seek to prevent and respond to the threat of violence against civilians, the ability to provide physical Protection of Civilians under threat of violence, including using force, is a unique capability of peacekeepers. Similarly, UN peace operations are uniquely positioned to engage in the long-term political activities that are necessary to establish a sustainable peace.

Slide 11

Vulnerable groups

Those most at risk of facing or suffering from violence, including girls and boys, women, minority groups, refugees, internally displaced, persons with disabilities, the wounded and older persons, and professionals at particular risk.

Vulnerability is a result of characteristics that are multidimensional and can change over time.

Key Message: While all civilians may be victims of physical violence and therefore require protection from it, due to resource limitations, missions will need to pay specific attention to individuals or groups most at risk of facing or suffering from such violence.

Vulnerability is a combination of factors that can change over time and depend on specific operational contexts. Frequently, vulnerable groups include girls and boys, women, minority groups, refugees, internally displaced persons, persons with disabilities, the wounded and older persons but also professionals at risk, including human rights defenders, medical personnel, teachers, journalists, and humanitarian personnel.

Situations of vulnerability are based on the characteristics of a person's individual and community factors (age, gender, sex, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, social status) and the factors that can lead to and compound those vulnerabilities (environmental factors, internally displaced person or refugee, geographic location, level of urbanization, level of state authority and capacity in that area, level of infrastructures). Access to assistance also influences vulnerability, including issues such as language barriers, freedom of movement, social or political barriers to communication with outsiders, gender stereotypes and social norms.

Slide 12

Definition of a Child

Article I of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that a child is
“every human being below the age of 18 years”

For all peacekeepers and UN personnel,
a child is any person under the age of 18 years





Key Message: Child Protection in UN Peacekeeping can broadly be defined the prevention of and response to abuse, exploitation, and violence against children. A child is any person under the age of 18 years. As peacekeepers you have a specific role to play in that. You also need to know how to deal with children when you come encounter them in your operations.

So, what is a child as defined by the UN? A Child according to Article I of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that a child is “every human being below the age of 18 years” For are purpose in POC mandates and UN Missions; A child is any person under the age of 18 years.

As per the 2015 DPO Policy on POC, field missions are required to ensure that “[...child protection is addressed pursuant to all DPO and DFS child protection guidance and relevant Security Council resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC). This includes, but is not limited to, mainstreaming of child protection into all mission components, child protection training of all peacekeeping personnel, monitoring, and reporting of grave violations against children, dialogue with parties to conflict to end grave violations against children, and release of children from armed forces and groups.

Slide 13

Human Rights Violations/Abuses

- **Violations are acts or omissions attributable to the State and its associated entities**
 - Involves failure to implement legal obligations deriving from human rights standards
- **Abuses apply to non-State actors where they exercise control over a given territory and population**

State transgressions of the human rights guaranteed by national, regional, and international law are known as human rights violations. They are acts and omissions attributable to the State involving the failure to fulfil legal obligations deriving from human rights standards.

Such acts or omissions might be the responsibility of a **states'** officials or agents such as police, military, judges, local administrators, or parliamentarians while they have been acting in their official capacity.

Under certain circumstances, non-State actors can also assume, voluntarily or not, human rights obligations. These obligations are particularly relevant in situations where non-State actors exercise some degree of control over a given territory and population, and their conduct thus affects the human rights of the individuals under their control (for example, de facto authorities or certain non-State armed groups). Failure to protect those rights by non-State actors is known as a human rights abuse.

POC mandates are more narrowly focused than human rights mandates, as they primarily consider action to protect civilians from violations or abuses of the rights to life and physical integrity, while the latter cover all types of rights by all persons.

Slide 14

Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV)

- Any harmful act directed against individuals or groups of individuals based on their gender
- SGBV constitutes a violation of human rights
- SGBV in conflict can become Conflict-related Sexual Violence (CRSV)

Key Message: Gender differs from sex; it refers to the socially ascribed differences between males and females. Sexual and Gender-based violence (SGBV) is any harmful act or threat thereof directed against individuals or groups of individuals based on their gender. It may include sexual violence, domestic violence, mental violence, trafficking, forced/early marriage, and harmful traditional practices. As such it is a violation of human rights.

This kind of violence builds on and prolongs the stereotypes of gender roles in society that deny human dignity of the individual and stunt human development. The overwhelming majority of victims/survivors of sexual and gender-based violence are women and girls. SGBV includes much more than sexual assault and rape.

The root causes and consequences of SGBV, including the pre-existing forms of discrimination that fuel it, must be understood to develop appropriate programs to prevent and respond to this violence. SGBV in conflict can become Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)

Slide 15

Responsibility to Protect – R2P

- Focuses on four mass atrocities:
 - Genocide
 - Ethnic cleansing
 - War crimes
 - Crimes against humanity
- POC / R2P share legal and conceptual foundations
- R2P goes beyond the principles of peacekeeping (host state consent)

Key Message: In response to the crises in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the international community developed a concept that obliged sovereign states to protect its citizens. If a state is “unwilling or unable” to do so, “the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect”.

R2P first emerged in a report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001. R2P addresses four specific types of atrocity crimes. This is significant as it means, for example, that R2P does not cover all violations or abuses of human rights, nor suffering caused by natural disasters. The four major crimes are:

- Genocide
- Ethnic cleansing; also includes forced relocation
- War crimes
- Crimes against humanity

Similarities between R2P and POC in UN Peacekeeping include:

- Both emphasize prevention and early warning
- Both stress that the response is multidimensional, not just military

- Both maintain that the government has the primary responsibility for safeguarding its citizens
- Both only use military force as a last resort

Slide 16

Threat

All situations that are likely to lead to death or serious bodily injury, regardless of the source of the threat.



Key Message: Threats of physical violence encompass all acts or situations that are likely to lead to death or serious bodily injury, regardless of the source of the threat.



Ask participants what sources threats of physical violence to civilians can potentially emanate from.

Answers should include:


- *Armed groups (or related terms such as militias)*
- *Host State security forces*
- *Third state security forces*
- *International security forces (including those mandated by the Security Council)*
- *Organised community forces*
- *Individual community members • Organised criminal gangs*

Threats of physical violence against civilians: Such threats encompass all hostile acts or situations which are likely to lead to death or serious bodily injury of civilians, including sexual violence, regardless of the source of the threat. This includes, inter alia, threats posed by non-state armed groups, self-defence groups, domestic and foreign state defence and security forces or other state agents and state-sponsored armed actors, as well as extremist groups and communities. It includes both direct and indiscriminate attacks, and attempts to kill, torture, maim, rape or sexually exploit, forcibly displace, starve, pillage, abduct or arbitrarily detain, kidnap, disappear or traffic persons or recruit and use children. It also includes harm associated with the presence of explosive ordnance including mines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. **“Threat” includes both violence actions against civilians which has materialised and is ongoing and violence which has the realistic potential to occur.** The threat need not be imminent unless the specific Security Council mandate requires this.

It is important to repeat here that this definition makes no distinction to the source of the threat. POC mandates require action irrespective of the source of the threat. For UN Peacekeeping Missions, in-depth threat assessments are essential for effective POC mandate implementation (see Module 3). Such assessments could include:

- Historical context of violence
- Capabilities and intention
- Perpetrator’s motivation for violence

Slide 17



A POC risk is the combination of likelihood and impact of threats on civilians. As such, risk is a function of both the vulnerability of specific groups and the threats they face. We can break it down using this graph as shown on the slide.

The Impact as shown via the vertical "Y" axis of the graph refers to the consequences the materialization of a threat would have on the civilians at risk.

The likelihood, shown as the "x" axis refers to the probability of a threat to materialize. An assessment of the likelihood is based on existing human rights reporting, intelligence, and historical analysis.

In terms of risk, threat A on the graph is very low as it has a low impact and not very likely to happen. The graph you see here on this slide is a sample risk analysis graph, we will be using this later and it will be cover in more detail in Module 3 and in the Tabletop exercise.

Slide 18

Protection Principles and Actors

The Protection of Civilians mandate is guided by a set of legal and practical principles, rooted in the UN Charter, international law and lessons learned from years of DPO experience. Additionally, there are many partners and interlocutors that assist and have a stake in the success of a POC mandate.

Slide 19

Peacekeeping POC Principles

- Grounded in International law
- Upholding UN peacekeeping principles
- Priority mandate
- Prime responsibility – host state
- Void in state capabilities / willingness – Peacekeepers responsible
- Active duty to protect - planned, deliberate, on-going
- C2 and ROE are critical
- Keep a gender perspective

POC mandates are a manifestation of the international community's determination to prevent the most serious violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and related standards, and they should be implemented in both the letter and spirit of these legal frameworks. POC mandates are complementary to and reinforce a mission's mandate to promote and protect human rights.

UN Peacekeeping is fundamentally built on three principles: Host State consent, Impartiality, and Use of force in self-Defence or Defence of the mandate.

As per UNSC Resolution 1894 (2009), all missions mandated to undertake the Protection of Civilians must prioritise POC in decisions regarding the allocation and use of available capacity and resources. Therefore, within the wide scope of potential situations of physical violence against civilians, the mission must prioritize those situations or incidents of greatest concern and allocate its resources accordingly.

The host state always has the primary responsibility to protect civilians within its borders. This responsibility is not diminished when a peacekeeping mission with a POC mandate is deployed. Where the state is unable or unwilling to protect civilians, or where government forces themselves pose such a threat to civilians, peacekeepers have the

authority and the responsibility to provide such protection within their capabilities and areas of deployment.

The Protection of Civilians mandate embodies an active duty to protect; missions do not engage in protection only in reaction to an attack. Activities to protect civilians should be planned, deliberate and on-going, and the mission should constantly work to prevent, pre-empt, and respond to violence against civilians. This includes presence in areas under greatest threat, a credible deterrent posture, and other activities in accordance with the mandate, the POC strategy and the military and police concepts of operations (CONOPS).

In missions with a mandate to protect civilians, it is the responsibility of commanders of all contingents to ensure all those under their command understand and comply with the mandate and its associated ROE/DUF. The Force Commander and Police Commissioner are ultimately responsible for their enforcement.


In Peacekeeping Operations, a gender perspective – the process of understanding and addressing gender-based differences in status and power, and considering how such differences shape the immediate needs, as well as the long-term interests, of women and men, girls and boys – is to be included into all plans, policies, activities, analysis and reports; often referred to as gender mainstreaming. The addition of Gender perspectives as a guiding principle for POC further reinforces the need for proper consideration of gender in POC activities. Examples: The conduct of searches by both male and female peacekeepers; the importance of including females in all contingents; activities to ensure all peacekeepers engage female community members properly and give them a voice.

The Gender Advisor, focal points, and experiences of the EP personnel should be used to help plan for these activities. In the EP Annex there is an Engagement Effects Table that may help in these planning efforts.

Slide 20

Kigali Principles (2015)

- T/PCCs, contributors pledge POC framework
- Better prepare leaders and units for POC
- Set of principles for training, C2, capabilities
- Signatory states growing
- Standards of conduct for personnel



Shown The principles discussed so far in this section emanate from the DPKO-DFS Policy on POC. Compliance with them is mandatory for all peacekeeping missions and all personnel. Separately from those principles, 2015 saw a set of voluntary pledges, without being legally binding or enforceable, were emerged by troop and police contributing countries, called the Kigali Principles.

These Principles were established at a conference hosted by Rwanda in Kigali in 2015, where top troop and police contributing countries, top financial contributing countries, UN professionals, scholars and other stakeholders convened to discuss the current state as well as the future of POC in peacekeeping. The purpose of the conference was to find ways to strengthen the ability of UN Peacekeeping to protect civilians and identify how Member States can contribute to this goal.

As a result of the conference, a set of 18 pledges was established that troop and police contributing countries can voluntarily sign up to. This set of pledges is voluntary and does not have legal implications or enforcement mechanisms. The initial number of nine signatory states has since grown substantially, representing nations contribute a preponderance of peacekeepers currently deployed in the field.

Slide 21

Protection Roles in a Mission

- Coordinated action required across sections and units
- Specialised functions within a mission include:
 - Senior POC Adviser
 - Women’s Protection Adviser
 - Child Protection Adviser
 - Human Rights components
- Role for military and police



Here Key Message: Within this complex structure of a peacekeeping mission, several functions have been designated to play roles in the implementation of POC, Child Protection and CRSV mandates. This should not distract, however, from the fact that effective protection requires a whole-of-mission approach, which in turn needs the buy in of all mission components and units, from the SRSG down to the working level.

On the civilian side, the Senior POC Adviser, the Women Protection Adviser and the Child Protection Adviser play important roles in the coordination of mission activities, advisory to senior mission leadership, analysis of the threat environment, training of peacekeeping personnel, and monitoring and reporting. In the case of Women Protection and Child Protection Advisers, this includes reporting through the specialised reporting mechanisms. Child Protection Advisers importantly also negotiate for the release of children from armed forces or groups. In addition, Human Rights components are the lead unit within the mission tasked to promote and protect human rights in the host country, jointly with other components across the mission. Human rights investigations and advocacy as well as monitoring and reporting are critical tools in this regard.


Military and Police play a role as the main armed actors in a peacekeeping context. The authorization of the military to use force to protect civilians from violence is a central

aspect of the protection concept as a deterrent and potential response mechanism to perpetrators. Both military and police

through their wide deployment and interaction with local authorities and communities are also important avenues through which to identify, monitor and report on threats, violations, and abuses against civilians.

The military plays an important role in the identification and release of children from armed groups and works closely with the armed forces or armed groups that signed action plans for the release of children. Likewise, the military assumes an important role during demobilization processes of armed groups that have recruited children to their ranks.

Slide 22



Many UN organisations have been mandated by the international community to protect civilians. This slide provides a small sample of some of the most important partners, but there are many more UN entities and non-UN organisations with a presence in the field. In many cases these actors have been in the country long before the deployment of a Peacekeeping Operation and will stay in the country long after.

Given the large number of protection actors, coordination is critical for an effective Protection of Civilian strategy. As far as the UN System is concerned, it follows an integrated approach. The SRSG / Head of Mission is the highest-ranking UN official in the country, under their leadership, the UN needs to come together and deliver as one. The DSRSG HC/RC, as the Humanitarian Coordinator, acts as the UN representative / agent for coordinating and synchronizing humanitarian and developmental support with UN agencies, international / regional humanitarian agencies/organisations and NGOs.

The UN Country Team encompasses all the entities of the UN system that carry out operational activities for development, emergency, recovery, and transition in programme countries. The Humanitarian Country Team includes agencies with humanitarian programs, as well as non-UN humanitarian actors.

Mandates and expertise of different non-mission partners may overlap with the UN Peacekeeping Operation. The mission must coordinate with all partners to maximize capabilities and resources. Without coordination, actions risk falling into a vacuum, **contradicting other actors' activities, or simply failing to maximize available resources.** While the benefits of coordination are obvious, there are legitimate obstacles including different cultures, different mandates, separate governance, accountability mechanisms, or different funding cycles. Coordination occurs at several levels:

At the mission-level, which is referred to as the whole-of-mission approach: POC requires concerted and coordinated action between all components of a mission under the mission's POC Strategy. **Relevant provisions of the strategy must be mainstreamed and prioritised into the planning and conduct of activities by all components, including through the joint definition of clear, realistic, and authorised objectives to eliminate or mitigate threats.**

When it comes to the coordination mechanisms in missions, the fact that every mission structure looks different also means that no two coordination mechanisms are the same but may look something like this:

- The most important mechanism is the Senior Management Group on Protection (SMG-P), which brings together the most senior leaders of a peacekeeping mission, along with the Heads of other relevant UN entities (typically OCHA, UNICEF and UNHCR)
- At the operational level, the POC Working Group convenes working level staff and is chaired by the POC Adviser
- At the sector and regional levels, peacekeeping missions have mechanisms that mirror the SMG-P and the POC Working Group for senior and working levels
- The Joint Operations Centre facilitates coordination of mission activities to implement the POC mandate; however, the trend in most missions is that the JOC fulfils more of a reporting coordination function
- An important tool to enhance coordination across peacekeeping missions are the Joint Protection Teams (JPT). JPTs are integrated field visits of civilian, military and police teams to assess the situation on the ground and evaluate POC activities.
- With humanitarian actors: UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs undertake a broad range of activities in support of the Protection of Civilians. Close and systematic coordination with these actors, particularly the Protection Cluster, is therefore essential to assess protection priorities and plan activities. To this end, a standard set of mechanisms has been established, some of which we have already touched upon earlier. Humanitarian actors rely upon their neutrality, impartiality, and operational independence (humanitarian principles) for their acceptance by all actors and thus their security and ability to access those in need to deliver assistance is important. Consequently, maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of

political and military actors, particularly in conflict and post-conflict settings, is a key factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their mandate effectively and safely. Humanitarian actors are civilians entitled to physical protection under the POC mandate


- The Protection Cluster: The Protection Cluster coordinates the activities of the range of humanitarian actors on the ground regarding the Protection of Civilians. The Cluster includes relevant UN agencies along with non-UN entities, such as NGOs and civil society organisation. Within the humanitarian response architecture, the Cluster works to improve the predictability, leadership, effectiveness, and accountability of response to protection concerns. UNHCR is the Global Protection Cluster Lead Agency, UNICEF is the lead agency for the Sub-Cluster on Child Protection, and UNFPA/UNICEF share the lead role in the Sub-Cluster for Gender-Based Violence. UN Peacekeeping Missions work closely with the Protection Cluster and Sub-Clusters through POC Advisers, Child Protection Advisers, and Women's Protection Advisers
- CM Coord: United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (UNCM Coord) facilitates dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors, essential to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. CM Coord is an ongoing activity, led by OCHA on the humanitarian side and peacekeeping missions on the political side, with the goal of strengthening coordination structures. It helps to develop context-specific policy based on internationally agreed guidelines, and it establishes humanitarian civil-military coordination structures, ensuring staff members are trained to make that coordination work
- CIMIC: At Force HQ of peacekeeping missions, CIMIC (U9 Branch)) provides the interface between the military component of a mission and its political, humanitarian, developmental, human rights, and rule-of-law components, as well as many other non-mission partners in the larger peacebuilding system
- With local communities: Actions to protect civilians should be planned in consultation with all sections of the local community – including women, men, girls, and boys – those in vulnerable or marginalised situations, and with a view to empowering them and supporting the mechanisms and community-based organisations they have established to ensure their own protection. Communities are in the best position to define their own threats and vulnerabilities. Addressing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and vulnerabilities affecting civilians or taking them into account when designing the protection response, will ensure a sustainable impact. Staff must be mindful in their engagement with communities not to expose people to risk or cause harm through their engagement

Slide 23

Introduction -Operational Concept of POC in peacekeeping

The operational concept for POC is laid out in the DPO-DFS Policy on POC, the Operational Concept is at the heart of POC action in UN Peacekeeping. It reflects the whole-of-mission approach that is necessary for effective mandate implementation and groups POC-related activities into three tiers. Activities under the three tiers are not sequential and often take place simultaneously. Peace operations respond to POC threats in 4 distinct phases that are not necessarily sequential. We will go into more detail on the operational concept in the POC lesson in Module 3.

Slide 24



Key Message: To protect civilians, a UN Mission has a range of instruments with which to accomplish that task. These instruments fall under three distinct tiers. At the heart of it, the three tiers of the operational concept make clear how POC implementation is a whole mission task, requiring coordinated action from all mission components.

Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations mandated to protect civilians have a range of instruments and approaches at their disposal. These are categorised under three tiers which are mutually accommodating and reinforcing and are implemented simultaneously and strategically, in accordance with the mission mandate, mission phase and the circumstances on the ground. There is no inherent hierarchy or sequencing between the tiers. The Protection of Civilians mandate is implemented at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and all components of the mission, including the military, have a role to play in each of the tiers. Action under all three tiers will emphasize prevention and pre-emption as well as the primary responsibility of the host state to protect civilians. The three tiers of POC action are:

- Tier I: Protection through dialogue and engagement

- Tier II: Provision of physical protection
- Tier III: Establishment of a protective environment

Tier I activities include dialogue with a perpetrator or potential perpetrator, conflict resolution and mediation between parties to the conflict, persuading the government and other relevant actors to intervene to protect civilians, public information, reporting on POC, and other initiatives that seek to protect civilians through public information, dialogue, and direct engagement.

Tier II encompasses those activities by police and military components involving the show or use of force to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to situations in which civilians are under threat of physical violence. Those actions are informed by and implemented in close coordination with substantive civilian sections, which help guide the objectives and conduct of military and police operations, including through joint POC planning and coordination structures.

Tier III activities are frequently programmatic in nature, as well as broad and designed with committed resources for medium- to long-term peacebuilding objectives. Sometimes presented as separate mandated tasks under country-specific resolutions, these activities help to create a protective environment for civilians and are generally planned for independently of the POC mandate.

Slide 25



The ways in which UN Peacekeeping Missions respond to POC threats can be divided into four phases. The four phases are not sequential, and missions will often find their activities fall into different phases in different parts of the country at the same time, and some of the same activities may take place across all phases. Module 3 will examine the four phases in more detail, at this stage it is enough to know that the objective of this approach is to either eliminate a threat or mitigate the risk to civilians associated with that threat. It must also be noted that these phases do not necessarily occur in sequential order and approaches relevant to different phases may be undertaken simultaneously or independently. Here are the four phases:

- Prevention
- Pre-emption
- Response
- Consolidation (threat has been mitigated/eliminated)

We will go into more detail in the following slide to explain these four phases.

Action is necessary across all four phases, in line with the proactive approach taken by peacekeeping missions. In the prevention and pre-emption phase, the incident has not occurred yet and missions can more effectively avoid violence by acting in these phases.

In the response phase, missions respond to a violent incident that has already occurred, and in the consolidation phase missions support post-conflict activities.

All the tasks we discussed about the three tiers can also be categorised across the four phases. Action under all three tiers may be taken within each operational phase.

Take the same task list used for the three tiers and discuss with participants where they fit into the four phases.

Slide 26

POC & UNIBAT Commanders

- **Maintain situational awareness; report violations associated**
- **Assess threats / risk to civilians, have contingency plans to mitigate**
- **Maintain links to protector actors**
- **Implement associated UN policies**
- **POC / CRSV- mainstream & train**



It is important to reach out and establish communication with the CP actors in your area, including the closest Mission Child Protection Officer, UNICEF and local NGOs with whom peacekeepers can exchange information and build up a level of trust. The first time to contact them should not be in an emergency.

Battalions must establish and maintain situational awareness on CP threats in the area of responsibility. Threats include the six grave violations discussed in previous slides. The civilian CPA can advise on the threat environment. Identify all the CP policies issued down the military chain of command and implement them accordingly.

Just as Force HQ views CP as a factor in all its plans and operations, Battalions need to do so as well. Every patrol is likely to encounter children and when Battalions consider actions against an armed group, it is important to keep in mind that the group might include children. Peacekeepers should not look at IDPs as a mass of people but see them as an entity which contains children, as well as adults, and therefore requires specific and relevant responses. CP training is critical and needs to build on the threats identified earlier. Battalions need to maintain zero tolerance on SEA and the use of child labour.

Slide 27

Take Away

- Modern conflicts increasingly targets civilians
- Host government- responsibility to protect, often do not have will or capabilities
- In peacekeeping, POC refers to all necessary action to prevent or respond to threats of physical violence to civilian, a priority for UN operations; mandate is guided by international law, UN principles
- Special considerations / linkages with POC, child protection, CRSV
- A range of POC actors are mandated; plans must be coordinated with host / local governments, partners and interlocutors
- 3 tiers of POC activities 3; each with possible 4 phases
- Whole-of-mission approach is the heart of POC implementation

Summary

Let us review.

- Modern conflicts increasingly target civilians
- The responsibility to protect belongs to the Host Government; however, often they do not have the will or capabilities
- In peacekeeping, POC refers to all necessary action to prevent or respond to threats of physical violence to civilian, a priority for UN operations; mandate is guided by international law, UN principles
- Special considerations / linkages to POC, child protection, CRSV
- A range of POC actors are mandated; plans must be coordinated with host / local governments, partners, and interlocutors
- 3 tiers pf POC activities 3; each with a possible 4 phases
- A whole-of-mission approach is the heart of POC implementation

Slide 28

Learning Activity- Distinction Exercise

- Who of these persons should be considered civilians or combatants?
- Why is the distinction so important?



LEARNING ACTIVITY: Distinction of civilians

RESOURCES 1 flip chart, 10 large pieces of paper, sticky tape

TIME Total: 15 minutes

PREPARATION Draw two columns on the flip chart, entitle one 'Civilian' and the other 'Combatant/fighter'.

Prepare 10 pieces of paper with the following labels on them:

- Armed man wearing uniform of an armed group
- Wife of the armed man wearing uniform of an armed group
- Unarmed man wearing uniform of an armed group
- Local government official
- Child soldier
- Cook in an armed group
- Nurse at a local hospital

- Journalist
- Man, in civilian clothes with a machete walking down the street
- Severely wounded member of an armed group

EXERCISE Hold up each piece of paper and ask participants which column on the flip chart this paper should be placed. Discuss each item and ensure agreement amongst the group before sticking it under one of the two columns.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTOR: Some of the answers will not be clear-cut, demonstrating the challenge of identifying civilians in the field. The following answers should be considered:

- Armed man wearing uniform of an armed group – combatant/fighter
- Wife of armed man wearing uniform of an armed group – civilian
- Unarmed man wearing uniform of an armed group – depends on the context. This man could be an active member of an armed group who simply does not possess a weapon or momentarily does not carry it with him. However, this man could also have turned in his weapon as part of a DDR process and is waiting for the next steps. In this case, he has not completed the DDR process and is thus not technically classified as 'civilian'. Nevertheless, for all intents and purposes this person could be disengaged from hostilities and lead a civilian life, thus fitting the definition of a civilian. A decision needs to be made on the ground and considering the local context and experience.
 - Local government official – civilian
 - Child soldier – receive special protection
 - Cook in an armed group – civilian
 - Nurse at a local hospital – civilian
 - Journalist – civilian
 - Man, in civilian clothes with a machete walking down the street – depends on the context. In some conflict's machetes have been used as weapons, but in many places, machetes are simply tools to tend fields. A decision needs to be made on the ground and considering the local context and experience.
 - Severely wounded member of an armed group – the wound renders the armed group member hors de combat, which means s/he enjoys protection from violence

Slide 29

Learning Activity- Scenario 3

Military use of schools (or hospitals)

You are a UN INF BN Commander and were informed that an armed faction opposed to the peace process and hostile to the UN has attacked a remote local in your AOR. You deploy a mobile operating base (MOB). When the company arrives the location, the local chief identifies a primary school compound for the MOB.


Discuss the scenario with participants. The scenario should generate the following discussion points:

- A grave violation against international law- Attacks against schools and hospitals. UNSC Res 1612 (2005)
- This scenario does not constitute an attack on a school, but rather use of a school. Use of schools by UN peacekeepers is strictly prohibited. There is a caveat that national armed forces can use schools if there are no other options, but this should be a last resort in a dire situation. UN peacekeepers should thus advocate for all armed forces to vacate schools and find another base
- Schools and hospitals must be zones of peace, where children are granted protection even in times of conflict. Despite this, there is an increasing trend in armed conflict those schools and hospitals are being attacked with detrimental effects and impact on children
- Apart from the direct and physical damage to schools and hospitals, conflict can result in the forced closure or the disrupted functioning of these institutions. Children, teachers, doctors, and nurses are also subject to threats by parties to conflict if suspected, for example, to support the other party to the conflict

Also, of concern is the use of schools for military purposes, as recruitment grounds and polling stations. Below are three questions you can ask participants to generate discussion (with suggested answers):

- What instructions do you give the company commander and why? Do not use the school premises. UN peacekeepers are prohibited to use any schools for military purposes. The UN Infantry Battalion Manuals strictly prohibits the use of schools by military forces (Volume 1, 2.13 – child protection)
- What difference would it make if they offered a hospital as the base for the MOB? It would not make a difference. Hospitals are protected installations according to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and cannot be used for military purposes
- What if the host nation's forces fighting with the faction are based in the school and invite the company to join them in a joint operation? The UN company commander should advocate for the unit to immediately vacate the school premises. The presence of host nation forces at the school increases the risk of the school being a target and the school being destroyed due to fighting. The UN company commander should then inform CPA and provide all relevant facts

Slide 30



Ask the class: How might the UN Mission implement a POC plan of an IDP camp this size? No correct answers but, facilitate the discussion with the following:

- What are the possible threats and risks
- A UNIBAT can does not have the capability to provide security / POC everywhere, this camp is too large; consider threat / risk-based approach; where are the threats located, consider high risk threats first, avenues approach into camp etc
- Large IDP camp with many interlocutors and international groups
- UN forces do not patrol or provide security inside IDP camps
- Discuss using the model of the UN Mission pillars- Humanitarian, Secure, Political (Tiers)
- What role / tasks can each pillar provide ion the POC strategy
- What partners should be considered
- UNIBAT forces cannot be everywhere

- Who should be the primary actor or has the responsibility- Host Nation
- Who should be inside the camp, outside the camp
- MC – has some role but not necessary the best tool to be used, but can look at contingency plans for outside threats that may influence, be of high risk, interfere etc. – concentrate via preventive / pre-emptive phases of high-risk threats that can do harm from other locations
- The use of EP teams, how can we best employ male and female members

Lesson 1.5



Force Protection

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson



Divide participants into a few groups and ask each group to come up with three ways to mitigate potential risk to UN Forces. Record the answers and review at the end of the lesson.

Aim

The aim of this lesson is to provide the participants a basic understanding of Force Protection (FP) in the United Nations Peace Operations framework.

- FP terminology and general strategy
- Military component and FP
- FP risk mitigating measures and the UNIBAT

Slide 1



A core function for the MC and the UNIBAT, force protection (FP) should be a key consideration in all Peacekeeping Operations due to the increased acts of violence that have significantly plagued UN forces, representing some 90 percent of fatalities. This increase is attributed to the asymmetric capabilities of threat actors, as well as the willingness of armed groups to actively target UN peacekeepers. The combination of violent threats and the lack of consent for UN operations in an area has manifested increased security risks for the mission and their forces. So how do we face these new threats and in turn mitigate these risks. A robust UN FP strategy in the mission, implemented by all mission components, primary by MC and the UNIBATs is the solution.

For this STM and in the discussions for a UNIBAT to implement FP tactical planning considerations, the definition for FP will be that it is a cyclic, continuous, analysis process of detecting threats to UN forces, and their facilities, equipment, resources, activities, and operational freedom of movement; and then assessing the threat risks and applying mitigation measures. These measures include threat prevention, pre-emption, and response / reactive, and consolidation to preserve the UN forces' operational effectiveness to execute any given mission successfully.

In this training material, we will focus on the military tactical aspects of force protection. Therefore, we will concentrate on threats that intentionally could disrupt temporally or permanently the tactical capability of the affected units to in the discharge (operation) **of the mandated tasks. To ensure that the unit's operational** readiness is not interrupted, commanders need to identify potential threats and plan actions and measures to mitigate the risk they pose to the operational capabilities of the unit. These will result in proactive and reactive tactical actions to reduce the risk of security incidents against the tactical composition of the unit. Other threats and hazards should be considered and adequately mitigated, but those may not require a tactical approach, but procedural actions.

In this lesson we will discuss the concepts of FP in a PKO and in module 3 we will cover the operational spectrum of FP and tactical considerations for implementing a FP strategy.

Slide 2

Content

- Introduction, definitions & terminology
- FP in peacekeeping and the military component
- UNIBAT and FP
- FP coordination



Here is the lesson content in this lesson addressing the FP framework to be applied in a UNPKO.

Slide 3

Learning Objectives

- Explain the importance of FP
- Describe key FP definitions and principles
- Explain why the threat / risk assessments are important to UN PKO FP strategies
- Explain the MC FP functions
- Explain how the UNIBAT fits into the FP framework and how best to integrate FP at the tactical level

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4

Force Protection (FP)

- **Cyclic process**
- **Detecting threats to UN forces**
- **Assessing risks, applying mitigation measures**
- **Preserve freedom of action for operational effectiveness**
- **Contributes to mission success**
- **Integrated in all task**



A robust threat & risk analysis is the foundation

Force Protection (FP) is.

A fundamental principle of all military operations and a way to ensure the operational capabilities and survivability of the UN military forces.

Force Protection is a cyclic, continuous, analysis process of detecting threats to UN forces, and their facilities, equipment, resources, activities, and operational freedom of movement; and then assessing the threat risks and applying mitigation measures. These measures include threat prevention, pre-emption, and response / reactive, and consolidation to preserve the UN forces' operational effectiveness to execute any given mission successfully.

This process consists of threat assessment, risk analysis and risk mitigation. Risk mitigation involves planning, preparing, coordinating, rehearsing, and executing actions to reduce the likelihood and/or impact of identified threats

It is a unit commander's responsibility to plan actions, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats that can reduce or eliminate the unit's operational capabilities, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect the UN Mission."

Slide 5

Definitions / Terminology

- Vulnerability:** weakness which makes one susceptible to harm
- Perpetrator:** actors to attempt, manifest or cause harm
- Protection:** preservation from injury, harm by person, thing
- Threat:** in context of FP, threats of security incidents encompass acts or situations likely to lead to death or serious bodily injury / damage to equipment / facilities that impacts mission success or freedom of movement / action
- Security:** protection against intentional dangers / damages
- Safety:** protection against non-intentional accidental / hazard events
- Hazard:** potential cause of harm from non-deliberate action / acts of nature
- Risk:** the combination of the likelihood and impact of threats to develop

Let us start off the lesson with explaining the key terms and definitions used in the UNPKO FP framework. understand some key FP terms. For the purpose of this training, we will focus on the tactical aspects of protection. Therefore, we will concentrate on threats that intentionally could disrupt temporarily or permanently the tactical capability of the affected units to discharge its mandated tasks. To ensure interrupted the unit's operational readiness, commanders need to identify these threats and plan actions to mitigate the risk they pose to the operational capabilities of the unit.

These will result in tactical actions to reduce the risk of security incidents against the tactical composition of the unit.

Other threats and hazards should be considered and adequately mitigated, but for the purposes of concentrating on the tactical considerations for PKO, hazards and other threats such as accidents and diseases may not require a tactical approach, but procedural actions.

There is a distinction between Security Incidents and Safety Incidents. Security incidents are those that have malicious intent. Safety incidents generally do not have a malicious or intentional component and are classified as accidents, hazards, or occupational safety events. These are defined as follows:

Security incident: occurrences resulting from an intentional act that harmed or had the potential to have harmed UN military forces, their tactical actions / movement / freedom of action. Also, included are threats that damages military equipment and facilities impacting the success of a tactical mission.



Safety incident: occurrences in which no intentional behaviour is involved and are caused by accidents, natural or human-made hazards that harmed or had the potential to harm UN Personnel, programmes, activities, premises, facilities, and assets

In Module 3 (Operational Framework), we discuss the tactical approach to mitigate Security Incidents which may disrupt the operational capabilities of the affected unit.

We will also, use the following terms:

- Perpetrator: Actors to attempt, manifest or cause harm
- Hazard is a potential cause of harm resulting from non-deliberate actions
- Vulnerability is a weakness which makes one susceptible to harm

Slide 6

THREAT	RISK
<p>Things that could harm us</p> 	<p>Likelihood of being harmed by THREAT and impact of it</p> 
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat Assessment: process of identifying potential security incidents affect operational capabilities • Risk Analysis: evaluation process to determine degree to considered each threat • Risk mitigation: process of designing proactive and reactive COAs to reduce the risk of a threat • Risk management: process to develop and administer the the risk strategy 	

Let us review the definitions of threat and risk that we covered in the previous slide. These terms will be important as we go into the operation framework, module 3 and put it into practice. An easy way to remember and understand the differences remember the lion picture on the slide.

Threat

In the context of this subject, threats of security incidents encompass all acts or situations that are likely to lead to death or serious bodily injury of the unit's personnel impacting the unit's operational capability to discharge its mandated tasks. Such situations against UN military units, may either be during mobile or static operations and the restriction of the unit's movement necessary to accomplish its mandated tasks. Also, incidents concerning the destruction and damage of UN forces of equipment and facilities that impact the mission's success can be a threat.

Risk

Risk is the combination of the likelihood and impact of threats developing. While impact refers to the consequences of the materialization of a threat would have, likelihood refers to the probability of a threat to materialize. Impact can be determined by the analysis of the unit's vulnerabilities towards the danger level that potential perpetrators present. In a Force Protection analysis should consider the intention, capabilities, and historical

background of the potential perpetrators. While a threat exists or not, the risk is a level or degree that the threat possesses against the unit's capabilities and it is frequently assessed as low, medium, or high.

Threat Assessment

Threat assessment is the process of identifying potential security incidents that can affect the operational capabilities of the unit or disrupt mandated tasks.

Risk Analysis

Risk analysis is the evaluation process to determine the degree that should be considered for each identified threat. The analysis should clearly identify high-risk threats, which should be given priority.

Risk Mitigation


Risk mitigation is the process of designing proactive and reactive COAs to reduce the risk of a threat. Risk mitigation does not aim to eliminate risk but to reduce it. These risk mitigation COAs should consider measures to reduce the likelihood of a threat to materialize and its impact if it could not be avoided.

Proactive measures include COAs to reduce the likelihood of a threat development and reactive measures focus on reducing the impact of the security incident.

Risk Management

Risk management is the process to develop, administer, and oversee the risk strategy to mitigate security incidents and involve the preceding tasks of threat assessment, risk analysis and risk mitigation. Risk management should result in be logical, feasible and relevant COAs (strategy) that preserve the operational capabilities of the unit. Experience, judgement and creativity play a critical role in this process.

Slide 7



Possible Threats to UN Forces

- **Attacks**
 - Direct Fire
 - Indirect fire
 - IED
- **Assaults**
- **Strikes**
- **Raids**

Incident Type	Count of S/M
Direct Fire Attack	274
Access Denials	232
IED Attack	116
Harassment	95
Stone Pelting on Peacekeepers	70
Ambush Attack	50
Indirect Fire Attack	50
Theft Incident	45
Attack on COB	39
Demonstrations	39
Protests	37
Criminal Trespass	35
Intimidation	31
Malicious Damage to UN Vehicle	16
Attack on Boat	15
Indirect Mortar Attack	14
Arrest of Peacekeeper by Host Govt	13
Indirect Rocket Attack	12
Detention of Peacekeeper by Host Govt	6
Armed Robbery on Peacekeeper	5
Malicious Damage to UN Chastels	5
Abduction of Peacekeeper	3
Carjacking	3
Malicious Damage to UN Aircraft	3
Admin Delays	2
Malicious Damage to UN Equipment	2
Hostage Taking of Peacekeeper	1
Malicious Damage to UN Buildings	1
UXO Blast Incident	1



Ask the class to give definitions and examples of missions wherein these incidents that describe threats may be a risk to UN military forces. Facilitate the discussion using the following explanations of the threats.

Here are some general categories of threats to UN Forces in an area of operations. Note the compiled list of incidents on the right side of the slide in blue. The predominant number includes direct fire attacks, access denials, IED attacks and general harassment such as stone throwing. For this training, we will summarize threats as:

- Attacks, involving direct or indirect fire or IEDs
- Assaults
- Raids

These incidents that target UN military units, either during mobile or static operations and the restriction of the unit's movement necessary to accomplish its mandated tasks.

For the purpose of this training, we will focus on the tactical aspects of threats that intentionally could disrupt temporally or permanently the tactical capability of the

affected units to discharge its mandated tasks. Commanders need to identify threats and plan actions to mitigate the risk they pose to the operational capabilities of the unit.

This will result in proactive and reactive type tactical actions to reduce the risk of security incidents against the tactical composition of the unit. Other threats and hazards should be considered and adequately mitigated, but those may not require a tactical approach, but procedural actions.

Slide 8

Responsibility for FP

- Host government – **primary**
- SRSG / Force Commander
- Military unit commanders
- Mission components – assist and reinforce
- UNDSS – assist and reinforce
- Other mandated forces – assist and reinforce

Who is responsible for FP in a mission? Ultimately at the tactical level, it is the unit's responsibility. The host state always has the primary responsibility to protect UN personnel within its borders. Where the state is unable or unwilling to protect, or where government forces themselves pose a threat, peacekeepers have the authority and the responsibility to provide such force protection within their capabilities and areas of deployment.

In missions, it is the responsibility of the SRSG, the force commander and the leadership of all military contingents ensure the FP of all those under their command. The mission's civilian components also have a responsibility to support the mission's FP strategy. We will go into more detail in module 3 primarily how other components can support and assist when we discuss the preventive and proactive phases of FP.

Additionally, there may be mandated security forces or regional organisations' forces that are supporting international and UN objectives that possibly reinforce or assist in the missions FP strategy.

Lastly, you will note the fifth bullet shows that UNDSS helps reinforce FP. UNDSS is the United Nations Department for Safety and Security. This department has a Security Management System (UNSMS) that provides a framework for a UN system-wide approach to security that encompasses policies, processes and security personnel

aimed at managing security risks to the UN system to enable UN system activities worldwide. We will discuss the in module 3 how this system supports the FP strategy in a mission.

Slide 9



To assist the tactical planning process, we can use phases. The four phases are not sequential, and the UN Mission and forces will often find their activities fall into different phases in different parts of the mission's AOR at the same time, and some of the same activities may take place across all phases. In Module 3 we will examine the four phases in more detail, at this stage it is enough to know that the objective of this approach is to either eliminate a threat or mitigate the risks to the UN forces associated with a threat. It must also be noted that these phases are a planning tool (consideration) and do not necessarily occur in sequential order and may be undertaken simultaneously or independently. Here are the four phases:

- Prevention,
- Pre-emption / Pre-emptive
- React / actions on contact
- Consolidation (threat has been mitigated/neutralised/eliminated)

Action is necessary across all four phases, in the circled area are the phases that are more associated with reducing the probability of an incident for happening. These are proactive approaches taken by peacekeeping missions. In the prevention and pre-

emptive phases, the incident has not occurred yet and missions can more effectively avoid violence by focussing and executing plans in these phases.

In the reactive / actions on contact phase, the mission / UN force is responding to a violent incident that is occurring. In the consolidation phase the incident has occurred and resources and mission capabilities are needed to support the post-incident.

Slide 10

Balanced Approach

- Conduct risk analysis to mitigate, reduce or neutralise harm
- Mitigating risks to force vs mission accomplishment
- Risk is inherent in military operations
- Accepting reasonable risk to accomplish task
- Action vs in-action
- Waiting in a reactive posture increases hostile/ violent perpetrators freedom of action to attack UN forces

FP measures need to balance the requirement to execute operations in high threat environments, while recognizing the need to keep UNIBAT personnel safe from harm. While the UNIBAT staff should always seek to maximize FP, risk is an inherent part of military operations. At times, the UNIBAT will have to accept that not all risk can be accounted for, and not all threats can be protected against. However, mitigating effects can be planned for. Being a deployed UNIBAT in UNPKO means identifying, mitigating and, where appropriate or necessary, accepting risk.

In the past, propensity for risk aversion by military units has put them in an increase posture for attack and in harm's way (projecting weakness). Non-action and a weak posture have increased the forces vulnerability or at least the perception by hostile forces that the UN will not respond. To improve FP, units should identify threats and risks to their security and take the initiative, using all the tactics, to neutralise or eliminate these threats. Missions should go where the threat is, to neutralise it. Missions should also push operations at night, to take advantage of their superior technology. Waiting in a reactive type of modality and posture only gives freedom to hostile forces to decide when, where and how to attack the UN forces.

Slide 11

UNIBAT / COY FP

- Part of the Sector / Force HQs FP Strategy
- Defensive and offensive operations
- Infantry supports:
 - Engagement / liaison
 - Patrolling with task and purpose
 - Reconnaissance and surveillance
 - Area / Local / convoy security
 - Neutralise perpetrators
 - Repositioning of forces / QRF
 - Actions on contact
 - Assist in consolidation (security)

Every Infantry leader has the inherent responsibility to secure their formation or position and must do so with their capabilities and means at hand. The slide shows examples of operations and tasks that support the FP framework. All measures depend on the task at hand, the forces available, the threats, risks, and the terrain; they may include the full range of active and passive measures such as:

- Patrolling with specific task and purpose
- Reconnaissance and surveillance- point and area
- Attack- pre-emptive on a hostile armed group
- Attack- a reaction force to neutralise hostilities- delay, respond
- Secure critical facilities- normally a static measure, but can include mobile forces
- Local Security- units immediate /location / area
- Convoy security

Slide 12

Good FP Practices

- Solid-C2 / Planning / institute preventive & proactive risk mitigation measures
- Ensure unit readiness
- Robust posture
- Common operating picture
- Early Warning
- Rehearse actions on contact
- ROE training
- Coordination with others



Here are a few good practices when it comes to FP:

- C2 / unity of command / SOPs; FP plans approved by higher HQs, institute preventive / proactive risk mitigation measures; consider force protection throughout the range of military operations; base the degree of security established on a continuous threat assessment; **have** security in each plan, SOP, OPORD, and movement order
- Good situational awareness / Common operating picture (COP); early warning / NAI's manned / plugged into MPKI process
- Visible robust security posture: professional demeanour (deter); constantly portray an image of professionalism and readiness, project force; ensure unit readiness; avoid becoming a lucrative target; solid physical security - bases / equipment / defences in good repair (prevention)
- Rehearse, exercise, drill tactical plans at all echelons (proactive); actions on Contact / ROE training key; flexibility to adjust
- Coordination with others

Slide 13

Coordination / Engagement

- Force / Sector HQs and staffs / Regional Offices
- Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (MPKI) framework
- EOD personnel, IED risk mitigation measures, engineers
- Aviation, fire support units and CASEVAC
- Civil military representatives
- Local governments / local security forces
- Mission components- civilian / police
- International Organizations, Regional Organizations, NGOs
- Other protectors

Coordinating with partners is key to successful FP operations. Fundamentally it requires the UNBAT, working together with the military peacekeeping-intelligence (MPKI) framework, EP, mission components like the police, other partners, and support sections to identify the full range of threats and to support the FP support requirements. For example, the MPKI sections should be consulted to ascertain intelligence products on all relevant threats, and the likelihood of the threats. An IED threat can be mitigated and or neutralised through the employment of special equipment and personnel for a convoy. Engineering units / section should be consulted to ascertain what improvements of operating bases. The UNIBAT does not do FP in isolation or does it do it solely for its own forces. Here are some examples of elements that should be considered:

- Sector and Force HQs and staffs
- Military Peacekeeping-intelligence MPKI framework
- EOD personnel and their equipment as required, electronic counter measures
- Patrols, including aviation fire support and CASEVAC
- Civil military representatives

- Use of EP for engagement (see EP Annex)
- Engineers to assist in a good repair of an of defensive positions and barriers for an Operating Base
- Local governments for information regarding criminal and hostile groups
- Mission components
- International Organisations, Regional Organisations, NGOs working for the protection and benefit of the local population
- Civilian agencies, hospitals, power generation facilities, water works, communication centres, logistics dump, river/seaports, airfields and bases and other sensitive offices/installations which have a direct bearing in essential services and good governance, schools, police institutions, religious site leaders, structures of cultural/historic value

Slide 14



Another important part of UN doctrine that addresses security and protection is the UN Security Management System and Safety (UNSMS). Because it is an important component of a Mission's security strategy, it is important that you become familiarised with the conceptual framework. Additionally, some of the UN military personnel (example UNMOs, Liaison Officers) may be under / part of the UNSMS umbrella / planning.

Slide 15



- UN duty to reinforce capacities of host governments
- Supports UN personnel in unstable environments
- Principle of “how to stay”
- Determines acceptable risk
- Provides resources to manage the risks
- Development, implementation policies / procedures

All components help to support, reinforce, or supplement the capacities of host nation under UNSMS. The goal of the UNSMS is to achieve a robust and cohesive system to enable the conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the safety, security and well-being of UN personnel and the security of United Nations premises and assets

The UNSMS:

- Enables conduct of UN work
- Ensures safety, security, and well-being of staff
- Ensures security of UN buildings and assets

To establish and maintain operations in an insecure and unstable environment, UNSMS adopts the approach of “how to stay” as opposed to “when to leave” as a tenet. UN has made progress in achieving risk acceptable in the operational environment. The focus is to stay and deliver.


Slide 16



The Security Risk Management Process (SRM) has replaced in the General Threat Assessment process. In short, the SRM is a more holistic and common-sense approach process to mitigating risk. Also, it helps missions use resources more effectively by focusing on mitigating the proper levels of risks. In short, the process you see on this slide is executed using the following rationale:

- For a given place and time period
- In a specific operational context
- An analysis of specific threats and our vulnerability to them is done
- Driving an evaluation of their impact and likelihood, to happen
- Indicating a certain risk level
- Steps are taken to address and mitigate the risks


Slide 17



UNSMS uses a similar threat and risk analysis as we discussed in the FP. This slide describes the different levels of risks that can be assigned; also, known as the Security Level System (SLS). The SLS assigns a security grade or level. This is used to identify the over-all level of threat or danger in a specific location where the UN operates. It improves threat assessment in a specific context.

The SLS evaluates the five categories of threats: armed conflict, terrorism, crime, civil unrest, and hazards – natural and human-made. Note that SLS includes hazards that is a departure from FP. An SLS can be different for different locations. The mitigation measures that reduce the risk will differ in locations. Note the map on this slide showing the two levels.

Slide 18



The slide describes some of the key personnel responsible for UNSMS in a UN Mission. Note that the green-blue structure are the individuals and cells appointed by Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (UNDSS) to support and execute the UNSMS in a specific area / mission. Yellow structure comprises much UN country and mission leadership. Let us look at some of the responsibilities of these key individuals.

Designated Official:

- Normally the senior UN official in the mission
- Country, area where UN is present
- Senior UN official normally appointed
- Responsible for security of UN personnel, premises
- Secretary-General delegates authority to make security related decisions

Principal / Chief Security Adviser / Security Advisor:

- PSA/CSA/SA – trained UN security professional appointed by Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (UNDSS)
- Advises and reports to DO
- Maintains technical line of communication to UNDSS

Area Security Coordinator (ASC):

- Appointed by DO
- Office separated from capital / HQs
- Develops area-specific security plans
- Appoints Wardens to areas of responsibility
- Coordinate and manage security arrangements
- Part of the Area Security Management Team (ASMT)
- Advises on security matters

Field Security Coordinator-Officers:

- Implements security risk management, crisis readiness, security preparedness for locations in country and area
- Prepares country security plans and listings of personnel
- Establish contacts with law enforcement agencies for best protection
- Conduct security surveys of residences and premises

Wardens:

- Regularly inform personnel regarding security arrangements and residual security risks
- Critical link between DO / ASC, staff
- Assists implementing security plans

The UNIBAT will most likely have dealings and relationships with Field Security Coordinator-Officers and Wardens. Also, note in the diagram that the FC is part of the UNSMS Security Management team.

Slide 19

Contingent-Supplement Plans

- UN Forces' support
- Contingency plans / Reinforce / QRFs
- Security escorts to civilian components
- Support to Wardens
- Some military personnel may be under UNSMS



The Force Headquarters should have SOPs with directives specifying which Sector Headquarters, UNIBAT will have responsibilities to assist the UNSMA strategy. Force Headquarters should also ensure that SOPs clearly designate specific units to provide Quick Reaction Force (QRF), on call security, planning, and rehearsals with UN civilian sites. As mentioned, some military personnel living in local communities, may be under UNSMS. UNMOs, military liaison, and military staff / experts on mission are a few examples.

Slide 20

All Peacekeepers Can Do

Abide by Mission and UN policies, guidelines, directives, plans, procedures, and training requirements

Required for UN personnel

UNDSS BSAFE Course

Basic Security in the Field

There is mandatory UN security training. All UN personnel must complete Basic Security in the Field (BSAFE). There is a suite of DSS courses tailored for select personnel and missions.

Slide 21

Take Away

- FP is a cyclic process of detecting threats to UN forces, assessing risk, applying mitigation measures to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness
- FP is based on threat and risk analyses
- The Mission, Force / Sector HQs, UNIBAT all contribute to the FP strategy framework contributing to the secure environment pillar of the mission mandate
- FP measures are not conducted in a vacuum, coordination with partners is key to success
- Core function in all tasks

Summary

This lesson has provided a basis for understanding of the UNPKO FP conceptual framework.

- FP is a strategy that operationalizes analysis to minimize vulnerabilities of UN Forces from risks during tactical operations
- FP is based on threat and risk analyses
- FP is integrated in all military tasks
- FP measures are not conducted in a vacuum, coordination with partners is the key to success

RESOURCES

Situations- Handout; chalk board or butcher paper and markers

TIME

Suggested time 30 min to one hour (dependant on the discussions).

PREPARATION

At the end of the lesson, choose some of the following situations / activities for review and discussion. **Depending on the time available and the student's level of understanding, select all or the appropriate number of situations or activities below.**

Divide the class into groups and give them the necessary time to read the narrative. Another option is to divide the plenary into three subgroups and ask to provide each group a different topic. Ask the students to discuss and report back to the plenary. Provide the students with the Handout below (or provide the handout as a read ahead the day prior to the lesson presentation).

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and access the knowledge of the group and individuals. Here are some suggested topics / solution sets to help facilitate the discussions.

Situation #1

- Report to Higher HQs and seek support to help define an appropriate response. As well, to civilian component sections
- Engage and advocate with national authorities to ensure freedom of movement
- Interact with perpetrators to lift constraints on the free movement of civilians
- If required, and negotiations fail, deter, and engage with force, if necessary, to restore the freedom of movement
- When using force, only do so in accordance with the Rules of Engagement (ROEs). In all cases, any measures taken to must prevent negative consequences to civilians
- Do a threat and risk analysis; send out reconnaissance / security patrols prior to NAI that are identified as key ambush sites

Situation #2

- Respond appropriately by exercising inherent right of self-defence
- Use proportionate force to prevent the perpetrators from disarming UN personnel or seizing United Nations equipment and vehicles
- Communicate through the chain of command for additional support as needed
- Do a threat and risk analysis; send out reconnaissance / security patrols prior to NAI that are identified as key ambush sites. Use of the EP in the Preventive, Pre-emptive, reactive phases

Activity #3

- Determines which locations/routes require priority (FP)
- Mission, threat, terrain and weather, troops, and support assets/resources available, time available and civil considerations. Use of the EP to gain human terrain information
- Maintenance of unit integrity (i.e., section, platoon, company).
- Size of element requiring protection
- Methods and troops for reinforcement
- Restriction of movement (manmade or natural)
- Identify NAIs, incorporate risk mitigation measure appropriate for the predicted action
- Example -Possible Ambush sites (NAI), conduct prior reconnaissance / counter ambush
- Encountering an obstacle/checkpoint
- Encountering a mine or IED
- Medical emergency
- Lost vehicle / Separated vehicle
- Lost communications
- Vehicle broken
- Vehicle bogged
- Short and long halt
- Landing zone

Hand Out Learning Activity FP Lesson 1.5

Situation 1

A UNIBAT element is providing security for a humanitarian operation. But after travelling certain distance, your movement was halted by unknown armed group for no reason. What would be your action? How might you better plan to mitigate the incident?

Situation 2

A UNIBAT element is traveling in a convoy; after covering some distance the convoy is ambushed and your forces are being targeted. what would be your action? How could you better plan prior to the convoy to mitigate the incident?

Activity 3

While planning, what are the main considerations for FP? What are the likely contingency plans you might visualize to include in any FP planning?

Lesson 1.6



Quick Reaction and Reserve Forces

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson



Ask the students if any of them have been deployed as a member of a UNIBAT Quick Reaction (QRF) and or Reserve forces (RES)? Have them explain some of their experiences to the class. Here are notes for facilitating the discussion:

- *What were the alert cycles for QRF*
- *How did the unit deploy*
- *How were they supported after they were deployed*
- *How long did they stay on mission in the assigned AOR*
- *What were the C2 arrangements*

Aim

The aim of this lesson is to provide the participants a basic understanding of the conceptual framework for Quick Reaction and Reserve Forces and how they contribute to UN Peace Operations in the Mission framework.

- General understanding and definitions
- Structure, organisations, and tasks
- Support

Slide 1



Lesson 1.6 Quick Reaction and Reserve Forces

The UNIBAT often is deployed in two special designated roles: as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), that is typically under the C2 of the FHQ or Sector HQs and designed to quickly deploy to any part of the AOR; or as a Reserve UNIBAT (normally assigned to the FHQ and designed to reinforce or cover new areas). These roles will determine its organisation and equipment. This lesson will go into the conceptual framework for the QRF.

Slide 2

Content

- Definitions
- State of readiness and notice to move
- Tasks / organisation / structure
- Command and Control (C2)
- Support framework

This lesson addresses the QRF and RES frameworks in a UNPKO. The lesson is broken up into two segments: the QRF and the RES, both covering this general content.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Describe the composition and purpose of a QRF and the RES and why it is important to plan for multiple means of transportation
- Explain how best to facilitate C2 for a QRF / RES; and explain the unique characteristics of the C2 arrangements and their perspective AORs
- Explain the differences between the QRF and RES

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4

The QRF

- Organised unit for a special mission / tasks
- Usually deployed in platoon or company size
- Can be a UNIBAT
- Rapidly Deployed to an AOR
- Based in one location and temporarily deployed to another location
- Deployed usually by FC / Sector Commander

A QRF is normally a platoon or COY size but, in some cases, it can be a UNIBAT, or a separate Infantry Coy designed for rapid deployment. Based in one permanent location and temporarily deployed to other location. The QRF will generally operate from a single operating base, often under the direct operational control of the FC / sector commander or UNIBAT commander. Its SUR organisation and equipment reflect tasks that normally keeps the unit on an alert cycle for short notice deployment. Operational deployment / transported by ground, water, or air. The UN Military Aviation Manual describes Air Assault as a task for Helicopter units in support of a QRF (or another UN Inf unit). "Air Assault is the movement of ground-based UN military forces by UN military helicopter to protect vulnerable groups, support legitimate forces, secure areas not yet fully secured and to directly engage hostile forces."


Slide 5

Characteristics

- Alert cycles
- Notice to move time
- Prepared to deploy by ground, air, water
- AOR is designated
- Special training with transportation organizations / nodes / equipment

Here are some additional factors that define a QRF. Often a UNIBAT HQs and or Sector HQs will rotate a UNIBAT platoon or a COY as a QRF. They are given deployment alert cycles (red-amber-green example) to set conditions for a rapid deployment and employment by many means of transportation in extremis or non-extremis situations. The QRF is normally supported with planning and given notices to move in an area designated by the command. Both civilian and military transportation must be pre-planned, rehearsed, and ready to execute when ordered to deploy.


Slide 6



Before showing this slide, ask the class to give examples of QRF organisations that they have had experience with operating in a PK environment.

The next three slides show examples of a standard UNIBAT with three light infantry COYs, UNIBAT COY, and an Infantry Platoon designated / task organised as a QRF. It does not show all the enablers. Of note, the structure will be based on the force requirements designed for a specific mission. A QRF can be a COY or a platoon depending on the mission (in rare circumstances a UNIBAT), and the requirements based on Force HQs, Sector HQs or the UNIBAT Commander. Bottom line, the QRF organisation must be flexible, deployable, and initially self-sustaining with the required organic or attached assets to support the task / mission assigned. Note the Asterisk; this is the Engagement platoon (in concept) as described in in lesson 1.3. Dependent on the situation, a commander may include it in the organisation.

Slide 7



Slide 8

A Possible QRF Platoon Organisation

- Normally 4 to 6 squads
- Heavy Weapons / anti-armor sections
- Security elements
- Search elements
- Medical
- C2

Here are some examples of a platoon's capabilities and organisation. The organisation is mission and TCC specific and will be defined in the unit requirements.

Slide 9

Mission Tailored Capabilities and Equipment

- Light armored vehicles
- All terrain wheeled vehicles
- Crowd control equipment
- Breaching equipment
- Hasty defense package
- EOD capabilities

A QRF must be flexible, deploy rapidly, and have the necessary equipment to perform tasks in all terrains and within a spectrum of multiple threats. Here is an example of possible QRF capabilities and equipment.

Slide 10

Requiring QRF

- Serious incident
- Attack on UN facilities, UN personnel, civilians
- Bomb threat / IED
- Secure / defend a facility /hasty perimeter security
- Establish hasty checkpoint / roadblock
- React to fire on a site
- Conduct Search
- Consolidation - treat / evacuate casualties
- Show of force / deter
- Assist evacuation operations
- Crowd control



Before showing this slide, ask the students to give examples of why / when (situations / tasks) a QRF might be deployed. Record the list and compare it with the slide.

Here are some examples when a QRF maybe deployed a/ employed.

Slide 11

Command and Control (C2)

- Designate C2 early, prior to deployment
- Unity of command - clear responsibilities / tasks
- Clarity in- reporting
- CONOPs, MDMP-running estimates and hasty planning
- Deployment triggers / criteria / alert cycles
- Plans briefed / endorsed by higher HQs
- Coordination and control measures set
- May include C2 hand-over by phase

Because QRFs can be deployed into extremis situations, involving several command relationships, in support of operations of units under a different TCC, in AORs or UN bases that are under the responsibility of other command structures / responsibilities, it is imperative to have clarity in C2 and unity in the command relationships. Of note, companies and platoons do not have a robust planning capability, therefore the higher HQs must support / provide this capacity / capability.

- C2 / higher HQs well understood prior to deployment
- Unity of command – a clear responsibilities of the tasks and reporting chain and types of reports
- Designate C2 early before the QRF deploys, TACON / OPCON etc.
- Clear direction / guidance in written orders
- Clarity in planning responsibilities, the HQs that supports MDMP / planning- running estimates, hasty planning, CONOP development, MPKI products / Plans brief and indorsed by Higher HQs
- All HQs understand the deployment triggers / criteria / alert cycles
- All plans briefed and endorsed by Higher HQs

- C2 may be adjusted during phases of an operation
- Clear C2 responsibility hand over to what unit or commander
- Coordinate / deconflict fire control measures with UN force already in AOR

Logistics and Support

- Categories of self-sustainment required based on SUR, logistical support available from the Mission or other units
- Self sustainment requirements established and understood before deployments
- Normally 3 days self-sustainment
- Modular support packages for mission- engineers, EOD, MPs, communications, UN-CIMIC, EP teams, PKISR

Categories of self-sustainment requirements are normally based on SUR and agreed upon prior to deployment of the QRF. Additional logistical support maybe available from the Mission or other units. It is important that the QRF unit can self-sustain for an initial period in the early phases of an operation (normally 3 days). All support requirements should be established and understood before deployment. The higher HQs should consider modular assets and support packages to give additional logistical support to - engineers, communication teams, MPs, UN-CIMIC, EP teams etc.

Slide 13



The UNIBAT often is deployed in two special designated roles: as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), that is typically under the C2 of the FHQ or Sector HQs and designed to quickly deploy to any part of the AOR; or as a Reserve UNIBAT (normally assigned to the FHQ and designed to reinforce or cover new areas). These roles will determine its organisation and equipment. This portion of the lesson will go into the conceptual framework for the Reserve (RES).

There are a similarities and differences between QRF and RES, and for planning considerations for future operations, the UNIBAT planners must be flexible and maintain situational awareness throughout the Sector and UNIBAT AORs and for RES specifically they must have a working understanding of the Mission AOR.

Slide 14

Reserve Defined

- Withheld from operations until a specific situation that requires its deployment
- Normally, an independent Infantry COY designed to reinforce UNPKO operations when needed
- In larger missions can be a UNIBAT
- Generally, operate from a single base
- Usually, under UN operational control of the FC

A RES can be a UNIBAT, or UNIBAT COY or a separate Infantry Coy designed for a specific deployment in a designated AOR. The RES will generally operate from a single operating base, often under UN operational control of the HOMC / FC. Its SUR organisation and equipment reflect tasks that normally designs the unit on to be flexible and have a robust self-sustainment capability. Operational deployment / transported by ground, water, or air.

The concept for a reserve is to maintain a unit that is not committed to ongoing operations and is ready to be deployed on order when the situation requires additional forces to meet operational demands. This unit is expected to be equipped with modern equipment to have a rapid and agile response to enable the FC to influence the outcome of operations throughout the AOR.

Slide 15

RES vs QRF	RES	QRF
	•Withheld from committed routine / future planned PKOs	•Response force; specific tactical tasks
	•Committed at high levels (FC)	•Emergency response to support forces operating in assigned area of operation
	•Reconstituted	
	•Organized based on uncertainty, changing threats, risks	•Mobile, task organized to rapidly deploy
	•Committed, performs a myriad tasks	•Can be part of a CONOP
	•Reinforces success, consolidates	
	•New AOR	

- A reserve force (RES) is a unit designation that implies that it is withheld from committed routine or future planned PKO / tasks / missions. It is normally task organised with available support assets.
- The RES is committed at a high level of command (HOM / FC). UN Missions establishes / organises a RES based on a tactical or strategic situational uncertainty, changing threats and high level of risks
- The RES is not a contingency force and not assigned a routine AOR
- Once committed, the RES force must have the capability to perform a myriad of tasks; normally, it is employed to reinforce success, consolidate efforts in completed operation, or to ensure a safe and secure environment in a specific AOR or in a newly assigned AOR; finally, as a show of force to reduce risks in a designated area
- The Mission / Force HQS should always have a reserve and if employed must reconstitute another reserve force

- Like the RES, the QRF is uncommitted with the purpose to handle more of an emergency response in support of forces operating in an already assigned area of operations. Because it is designated as quick, it must be mobile, and task organised to rapidly deploy
- QRFs normally receive specific tactical tasks; a QRF is more of a response force

Slide 16

Rapid Deployment Battalions (RDB)

- “Protection by Projection” for POC
- Currently in some limited UN Missions
- Rapidly deploys anywhere in UN mission for POC
- Organic engineer, medical, mortar, EOD, logistical capabilities
- Mobile / air-transportable equipment / troops
- 4 x COYs (Platoons-3 x motorized, 1 x mech platoons)
- Self sustaining for long periods of time

Before we continue the lesson, it is important to note and to mention that in certain UN Missions there are designated Infantry battalions as Rapid Deployment Battalions (RDB). The RDB was born under the General Santos Cruz concept of "Protection by Projection." Studies have shown that there was a need for a highly mobile unit capable of rapidly deploying anywhere within a UN Mission to specifically protect civilians.

The RDB would be tasked in accordance with the Mission's military concept of operations, with the focus on the Protection of Civilians. The RDB forms a critical part of the Mission's POC strategy. To be effective, the RDB's capabilities include the analysis of threats to the vulnerable populations in its area of responsibility (AOR), so that it can deter such behaviour and, where necessary, neutralise it.

The RDB is able to operate day and night, at short notice, throughout the mission AOR. The battalion will be used to plug security gaps where there is no military presence and respond to situations where additional security forces are required in areas where civilians are most vulnerable to attack.

The RDB is prepared and configured to deploy forces in a phased approach. Leading elements of the RDB, comprising dismounted infantry forces, will be deployed quickly to mitigate imminent or ongoing crises. Follow-on elements, including additional elements

and equipment, will reinforce the operation, as necessary. The unit is capable to conduct operations itself or in conjunction with host nation security forces.

The RDB is equipped with air-transportable vehicles and equipment; has sufficient firepower; and is able to sustain itself for extended periods of time without external support. The locations for employment will be determined by the Force Commander. The unit will be deployed within a Sector's area of responsibility or in neighbouring sectors.

RDB organisation consists of a battalion HQ, 4 x mobile infantry company groups, each group comprising 3 x motorised platoons, one mechanised platoon, and a support platoon (total battalion strength: 850). The support company will comprise a HQ, one mortar platoon, one engineer platoon, an EOD team, one recce and surveillance platoon. Also, included for support are two Level 1 hospitals, a logistics group with a logistics platoon, a signal platoon, a maintenance platoon, and a transportation platoon.

Principles of Reinforcement

- Flexibility and Mobility
- Generic and Contingency Planning
- Infrastructure Support
- Speed

1. Flexibility and Mobility. The flexible use and timely deployment of forces is dependent on effective support arrangements based upon the best use of available resources. It requires a high degree of operational flexibility and complementary levels of mobility, and places a premium on achieving effective interoperability, standardization, logistic support, and command, control, and communications.

2. Generic and Contingency Planning. Detailed pre-planning for every individual option will not be possible since the volume, destination and timing of reinforcement will not generally be possible to predict. Transport and movement planning may therefore need to be based on a capability/capacity planning system (which matches force and support capabilities to the role envisaged) as a means, and common method, of providing the ability to react to varying requirements.

3. Infrastructure Support. Infrastructure planning in support of reinforcement remains of fundamental importance and must be adapted to the requirements of forces. It necessary to make optimum use of existing facilities and assets, covering the full range of requirements for base and staging areas and secure movement and reception of reinforcement forces.

4. Speed. The execution of military operations requires timely and accurate execution of tasks in a synchronised manner to achieve desired results. Reinforcement of any unit or body of force or men in UN PSO required proper planning and urgency in deployment in order to prevent escalation of any outward incidence or situation.

Slide 18

RES Requirements

- Light, motorised or mechanised
- Deployment by ground, water or air
- Modularity / flexibility
- 24 / 7 operations
- Self sustaining
- Delivers direct / indirect fires
- Suited for human intelligence
- Assigned AOR for prolonged missions
- Phased deployment

Now let us specifically look at the UNIBAT and its characteristics to be an ideal RES. Normally, there are three types of UNIBAT: Light, Mechanised and Motorised. The UNIBAT is comprised of three or four self-sustaining Infantry Companies (INF COY) also referred to as Infantry Company Groups (ICG), capable of deploying and operating independently to execute tasks as directed in the battalion AOR. These COYs are also ideal for a COY level RES. The requirements are based on mission, threats, tasks, and capabilities as required by the statement of unit requirements (SUR) needed to support the mandate.

The UNIBAT with organic and enabled capabilities, will execute operations from defensible, independent, and logistically self-sustaining Operating Bases (OB). The units have the capability to operate on a 24/7 basis and must be suitably equipped for the Operating Environment, including local climate and weather conditions. In self-defence or in the protection of the mandate within the ROE, it can deliver sustain direct and indirect fire.

Slide 19



You have seen this slide in an earlier lesson. A UNIBAT unit designated as a reserve has infantry tasks that support the military components strategy. The core or primary operational lines for the UNIBAT are Offensive and Defensive Operations, Tasks are defined, and measurable activity performed by a unit and the activity contributes to the mission accomplishment.

In the UN and in accordance with most ROEs, the UNIBAT neutralises hostile groups or forces. Neutralise is the task that renders spoilers to the UN mandate, hostile personnel or forces harmless. This can be done by show of force (presence alone).

Defensive Operation - here are enabling tasks that support:

Block – A tactical task that denies a hostile force or group access to an area or prevents their advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach

Deny- A task to hinder or prevent a hostile force from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, or facilities

Retain – A tactical task to occupy and hold a terrain feature to ensure that it is free of a **hostile forces' occupation or use**

Secure – A tactical task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed because of hostile action

Offensive Operations, here are tasks that support:

Clear-A tactical task that requires the removal of all hostile forces and eliminate any organised resistance in a designated area

FIX- A tactical task where a commander prevents a hostile force from moving from a specific location for a specific period

Isolate- A tactical task that requires a unit to seal off a hostile force from their sources of support, deny their freedom of movement, and prevent them from having contact with other hostile forces

Seize – a tactical task to occupy physically and control a designated area; taking possession of a designated area by show of force or force

Occupy – A tactical task that involves a force moving into an area so that it can control the entire area

Note that reconnaissance and neutralise tasks are condition-based tasks that support all the other tasks above.

Slide 20


Special Enabling Tasks in Support of the Mandate

- Patrolling
- Liaison and coordination
- Conduct Convoy escort
- Cordon and Search
- DDR support
- Observation point (OP)
- Check Point (CP)
- Establish TOB

All MPKI and MDMP driven


On this slide we show some of the Reserve Infantry COY's enabling tasks other than attack and defend that support battalion operations and macro battalion task. Leaders at all levels should understand how COYs plan and execute some of the most common peacekeeping tasks. It is important to note that many of these tasks may have Force / Sector SOPs or formal Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Clear understanding of these tasks will facilitate TCC planning and preparation, task-organisation, and the conduct of task-oriented training for the COYs.

Slide 21



The next two slides show an example of a RES both for a UNIBAT and COY. These are basic models only. Additional enabler units maybe required. Note: the Engagement Platoon (in concept) as described in Lesson 1.3.

Slide 22



Slide 23

Possible Tasks

- Support / reinforce ongoing PKO in need of additional resources to ensure success or reduce risks (normally at the operational / strategic level)
- Support POC / FP plans and strategies
- Deterrence to reduce violence in an area
- Support humanitarian efforts during a surge
- Fill operational mission gaps during transfer-of-authorities and unit rotations



Before showing this slide, ask the class to give examples of why the RES might be deployed (Purpose). Also, ask the students if anyone has had UNPKO experience as a member of a reserve unit. Have them discuss their experiences.

On this slide are examples of why a HOMC / FC might deploy a RES.

Slide 24

Command and Control (C2)

- Centralised control
- Deployed to specific sectors on need
- FC has UN operational command and control
- Sector Commanders may have UN tactical control (usually COY)
- Adjusted as situation dictates

Like the QRF, it is important to note that all C2 arrangements and coordination including communication plans need to be finalised prior to the RES being deployed. This is to avoid mix up once the reserve unit is operating in an AOR. Unity of command and clear delineation of tasks and command structure is clear at every phase/ stage of the RES deployment is required. The FC, normally, has UN operational command and control of the RES and the sector commanders may have UN tactical control (usually a COY size).

Slide 25

Support and Logistical Framework

- Capable of completing tasks, sustain operations
- Capable of being deployed throughout the Mission AOR
- Self-sustainment in accordance UN agreements
- Capable maintaining resources / personnel to support contingent administratively and logistically for mission duration
- Expeditionary mind set

Support in the areas of supply, maintenance, transportation, medical, general engineering as well as construction and field services.

The unit must be capable of completing all mandated tasks unique to the environment, as required under the terms of the SUR/SFR/MOU, without interruption.

The unit is expected to meet the standards of self-sustainment detailed in accordance with the terms of the SUR/SFR/MOU and the Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) Manual of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in PO. They must be capable of providing and maintaining the necessary resources and personnel to support the contingent administratively and logistically for the duration of the mission.

Slide 26

Take Away

- QRF / RES must be tailored organizations for the mission to be ready to deploy by various means of transportation
- Clarity of C2 and responsibilities must be designated early and understood by all
- Early QRF involvement in running estimates, hasty mission analysis, CONOP development is important
- Both QRF / RES must have a robust self-sustainment structure
- Need for a robust, flexible and mobile units
- RES must be able to deploy and perform unit tasks
- RES must be flexible to deploy for prolonged operations

This lesson has provided a basis for understanding of the UNIBAT as a QRF / RES unit:

- The need for a robust and agile force; proficiency in infantry tasks. The ability to rapidly influence operations in AORs assigned
- The Importance of a defined C2 arrangement prior to employment is key. It must be articulated and understood by all. There will be the need to clearly delineate the lines of reporting to ensure smooth operations
- Ready to deploy. The PKO environment has further compounded the problems and any delay in despatching troops to respond to situations may be catastrophic. For the QRF -rapidly and for RES-speed in tempo, deliberately phased into an AOR. Unit must be flexible and mobile
- All efforts must be made to free the force so that it may revert back to its standby role, if not the FC must reconstitute the QRF or the RES

Lesson 1.7



Crowd Control Operations



Starting the Lesson



Ask the students if any of them have been deployed in a UNPKO that included crowd control operations. Have them explain some of their experiences to the class. Here are questions to help in facilitating the discussion:

- Did the unit do special training
- How did they employ units, size etc.
- How where they supported
- Did host nation security forces / police support them and how did they coordinate efforts
- What were the C2 arrangements

Aim

The aim of this lesson is to provide the participants a basic understanding of the conceptual framework for crowd control operations and how the UNIBAT contributes this capability in UN Peace Operations.

Slide 1



Lesson 1.7 Introduction to Crowd Control Operations

Because Infantry units have such diverse tasks and mission, often the UNIBAT may be employed to conduct crowd / riot control. Public Order Management is primarily a Host Nations responsibility. If the Host Nation fails to conduct Public Order Management, within certain UN mandates the UN maybe asked to assist. The UN Police and their Formed Police Units (FPU) are usually assigned such tasks, however, if the capabilities or capacities do not exist; under extreme circumstances, UN Military units may be called upon to support or conduct crowd control. Under these critical circumstances, only with the proper training and equipment should a UNIBAT execute such an operation. This lesson will describe the conceptual framework for such operations.

Slide 2

Content

- Definitions
- Crowd behavior
- Principles of crowd control
- Task organisations
- Intro to formations and positions
- Equipment
- Support and logistic considerations

Here is the lesson content addressing the conceptual framework for crowd control.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Describe the principles of crowd control
- Explain the importance of MPKI
- Explain the framework for organizing a unit
- Describe the basic formations and positions
- Explain why it is important to coordinate with local authorities / security force
- Describe support and logistic considerations

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4

Definitions

Crowd


- ✓ Large number people with innocents & agitators
- ✓ Chaotic

RIOT

- ✓ Violent crowd
- ✓ Violent public disturbance
- ✓ Destruction of property

UN Crowd Control Operations

- ✓ Within Mandate
- ✓ POC / FP
- ✓ Control / disperse
- ✓ Use of minimum force



Demonstrations in Haiti

A crowd is a large number of persons temporarily congregated, it nearly always includes innocent people that are caught up in it through circumstances or curiosity. It may also shelter agitators, who are aware of the benefits out of the chaos that is created. They seek to provoke the host nation (HN) authorities or UN forces into ill considered, hasty action.

Types of crowds:

- Aggressive - characterised by a state of disturbance of order, carrying out offensive actions
- In panic – when seeking safety, individuals flee. In this situation, the biggest problem is the convergence of human masses to flow paths (escape routes) of limited capacity.
- Predatory – Looting -when driven by the desire to destroy or take possession of material goods (public or private), such as when disturbances are related to obtaining food, consumables etc.

A riot is a crowd that is focused on civil unrest that behaves in a violent way to provoke public disturbance against authority, property, or people. Riots target the destruction of property, public or private.

We should always be sensitive and weigh all the consequences when deploying military assets in civil unrest and crowd control. UN Crowd Control Operations have political and international ramifications. If available host nation and or police security forces are the better option; however, if the safety and security criteria outweigh other risks involved, the military option is available.


If a UNIBAT is used for crowd control we must stay within the parameters of the mandate, POC, FP strategies / guidelines, and within the ROE. All actions conducted by a UN Unit to control and disperse a violent crowd, must be acting under the mandate of protecting civilians, UN personnel and facilities

It is therefore important that not more than the minimum force is used to control and disperse a crowd and that the methods employed are appropriate.

Slide 5

Causes

- ✓ Social
- ✓ Economic
- ✓ Political
- ✓ Public Calamity
- ✓ Omission or Collapse of Constituted Authority
- ✓ Against UN presence



Here are some causes for crowds, crowd violence and riots:

Social. social motivation may result from social or religious conflicts or other reasons.

Economic. Riots with economic motivation may derive from differences between social classes, between employees and employers, or may result from extreme poverty, which may induce people to commit acts of violence to gain food or fulfil essential needs.

Political. Riots may emerge from political, ideological, or party divergences so that the political power is hit by use of illegal means.


Public calamity. Certain conditions caused by catastrophes may trigger violent riots among the population. They may fuel fear of other adversities, as well as food, clothes or shelter shortage and urban disorder or looting.

Omission or collapse of constituted authority. Authority omission when carrying out their functions may originate riots started by individuals or groups who believe they are entitled to break the law and remain unpunished.

Slide 6

Other terms

- Multitude
- Mob
- Insurrection
- Subversion



Here are some other terms that maybe applied in discussions with other organisations or the host nation. A multitude is a great number of people temporarily gathered in an unorganised manner. It may result from a casual meeting in central commercial areas in big cities.

A mob is usually described as a crowd in disorder, characterised by intense agitation, loss of rationality and respect for the law, thus becoming easy prey for negative leaders.

Insurrection is a total disrespect to order. Planned action against individuals and institutions.

Subversion: it is the set of local actions of a tactical nature and predominantly ideological. Subversives seek to indoctrinate the population that the constituted power and existing institutions cannot remain in power, even if creating riots are necessary.

Slide 7



The principles governing crowd control are as follows:

1. Speed. Speedy arrival at the point of incident should be a matter of priority since crowd likely and inevitably are bent to loot and destroy.
2. Mission and Objective. Conveyed by superiors to accomplish the mission
3. Cooperation with the Host Nation. UN forces can only intervene when they ask the UN forces for support, are non-existent or unwilling to create order.
4. Defence / protection /security. Approach and action must be taken to achieve all around security and to isolate the crowd. FP planning consideration / FP strategies.
5. Warning. Commander must use all available means to warn the crowd. This entails the use of bulge, public address system or whistle. The warning must be given in a language that the local population understands. A magistrate or legal officer if available may be involved to read the riot act to the crowd. A warning banner or interpreter can also be used to interpret the Riot Acts as the magistrate reads. One of the most effective deterrents to a crowd, however, is the sight of a smart, highly

trained, and efficient body of soldiers carrying out their riot control drills with precision and determination.

6. Graduated Use of Force / Forced use- minimum and progressively. The use of force is to be reserved as the last resort and where necessary, force must be kept at the minimum. Forces must embrace the gradual application in a progressive manner and must stop once the immediate objective is achieved. More force than necessary should never be used for crowd control or dispersal though there may be instances where rigid adherence to the principle of use of minimum force may result in high casualty. The subsisting rules of engagement must be invoked where such situation exists. Always refer to the approved ROE.
7. Dominating the Area. It is of no use dispersing the crowd and leaving immediately, as there is the likely tendency of the crowd to regroup. A joint plan must, therefore, be made by the military and police forces for patrolling the area. This may be carried out by the troops or police or both. Whenever the commander is satisfied that the crowd is not reassembling or that the police alone can carry out the patrolling, the military force is to be withdrawn to a predetermined location.

Slide 8

Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence and Information Requirements

ISR / UAS assists



- Numbers?
- Leaders?
- Purpose?
- Armed Individuals?
- Weather?
- Direction they are heading?
- Position / Size / capabilities of troops and other security forces in the area?
- Attitude towards the UN

As the UNIBAT conducts its threat-based assessments here are some of the key information requirements that should consider in the planning process and in intelligence gathering.

Information that will help us plan:

- Numbers leaders, key persons
- Other stakeholders
- What is their objective? What is their narrative they want to be heard?
- Weather conditions
- Who are they? What is the overarching identity of the crowd? Are they strikers, ethnic factions, or social protesters? Do they identify themselves as strikers, ethnic groups, religious factions, or protesters against some perceived social injustice?
- What are their goals?
- What is the composition of the crowd and are there any known factions?

- What are they capable of doing?
- What are their traditional behaviours or cultural repertoires?
- When and where will they assemble?
- Where will they go?
- What are the possible targets of violence?
- What is the worst-case scenario?
- When and where will they disperse?
- Are there plans for subsequent gatherings?

The Use of ISR/UAS is very important to support disturbance control operations. The use of UAV and other intelligence tools is key to the constant evaluation of threats.

Slide 9

Crowd Control - How

- According to the principles
- Constant evaluation of threats
- Minimum use of force; carried out gradually according to threats that arise
- Separate peaceful and violent elements

The means for the control must be carried out gradually and according to a constant evaluation of the possible threats existing in the area of operations.

Use of the force to control crowds must be carried out in a gradual manner according to the type of actions and threats that arise from the group of people and the peaceful or violent events that are carried out. We will discuss this in more detailed in module 3.

Slide 10

Crowd Control/Force Protection Procedures

- Accompaniment
- Denial
- Confinement
- Detentions
- Dispersion
- Return to Normality

The phases of a crowd control operations may follow what is described as Accompaniment, Denial, Confinement, Detention, Dispersion and Return to Normality.

Accompaniment: Monitoring an assembled crowd consists of gathering necessary intelligence and watching them to determine progress and development. Knowledge about the causes of the crowd must be known to the UN military, police, and civilians authorities. This understanding helps facilitate planning and the way we will employ our forces.

In some cases, the proximity of our troops to the demonstration causes the demonstration to shift to a stance against the presence of our troops and with that, the protection of UN personnel is in danger.

Denial: Blocking is the physical denial of advance upon a facility or an area by a crowd.

Confinement/containment: Confinement is limiting a crowd to the area they are presently occupying. Containment is useful to prevent those in the crowd from escaping. Crowd control formations, perimeter patrols, and barriers are effective methods to accomplish containment

Detentions: Civil authorities must provide adequate detention facilities for all subjects. If UNIBAT is required to detain temporary an individual, a location / facility needs to be set up. Civil authorities must take the lead on detentions and if for some reason the UNIBAT forces must detain a person, the proper procedures for an expeditious handover must be in place. If a UNIBAT is required to establish a temporary detention point, it must be reviewed by commanders at all levels with the assistance of the proper civilian component authorities.

Dispersion: Dispensing is taking deliberate actions to fragment an assembled crowd

Return to Normality: the crowd is calm and back to normal daily activities.

Slide 11

Considerations

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rules of Engagement (ROE) • Graduated Use of Force • Deterrence- robust presence / show of force • Non-Lethal methods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Necessity</u>- preventive, not punitive • <u>Minimum Force</u>- required to achieve • <u>Impartiality</u>- firm, fair • <u>Good Faith</u>- humanitarian laws, UN principles
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Ask the class to give examples of types of equipment, the use of force and techniques for crowd control.

Dispersal of the crowd is the aim. However, all methods must be in accordance with the ROE, UN policies, Human Rights laws, and within the spirit of the UN principles. On the right side in light blue are the principles / intent we want to achieve. Left are the key elements in all methods of dispersal.

In all cases, gradual force is applied.

- Deterrence / Show of force
- Ostentatious display of armoured vehicles
- Troops show discipline, displaying alertness and readiness to engage
- Verbal and visual persuasion using loud, public address system
- Photographing ring leaders and agitators to identify them as constituting a disturbance of public peace
- Gradual troops advance towards the crowds in riot gear

These actions next actions are considered at the higher end of graduated force, and if used must be if within the ROE. In these cases, the crowd has escalated violent actions against other civilians, UN personnel and forces. Remember the lesson on the conceptual framework for POC and the responsibility to protect. These following actions must be used with caution in order to minimize unintended consequences and can be lethal if not properly trained to use and employ:

- Tear gas and water cannons
- Non-lethal weapons
- Sponge grenades
- Anti-traction technology and sticky foams

Crowd control operations are usually extremely sensitive especially if they are being executed by UN forces depending on the degree of involvement and the mandate.

It is very vital to carefully design the rules of engagement (ROE) to bring to the barest minimum any possible repercussion that may arise.

The procedure for escalation of force up to and including the use of deadly force, as well as detainment of individuals (authority and handling) and contingencies covering medical treatment of casualties resulting from troop's action and employment of Quick Reaction Force (QRF) need to be clearly spelt out.

Slide 12



Ask the class to give examples of types of equipment, the use of force and techniques for crowd control.

UN troops must bear in mind that in crowd control situations, less-lethal use of force is essential when solving incidents or threats. Lethal use of force may only be used when a crisis escalates to a level where life is threatened within the framework of FP, POC ROE, UN guidelines, and mandates. Mission ROE, SOPs and policies should be referenced and followed as to what type of force and equipment can be used.

Slide 13



APC's deterrent effect and striking power may in certain situations deter crowds from acts of violence. Armoured vehicles, on wheels or tracks, cause considerable psychological and deterrent effects on the crowd. APCs are employed as a Reserve Force not only to back up engaged forces

They may also be used as command posts for the protection of soldiers patrolling on foot and for cordon and isolation actions.

Their mobility, armour and – if necessary - firepower ensure that barricades and other obstacles are removed.


Due to their deterrent effect and capability of unblocking access routes, armoured vehicles should lead the way for all convoys. It is important to highlight that because APCs can unblock streets quickly.

Armoured vehicles can be positioned behind or together in troop formations; however, this formation must be exhaustively rehearsed to ensure spacing between the troops and the vehicles is maintained and to reduce any safety risks to the ground troops.

Slide 14

Elements

- Cordon and Isolation Force
- Strike Force
- Reaction Force
- Reserve
- Observation / Base Team
- Support Team
- Search Team



Cordon and Isolation Force. Troops responsible for traffic and roadblocks control on main access routes in order to monitor the crowd and prevent more people from joining the riot.

Strike Force. It consists of troops equipped with shields, batons, tear gas ammunition, armoured anti-riot vehicles, and dogs – all of which aim at dispersing the crowd and carrying out Crowd Riot Control actions so that order is re-established.

Reaction Force. It consists of troops who stand ready in case a Strike Force is antagonised with overwhelming force/weapons – it will react in accordance with pre-established engaging rules.

Reserve Force. It consists of forces whose characteristics are similar to Reaction Force's so as to reinforce Cordon and Reaction Forces or to operate in an area nearby

Observation and Fire Base Team. It consists of observers, cameramen and radio operators who occupy dominant positions in order to identify leaders and firearms and engage in accordance with established rules.

Support Team. It consists of a team of medics, firefighters, legal advisors, social communication, essential public services, etc.

Search Team. It is responsible for searching an area after it is taken over to capture riot leaders, criminal offenders or individuals who have committed acts of violence as well as weapons, ammunition, and explosive devices. Searches, when inside homes, require a court order and can only be carried out during the day. When there is flagrante delicto, or strong indications of its occurrence, the warrant may be dismissed.

Slide 15




The next few slides will provide you some familiarization on crowd control positions and formations. Member states / Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) follow their own doctrine and training. Here are some examples of the individual troop positions that maybe used for crowd control operations. Also, positions and formations are adopted depending on the equipment available and the actions of the crowd.

Slide 16

Formations


- Initial
- Support Point
- **Line**
- **Wedge**
- Row
- Column
- Groups on Line
- **Echelon**
- Line formation with vehicle support



Here are some of the formations that a TCC may use to conduct crowd control, the UNIBAT may consider adopting these recommended formations; for simplicity and general knowledge, we will go over the three common formations that are highlighted:


- Line
- Wedge
- Echelon

Slide 17



This formation is used to stop a crowd or push it back. The line formation, when offensive, is used to make the crowd retreat, head to a clear area, or evacuate a street. When defensive, the line is formed to refrain the crowd or block certain road or street accesses. Obstacles should be placed to help achieve objectives.

Slide 18



Wedge Formation. Wedge formation is used to penetrate a crowd. When offensive, the wedge formation enables the squad to penetrate and split the crowd. Defensively, this formation can be used when quick reactions are necessary toward any direction

Slide 19



Echelon Formation. Echelon formation is used to drive a crowd away from an object or building. Generally, the normal distance between troops in echelon is one step back and one step to the right or left as shown.

Slide 20



An important tool in crowd control that should be mentioned is the use of PKISR assets. PKISR and aerial support assets enables UNIBAT commanders to have real time or near real time information on the direction and number of crowd formation. The unit troops can readily be re-positioned before the crowd approaches. Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) contribute decisively to situational awareness and is a valuable asset of modern UNPKO.

The Use of ISR/UAS is very important to support crowd control operations. With the use of this means of support, we can identify armed people in the demonstration, quantity, direction of the demonstration, position of the demonstrators, and the deployment of other troops on the ground, contributing to a better situational awareness.

The use of IRS/UAS to identify the main activities and positions of demonstrators on the ground makes it easier for troop commanders, at all levels, to better position their troops on the ground, identify possible locations for troops in reserve, identify locations for the outflow of protesters.

The authorization for take-off from the IRS/UAS must be in accordance with the air equipment flight rules of the Host Country and of the Mission Aviation Cell.

Slide 21

Take Away

- Important to act within the UN Mandate, rules and particular guidelines
- Principles of crowd control help guide operations
- General understanding of formations
- Specialised equipment needed
- MPKI products / threat-based analysis are key
- Importance to cooperate with local authorities and others UN Forces

This lesson has provided a basis for understanding of the UNIBAT and crowd control operations, the conceptual framework. More detailed planning considerations and hands on learning activities will be covered in Module 3.

Lesson 1.8



Handling of Detainees



Starting the Lesson



Ask the students if any of them have been deployed in a UNPKO that included the handling of detainees. Have them explain some of their experiences to the group. Here are notes for facilitating the discussion:

- Was there special training needed
- How did they process the detainees
- How where they supported
- How was the turnover to local authorities completed
- What support did they get from the police/ civilian components

Recommend that lesson be presented by a trainer who has some personal experience in planning or conducting operations that had to handle detainees in a UN Mission. Also, the trainer should review the Standard Operating Procedure on the Handling of Detention in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, by DPO, DPPA and UNDSS with an effective date of 1 January 2021 (or the updated version).

Slide 1



Lesson 1.8 Conceptual Framework for the Handling of Detainees in Peace Operations

Because Infantry units have such diverse tasks and mission, the UNIBAT during normal operations and daily tasks may be involved in the handling of detainees. Only with the proper training and understanding of the UN / Mission SOPs should a UNIBAT apprehend and handle detainees. This lesson will describe the conceptual framework for such tasks. Because a UNIBAT may need to handle detainees under many circumstances, it is imperative that we understand the conception, legal and operational frameworks for detainee operations.

Slide 2

Lesson Content

- UN SOP- Handling detainees
- Definitions / key individuals
- Principles
- Legal / Human Rights
- Administrative / records / coordination

Here is the content of the lesson.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Explain the purpose and general scope for the DPO SOP for handling of detainees
- Explain key definitions and the role of key individuals
- Describe the principles for the handling of detainees
- Describe the framework for records / and coordination
- Explain the maximum timeline the UN can detain someone

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

The UNIBAT leadership and staff must ensure that all personnel under their command are fully aware of the obligations to treat detainees humanely and follow the UN DPO and Mission SOPs for handling detainees. There are many military and civilian components and staff personnel that can assist the UNIBAT commander. Also, important is the knowledge of the requirements for reporting and handover. The UNIBAT must ensure to plan for detainees in all operations.

Slide 4

The slide is divided into two main sections. The left section has a blue background with the UN logo and the title 'Why the UN Department of Peace Operations SOP'. Below this is a light blue box containing a bulleted list. The right section has a white background with the UN logo, classification 'UNCLASSIFIED', and the title 'Standard Operating Procedure' followed by 'The Handling of Detention in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions'.

Why the UN Department of Peace Operations SOP

- Handled humanely; consistent with international laws
- Permitted where Use of Force by mission mandate
- Under UN control
- Missions have internal SOPs

UNCLASSIFIED

United Nations
Department of Peace Operations
Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
Department of Safety and Security
Ref. 2020.13

Standard Operating Procedure

The Handling of Detention in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions

The baseline for the conceptual framework for handling detainees is described in the DPO Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on the Handling of Detention in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. This document helps set the standards for the handling detainees in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The focus of the document is to ensure the proper handling detainees in a humane manner that is consistent with applicable international humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws, norms, and standards.

Of note, detention is permitted only in circumstances where the use of force is authorised by the mission's mandate and only in the circumstances set out in the mission's Rules of Engagement (ROE). The applicability is confined to those situations where an apprehended individual is placed under the effective control of the United Nations peacekeeping mission. The SOP is not applicable for apprehension by national officials of the host State or any other entity in the presence of United Nations personnel, or within the context of joint operations between a United Nations field mission and the host State authorities where a person is apprehended by the host State authorities and always remains under their effective control.

In most cases, UN Missions will have SOPs that are mission specific and that use the DPO SOP as a baseline. The Head of Mission or their delegate may issue supplemental guidance and mission SOPs relating to the handling of detained persons to meet specific exigencies within the mission. Such supplemental guidance may consider national legislation of the host country. Any deviation to the SOP requires the Head of Mission to transmit such guidance to UN Headquarters.

Slide 5



To ensure that we are all using the same common language for handling detainees, it is important that we go over certain key definitions in accordance with the DPO SOP, Handling of Detention in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

- Apprehension: The act through which an individual is placed under the effective control or custody of United Nations personnel
- Detention: The temporary deprivation of liberty of a person by United Nations personnel in a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation or special political mission. Detention commences from the moment of apprehension and continues for as long as a person is deprived of his/her liberty and remains under the effective control of United Nations personnel, regardless of the duration of the detention and ends upon release or handover
- Handover: The act of passing a detained person from the effective control of the United Nations field operation to that of the host State authorities or any other authority
- Transfer: The act of passing a detained person from one designated place of detention to another

- Designated Place of Detention: A United Nations facility or other location that is designated by the mission for holding persons detained
- Child: A person who is under the age of 18. Where there is doubt as to whether the detained person is a child, he/she should be treated as a child

Slide 6

Key Individuals in Handling Detention - Definitions

- **Apprehension Officer-** involved in apprehending
- **Unit Commander-**manages, supervises, preserving items seized
- **Commanding Officer (usually Sector / Force)-** notifies JOC / DFP, decides release or detain, maintains records
- **Detention focal point (DFP)-** Civilian (legal expert), monitors SOP compliance; keeps HoM informed, liaises with host state authorities / IC-Red Cross

On this slide are key individuals that are important to the UNIBAT when handling detainees.

- **Apprehending Officer:** A member of the mission who oversees the apprehension of an individual. The officer involved in the apprehension of a detainee is responsible for informing the person of the reasons for detention; searches the detained person, seizing items and ascertaining identity, age and medical condition
- **Unit Commander:** Manages and supervises the detention. Preserves items seized and records information. Determines to which the detained person is to be transferred. Notifies their Commander of the apprehension and organises the transport. Provides a written report of all circumstances of the apprehension
- **Commanding Officer of Unit Commander (Normally Sector / Force commander):** The commanding officer of the detaining unit (Unit Commander) is responsible for the initial determination whether to release or continue detaining the person and notifies the Joint Operations Centre or the designated office. Informing the detained person of the reasons for the detention upon arrival at the designated place of detention and may notify a family member or other person designated by the detainee

- Detention Focal Point (DFP): A United Nations field mission senior civilian staff member with legal expertise, not under the authority, command and control of the military / police components and assigned the roles to monitoring compliance of SOPs and keeps the Head of Mission informed about detentions. They liaise with host state authorities and the International Committee of the Red Cross. They coordinate the risk assessment process prior to handover of detainees and oversees post-handover monitoring

Slide 7

Principles for the Handling of Detainees

- **Humane treatment (personal responsibility)**
- **Mandated / legitimacy (SOP / agreements)**
- **Mission specific**
- **Non-discriminatory**
- **Sound administration**
- **Reporting / accountability**
- **Training**

The principles of handling detainees include the following:

Humane treatment (a personal responsibility)- A United Nations mission shall not subject anyone to arbitrary or unlawful detention. It shall ensure that all persons temporarily deprived of their liberty are treated in a humane manner and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. All United Nations mission personnel are responsible for the safety and well-being of persons detained by and under the effective control or custody of the field mission until the person is handed over to the national / state authorities or released. Female detainees must be searched by females.

Mandated / legitimacy / legal- Actions taken shall comply with the mission mandate, with the mission-specific with Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), Status of Mission Agreements (SOMAs), with the UNSMS security policies and operational guidelines, and with applicable international humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws, norms, and standards. Nothing in this SOP shall affect the applicability of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws to United Nations missions or the obligation of United Nations personnel to respect such laws.

Mission specific- A Head of Mission or his/her delegate may issue supplemental guidance relating to the handling of detained persons to meet specific exigencies within the mission. All such supplemental guidance shall be consistent with this SOP and shall

comply with applicable international humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws, norms, and standards. Such supplemental guidance may also consider any national legislation of the host country, as appropriate. The Head of Mission shall immediately transmit such guidance to Headquarters by code cable.

Non-discrimination- Detained persons shall not be subjected to discrimination on any grounds, including sex; race; colour; language; religion; political or other opinion; national, ethnic, or social origin; sexual orientation or identity; association with a national community; property; birth; disability or other status. Female detainees must be searched by females. Appropriate honour and dignity should be shown for local culture, religion etc. Communications with the detainee should be done in their language.

Reporting and accountability- Careful steps should be in place to ensure that proper records and reports are completed and maintained. There are examples of forms and reports required in the UN DPO SOP. Points to be kept in mind should be:

- Record all aspects of the apprehension and detention, including an inventory of items taken from the detained person
- Reports to Higher HQs
- Photograph of captured items should be taken
- A list should be prepared and properly signed by all stakeholders
- Captured items (valuable personal items) should be kept in a safe custody

Training- The UNIBAT shall take all necessary measures to ensure that appropriate training on the SOPs is provided to the subordinate unit's personnel. The Detention Focal Point should monitor the induction and in mission training.

Slide 8

Detention and Human Rights

- Right to liberty and security
- Prohibition of arbitrary detention
- Informed of reason for detention
- **UN must turn over to authorities or released within 96 hours of the time of first apprehended**
- Legal assistance; not testify against oneself
- Prompt family notification
- Special considerations for females and children

Let us explore in more detail detention and human rights. A UNIBAT and all its personnel are responsible for properly handling detainees. All detained persons are temporarily deprived of their liberty; and therefore, must be treated in a humane manner and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. Here is a framework that supports human rights when handling detainees. It is important that at the tactical level detainees are handed over or transferred to the proper authority in an expeditious, efficient manner to be able to manifest these rights. At the tactical level we must understand these rights and how they might be fostered at all levels.

1. Right to liberty and security of person and to freedom of movement: Freedom of movement is one of the fundamental rights of individuals. In certain cases, this right can be limited by the State, but only within very strict parameters. Restrictions must be clearly specified in the law, and must be necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.

2. Prohibition of arbitrary detention: deprivation of liberty is an extremely serious matter and can be justified only when it is both lawful and necessary. No one can be deprived of his/her liberty without legal reason or process, by an act of Government or with its complicity, tolerance, or consent.

What is an arbitrary arrest?

- Not based on legal grounds
- Not respecting legal procedures
- Not reasonable/appropriate in the circumstances
- Not proportional to the legal objectives
- Discriminatory
- Without fair, solid, and substantial cause

3. Right to be informed of the reason at detention: Any arrested person shall be informed at the time of his/her arrest the reason for the arrest. This shall be done in no technical language that the arrested person can easily understand. The detaining officer is not required to fulfil this obligation if the detainee makes it impossible to do so at the time of detention. If this occurs, the detaining officer shall inform the person the reason for his detention at the earliest possible time.

4. Handover to authorities should be in a reasonable time, fair trial or be released. Any person detained by a United Nations field mission shall be handed over to the host State authorities or released as soon as possible and, in any case, within 96 hours of the time that he or she was first apprehended. Where a handover takes place, all requirements for handover shall be met within this timeframe. If the requirements for handover are not met within 96 hours from the time that the person was apprehended, the detained person shall be released.

5. Right to prompt access to a lawyer: Any arrested person must be provided with the opportunity to make contact/engage with a lawyer. Right not to confess or testify against oneself: An arrested person cannot be forced to testify against himself or make any comments or confessions regarding the incident; there is an implied right to silence.

6. Right to prompt notification of family or if appropriate, a person of their choosing.

7. There are special considerations and procedures for both females and children.

Slide 9

Records

- Personal data of the detainee
- Apprehension officer
- Reason for detention
- Time / date / place
- All individuals involved
- Other information of the site
- Items seized

Here is an example of the possible information that will be required to record at the time of the apprehension / detention, including an inventory / photo of items taken from the detained person.

Slide 10



On this slide we show a list of forms that the Mission may require:

- Detention form- to record all aspects of the apprehension and detention, including an inventory of items taken from the detained person which is to be attached to the detention form
- Transfer form- to be used for the transfer of a detainee from one UN facility/location to another
- Medical form- to be completed upon medical examination or transfer to a UN medical facility for medical treatment
- Release form- to be completed upon the release of a detained person
- Handover form- to be completed upon handover of the detainee to State authorities
- The Statement of Detention- shall be handed to the apprehended person by the Unit Commander as soon as possible This statement shall be translated by the mission into a language the detained person understands and, when given to the detained person, should, where reasonably practicable, be read aloud to the detained person

- The Declaration of Assurance- written in the official language of the host State can be used to obtain necessary assurances from the national authorities as a preparatory measure prior to the handover
- A Statement on Release or Handover- shall be filled in and given to the person released or person handed over to the host State authorities

Slide11

Liaison and Coordination

- Sector and or Force HQs
- Military police / force provost marshal
- UN police
- Detention Focal Point (DFP)
- Appropriate human rights components
- Civil affairs
- Gender Adviser or Senior Women's Protection
- Child Protection Adviser / Focal Point
- Medical personnel
- International Committee of the Red Cross

The UNIBAT staff and commanders are required to coordinate with their Higher HQs and the other mission components. Here are examples of the possible interlocutors. A very good source of information can be the Force Provost Marshal and the Military Police. They should also be aware of the range of non-military governmental, and independent (national and international) organisations that play a pivotal role in assisting in, and overseeing, arrangements for the treatment of detainees.

Slide 12

Take Away

- Handling of detainees should be part of mission analysis
- UN DPO has an SOP; normally Missions have their SOPs
- When handling detainees, the UNIBAT should understand the key definitions, principles and personnel
- UNIBAT should transfer / handover as soon as possible (UN must turn over to authorities or released within 96 hours of the time of first apprehended)
- Ensuring human rights; special considerations for female and child
- Keeping detailed records and reports are important
- Liaison, coordination with mission and non-mission actors are crucial when handling detainees in a PKO

The UNIBAT leadership and staff must ensure that all personnel under their command are fully aware of the obligations to treat detainees humanely and follow the mission SOP for handling detainees. There are many military and civilian components and staff personnel that can assist the UNIBAT commander. Also, important is the knowledge of the requirements for reporting and handover. The UNIBAT must ensure to plan for detainees in all operations.

Lesson 1.9



MPKI and PKISR Overview



Starting the Lesson



Ask the students if any of them have been deployed in a UNPKO that included operations with ISR units and or unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Have them explain some of their experiences to the class. Here are notes for facilitating the discussion.

Aim

The aim of this lesson is to provide the participants a basic understanding (Introduction) of the conceptual framework for Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (MPKI) and Peacekeeping Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (PKISR). More details will be covered in module 3 lessons.

Slide 1



As you will recall, the purpose of UN military peacekeeping-intelligence (MPKI) in UN Peacekeeping Operations is to provide situational awareness to enhance decision making, provide early warning of threats to UN personnel and the civilian population, and to identify shifts in trends that could impact the mission's ability to implement its mandate. Peacekeeping-intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (PKISR) is an enabler in providing that situational awareness and supporting UN decision-making.

As the mandates and operating environments of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations have evolved, there is a need for peacekeeping missions to understand their operating environments better and to produce intelligence products to support mandate implementation.

This module aims to inform you of the PKISR conceptual framework. Much of this module will be revision since all participants should have completed the UN staff officer and UN military intelligence officer (MIO) courses before attending this course. However, to set the context, this module will reiterate some of the fundamental issues that will underpin the PKISR course. Additionally, we will introduce the unmanned aerial systems (UAS) capabilities as a resource for the UNIBAT. In both module 1 and in module 3 we will use both PKISR and PKISR interchangeable.

Slide 2

Lesson Contents

- MPKI and the PKISR processes
- Role of leadership
- Definitions
- Command and control
- Characteristics and capabilities of Unmanned aerial systems (UAS)

Here are the topics we will be covering in this lesson.


Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Explain why UN MPKI and PKISR capabilities are important to UN missions
- Explain the role of mission leadership in directing the use of PKISR
- Explain key PKISR definitions
- Explain the command and control of PKISR assets
- Describe UAS characteristics, capabilities, acquisition and analysis framework

Let us review the learning outcomes before we start this lesson. Please take a moment to read and understand what you are expected to be able to do at the end of the lesson. At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on this slide.

Slide 4



This lesson is based on the United Nations Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook (May 2019) and the Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Staff Handbook (Sep 2020).


Why has the UN embraced Intelligence instead of Information? Mandates and operating environments of United Nations peacekeeping missions have evolved, so too have the capabilities, processes and procedures required to gather and analyse information.

In high-tempo, complex and dangerous environments, asymmetric, hybrid and transnational threats pose serious dangers to peacekeepers and the population and impact the mandate implementation. In these environments, there is a need for peacekeeping missions to understand their operating environments better. This also includes maintaining a strategic overview of developments, and anticipated strengths and weaknesses of threats/spoilers that may impact on the ability of peacekeepers to execute their mandate effectively.

The Department of Peace Operations, Office of Military Affairs (OMA) has developed the Military Peacekeeping-intelligence and Peacekeeping-intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance handbooks, which support the military component who work within the Mission PKI system. The way the UN conducts peacekeeping-intelligence may differ from your own national methodology; it is crucial to understand these differences.

Slide 5



Here is the MPKI cycle. It is typically represented as a closed cyclical path of activities that takes you through direction, acquisition, analysis, and dissemination. We will be looking at elements of this cycle to help explain the use of PKISR capabilities, and more specifically activities aligned to the acquisition stage of the cycle.

Slide 6

Why UN Peacekeeping- Intelligence?

- Support situational awareness to enhance decision making.
- Provide early warning of imminent threats to civilians and UN personnel.
- Identify relevant trends and threats.

At DPO policy states that the fundamental purpose of peacekeeping-intelligence in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations is to aid mission leadership in taking decisions by:

- Ensuring a common operational picture: establishing and maintaining an up-to-date, accurate peacekeeping-intelligence picture of the mission area helps to support planning and operations
- Providing early warning of imminent threats: providing early warning of an imminent threat to life, through timely intelligence, allows the mission to act appropriately in accordance with its mandate
- Identifying risks and opportunities: Peacekeeping-intelligence can provide mission leadership with an enhanced understanding of shifts in the strategic and operational landscape, with respect to the safety and security of UN and associated personnel, the Protection of Civilians, as well as the political context

Slide 7


Principles

- Under rules
- Non-clandestine
- Areas of application
- Respect of state sovereignty
- Independence
- Accountability, capability, authority
- Security & confidentiality
- Command led
- Invest in ISP and MPKI battle-rhythm
- Centralised control-decentralised execution
- Objectivity
- Accessibility and timeliness

Let us review the principles that guide PKI. The overarching set of principles from the UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy is on the left of the slide, and the practical set of principles from the UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence (MPKI) Handbook on the right. Both sets of principles also apply to PKISR and will help to guide you in your duties as a military intelligence officer (MIO).

These principles cover all activities regarding the management and conduct of United Nations peacekeeping-intelligence. All subordinate guidance, directives, plans and operations shall comply with these principles.

Slide 8



Now let us change gears to the subject of PKISR. This diagram shows 3 of the 4 steps of the MPKI cycle and where PKISR supports it. Note that the cycle is not complete – the 'dissemination' step of the cycle has not been included for the purpose of this slide.

The aim of PKISR is to manage the acquisition of information. This is a complex process that involves the consolidation and prioritization of information requirements and matches them alongside Mission PKISR assets, all in support of current operations. What makes it complex, is the ability of the U2 to interpret requirements and acquiring the necessary data for it to be processed into intelligence, all in a timely manner that supports decision making. PKISR drives the MPKI cycle. Of note, the tasking of PKISR is not the sole domain of the military component of a Mission – any component of the Mission can request information via in a PKI-related question. We will go into more detail on this issue later in the course.

Slide 9

Role of Mission Leadership

- **Mission leadership plays a key role in directing PKISR**
- **Clear direction helps PKISR focus on what is important to the leadership**
- **Continual leadership ensures PKISR assets are prioritized to collect critical information requirements**

The mission leadership plays a key role in directing PKISR. It is important that PKISR resources collect information that supports the leadership's decision-making process. Because there is a finite number of resources, it is essential that intelligence requirements are prioritised based on the needs of the leadership. As such, it is important that the leadership provides continual direction and guidance as part of the PKISR process.

The commander must be prepared to provide direction in times when the staff cannot resolve resourcing issues themselves.

Slide 10

PKISR key terminology

- Intelligence requirement
- Commander's Critical Information Requirements
- Priority Peacekeeping Intelligence Requirement
- Specific Peacekeeping Intelligence Requirement
- Essential Elements of Information
- Request for Information
- Indicators and Warnings
- Force Information Acquisition Plan
- Force Information Acquisition List

There are certain PKISR terms that must be understood by the UNIBAT staff to ensure the PKISR process runs smoothly. We will go through each term, explaining what it means and how it relates to the other terms and the PKISR process, including the information acquisition plan. It is important that the Force leadership and HQ staff are aware of this terminology.

Slide 11

Intelligence Requirement (IR)

- IRs are determined during the planning process
- IRs aim to answer the gaps in knowledge important to decision-making process
- All IRs should be prioritized to allow the most effective tasking of acquisition units

Intelligence requirements are determined during the planning process by reviewing what is already known against what needs to be known to fulfil the mission. When there is a gap in knowledge, a question is posed to form the basis for an intelligence requirement. Answering questions will assist the commander in making a decision.



Instructor notes: The PKISR Handbook defines an IR as 'the basis for tasking of an acquisition unit'. For these lessons, the intelligence requirement (IR) is defined as shown on the slide, and information requirement (IR) is as described in the PKISR handbook.

Slide 12

Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR)

- Information that is required to allow Force leadership to make timely and effective decisions
- U2 may need to define CCIRs on behalf of the leadership

Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIRs) are the overarching requirements set by the Force leadership. They can be anything the Force leadership determines as critical to the success of the mission or represents a threat to the implementation of the mandate. CCIRs should be established from the outset of a UN Mission, although they will be reviewed and amended throughout the life of a Mission.

Generally, the CCIRs that the Intel cell receives from the Force leadership will be very broad and general in nature. For example, the Force Commander might ask what threats exist from a certain armed group. It is the U2's role in this case to break this broad question down into a series of smaller questions that can eventually be tasked for acquisition, more of which in the following slides.

Slide 13

Priority Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement (PIR)

- PIRs form the basis of acquisition priorities
- PIRs should be drawn primarily from CCIRs
- U2 will need to define PIRs on behalf of the leadership
- PIRs should be regularly reviewed to ensure that they are still relevant

There is often insufficient PKISR assets in the mission to collect all intelligence requirements. Therefore, it is essential that the acquisition of information reflects the Force Commander's priorities to ensure the effective coordination of PKISR assets.

Priority Peacekeeping-intelligence requirements (PIRs) should be drawn primarily from the CCIRs but can also be derived from direction given by the Mission and Force leadership. PIRs form the basis of acquisition and therefore staff should spend time to ensure they are well written and truly represent the needs of the leadership. The PIRs will form the basis for the tasking of PKISR assets.

It is important to note that the commander is unlikely to offer a set of PIRs written in a way that feeds the PKISR process. Instead, they will likely outline their concerns and operational priorities, and it is the responsibility of the peacekeeping-intelligence leader (Chief U2) to draw PIRs from what is discussed. These PIRs are likely to form an important part of the information Acquisition Plan (IAP).

Slide 14

Specific Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement (SIR)

- PIRs are broken down into several SIRs to facilitate collection efforts
- SIRs are best structured thematically to support the acquisition process

PIRs can be broken down further into specific peacekeeping-intelligence requirements (SIRs) which are specific questions aimed in a focused manner to be included in an Information Acquisition Plan (IAP). For example, a broad PIR relating to the Protection of Civilians might not make sense to a reconnaissance patrol – for example, 'what are the threats to civilians?'. However, asking questions such as, 'what threats face civilians in town x', 'which armed groups are active in town x', 'where are civilians most vulnerable in town x', 'why are armed groups attacking town x', etc. are easier for the patrol to answer.

It makes sense to group the SIRs thematically. This saves duplication of effort and provides the U2 staff with a coherent response to their acquisition questions which in turn allows them to answer PIRs effectively.

Slide 15

Essential Elements of Information (EEI)

- EEI are individual questions that will be assigned against the acquisition assets
- The EEIs relate to the SIR, which in turn relate to the PIR
- There are no set rules on how many EEIs relate to an SIR

The EEI is the final step in breaking down PIRs into individual questions that can be assigned against a specific acquisition asset. The EEIs provide the details needed to inform the development of the information acquisition plan (IAP). EEIs, once answered, should provide enough information to allow analysts to give a complete and satisfying answer to each requirement. The EEIs relate to the SIR, which in turn relate to the PIR. There are no set rules on how many EEIs relate to an SIR – this will be the role of the U2 staff to determine, based on its capacity to manage the IAP.

Request for Information (RFI)


- RFI is a request for information by any individual or entity in the Mission that needs to be answered by PKISR capabilities
- All RFIs must receive a response, even if the request cannot be answered
- RFIs can be prioritized against the EEs to allow for the effective tasking of PKISR

ISR assets are not the sole domain of the military, and as such any component in the mission must be able to request information that helps them implement the mandate, for example, monitoring IDP camps, the movement of internally displaced people, election violence, etc.

The RFI process allows for any individual or entity in the Mission to ask a question that needs to be answered by the PKISR capabilities. The Force requires a well-established process that allows all Mission civilian and uniformed components to submit an RFI, which can be prioritised against the EEs to allow for the effective tasking of PKISR.

Maintaining a relationship with other Mission entities helps to facilitate this process.

Slide 17



This diagram demonstrates how, on the left, the U2 receives direction in the form of CCIRs or PIRs. These requests for information are then analysed and broken down into more detail until eventually specific questions are identified that can be assigned to different acquisition assets based on those assets' capabilities and suitability for the task.

Indicators and Warnings (I&W)

- An indicator is an observable behaviour or event that points towards a particular outcome
- Generally, indicators should be linked to a named area of interest (NAI), where such behaviors and events can be observed

An indicator is an observable behaviour or event that signals a particular outcome, or that confirms or denies a relevant actor's course of action. Such indicators and warnings are usually based on historical data collected during the life of the Mission. For example, the assembly of armed personnel in a specific area or the pre-emptive movement of civilians away from their village might indicate an imminent attack. Such indicators and warnings can be time sensitive and therefore must be acted on immediately in order to inform decision-makers.

It is impossible for PKISR assets to monitor all events in the mission area. For this reason, indicators are aligned to specific geographical locations, referred to as named areas of interest (NAI). In other words, areas where the mission thinks certain indicators will possibly highlight an imminent event taking place.

Slide 19

Information Acquisition Plan

- A tool that captures the 'direction' from the mission's leadership
- The IAP is a living document
- There is more than one IAP in the mission
- Basis for execution orders, via an 'information acquisition list'

The Force Information Acquisition Plan (IAP) is a tool that captures all the intelligence requirements (questions) from the Mission leadership, including the Force Commander, and from other sources that need to be answered using PKISR assets.

The IAP is a living document. It must be reviewed regularly to ensure questions have been answered and that new requirements are added to the plan. The plan is the basis for collating requirements, prioritizing them, and tasking ISR, ensuring the right sensor is deployed to answer a specific question.

Several IAPs will exist within the mission, such as a Mission / Force / Sector and Battalion IAP depending on the different assets and questions being asked at each level.

The IAP is the basis for an executive order. The staff use the IAP to task, direct and manage acquisition assets to acquire information against the requirements. The daily tasking of PKISR assets will be found in the Force's Information Acquisition List, which we will go onto next.

Slide 20

Information Acquisition List

- A daily list of information to be acquired on a given day
- Each requirement is tasked against a specific PKISR unit / assets
- Each requirement is prioritized to ensure the most information is collected first
- A combination of the prioritized EEIs, RFIs and I&W

The Information Acquisition List (IAL) is a tool that captures the daily tasking of PKISR assets to collect against specific information requirements. Tasking is aligned to the prioritization noted in the IAP to ensure the most important information is collected first.

The IAL is a daily tasking order that brings together the priority EEIs, RFIs and I&Ws that need to be acquired on that day.

Command and Control

- A clear C2 structure is essential for the effective management of PKISR
- Ideally, execute a centralised command and decentralised control structure
- C2 of PKISR assets may differ between missions

It is important to have a clear understanding of the command and control of PKISR assets within your mission. Arrangements between missions may be slightly different based on mission standard operating procedures. Ensure you understand the PKISR C2 structures once you are in the mission.

A clear C2 structure is essential for the effective management of PKISR to ensure the timely acquisition and dissemination of intelligence. The most effective way to manage PKISR assets is to execute a centralised command and decentralised control structure. In practice this means that whilst the Director/Chief of Mission Support (D/CMS) is responsible and accountable for the effective utilization and tasking of UN commercial or military PKISR assets, the process of assigning effective tasking to those assets should be conducted at a lower level and managed by Chief PKISR on behalf of the U2. There might be occasions where the control is delegated to another entity within the Force, e.g., a sector HQ for a specific operation or be retained with D/CMS.

Slide 22

Unmanned aerial systems (UAS)

22


As a military intelligence officer, working in PKISR, you must be familiar with the PKISR assets available to you in the mission area so that you can employ them to full effect. This portion of the lesson will provide an overview of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), an important asset in UNISR capabilities.

Slide 23



The next few slides highlight key aspects in the United Nations UAS Guidelines (2019), the Military Aviation Unit Manual (2021) and the Aviation Manual (2021). A deeper explanation about the subject can be found in these three publications.

Slide 24



As UAS are widely employed across a variety of national and coalition operations, the terminology around the capabilities and the way in which they are described are relatively broad. It is important to document UAS terminology for the purpose of creating a clear, unambiguous UN picture of what is meant by the terms that are used when discussing the subject.

The following definitions are the basis for understanding UAS operations in a UN Peacekeeping Mission:

Unmanned aircraft (UA). The overall term for all aircraft that do not carry a human operator and can be operated remotely using varying levels of automated functions.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). A UAV is an unmanned aircraft that is remotely controlled by a UAV operator who is tasked with the overall responsibility for the operation and safety of the UAV but does not need to be trained and certified to the same standards as a regular pilot of a manned aircraft. This is typically the case for small and tactical UAS operated for military purposes or for commercially available quad copters employed for main operating base security and surveillance (such as ScanEagle, Shadow 200, etc.).


Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). The overall term for a system whose components includes one or more unmanned aircraft, the supporting network and all equipment and personnel necessary to control the unmanned aircraft.

Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). An unmanned aircraft that is controlled from a remote station by a pilot, who is tasked with the overall responsibility for the operation and safety of the RPA and who has been trained and certified to equivalent standards as a pilot of a manned aircraft as per civilian or military regulations. This is usually the case for all medium and high altitude / long endurance RPA (e.g., MALE/HALE).

Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS). A UAS whose components include one or more RPA.

Aviation Safety. In the context of aviation, safety is the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk management.

Slide 25



There is additional terminology that requires clarification in the context of the UN's use of UAS. When discussing the ability to control the aircraft the term line of sight (LOS) is often used.

Let us start explaining the differences between the various types of control. The term line of sight (LOS) refers to the way a Ground Control Station (GCS) communicates with a UAS to provide directional input and to receive any feed from the sensors. There are 3 types of 'line of sight' control depicted on the slide.

First, 'visual LOS' is used to describe most Class I UAS as the aircraft pilot must be able to always see the UAS to safely control the asset and avoid collisions with other aircraft, people, buildings and terrain.

Next, 'radio LOS' is used to describe a UAS that can go beyond the visual operator range, but is limited by terrain obstacles, just like a common radio station that we tune in our car.

Finally, 'beyond LOS (BLOS)' refers to the need to use satellite uplinks and downlinks to communicate with the UAS and is almost exclusively used to refer to Class III UAS.

Slide 26

Characteristics

Class	Category	Recommended Employment	Normal Aprox Recommended Altitude (AGL)	Range	Examples
Class III	HALE	Strategic/National	< 65,000 ft	Unlimited (BLOS)	Global Hawk
	MALE	Operational/Theater	< 45,000 ft	Unlimited (BLOS)	Heron/Hermes 900
Class II	Tactical	Tactical Formation	< 18,000 ft	< 150 km (LOS)	Hermes 450/Falco Sperwer
Class I	Small	Tactical Unit	< 1,000 ft	< 50 km (LOS)	Scaneagle/Shadow 200 Luna
	Mini	Tactical Subunit (manual or hand launch)	<1,000 ft	< 25 km (LOS)	Raven/Aladin Puma/Skylark Heidrum V1
	Micro	Tactical Subunit (manual or hand launch, tethered)	< 400 ft	< 5 km (LOS)	WASP/III/MICADO DJI Phantom 4, DJI Mavic Pro Hovermast 100

UAS are categorised to acknowledge certain characteristics. We will go through each in turn using this slide, starting at the bottom with Class I.

Class I UAS are small, mini, and micro in size, and are only operated up to a limited altitude of not more than 1,000ft above ground level (AGL). Normally they weigh between 1-25kg and are operated within radio line of sight (LOS) of the operator. They have a maximum range of up to 50km. The main purpose of these UAS is to support operations at a tactical unit level, normally platoon or company, and up to a battalion level in case of the small UAS.


UAS Class II UAS/RPAS normally have a maximum take-off weight of between 150-600kg and are equipped with a LOS data link. They are normally operated up to 18,000ft AGL, with a maximum range of 200km. Payload limitations and airworthiness restrictions may limit these systems to operations in restricted or special use airspace. Class II systems are normally used at sector level.

Finally, UAS Class III UAS, typically MALE (Medium Altitude Long Engage) and HALE (High Altitude Long Engage), normally weigh more than 600kg and operate up to 65,000ft AGL. They have unlimited range since they operate under a 'beyond line of sight' (BLOS) control system. These systems are normally used at the Force level.

Slide 27

Sensor capabilities

- Full Motion Video (FMV)
- Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)



UAS cannot be armed while serving on a UN Peacekeeping Operation.

The overwhelming majority of UAS available in UN Peacekeeping Missions, whether commercially provided or as part of a TCC commitment, have imaging sensors as a core capability. Where operational requirements dictate, more complex sensors can assist in enhancing the intelligence picture. Two specific sensors are full motion video and synthetic aperture radar. Let us look at both capabilities.

A Full Motion Video (FMV) sensor suite will likely have electro-optical (EO) for use during daylight and infra-red (IR) capabilities for day and night, which further enhances situational awareness as the IR sensors will highlight activity which is not visible to the human eye. Both sensors will be affected by adverse weather conditions such as cloud, dust, and moisture, regardless of whether they are fitted to manned or unmanned platforms.

A Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) can operate in all weather. It provides a day/night imaging capability and in its more basic employment can support disaster relief through covering large areas, for example, by detecting flooding and assisting in prioritising

humanitarian relief. More advanced techniques can highlight changes not detectable by the human eye, for example, dirt displaced by tyres or digging, potential improvised explosive device placements and changes in dispositions of forces.

Slide 28

Sensor capabilities

- Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI)
- Multi/hyper Spectral Imaging (MSI/HSI)

The Other types of UAS imagery sensors are:

Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI): a specific capability of SAR, the GMTI provides a scanning mode to identify moving objects. The GMTI sensors are particularly useful at highlighting new and existing lines of communication through open areas and, when used in a surveillance mode over a period, can provide indicators of certain activity, for example, possible smuggling routes.

Multi/Hyper Spectral Imaging (MSI/HSI): MSI and HSI sensors can exploit data across the entire electromagnetic spectrum. These advanced sensors can be particularly useful in UN Peacekeeping Missions by detecting chemical spills, gaseous effluent and objects concealed by man-made camouflage techniques. These more advanced sensors generate considerable volumes of data and therefore specialists and data storage infrastructure will be needed - this must be considered as part of the approach in procuring these capabilities.

Slide 29

Strengths

- Endurance
- Enhancing situational awareness
- Supporting the protection of forces
- Reducing footprint in dangerous environments
- Verifying reports on displaced people




To better understand the strengths and weaknesses of PKISR assets. We will now look at the strengths that support the employment of UAS over other PKISR assets.

Endurance: UAS tend to have a longer endurance than manned systems. They can provide uninterrupted support by changing crews at a ground station.

Enhancing situational awareness: A UAS can provide a prolonged presence over a target area.

Supporting the protection of forces: UAS can support the protection of forces by monitoring hostile areas, tracking the movement of armed groups, surveillance of critical infrastructure and the reconnaissance of suspicious routes. The presence of a UAS could provide an element of deterrence against an armed group which is considering conducting violent activity, if that group believes it is being monitored.

Reducing footprint in dangerous environments: UAS allows commanders to acquire information without putting UN personnel at risk.

Verifying reports on vulnerable people: UAS could be used to verify reports on IDP movements or the situation on IDP camps.

Slide 30

Weaknesses

- Cost
- Meteorological effects
- Constraint: operating near international borders



The diagram on the left illustrates the operational zones of a UAS. It shows a 'Transition Contour' and an 'Operating Area' (a green cube) extending from a ground station. Labels include 'Coastal Range', 'Transition Contour', 'Operating Area', and 'VFR Altitude'. The photograph on the right shows a white UAS aircraft with 'UN' markings on its fuselage, parked on a tarmac next to a hangar.

Now we will look to some weaknesses that must be considered before deciding to employ UAS.

Cost: A Class III UAS is expensive and can come with up to 100 support personnel and equipment, which could include a ground control station, launch equipment and possibly a recovery element. The cost of a UAS will inevitably impact on how many assets are available in a UN Mission and how quickly they can be repaired or replaced following an incident due to mission operating budgets. As such, a UAS could be a scarce resource which must be managed to ensure efficient and effective employment.

Meteorological effects: Poor weather conditions have a greater effect on UAS since they tend to be smaller, lighter, and slower than manned aircraft. High winds can affect take-off and landing as well as increase fuel consumption, thereby reducing the asset's time on task.

Constraint - International Border Proximity Operations. UAS are constrained from flying within 0.5 nautical miles of an international border without authority to do so. This is a constraint since several countries where UN Peacekeeping Missions are deployed have active borders, meaning that they experience activity that could affect mandate implementation, e.g., flow of refugees, movement of armed groups, transnational criminality, etc. Other proximity restrictions may also be in place, requiring specific authority for Mission leadership, e.g., up to 5 nautical miles from an international border.

Slide 31

Takeaway

- Clear direction from mission leadership ensures ISR assets are used efficiently
- Clear command and control is necessary to ensure the timely management of ISR assets
- Establishing a mechanism based on clear terminology helps to manage the PKISR process
- Understand the different types of manned and unmanned aircraft – this will help dynamic tasking

Mission leadership plays a critical role in making sure PKISR assets are tasked efficiently based on their direction and guidance. The MPKI staffs should ensure the leadership remains engaged and provides additional guidance when needed.

Clear command and control is required to ensure the timely management of ISR assets. However, each mission may adopt a slightly different approach based on the context of the mission, number of PKISR assets available and the threat.

The PKISR process relies on a commonly understood terminology to make it as efficient as possible. It is possible that different Mission entities will use different terminology to describe the same activity / function. MIO staff should not be surprised by this and do their utmost to identify differences and work through them to ensure the PKISR process is managed as effectively as possible, for example, individuals using national rather than UN terminology.

Module

1



Conceptual Framework

At the conclusion of Module 1, a few concluding points are worth noting:

- A range of policies, manuals, guidelines, philosophy, and principles have been developed over time to create an understanding of a UNIBAT operating in UN Peacekeeping Missions
- Nevertheless, the implementation and execution of the UNIBAT's capabilities in the mission is never straightforward and a general understanding and an open, flexible attitude within the United Nations' conceptual framework is needed by the leadership, staff, and troops / forces in the employment of the Infantry
- The capabilities of an UNIBAT can be leveraged to help execute the mandate. It is essential that units establish a working coordination, liaison and support networks based on this conceptual framework that will facilitate planning and execution of the UNIBAT tasks in a UNPKO
- It is important that all UNIBAT personnel have a general understand of the Mission's / Force / Sector POC and FP strategies, and the principles and framework for conducting crowd control and the handling of detainees
- When employing the UNIBAT in a PKO, it is essential that operations are based on threats and risk analysis. The PKO environment is lethal and has spoilers that focus efforts to disrupt mandate objectives. The MPKI and PKISR processes help provide a framework for planning operations. We will go into more details in module 3

Module 2



Legal Framework

Aim

This module conveys to the UNIBAT leadership key aspects of the legal framework governing their work.

Relevance

Module 2 empowers UNIBATs to approach their tasks with confidence by providing them an understanding of the legal authority and underpinning their work, while also explaining legal limits they must respect.




Learning Objectives for the Module

- Apply rules of international law that provide framework for UNIBAT's work
- Invoke legal rules that protect UNIBATs and the mission as a whole
- Identify and raise concerns about violations of human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law that UNIBATs may encounter
- Follow key policies of the Secretary-General and the Department of Peace Operations that are binding for all UN Mission personnel

Overview

Lesson 2.1 of the module (slides 3-23) provides an overview of fields of general international law, the UN Charter, international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law. Lessons 2.2 of the module (slides 24-41) reflects on aspects of the mission-specific legal framework that are relevant for UNIBAT, including Security Council mandates, SOFA/SOMAs and the related norms on immunities, discipline and accountability, binding norms in peacekeeping policies, and mission rules of engagement.

Symbols Legend Reminder

	<p>Interactive presentation or small exercises to engage the participants</p>
	<p>Suggested film segment to illustrate the content</p>
	<p>Note to the instructor to highlight aspects of the materials or point towards additional materials</p>

Lesson 2.1



International Legal Framework

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Overview

This module begins with an overview of how general international law, including the UN Charter, guide the work of UNIBATs and the mission as a whole.

The term 'International Law' commonly refers to a body of law that governs the legal relations between or among States and international organisations. These training materials look at international law as a combination of binding law ("hard law") and non-binding law ("soft law"). Binding law refers to rules that are legally binding and that States must therefore apply, such as treaty law (i.e., conventions, agreements, and protocols), as well as customary law.


The areas of international law most relevant for the work of peacekeepers are the UN Charter, International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law, and International Refugee Law.

Slide 1



This module conveys to the UNIBAT leadership key aspects of the legal framework governing their work. Module 2 empowers UNIBATs to approach their tasks with confidence by providing them an understanding of the legal authority and underpinning their work, while also explaining legal limits they must respect.

Slide 2



At the top of the hierarchy of norms depicted in this slide are the UN Charter (the “UN’s constitution”) and fundamental norms of general international law. Even the Security Council must respect these norms (and does so in its practice). For instance, a peacekeeping mission could not be mandated to attack civilians or push back refugees to places where their life is at risk, since this would entail breaches of fundamental norms of international human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law.

In module 2.1, we are discussing the top two layers of the hierarchy of norms. The remaining sources of law in this graphic will be discussed in Module 2.2.

Slide 3

Learning Objectives

- Apply rules of international law that provide framework for UNIBAT's work
- Invoke legal rules that protect UNIBAT and the mission as a whole
- Identify and raise concerns about violations of human rights, humanitarian and refugee law that UNIBAT may see

Here are the Learning objectives. Let us take a minute or so to review.


Slide 4



Lesson 2-1

Legal Framework for Peace
Operations:
General International Law

Slide 5



The Charter of the UN is the founding document of the Organisation and the basis of all the Organisation's work. The UN was established to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." It therefore prohibits force between states, except in self-defence or with Security Council approval.

While the UN Charter does not make explicit reference to peace operations, it is undisputed that the UN Security Council may establish peacekeeping and special political missions. All UN peace operations are deployed based on:

- Chapter VI (deals with pacific settlement of disputes), and/or
- Chapter VII (binding measures to respond to breaches of the peace)

Special political missions or observer missions are generally deployed under Chapter VI. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions, which are often deployed after non-international armed conflict, usually have a mandate that invokes Chapter VII. This is done notably to clarify that they may use force to protect civilians, regardless of whether civilians are threatened by armed groups or (rogue) state forces.

In addition to ensuring peace and security and promoting development, the UN Charter also commits the UN to promoting and encouraging respect for human rights. For this

reason, all peace mission personnel must respect human rights. The Policy on Human Rights in Peace Operations also requires all missions to advance human rights through the implementation of their mandate, even if they do not have an explicit human rights mandate or human rights component. Example: UNIBAT developing a plan to support the security for a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme / operation under the mission's mandate should understand the sensitivities of non-discrimination between women and men and the sensitivities when operating around women and girls associated with armed groups.

Slide 6



When serving in the United Nations, all UNIBAT personnel must respect at all times, international human rights, humanitarian, criminal and refugee law. Furthermore, they have to protect people against violations of these fundamental norms and they must promote them in their daily interaction with other actors, including with the host state forces and any armed groups they may engage with under their mandate.

Slide 7



International Human Rights Law



- Dignity, freedom and equality
- Obligations mainly for states
- Also during war or other national emergencies
- Peacekeepers: respect, protect & promote human rights



Before showing the slide, ask participants who is entitled to human rights, and whose responsibility it is to protect them? Answers should include that every human being enjoys human rights, and that state authorities are primarily responsible for upholding them. Human rights are universal. Everyone is entitled to the same fundamental rights. There are some groups, who may have specific needs or are particularly at risk of discrimination and rights violations. These have been given specific rights protections (e.g., children, women, indigenous people, persons with disabilities).

IHRL always applies, including during armed conflict and other national emergencies (because that is when human rights are most under threat). Example of human rights especially relevant to peacekeeping include the right to life, right not to be tortured, right not to be discriminated against, rights to food, water, health, and education.

First and foremost, states must respect human rights and protect their population from threats by private actors (e.g., by diligently arresting and prosecuting perpetrators of rape). It is widely accepted today that armed groups with effective control over territory also have human rights obligations. In any case, UN practice considers that armed

groups that commit atrocities such as summarily executing, raping, torturing, or looting engage in human rights abuses.

UN policy also accepts that UN Missions and personnel must respect human rights in their work. Example: The UN would not be allowed to discriminate based on religion in its hiring practices or use excessive force in violation of the right to life.

Slide 8

Case 1: Help wanted

A political opposition party calls for peaceful protests. The government prohibits the protests and sends in its army to disperse the demonstrators.

The local army commander asks UNIBAT to provide additional troops to help disperse the demonstrations and “restore law and order”.

Is UNIBAT allowed to provide help?

Participants should discuss this case in plenary – or if time permits in small groups. Key points to emphasize:

- Peaceful political protests are protected by the freedom of peaceful assembly and the human right of free expression. The government prohibiting the protests and sending in its army to disperse them would violate human rights.
- The United Nations must not aid and assist human rights violations. UNIBAT must therefore not provide any help, even if the mission has general mandate to help maintain law and order. In order to manage risks of aiding violations of others, the United Nations put in place a Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces that set out a process to assess and mitigate risk before any security support is provided (see next slides).
- In this situation, the UNIBAT Commander should raise concerns about possible human rights violations with relevant counterparts in the host state. If there is a Protection of Civilians mandate, the military component, as well as all components of the mission, are required to take measures to protect

the (civilian) demonstrators from any violence directed against them (in practice, this is very complex and will require consultation with Mission leadership and host nation authorities).

Slide 9

Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces

United Nations support to non-UN Security Forces cannot be provided:

- If risk of the receiving entities committing **grave violations** of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law
- Relevant authorities fail to take the necessary **corrective or mitigating measures**"



PHOTO MOMIC

**Protects and promotes credibility,
impartiality & legal interests of the mission!**

The Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) is binding for the entire United Nations (not just peacekeepers). It was established by the Secretary-General and the Security Council has repeatedly endorsed it.

According to the HRDDP, support to non-UN security forces cannot be provided

- Where there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights, or refugee law
- Where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures"

All UN entities that plan to or are already providing support to non-UN security forces must therefore conduct a risk assessment that involves providing or not providing such support. This assessment needs to consider the risk of the recipient entity committing grave violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law, or refugee law. Furthermore, the UN must consider whether there are any mitigation measures that can reduce the risk of violations (e.g., by increasing training or excluding problematic units from support)

It serves to ensure that the UN does not support or collaborate with host state elements that are involved in grave violations of human rights, IHL or refugee law. The policy serves to protect the United Nations from aiding legal liability for inadvertently aiding violations committed by others. Distancing the U.N. from state forces involved in grave violations also protects the U.N.'s reputation and perceived impartiality.

UN Photo shows MONUC providing transport to national army units in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When the United Nations found that some national army units who received UN support were violating human rights, the Security Council made further MONUC support conditional on compliance with human rights. The HRDDP was established against the backdrop of MONUC's conditionality policy.

Slide 10



✓ **Risk mitigation & engagement, not blunt conditionality**

✓ **Suspension or withdrawal of support: measure of **last resort****

✓ **Applies to **all types to support****

✓ **Includes support to states and **regional organizations****

✓ **HRDDP senior-level **taskforces** & standard operating procedures**

Application of the HRDDP

Any support provided by the UN to non-UN security forces must follow the HRDDP. Relevant support provided by peace operations includes conduct of joint operations, planning support, sharing of intelligence, training, capacity building, mentoring, technical cooperation, and financial support. Certain areas are exempted:

- Training and engagement on IHL and human rights,
- Mediation-related support (e.g., transporting officers to peace negotiations),
- Medical evacuation.

The HRDDP also covers support provided to regional organisations, for instance support to African Union peace and security operations such as AMISOM

Missions have established taskforces and standard operating procedures to help assess risks, coordinate engagement with supported entities and devise measures to mitigate the risks. The mission will work with host state partners to bring the risk of violations down to an acceptable level. However, where support recipients continue to commit grave violations, the mission may have to temporarily suspend or altogether withdraw its support to them.

 The UN Photo shows a UN police officer providing training to the Haitian National Police.

Slide 11

**Mitigating risks of
joint security operations**




- ✓ Joint planning, including for contingencies
- ✓ After action reviews
- ✓ Background checks. Exclusion of problematic units & commanders
- ✓ Insistence on individual accountability & case referral

In joint security operations, the risk of the UN being seen as associated with violations committed by other forces is particularly high. Missions can take common sense measures to mitigate the risks of violations:

- A joint operation involving UNIBAT should always be based on joint planning that also covers unexpected contingencies.
- After any operation there should be a joint After-Action Review to learn from the operation and review how to further reduce the risk of violations in future operations.
- It should be established which national commanders and units exactly are taking part in the joint operation. Based on background checks (usually done with the support of human rights components) units and commanders with a problematic human rights/IHL compliance record should be excluded.
- If despite all measures, some national forces engaged in grave violations, the mission must insist that the individuals concerned are investigated and

prosecuted to deter violations in future operations and re-establish trust in the eyes of the local population.

Slide 12

International Humanitarian Law (IHL)



- Geneva Conventions & Protocols




- IHL applies:
 - in international and non-international armed conflict
 - to all parties of an armed conflict
 - to peacekeepers as long as they participate in hostilities

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) must be respected by parties to armed conflict. States forces fighting each other in an international armed conflict must respect it. In a non-international armed conflict, the state military forces, and the non-state armed groups involved must abide by IHL.

Since impartiality is a central principle of peacekeeping, UN military forces are generally not a party to the conflict. However, IHL may apply temporarily to them for as long as they engage as combatants in armed conflict. Example: a peacekeeping force carries out an offensive operation against an armed group that poses a grave threat to civilians.




Note to Instructor: The illustration shows the emblem of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which initiated the development of humanitarian law in the 19th century. The ICRC remains the neutral guardian of IHL in conflict areas across the world.

Slide 13

Objectives of IHL

- Regulates conduct of hostilities & means of warfare
- Protects those not engaged in hostilities
- Parties respect and ensure respect for IHL



IHL regulates the conduct of hostilities. Example: Requiring parties to minimize as far as possible the harm to civilians not participating in the hostilities. It also outlaws certain means of war to reduce unnecessary suffering by civilians or combatants. Example: prohibition of the use of any chemical or poisonous weapons in warfare.

Parties must respect IHL themselves and they ensure that others respect it as well. Example: In accordance with its obligation to ensure respect for IHL, a state has a duty to prosecute and punish non-state armed group members who commit serious violations of IHL amounting to war crimes.

Slide 14

Protected Persons under IHL




- Civilians not directly participating in hostilities
- Medical and religious personnel of armed forces
- Wounded, sick and others *hors combat*
- Prisoners of war & interned armed group fighters
- Peacekeepers (unless engaged in military hostilities)



Ask participants who is a civilian in the two pictures. The armed herder on the right may well be a civilian who is only armed to protect himself and his cattle from marauders. In many mission settings, armed civilians are a common sight and them carrying weapons like assault rifles does not necessarily mean that they are participants in hostilities between militarily organised parties to conflict.

Under IHL, any person who is not or is no longer directly participating in hostilities shall be considered a civilian, unless he or she is a member of armed forces or groups. In case of doubt, the individual or group of individuals shall be considered civilian and afforded the protection owed to civilians until determined otherwise. Civilians may be in the possession of arms, without necessarily being combatants. Under international humanitarian law, civilians who are in the possession of arms, for example, for the purpose of self-defence and the protection of their property but who have not been or are not currently engaged in hostilities are entitled to protection.

Members of armed forces or armed groups that are *hors de combat* ('out of battle') also enjoy protection under international humanitarian law. Notably, those who can no longer because they are wounded and sick must not be attacked but collected and medically cared for.

Prisoners of war (POWs) and interned/detained armed group fighters enjoy special protection. They must be treated humanely in all circumstances and not be subjected to any humiliating and degrading treatment. Unlike regular soldiers who become POWs, captured rebel fighters may be prosecuted for their participation in the armed conflict. However, this must be done before “a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples” (see Common Art. 3 Geneva Conventions.)

Peacekeepers, regardless of whether they are military, police or civilians, are protected under international law. Directing attacks against them may amount to a war crime. An exception applies only for as long as military peacekeepers engage in hostilities.

Slide 15

Conduct of hostilities

- **Distinction** between civilians and military targets
- **Precaution** to avoid civilian losses
- **Proportionality** between military advantage & civilian loss



In their conduct of hostilities, parties to conflict must abide by basic principles to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects such as homes, hospitals, places of worship etc. The Protection of Civilians in the conduct of hostilities builds on three basic principles.

The basic principles of IHL are the following:

- **Distinction:** In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, parties to the conflict at all times have to distinguish between the civilians and combatants, and between civilian and military objects. Operations must only be directed against military objects. Indiscriminate attacks that do not distinguish between civilians and combatants are prohibited. Example of violation: Shelling an entire village with heavy artillery without trying to distinguish between military targets and civilian homes.
- **Precaution:** In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Examples of violations:
 - Before launching an assault, no effort is made to verify that the target is actually a military target.

- Soldiers take their position too close to civilians, placing them at risk of getting in the crossfire.
- Proportionality: Loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. This means that when considering a target, the damage to civilians and their property cannot be excessive in relation to the military advantage gained. Proportionality is not an issue if the target is purely military, and no civilians are nearby. Example of violation: Bombing a private home housing dozens of civilians to kill one ordinary soldier who took shelter there.

Slide 16

Case 2: plan of attack

- An armed group regularly attacks local civilians. The armed group fighters live in a village among civilians of the same ethnic group. They do not always wear uniforms or carry weapons openly. The village has a hospital where many wounded fighters are treated.
- The host state army is planning to launch armed operations against the group in the village.

The army asks UNIBAT for advice on how to conduct its operation in line with IHL rules.

Participants should discuss this case in plenary – or if time permits in small groups. Key points to emphasize:

- *The armed group commits serious IHL violations by attacking civilians. Also, the armed group violates the principle of precaution, because it set up positions close to civilians and fails to distinguish themselves through uniforms.*
- *The state authorities have duties under human rights and IHL to protect the population in its territory from such violations. Pursuing an operation to neutralise the group, seeks to implement this duty. The mission would therefore usually encourage the security forces to conduct it.*

The operation must be conducted in compliance with IHL and human rights so that it does not place other civilians at risk. The fact that their armed group enemies fail to respect IHL does not absolve the state forces from respecting IHL. Principles to consider include in particular:

- Principle of precaution to minimize harm for the civilian villagers. In practice, state forces should gather intelligence to know where exactly armed group fighters are positioned and where civilians live.
- Principle of distinction of civilians and military targets. In practice, armed force could surround the village, demand a surrender of the group and, failing that, give civilians a chance to evacuate before launching their operations. Those exiting the area would have to be promptly screened to ensure no armed group fighters can escape. It must be kept in mind that the hospital, even though it treats wounded fighters, is not a military target, but instead enjoys special protection. The army is not allowed to attack it. The wounded fighters are also protected persons and cannot be made targets (e.g., by shooting them in their hospital beds). However, the army can surround the hospital and move in to detain the wounded fighters. Those captured must continue to receive the necessary medical care and the army has to plan for that contingency.
- Principle of proportionality to ensure that civilian losses do not outweigh military advantage gained. Security forces should not use explosive weapons with a large and imprecise impact radius in their operations (e.g., large mortars or heavy artillery) given that they may incidentally kill a disproportional number of civilians.

Slide 17

IHL to protect children

- Entitled to special protection, care and aid
- Children must not be the target of attacks, except if they directly participate in hostilities and in self-defence
- When interned, held in separate quarters
- Evacuation from besieged or encircled areas
- No child recruitment and participation in hostilities (18 years limit under CRC Protocol)



Children face particular dangers during armed conflict, especially when they are used as child soldiers. IHL contains special protections for children.

Children must not be the target of attacks. An exception applies if they directly participate in hostilities. Example: UNIBAT soldiers who are attacked by armed child soldiers may fire in response to defend themselves.

Captured child soldiers must be kept separate from adult fighters. There are special processes to help such children reintegrate into civilian life. The mission's Child Protection Unit and UNICEF can provide further advice.

The United Nations will proactively advocate with all parties to the conflict not to recruit or use in conflict anyone under 18 years old. Often, the government and the UN will have devised special action plans to ensure that no children are used in armed conflict. UNIBATs must lead by example by not employing children (e.g., UNIBATs may not hire children to serve as cooks or cleaners).

The UN also has a strict policy not to occupy any school buildings to accommodate its forces.

Slide 18

International Criminal Law

- **War crimes:**
grave breaches of Geneva Conventions and other serious violations of IHL
- **Crimes against humanity:**
systematic or widespread inhumane acts
- **Genocide:**
intent to destroy ethnic or religious group
- **State duty to prosecute**
perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide
- **International tribunals & courts** can prosecute (e.g. International Criminal Court)

Some violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are considered so grave by the international community of states that they are regarded as international crimes, namely war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

All states have a duty to prosecute and punish such crimes if committed within their territory. Furthermore, the international community may set up international tribunals and courts to prosecute and punish international crimes. Example: In response to international crimes, the Security Council set up the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). States also established the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC has jurisdiction to pursue international crimes committed in states that have accepted its jurisdiction (more than 120 countries so far) and in places that were referred to the ICC by the Security Council (examples: Darfur and Libya).

There are three major categories of international crimes that soldiers should know:

War crimes: Violations of fundamental rules found in the Geneva Conventions or other sources of IHL also entail war crimes on the part of the individuals who commit such crimes. As the name suggests, war crimes can only be committed in armed conflict.

Crimes against humanity: Where state authorities or armed groups commit inhumane acts such as murder, rape, torture in a systematic or widespread manner, this may entail

crimes against humanity. Such crimes typically involve an underlying policy to commit crimes and/or an elaborate degree of planning at high levels.

Genocide: In accordance with the 1948 Genocide Convention, killing or in similar ways targeting members of a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group may amount to genocide. The perpetrators must **act with the** “*intent, to destroy, in whole or in part, the group, as such.*” It is not enough to kill some people because of their religion or race. There must be an intent to annihilate the entire group globally or in a specific area. The historic example that gave rise to the notion of genocide is the Holocaust, in which Nazi Germany tried to annihilate the entire Jewish population of Europe.

Slide 19

Case 3: irresponsible command

- The military systematically looted a city and soldiers raped hundreds of women and girls.
- The military commander of the troops never ordered her troops to commit such atrocities. However, she knew about them and did nothing to stop the troops under her command.

Has she committed an international crime?



A plenary or group discussion should bring out the following key points:

- *Military commanders have command responsibility. They cannot wilfully close their eyes to grave violations committed by their subordinates.*
- *Regardless of whether they ordered such crimes, commanders will be held responsible for international crimes if their troops commit them, and they fail to do what they can to prevent or repress such crimes. (See next slide).*
- *UNIBAT commanders should invoke this principle in their engagement with national forces, if they find that national commanders fail to control their own troops. If military professionals explain the principle of command responsibility in a peer-to-peer dialogue this can have an important positive impact and increase human rights/IHL compliance on the part of national forces.*

Slide 20

Command responsibility

Commanders are responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity under their command if :

- They **knew or should have known** about the crimes

AND

- failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to **prevent or repress** the crimes, including by investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators

Criminal responsibility without participation in crime itself!

As shown by case 3, command responsibility is an important concept to know for any military commander because a commander can incur criminal responsibility for grave international crimes simply by standing by and doing nothing, even without actively participating in such crimes.

Slide 21

International Refugee Law



- Refugees usually need special protection. Missions may have mandate to assist with their return
- **1951 Refugee Convention:**
 - Definition: Fear of **persecution** due to race, religion etc.
 - International protected status / under UNHCR mandate
 - Refugee rights (e.g. freedom of movement)
- **1969 African Refugee Convention**
 - Refugee status also to those fleeing **armed conflict** and other major violence



When governments are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, individuals may suffer such serious violations of their rights that they are forced to flee their country and seek safety in another country. Since, by definition, the governments of their home countries no longer protect the basic rights of refugees, the international community must step in to ensure that their basic rights are respected.

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is the foundation of international refugee law. The term “refugee” under the Refugee Convention refers to persons who have to flee their country due to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. “Individuals suspected of crimes against humanity are excluded from refugee status.

Fleeing a country where an armed conflict is taking place qualifies a person only as a refugee if specific requirements are met (notably evidence of individual “well-founded fear of being persecuted”). However, regional instruments have expanded the scope of the refugee definition. Under the 1969 African Refugee Convention, refugees are also those who must flee “events seriously disturbing public order” such as armed conflict.

For Latin America, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees expands the concept to also include persons who flee internal conflicts and generalised violence in their country.

Refugees are generally civilians, and the mission must hence protect them under its CPOC mandate. In addition, Peacekeeping Operations are often tasked with the creation of conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return or local integration of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Slide 22

Case 4: “go back home”

The host state army is forcing refugees to go back to their own country.

The refugees will be imprisoned at home for “having illegally left the country.” In prison, women are often raped by the guards.



What legal concerns should the UN raise with the army?



A plenary or group discussion should bring out the following key points:

- One of the most fundamental principles of refugee law is the prohibition of refoulement. This means that no one may be sent back to a country where they would face a real risk of persecution, torture (including rape as a form of torture) or other grave human rights violations.
- Refoulement of refugees can amount to the international crime of deportation, which exists as a crime against humanity (if widespread or systematic) and as a war crime (if committed in the context of an armed conflict).
- The host state army is therefore committing grave violations. The UN is not allowed to assist such operations in any shape or form. Instead, it will raise concern about them, usually under the leadership of UNHCR. In line with the “One UN” principle

and their role to promote respect for international law, UNIBAT Commanders should echo such concerns in their engagement with counterparts in the host state army.


Slide 23

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

- **Forced to flee** (e.g. due to war or natural disaster) but have **not crossed an international border**
- Maintain human rights and citizens rights
- Home state must protect them

Protected by:

- UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
- AU Convention on Internal Displacement in Africa



Internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been displaced due to armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violations, natural or human-made disasters. Unlike refugees, they have not crossed an international border, but remain in their own country.

The protection of IDPs and other affected populations within their own country is primarily the responsibility of national authorities. Unlike refugees, IDPs do not enjoy a special legal status under international law. However, the international community has a role to play in promoting and reinforcing efforts to ensure protection, assistance, and solutions for IDPs. UNHCR generally considers them to be of concern to its mandate and the mission will often make special efforts to protect IDP sites under its PoC mandate. UNIBAT will often be tasked to secure the perimeter of IDP camps, while UNPOL may work with the local police to ensure law and order within the camp.

IDPs keep their human rights and their rights as citizens of the country. For instance, IDPs maintain their citizen's right to vote in elections. Therefore, the state has to make arrangement that they can vote at the site of their displacement.

In 1998, the UN Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs issued the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The principles, which have been repeatedly

endorsed by the international community of states, summarize binding legal obligations that can be found in international humanitarian and human rights law.

Leading the way at regional level, the African Union has adopted the Kampala Convention on Internal Displacement in Africa. It reinforces the protection of IDPs.

We will continue with lesson 2.2 and we will summarize both this lesson 2.1 (this lesson) and lesson 2.2.

Lesson 2.2



United Nations Peace Operations-Specific Legal Framework

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Starting the Lesson

Overview

Apart from general international law, peacekeeping missions and their activities are also governed by a peacekeeping specific legal framework that includes:

- Security council resolutions and mission mandates contained therein
- Status of Forces or Status of Mission Agreements between UN and host state
- Agreements between UN and troop or police contributing countries,
- Secretary-General and UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) policies
- Rules of Engagement and Directives on the Use of Force
- Mission-specific SOPs and directives

This legal framework shapes UN peace operations and their activities, including UNIBAT military operations.

Peacekeepers are expected to carefully read and understand the mandates, agreements policies and directives relevant to their work. Compliance is mandatory for all peacekeepers, irrespective of whether they are military, police, or civilians.

Peacekeepers must know about essential privileges and immunities that protect them in their work, while also being aware of the legal framework to ensure their accountability, good conduct, and discipline.

Slide 1



Lesson 2-2
Peace Operations Specific
Legal Framework
Mission Specific

Apart from general international law, peacekeeping missions and their activities are also governed by a peacekeeping specific legal framework

Slide 2

Security Council Mandate

- **Security Council Resolution:**
Highest legal basis for the deployment of any mission
- **Outlines the tasks and responsibilities that the Council expects the mission to accomplish**



Every Peacekeeping Operation begins with the Security Council adopting a resolution that establishes the mission. The Council seeks to establish a mission with the consent of the Host State. Depending on the mission's mandate and role, it will want the consent of the parties to the conflict.

The Security Council resolution sets out the mandate of the mission, i.e., the tasks assigned to it, including any explicit authorisation to use force. Mandates, or tasks, differ from mission to mission. The range of mandated tasks differs between peace operations based on the conflict environment, challenges on the ground and other factors. Security Council mandates may also set cross-cutting thematic tasks for all missions, e.g., the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence.

Resolutions that authorize the deployment of a peace operation also establishes the maximum strength of the uniformed components (military and police). The Security Council mandate is typically established for a fixed period (usually one year) after which the Council may renew it. At this stage, the Council will review the authorised strength of and make adjustment as deemed necessary.

Slide 3

Security Council's protection mandates

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li style="margin-bottom: 10px;">• Human Rights 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Addresses everyone and all human rights, not only physical integrity • Protection and prevention based on law, advocacy and capacity-building
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li style="margin-bottom: 10px;">• Protection of Civilians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect against physical violence • Includes physical protection and prevention, including use of force
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li style="margin-bottom: 10px;">• Child Protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Built around six conflict-related grave violations against children • Consolidation in HR component
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li style="margin-bottom: 10px;">• Conflict-related Sexual Violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focuses on women, girls, boys & men • Consolidation in HR component

Whole-of-mission responsibilities

26



Before presenting the slide, show the short (8min) United Nations training video on military components and their work to protect human rights. Based on real mission examples, the video shows how military components contribute to upholding human rights, protecting civilians and preventing conflict-related sexual violence.

The videos are available

in English: <http://webtv.un.org/search/military-human-rights-cooperation/6214386490001/?term=2020-12-05&sort=date>

And in French: <http://webtv.un.org/search/composantes-militaires-%E2%80%93-coop%C3%A9ration-en-mati%C3%A8re-de-droits-de-l%E2%80%99homme/6214384098001/?term=2020-12-05&sort=date&lan=french>

More and more, peace operations are placed in situations without a firm peace to keep, with the expectation that their presence can protect the most vulnerable.

Therefore, multidimensional peacekeeping missions are regularly assigned protection mandates. Specialised civilian staff work on these mandates including human rights officers, Protection of Civilians advisers, child protection advisers and women protection advisers. However, these mandates remain whole of mission responsibilities to which UNIBATs must contribute. Protection mandates may overlap, as they complement and reinforce each other:

- The human rights mandate seeks to protect the entire population and the full range of human rights. The mission will use peaceful means such as reporting and other advocacy or capacity-building measures to advance this mandate
- The Protection of Civilians mandate is narrower in that it is only concerned about physical violence and protects civilians only (as opposed to e.g., detained fighters). However, it goes deeper than the human rights mandate because it authorizes the mission to use force where necessary to protect civilians
- Child protection is focused on the six grave violations against children in conflict: killing and maiming children, recruitment for armed conflict, sexual violence, abduction, attacks on schools and hospital, denial of humanitarian access.
- Conflict-related sexual violence requires a nexus between the sexual violence and the conflict (e.g., domestic violence would typically not be covered)



Provide examples on how protection mandates overlap or differ, e.g.:

- *If state authorities order the closure of a newspaper for criticizing the government, this violates the human rights to freedoms of expression, media, and information. However, in the absence of physical violence, the CPOC mandate is not triggered. However, if rogue state agents proceed to physically assault the journalists, the mission may intervene under its CPOC mandate, including by using force where necessary*
- *If an armed group traffics underage girls for purposes of sexual exploitation, this amounts to an abuse under the human rights mandate. The mission must exercise its CPOC mandate to protect the girls. Such sexual violence against children is of concern to both the children protection and CRSV mandate*

Slide 4

Case 5: mandate interpretation

The Mission's mandate authorises it to take **'all necessary measures to protect civilians'**

Local villagers captured **three 16-year olds** whom they accuse of being **fighters of an armed group** involved in crimes against humanity.

The town's mayor wants UNIBAT to **send blue helmet soldiers, detain the three persons and put them on trial**. The mayor fears that otherwise riots may break out or the three may be lynched.

What is the mission legally allowed to do? What is it not allowed to do?



The case discussion should show that the mission's Protection of Civilians mandate determines what the mission is allowed to do:

Civilians: *The population of the town are civilians not participating in hostilities (see IHL definition, discussed above). If they are indeed armed fighters, the 16-year-olds are not civilians but participants in the conflict (although they are children under 18 years). However, they could be wrongly accused of being armed group fighters, so that the mission should try to protect them in any case.*

Threat of physical violence: *The local community faces a constant threat of physical violence due to the presence of an armed group committing crimes against humanity. Note that the threat does not have to be imminent (i.e., no need that violations are about to happen). The captured 16-year teenagers also face a risk of violence (summary execution by way of lynching).*

Protection without prejudice to the responsibility of the host state: *The mission should assess whether the local police can manage the situation. However, it is*


likely that the police cannot deploy with the necessary strength and urgency, so that the mission must react.

All necessary measures: Under its POC mandate, the mission can use force to protect civilians. Using graduated force, it would first seek to show authoritative physical presence to contain the situation. The mission may also apprehend and temporarily detain the teenagers (including for purposes of protecting them). However, the POC mandate does not give the mission prosecutorial or judicial powers. These remain the sovereign prerogative of the host state. Instead, the mission would seek to promptly handover the teenagers to the local authorities provided the latter can guarantee to treat them humanely (the revised Standard Operating Procedures on Detention by UN Peacekeepers set a time limit of 96 hours to implement a risk assessment and the subsequent handover). If they are indeed children used in armed conflict, they should eventually go to a programme to help integrate them into civilian life that the mission's Child Protection Unit and UNICEF will typically be involved in.

Slide 5

Protection of Civilians Mandate:
“All Necessary Action”

- Includes military, civilian and police action
- Does not replace sovereign responsibilities of host state
- Authority to use deadly force (as a last resort) to protect civilians under threat
- Action must comply with human rights and IHL, as spelt out in Rules of Engagement



The Protection of Civilians mandate is the strongest among the protection mandates in that it allows “all necessary measures”, including the use of deadly force as a last resort.

This authority can be used where the host state is not willing or able to protect civilians on its own.

Like any use of force, any action to protect civilians must comply with human rights and, if UNIBAT uses combat level force, also IHL. The Rules of Engagement will provide details specific to the mission.

Slide 6

Rules of Engagement

- Guidance on authority and limits to use force, and base for accountability
- Covers weapons use, detention, searches
- Abide by human rights at all times.
- When military engaged in hostilities, must also comply with international humanitarian law



Guidance as to when and how the mission may use force can be found in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) that apply to the military component and the Directives on the Force (DUF) for the police component. ROE provide mission-specific guidance that builds on the mission's Security Council mandate, international human rights, and humanitarian law as well as DPO policy guidelines on the use of force. ROE not only cover force in the narrow sense of the word (i.e., kinetic force) but also forcible measures such as detention or searches and seizures of materials.

ROE commonly include:

- Use of force
- Use of weapons systems
- Authority to carry weapons
- Authority to detain, search, disarm
- Reactions to civil actions or unrest

TCCs are not permitted to modify ROE according to national interpretation(s), nor are T/PCCs allowed to impose any caveats on the authorizations to use force that are contained in the ROE, without formal consultation with UNHQ and the express written agreement of DPO. TCCs must prepare and train personnel on ROE. Every UNIBAT member must know the ROE.

Slide 7

Use of Force by Peacekeepers

<p><u>Authority to Use Force</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-defence • Defence of mandate, including freedom of movement • Protection of civilians • Other mandates given by Security Council 	<p><u>Limits of Use of Force</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generally minimal use of force: HR/policing rules • Military can escalate to combat-level force when necessary: IHL/military rules
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ROE set out when the mission has authority to use force. This authority always includes the use of force in self-defence. The use of force beyond self-defence depends on the mandate. Multidimensional missions may be authorised to use force in defence of the mandate, including for purposes of asserting their freedom of movement. Furthermore, they regularly are mandated to use all necessary means to protect civilians against physical violence. In some cases, the mandate may further expand the authority to use force. Some mandates have given authority to use force to neutralise armed groups in support of the host state.

ROE and, for police, Directives on the Use of Force also establish limits on the use of force. Under their DUFs, your uniformed colleagues in police components must always use force within the limits of international law enforcement and human rights standards.

The ROE for the military component also restrains the use of force to the minimum necessary level. However, the military may engage in combat-level military force where necessary to effectively implement mandates involving use of force authority. In such situations, military peacekeepers are bound primarily by the rules of IHL on the conduct of hostilities.

The Mission has a responsibility to make full use of authority to use force to the extent appropriate and necessary to effectively implement their mandate. UNIBAT members may be held accountable and face disciplinary measures and criminal sanctions under the jurisdiction of their home country if they use excessive force beyond what international human rights or humanitarian law permit. However, findings of excessive force have rarely, if ever been made against military peacekeepers. Rather there may be problems where components failed to use the force necessary to protect the mission or civilians. Since UNIBAT are under the command of the force commander, any failure to follow lawful orders from the force commander would amount to a case of insubordination that can be tried under the jurisdiction of the respective UNIBAT's home country.

Slide 8

**DPO Guidelines on Military Use of Force:
Minimal Force where possible**

- Minimal force to reach objective
- Graduated force
- Proportionality (lethal force to protect life)



Note: United Nations Police will only use non-military force!

- ✓ Avoids escalation of violence
- ✓ Avoids participation in conflict
- ✓ Minimize harm to civilian population

DPO has established guidelines on the use of military force that also shape the ROE of specific missions. They emphasize that missions should only use as much force as necessary to reach their objectives. In particular, the use of firearms and other lethal force may only be used to protect persons from physical violence, but not e.g., solely to protect mission property. This is a deliberate policy decision that serves to

- Avoid escalation of violence
- Avoid that the military component becomes a participant in the armed conflict
- Minimize the risk of harm to civilians that any escalation of force entails.

While UNPOL units must never go beyond the level of minimal necessary force that guides police work, UNIBATs and other UN military units may apply combat-level force whenever it has authority to use force and such combat-level force becomes necessary. Examples:

- The military component deploys helicopter gunships to protect civilians living in a city, which is being attacked by an armed group
- To defend its mandate and assert freedom of movement, UN forces launch a military assault to dismantle an armed group's heavily guarded but illegal roadblocks

When using this level of force, UNIBAT must respect IHL, including the fundamental principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality.

Slide 9

Case 6: force protection

<p><u>Scenario 1:</u> A group of angry villagers starts throwing stones at the UNIBAT and UN formed police units guarding a UN compound.</p>	<p><u>Scenario 2:</u> The next night, the same compound is shelled with mortars by unknown attackers.</p>
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What force may the United Nations use in each scenario to defend themselves?



The case discussion should show how the UN rules on the use of force dictate a fundamentally different approach to defending the mission in each scenario:

- Scenario 1 is a law enforcement type of threat involving violent civilians. Such a case should be resolved with the minimal level of force necessary to protect the compound. Typically, the Formed Police Units would be called upon to deploy less lethal weapons such as tear gas to push back and disperse the villagers.
- Scenario 2 involves a military-grade, deadly threat in which UNIBAT may immediately respond with deadly force to defend itself and other UN personnel against the attack. However, it must respect rules of IHL. For instance, if the attackers shell from within civilian populated areas (which is a grave IHL breach on their part), UNIBAT's military response has to take precautions to protect civilians in that area.

Slide 10

Host State Agreements (SOMA/SOFA)

- Legal doc signed by UN and host state
- Privileges and immunities for UN mission / personnel
- Examples: freedom of movement, customs exemptions, visa requirements
- Supplemented by special agreements (example: handover of detainees to host state)




Before the deployment of a peace operation, the UN and the host Government sign a Status of Forces Agreement (for peacekeeping missions) or Status of Mission Agreement (for special political missions). The SOFA/SOMA establishes the legal framework that regulates the status of the mission and its members in the Host State, including privileges and immunities for UN personnel. It elaborates on protections the UN already enjoys under customary international law and the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Notwithstanding their privileges and immunities, the Peacekeeping Operation and its members remain under an obligation to respect local laws and regulations. Peacekeepers respect and follow the national laws of the host country.

SOFA/SOMAs usually guarantee that:

- UN premises in the host country are inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the UN, which controls access to all its premises.
- UN equipment and vehicles are immune from search and seizure.
- The UN has the right to un-restricted communication throughout the host country.
- The UN may disseminate information on its mandate to the public which is under its exclusive control and cannot be the subject of any form of censorship.

- Mission personnel have functional immunity for official acts (see below)
- Mission personnel enjoy freedom of movement in the country (see below)

The mission may conclude additional agreements with the host country. Example: In accordance with the SOP on Detention by Peacekeepers, a mission that detains persons under its mandate and wants to hand them over to the host state, must first conclude a legal agreement guaranteeing that the host state treats such persons humanely and provides the mission with access to follow up their situation.

 UN Photos show the signing ceremonies of the UNAMI SOMA and UNMIS SOFA.

Slide 11

Immunities and Exclusive Jurisdiction

- Troop contingents under exclusive disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction of their own states. Promise under TCC MOU to ensure accountability
- UNMOs and Police have functional immunity for official acts. Can be waived by Secretary-General
- Immunity does not mean impunity for peacekeepers

Special protections ensure that mission personnel cannot be prosecuted or arrested by the host state to intimidate them or frustrate their work.

UN Military Observers and UN Police Officers enjoy functional immunity. The host state may not arrest or prosecute them with regard to anything they say or do in relation to their official duties. In principle, this functional immunity can be waived by the United Nations in the interests of justice or the organisation. The UN may in particular allow the **officers'** home state to prosecute. In comparison, the UN would rarely ever allow the host state to prosecute that many states that host peace operations lack a reliable justice system that can ensure due process.

UNIBAT members enjoy an even fuller protection against arrest or prosecution. Under the SOFA/SOMA, their home state retains exclusive jurisdiction over them. This means that UNIBAT members who commit a crime, can only be arrested and prosecuted by their own justice authorities.

However, these protections do not provide UNIBAT members with impunity for criminal wrongdoing. Under the Memorandum of Understanding between the UNIBAT TCC and the United Nations, the TCC makes a legally binding promise to ensure accountability. In

case this promise is not kept, the United Nations can repatriate relevant personnel or entire contingents. With regard to cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), the Security Council even obligates the United Nations to repatriate entire contingents in case they fail to investigate and prosecute SEA or do not report back to the United Nations on the steps they have taken.


Slide 12

Case 7: Roadblock

A UNIBAT platoon conducts a patrol to implement its mandate to verify ceasefire violations

An armed group has set up a roadblock and refuses to let UNIBAT pass.

The armed group argues that peacekeepers did not get prior authorization to access the area under its control



What is UNIBAT legally authorized to do?



The following issues should emerge from the case discussion:

- *The armed group impedes the freedom of movement throughout the country, which is guaranteed under the SOFA/SOMA. Missions do not have to seek prior authorization before moving around the country as this would undermine their capacity to effectively conduct observation tasks in the mission area. In the case at hand, the unit will be unable to verify whether the ceasefire has been violated or it.*
- *In principle, the host government has a duty under the SOFA/SOMA to ensure the mission's safety, security, and freedom of movement in the country. The mission might therefore insist that it takes measures to dislodge the armed group and remove the illegal roadblock*
- *However, the host government may be unable or unwilling to remove the roadblock. Under its own authority to use force in defence of its mandate, the mission is legally entitled to use all necessary means to force their way*

through the checkpoint. In case the armed group fighters use force against mission personnel, UNIBAT can rely on its authority to use force in self-defence to protect themselves.

- *While the foregoing indicates what the mission is legally entitled to do under its mandate, there are strategic and political implications of pursuing a course of action involving the use of force against one of the conflict parties. The mission's rules of engagement will provide some guidance on how mission personnel should react where their freedom of movement is denied. In cases of doubt, further guidance should be sought from the chain of command if reasonably possible under the circumstances.*

Slide 13

United Nations Policies & Guidance

- **SG policies apply to all UN work**
DPO policies are specifically for peace operations
- **Details of policies are elaborated through guidelines, standard operating procedures & standing orders**
- **SG & DPO Guidance is legally binding**


The United Nations has internal regulations that are binding on UNIBAT and other peace operations personnel. The basic principles are contained in policies that may be adopted by the Secretary-General for the entire UN (see e.g., the HRDDP discussed in lesson 2.1) or by DPO/DPPA specifically for peace operations. Further details are laid out in guidelines, standard operating procedures, or mission-specific guidance.

By way of example, the following slides will cover three particularly important DPO policy documents. These establish binding rules on how UNIBAT should handle issues related to detention, peacekeeping-intelligence, and human rights violations.

Slide 14

**DPO Standard Operating Procedures
on Detention in UN Peace Operations (I)**

- Arrest & detention powers based on Security Council Mandate and ROE
- SOP triggered once UN has target person under its effective control
- Due process: Inform person about reason for detention, inventory of items taken from detainees, notification of their family etc.
- Mission’s Detention Focal Point must be immediately notified
- ICRC notified within 36 hours and given access to detainees
- Foreigners may demand that their consulate is alerted



Their mandate and the Rules of Engagement elaborating it may give a peace operation the power to apprehend and temporarily detain individuals. Example: In exercise of its Protection of Civilians mandate, a UNIBAT patrol apprehends three men as they are attempting to rape a woman.

The procedures to be followed in such cases is laid out by the DPO Standard Operating Procedures on Detention. They set out a process on how the UN can temporarily detain persons with a view to handing them over to the host state authorities or releasing them again, as appropriate.

UNIBAT are responsible to familiarize themselves with the SOPs and mission-specific rule. Every mission will also nominate a detention focal point (a civilian who is neither military nor police) will monitor compliance with the SOP under the overall responsibility of the head of mission and who can provide advice as needed.

The SOPs apply once the UN has the target persons under its effective control, even for very short periods. This applies even if some local officials may accompany the UN during operations if UNIBAT effectively controls the apprehension. Compliance with the SOPs cannot be evaded by introducing evasive concepts like “temporary holding” or the like.

Once UNIBATs have effective control over a person, the SOPs set out detailed guidance on how to proceed. They must inform the detainee about the reason for the detention, make an inventory of any items temporarily taken or seized from the detainee, give the person the option to inform their family or third parties etc.

Furthermore, the Detention Focal must be immediately notified. The SOPs also require notifying, within 36 hours, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As per the SOPs, the ICRC has a right to get access to detainees and conduct confidential interviews with them. Foreign nationals may demand that their consulate is alerted (the choice is with the detainee).



UN Photo shows UN forces arresting former Liberian President Charles Taylor in order to hand him over to the International Criminal Court, which later convicted him of crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Slide 15

**DPO Standard Operating Procedures
on Detention in UN Peace Operations (II)**

- Humane treatment during detention. Mission responsible for water, food, hygiene, medical care etc.
- Separation of male and female detainees; adults & children
- Temporary detention (96h) only. Then handover to authorities or release
- No handover if risk of persecution, torture/ill-treatment, disappearance, summary execution or death penalty. Mission must assess risk prior to handover and monitor handed-over persons

DPO Standard Operating Procedures complemented by mission specific guidance, appropriate orders & training for all concerned staff.

Anyone detained by the United Nations must be treated humanely. The mission must plan to ensure that detainees are kept in adequate holding cells, receive water, food, hygiene facilities, medical care as required by international standards (these are detailed in an international document called the Mandela Rules, named after the famous Anti-Apartheid campaigner, political prisoner and later South African President).

Detainees must be separated in line with international standards. Men and women as well as adults and children must be kept apart (except children and their parents who should not be separated from each other). To ensure compliance, relevant needs and resources must be factored in at the mission planning and budget stage already.

If UNIBAT personnel receives any allegations of detainees being subjected to torture or ill-treatment such concerns should be immediately transmitted to the Detention Focal Point and the mission's conduct & discipline team.

The SOPs envisage that the UN will only hold detainees for 96 hours. After 96 hours, the person has to be handed over to state authorities (usually the host state authorities, although exceptionally a handover to a third state presence may be carried out). If no handover is possible or appropriate, the person must be released.

The UN is prohibited from handing over a person to the host state if there is a real risk of that person being subjected to persecution, torture or ill-treatment, disappearance, or summary execution. Consistent with the UN policy of opposing the death penalty, a person must also not be handed over if there is a real risk of the person being subjected to the death penalty.

To implement these non-refoulement guarantees, every mission must strike a legal agreement on handover and related guarantees with the host government. In addition, the mission must carry out a conduct an individual risk assessment before any handover and closely monitor the subsequent treatment of the person who was handed over.

Slide 16

**DPO Policy on Peacekeeping Intelligence (PKI):
Limits on UN intelligence activities**

- ✓ **Full respect for human rights & international law**
- ✓ **No clandestine activities**
- ✓ **No exposure of sources to harm**
- ✓ **Independence of UN's peacekeeping intelligence**
- ✓ **Cooperation with states subject to conditions**

Also, to better protect the mission and civilians from security threats, UN peace operations may collect, process and share peacekeeping-intelligence. Yet, this work is subject to strict rules that are laid out in the DPO Peacekeeping-intelligence Policy and underlying PKI guidelines. Some are based on international human rights standards. Others are established by the UN to protect the independence and impartiality of our missions.

Intelligence gathering must fully respect human rights. To provide an obvious example, it would not be permissible for UN personnel to physically abuse captured armed group fighters or deny them water, food, or necessary medical care to force them to provide information.

Clandestine activities are outside the boundaries of peacekeeping-intelligence and shall not be undertaken because they undermine the reputation of the mission and may place our personnel at risk. UN policy defines clandestine activities as “the acquisition of information or intelligence conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment of the activities, because they are illicit and/or are inconsistent with the legal framework, principles, policies and mandates of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations”. For example, United Nations staff would never hack into a database of a government authority or non-governmental organisation to get information.

However, the limitation to non-clandestine means does not mean, the mission must reveal its sources to the host state or others. To the contrary, all mission personnel are required to apply particular care not to expose any sources or potential sources of information to harm. Before approaching any human sources, it must therefore be carefully assessed whether contact with the United Nations would place the source at risk and whether confidentiality can be ensured. To provide an example of compliance, UNMO decide not to ask villagers about armed group activity in the region, because they are aware that armed group informants are closely watching the village and the armed group may subject to reprisals anyone who is merely suspected of providing information to the UN. When they interview sources, UNMO should always ensure confidentiality, e.g., by meeting them away from their place of residence.

United Nations peacekeeping-intelligence activities must be fully autonomous from and independent in all aspects of any national intelligence system or other operations and will maintain their exclusively international character. **The mission's independence and perceived impartiality may be compromised if we are seen as being an intelligence arm of the host government or third states.** Information may be shared with other state authorities, but subject to conditions and limits of international human rights law. Notably, the United Nations will not invite the provision of any information if there is a real risk that such information was obtained by way of torture or other serious human rights violations.

Similarly, the UN will not share information with intelligence actors if there is a real risk that such information is used to further violations of international human rights or humanitarian law. For instance, UNIBAT would not share an armed group location with the host army if it would invite an airstrike conducted without regard to civilian casualties in contravention of the IHL principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality.

Slide 17


Case 8: who is this armed group?

To obtain information on a new armed group, UNIBAT considers to:

- *Establish a joint intelligence cell with the host state's military intelligence*
- *Infiltrate UN language assistant as a recruit into the armed group*
- *Pay an armed group fighter for copies of the group's battle plans*
- *Speak to children who cook for the group*

Relevant PKO principles:

- Independence of UN intelligence
- Protect sources from harm
- No covert action
- No paid informants
- No children as sources





Ask participants to discuss in small groups or in plenary, how each of the four ideas on gathering intelligence falls short of the legal requirements of UN Peacekeeping-intelligence. Reveal the responses in the red text box only when debriefing on the exercise.

The discussion should show that none of the proposed courses of action comply with UN policy and the legal framework it is based on:

- *In order to protect our impartiality Peacekeeping-intelligence process must be autonomous from other actors. While we can share information under certain circumstances, the UN may not create a joint intelligence cell with a national intelligence agency*
- *Infiltrating a community liaison assistant into an armed group is a clandestine activity not allowed under UN rules. It does not matter that the target is an armed group. The prohibition of clandestine activities also serves to protect us from accusations of "spying" that may undermine the*

mission's reputation as an impartial risk and place mission personnel at risk. Such infiltration would often also have to involve national staff (like the language assistant in this case) who are particularly vulnerable to reprisals

- *The DPO Guidelines on Acquisition of Human peacekeeping-intelligence prohibit to pay informants. This rule applies regardless of whether the informant works for a state authority, an armed group or is just a private citizen*
- *The same DPO Guidelines also specify that missions must never recruit children as sources of intelligence, because they cannot give free and informed consent to assume the grave risks involved in an informant's role. Paying children for military information may also violate the human rights and IHL prohibition of not recruiting children for military activities*

Slide 18

**Policy on Human Rights in Peace Operations:
Responsibilities for all UNIBAT members**

- **Identify**
- **Record**
- **Report**
- **Confidential**
- **Refer victims (support)**
- **Intervention to protect**
- **Follow situation**



The Guidelines for Military Personnel in Peace Operations and the Policy on Human Rights in Peace Operations establish specific responsibilities for military components that come across violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

As a UNIBAT member you may be required to observe, monitor, and report on developments impacting on the human rights situation, including human rights violations and abuses against children associated with armed forces or patterns of conflict-related sexual violence. You should be actively identifying concerns by reaching out to all sectors of society.

You must promptly record and share with the human rights component all allegations on violations they receive or observe for follow-up. Child Protection Officers and Women Protection Advisers will deal with cases specifically involving grave violations against children or conflict-related sexual violence. Formal mechanisms such as SOPs will address such information-sharing.

Respect for the principle of confidentiality must always be maintained. Names of victims and witnesses should not be included in reports with broader circulation.

Based on referral systems established by the mission or UN agencies, UNIBAT must promptly refer victims to providers of medical assistance, psychosocial support, and protection.

In some cases, intervention, e.g., by raising an urgent concern with the party concerned, may be appropriate. The protection of civilian's coordination structures must be alerted so they can initiate a concerted mission intervention.

Slide 19

Lesson Take Aways

- UNIBAT must respect human rights and IHL, and also help ensure that local forces respect them
- SOFA / SOMA give UNIBAT freedom of movement and other legal protections
- ROE regulate UNIBAT use of force. May use as much force as needed to defend mission, protect civilians and achieve mandate
- Secretary-General and DPO policies set binding rules for UNIBAT, e.g. on detention & intelligence

Summary

Key takeaways regarding the Legal Framework include:

- UNIBAT must respect human rights and IHL, and also help ensure that local forces respect them
- SOFA / SOMA gives UNIBAT freedom of movement and other legal protections
- ROE regulate UNIBAT use of force. May use as much force as needed to defend mission, protect civilians, and achieve mandate
- Secretary-General and DPO policies set binding rules for UNIBAT, e.g., on detention & intelligence

Module 2



Legal Framework

Take away from Module 2 include:

- International and national humanitarian legal frameworks impact and guide peacekeeping in the field
- Bodies of international law provide special protection for those members of communities that are most vulnerable, women, children, refugees
- Peacekeepers must monitor and report violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
- Peacekeepers do not have impunity from laws and are held accountable for unlawful activities
- Peacekeepers can ask their command, Legal Officers, POC Officers for assistance
- Legal frameworks govern human rights, IHL and peacekeeping generally
- Peacekeepers must comply with IHRL and IHL themselves, and monitor/report abuses by others. Peacekeepers will be held accountable for individual actions

Module 3



Operational Framework

Module 3 at a Glance

Aim

The module does not aim to create or train participants on a decision-making process for UN peacekeeping; and does not discuss particular military doctrines, which may vary between troop contributing countries. Rather, the module offers tactical planning considerations that commanders and their staff might apply to their own decision-making processes as per their national doctrine.

Learning Objectives

The learning objectives for Module 3 are based on the goal of being able to apply the main aspects of the first two modules into practice:

- Know how to translate conceptual and legal frameworks into appropriate action at the tactical level
- Identify key documents, techniques and tools that may provide guidance in a UN PKO environment

Overview

Module 3 provides a systematic approach to apply unique PKO tactical planning considerations to POC, FP, infantry tasks, the employment of and coordination with specialized units, the handling of detainees and crowd control

While this module focuses on the tactical level, the overview you received in modules 1 and 2 help provide the strategic and conceptual concepts that help in the transition into this module. The module focuses on the “how” and provides guidance to help the UNIBAT approach planning in a UN PKO.

Slide 1



Module 3 Operational
Framework for the UNIBAT

Slide 2

Module 3 Content

- Introduction to tactical planning guidance and considerations in a PKO
- Threat-based approach, risk mitigation, and MPKI
- Protection of Civilians (POC) planning considerations
- Force Protection (FP) planning considerations
- Military tasks that support the mandate
- Employment of QRF and RES
- Crowd control operations
- UNIBAT working with EOD
- The handling of detainees
- The UNIBAT and ISR

Here is the content of Module 3. In this module the focus will be providing the UNIBAT staff and leadership tactical planning considerations for UN PKO.

Lesson

3.1



Intro to Tactical Planning Guidance and Considerations in a PKO




Starting the Lesson

The aim of this lesson is to help familiarize the participants with tactical planning guidance and considerations in a PKO. Military officers in the UNIBAT should understand that tactical planning in peacekeeping operations is multidimensional and a diverse process that may include many components. Successful military operations rely on the understanding and employing a common and comprehensive planning and decision-making process from the Force HQs to the Sector HQs, the UNIBAT HQs and down to the infantry companies. This methodical process relies on staffs and commanders to seek optimal solutions and to make decisions to achieve success.

In a traditional military operation, the planning process will determine resource requirements i.e., the troops and equipment required to achieve the task. In the context of a UN peacekeeping mission many of these factors would have been determined as part of the strategic planning in UNHQ and provided as guidance through relevant documents such as the Security Council Resolution outlining the mandate of the mission, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Integrated Strategic framework (ISF), Mission Concept.

At the tactical level, each troop contributing country's national doctrine has established their own military decision making as a distinct analytical process. Therefore, this module does not aim to train participants on a certain decision-making / planning process, but rather seeks to highlight how commanders and their staff should integrate UN planning documents, Force Protection, POC, Child Protection, CRSV and the unique planning considerations, as well as understanding of how the military tasks that support the Mission. The lesson provides tactical PKO planning guidance for troop contributing countries TCCs to consider in their own planning process.

Slide 3



Lesson 3.1
Tactical Planning and Military
Decision Making Process
(MDMP) Introduction

Military officers in the UNIBAT of a UN Mission need to understand the unique process of tactical planning in a Peacekeeping Operation. Successful tactical military operations rely on the understanding and employing a planning process that relies on the staff and commanders' efforts to seek optimal solutions and to make decisions to achieve an objective in a dynamic, lethal PKO environment.

This process does not stand isolated in the entire peacekeeping planning mechanism. This process is supported by the other mechanism like the liaison among different layers of military component as well as the coordination with other civilian and police component.

In this lesson we will provide you an introduction into tactical planning considerations and guidance that can help member states integrate and manifest their own planning / military decision-making process MDMP in a PKO. More importantly, we will discuss these special tactical planning guidance and considerations for the UNIBAT operating within the UNPKO FP and POC frameworks.

Slide 4

Content

- Tactical planning
- Mission strategy, implementing guidelines for the military
- Overview
- Planning considerations for POC / FP
- COAs and Risk Mitigation introduction
- Phases of response and use of force

Here is the content of this lesson. We will explain tactical considerations and guidance to be used for planning for force protection and Protection of Civilians. The lesson will also, review the risk analysis and assessment concept.


Slide 5

Learning Outcomes

- Identify key documents that provide tactical guidance for planning
- Explain the importance of tactical planning in a PKO
- Explain why a threat-based assessment is important to the planning process and how it relates to risk mitigation priorities
- Explain ways to analyse the Operational Environment for FP and POC; describe the difference and focus
- Explain how do phases assist in the planning process
- Explain tactical planning considerations for FP and POC

As a good training practice, let us review the learning outcomes of this lesson: At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 6



Starting at the highest strategic level, this slide provides an overview of the different planning processes in the UN system and how they eventually impact operations on the ground. This will help to understand the complexity of planning in the context of UN Peacekeeping.


- Mission-specific planning is part of the broader UN-wide planning process, which takes initial guidance from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG)
- At UN Headquarters, DPO will develop a Mission Concept, which is a strategic level articulation of what the field mission will do and how. Under the Mission Concept are military, police and support concepts that provide more details
- Once the mission is established, the Mission Concept will inform the development of a Mission Plan, which is the Mission's operational plan of how to implement the mandate. The Mission Plan must be aligned with the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), where it exists. The purpose of an ISF is to bring together the mission and the UNCT's mandates around a set of agreed priorities and measures

to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN system on the context's peace sustainment needs

- Each component in the Mission should have component-level plans such as annual work plans aligned with the overall Mission Concept and Mission Plan
- In addition, the Mission may have mission-wide strategies on cross-cutting issues such as Protection of Civilians, child protection and gender mainstreaming
- The results-based budget (RBB) of the Mission is the primary resource management tool at the mission level. It is derived from the Mission's plans for the following year and acts as a strategic tool to measure progress against mandated tasks and stated objectives
- Plans should guide implementation and help monitor impact on the ground, should be continuously updated based on evolving conflict analysis and should help determine when a change of course is needed

All strategic and operational level planning processes related to Peacekeeping Operations must comply with the appropriate UN Policy. DPKO-DFS released a Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning. This Policy applies to UN-wide planning processes but does not specifically address planning for UN Peacekeeping Missions.

Slide 7



This is a busy slide, but it will help portray the nested concept of the importance of the layers of HQs' planning and coordination. Key to the process is the back briefs to higher HQs and the higher HQs approval of a subordinate's plan. While using the MDMP and planning process, it is important to bring in and coordinate with all UN components, UN partners, interlocutors, and local governments.

FP and POC Planning flows from the Mission Mandate through each planning level, culminating in an OPORD/PLANORD to Unit Commanders. Commanders are required to consider FP and POC Planning in all their mission planning.

The Mission Mandate is always going to comply with and reflect over-arching laws and policies that require the Protection of Civilians. The Mission Mandate triggers FP and POC Planning in parallel with other mission planning. The product of FP and POC Planning is not so much a plan, but considerations to be incorporated in the mission planning. FP and POC Planning flows down to the Force Commander's OPORD, Sector Commander's OPORD to Unit Commanders who will be tasked with conducting the Planning in their AOR as a part of their Receipt of Mission.

Note that at the sector level, close liaison with the UN Country Team / Regional HQ is essential in understanding the Political and Humanitarian aspects of POC. The three pillars of responsibility in a UN Mission are Political, Security and Humanitarian. The Military component's primary responsibility is within the security pillar. Therefore, the sector and force HQs must ensure that they support the unit commanders by coordinating with and help create synergistic efforts in support of FP and POC planning via the other Mission components.

Unit FP and POC Planning will focus on understanding the specific vulnerabilities to UN personnel / forces and within population / civilians (vulnerable groups) in their AOR and planning proactive measures to both prevent and pre-empt and reactive measures to responses in order to reduce the effects of abuses against civilians and attacks against UN personnel.

Force and Sector HQs will normally follow the UN-MDMP planning process, while unit commanders use their national planning processes to create the elements of their plans. It is best to check with SOPs on the required formats of products. It is essential that the Sector and Force HQs understand the tactical challenges and threats at the tactical level of the UNIBAT.


Once a unit commander develops their plan, the next higher HQs must endorse and underwrite that plan. This includes accepting the risks and assisting the unit commander in mitigating the risks. This may include accepting responsibilities for certain NAIs and TAIs inherent in the plans.



For discussion:

To ensue successful planning, it is key that there exists a close liaison with the Sector HQs, UN Country Team. The three pillars of responsibility in a UN Mission are Political, Secure Environment and Humanitarian. The MC and UNIBAT is primarily concerned with a Secure Pillar, how can you synergize the relationship with the interlocutors and partners?

Slide 8




Good planning is the cornerstone of successful UN military operations. The tactical planning processes for the UNIBAT is according to their national doctrine. Each TCC has its own planning process, the UN did establish its own process designed to enhance interoperability, thereby facilitating combined operations at the Force and Sector HQs level. The UN planning process ensures inclusion of the UN military peacekeeping-intelligence framework. Analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE), incorporating assessments of the physical, human and information terrain is key to the process.

On this slide is a tool to help explain tactical planning consideration in a PKO tactical that TCCs can incorporate into their planning process. To facilitate the planning of FP and POC into Peacekeeping Operations, the UNIBAT staff should consider / use as a guide the following tool shown here and adapt to their planning process: assessment of the operating environment, mission analysis, development COA development, / selection, the preparation and delivery of orders and the execution.

In the next few slides, we will review each step in this planning guide. Of note, it is linear and phased in description; however, it is far from a linear process. Tactical planning is not stagnant, it is a cyclic, continuous process that is reviewed and refined. We constantly

updated analytical products, decisions, and orders to reflect the changing threats, risks, environment, and objectives. And remember, it is important that it is an entire (inclusive) staff process.

Slide 9



The purpose of this initiation step is to alert all participants of the planning requirements: the amount of time available for planning and decide on a planning approach. When a new mission is identified, commanders and staffs perform the actions:

- Alert key participants
- Gather the tools for planning- related documents, including the higher headquarters' operation order, maps, terrain products, running estimates
- Update and refine the Analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE) products
- Determine time needed to plan and prepare for the mission
- Start to determine the constraints and information requirements.
- Commander provides planning guidance
- Conduct an initial assessment, determine the specified tasks, implied tasks, and mission essential tasks
- Authorised movements to begin information acquisition activities, such as- patrols, matrix execution, open source, MPKI cell products, JOC / JMAC Reports, and Request for information (RFI) to higher HQs


- Issue a warning order (WARNORD #1)



Ask participants:

- (1) What are the actions to be performed when a new mission is received?*
- (2) What could be the information collection activities that can be conducted?*

Slide 10



Mission Analysis is key to any planning process tool. It takes higher-level guidance provided to the planners, challenges it against the facts and assumptions, and then refines it to better detail the mission and the planning requirements. This process should result in a restated mission, planning guidance, and UNIBAT Commander's intent, incorporating purpose, method, and end state. The deduction and analytical frameworks are central to this process, where factors of information are arranged under a series of headings that include:

- **Tasks:** Refine and establish specified, implied, and most important, the mission essential task that drives the success of the mission. Tasks are associated with effects to be achieved in respect to an actor, group, spoiler actor, hostile group, terrain, or UN Forces
- **Constraints:** Something that limits the plan
- **Clarification:** Something that requires additional information from higher HQ.
Planning Guidance: A conclusion that guides the UNIBAT staff
- **An Information Requirement (IR):** Information that is required for planning purposes

- UN Mission Analysis follows these steps which are evaluated using the above factors:
- Identification and analyse the Sector and Force Commander's intent that establishes the reason for the UN Mission
- Identify and analyse critical Facts and Assumptions
- Identify and analyse Tasks
- Identification of specified tasks to be completed
- Identify and analyse Constraints and Restrictions- constraints (limits), restrictions (unit must not do), and freedom of action (the absence of any limitation)
- Assets available to the UNIBAT
- Acceptable risk classified (high to low) so it can be prioritised and mitigated accordingly
- Time- key operational timings
- Identifying key and decisive terrain features and operational effects
- Draft commander's intent. Here is an example: Purpose: Restore security in the town of Jabra while dominating the area to ensure compliance of no armed groups in the area according to the brokered cease fire. Method: Enforce free movement of the population without fear of attack or harassment by parties or criminal gangs. End State: Complete cessation of interference with humanitarian aid, attacks on civilians and hostilities against the UN's presence

The Mission Analysis portion also includes an updated analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE). The UNIBAT MPKI cell is instrumental in this analysis, they should draw on information and intelligence from Sector (G2), UN regional offices, partners, and Force-level (U2) evaluations. The AOE is a continuous process and staffs must work to update it constantly, particularly during operations. The AOE involves the analyses of the following:

- Physical terrain-evaluation of the effects of terrain features such as terrain relief, bodies of water, road networks, urban areas, culturally or environmentally important sites, natural resources and other physical factors on UN operations and mandate implementation
- Human terrain - analyses of the effect of human terrain features such as tribal, ethnic, and religious groups, and such things as areas that are supportive or unsupportive of the UN operations and mandate implementation
- Information terrain - evaluation analyses the effect of communications infrastructure, communications blackspots, internet, and media penetration, on UN operations and mandate implementation
- Weather- impact on mobility, visibility, and sustainability of operations

- Actor Evaluation - analytical tools to identify relevant actors in the AO, their intent, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and other critical factors. They can include local personalities, influencers, and community groups who the Mission is likely to engage. An understanding of threat actors in the BAT AOR will assist the unit in its contingency planning, its risk mitigation, and will inform planning of all operations, including protection of civilian tasks
- Situation Integration- assessment integrates the understanding of the operating environment and the actors. Future scenarios are generated, and non-UN actors' courses of action are developed and evaluated. This allows the UNIBAT staff to plan against a range of scenarios, usually focused on the threat actors' scenarios. These threat and spoiler actors' courses of action, which will inform contingency planning, risk mitigation, and force protection measures. Also, the impact of UN operations on other relevant actors must be assessed, including the likely reaction to UN operations by local key leaders, and vulnerable population groups




Internal and external staff communications is vital for planning / mission success. Discuss what you do to facilitate dialogue and sharing of information.

Ask the participants:

- *What are the essential elements of intent?*
- *What is the relationship between specified task, implied task/s and mission essential tasks?*

Facilitate discussion and have them explain -Purpose (of the Mission/Task), Method, End-State. Some students may find it difficult in phrasing the End-State. Have them give examples of End-State

Slide 11



The purpose of course of action (COA) development is to establish one or more military options that will fulfil the assigned mission or military tasks. While it is important to establish threat actor reactions and COAs, it is also important, particularly in a UN context, to consider what second order effects a UN Mission might have. For example, what impact will the COA have on local key leaders or on vulnerable civilian populations? For a UNIBAT COA to be valid, UNIBAT Operations personnel must ensure that it is feasible (it can be accomplished with available resources), that it is acceptable (to UN policy, and levels of risk). It is important that a COA has the following elements:

- What -tasks to be executed
- When -critical timing parameters
- Where - locations where military effects will be achieved
- How- concept of operation, incorporating tasks
- Why - purpose of the mission

Generally, a COA will be depicted visually and, in few words, often on a board with the mission, **commander's intent**, a **scheme** of manoeuvre (overlaid on the relevant geographic terrain, with phases, a purpose, method and end state, and IR

UNIBAT staff should develop at least two courses of action for an assigned task. COAs must then be considered from a spoiler, threat actor and vulnerable civilian perspective. This process is known as wargaming. This process must be recorded so that when a COA

is eventually selected, likely threat actor reactions and courses of action can be mitigated or otherwise planned.

Once more, it is necessary that the UNIBAT staff considers the impact of its COAs on non-threat actors such as vulnerable civilian groups, local key leaders, and other important actors of the local environment.

Methods to conduct an analysis of a COA:

- Develop decisive points and lines of operation
- Use of capabilities: Air operations, force mobility and firepower
- Vulnerabilities: Limited forces, level of credibility
- Critical requirements: Consent, Situation Awareness, freedom of action, ROE
- Critical capabilities of own force that are vulnerable
- An Effects matrix / schematic

At a minimum, the following must be considered for each COA:

- Main effort
- Supporting effort
- Type of manoeuvre / movement
- Integration of other units, support, and civil partners
- Command, control, and communications.
- Adversary threats, risks and COA.
- Test against suitability, feasibility, acceptability, political impact


The COA analysis and comparison is presented to the UNIBAT commander for decision, who then, having been supplied with an overview of each COA, with their relative strengths and weaknesses, likely spoiler actor reactions, and UN-specific criteria (ROE, UN principles, POC, etc.) makes an informed decision as to which COA to refine and develop. The staff must do and explain a detailed Course of Action Analysis, Selection Comparison-COA Advantages Disadvantages and recommend a COA.

Here are a few COA testing guidelines:

- Must be vetted with impacts to the other two pillars of the mission / mandate we discussed in Module 1– Humanitarian / IHL and Political, as COA may have a positive or negative effect on these strategies from a strategic to a tactical ramification


- Military necessity, proportionality, discrimination
- Remaining objective and impartial
- Continuous verification of each COA's credibility
- Avoid early conclusions
- Each COA must be tested against spoilers, the most likely and most dangerous

Slide 12



The UNIBAT staff need to identify the COAs where the threats targeting UN Forces and the civilian population fall into risk criteria of likely, highly likely, or imminently to happen and pose a severe or catastrophic impact to the UN or Civilian population. In the next Lesson we will go into more detail in the threat mitigation process.

Slide 13




The Staff prepares, coordinates, authenticates, reviews, publishes, and distributes the orders and plans. The operations officer must be firmly in charge of the process. Staff sections coordinates with staff primaries to assist in production of the OPLAN or OPORD. The commander gets updates and is continually briefed on content and process and gives the final approval of the order. The HQs ensures that the order is consistent and is **nested with the higher commander's intent, which is done through reconciliation and orders crosswalk.** The Order must be briefed and presented to the higher HQs for final review and approval. The higher HQs commander and staff should mitigate or provide the necessary resources to execute the plan.

The total process is not stagnant; it is a continuous process because as new information is received, events or the environment changes. Also, producing the order does not stop the supervision of the subordinate's units. The UNIBAT staff and commanders must assist the subordinate units in their planning process and must approve their final plans. Likewise, the UNIBAT must brief their plans and get approval from the Sector / Force HQs. The higher HQs must do the following:

- Receive brief backs on subordinate unit plans

- Approve subordinate unit plans
- Underwrite and assist in the gaps or areas that the subordinate unit may have
- Assist in mitigating risks, providing additional capabilities, resources if needed
- Covering NAIs if need be; answering IRs

Slide14




During the execution step, the staff and commanders continue to conduct assessments of the situation and may require the staff to go back or start again in the planning cycle. Rehearsals are a key element of execution that allow leaders and their troops to practice aspects of the concept of operations. These actions help units orient themselves to their tasks, environment, and other coordinate with supporting units before executing the operation.

Slide 15

Using the MDMP model for UNPKO POC / FP Tactical Planning Considerations

Now that we did a review of a generic MDMP, let us use this model to help in the explanation and discussions as we go forward to apply this tool in POC and FP planning. As we go through this portion of the lesson, consider how you would apply these tactical planning considerations into your own planning doctrine.

Slide 16




The UNIBAT should focus their planning efforts on prevention and pre-emptive. If you remember on an earlier slide showing risks. The UNIBAT should identify those threats targeting UN Forces and civilian populations that fall into the risk criteria of likely, highly likely, or imminently to happen and pose a severe or catastrophic impact.

The ways in which UN Peacekeeping Missions respond to FP and POC threats can be divided into phases. The four phases are not sequential, and missions will often find their activities fall into different phases in different parts of the country at the same time, and some of the same activities may take place across all phases. It is enough to know that the objective of this approach is to either eliminate a threat or mitigate the risk to civilians or the forces associated with that threat.

It must also be noted that these phases do not necessarily occur in sequential order and may be undertaken simultaneously or independently. Action is necessary across all four phases, in line with the proactive approach taken by peacekeeping missions. In the prevention and pre-emption / proactive phase, the incident has not occurred yet and missions can more effectively avoid violence by acting in these phases.

In the response phase, missions respond to a violent incident that has already occurred, and in the reactive, actions on contact, consolidation phase missions support post-conflict activities. During military planning for FP and POC, intelligence efforts should be focused on the prevention and pre-emption / proactive phases for groups associated with a high-risk criterion.

Slide 17



The MDMP for POC operational planning is relatively the same for all operations; however, there are some areas that we should focus on for a better understanding. We will always base our analysis on threats and risks; however, the normal operational paradigms we consider in our own militaries require a renewed focus on vulnerable populations, and as in all UNPKO the political and humanitarian ramifications of any military operation.

For FP, we should remember that there is not an enemy force; instead, there are perpetrators of violence / spoilers that do not necessarily have the goal of accomplishing the mandate or see UN forces as disruptors to their lives or livelihood.

UNPKO are complex and at times, can breed chaos and confusion. We often have incomplete intelligence and information. However, in the end we must always be concerned with the UN creditability and the protection of the population. Attacks on UN personnel and the killing of peacekeepers have a major impact on the mandate and posture of a UN Mission.

Let us explore the approach to the analysis of the operational environment as it pertains to FP and POC. These considerations are to be incorporated into all mission planning.

While FP and POC is considered separately in a wider MDMP planning, it is generally the same staff and processes doing both. FP and POC planning produce considerations that are injected into mission planning in to ensure that both occurs effectively.

Under the POC Mission Analysis step, planners follow the process of:

- Using the MPKI analysis products of the area of operations and terrain, Identify and analyse all key actors in the AOR based on their relevance to the attacks on Civilians
- Select those key actors that represent a threat
- Determine the level of risk (impact and likelihood) that threat actors pose to vulnerable civilians and the UN
-

Actors can be supportive, neutral, or hostile. The threat actors are a concern and the level of risk they pose to vulnerable civilians is then injected into mission planning to allow commanders to determine which UN facilities and operations, civilian population / groups they need to protect, and how they will protect them.


Under the FP Mission Analysis step, planners follow the process of:

- Identify and analyse all key actors in the AOR based on their relevance to the attacks on the UN Forces
- Select those key actors that represent a threat
- Determine the level of risk (impact and likelihood) that threat actors pose to vulnerable UN forces and bases

The threat actors and the level of risk they pose to vulnerable civilians and UN forces are then injected into mission planning to allow commanders to determine which UN military units, bases and operations, civilian population / groups that are at risk and require measure to mitigate those risks.

The UNIBAT should identify those threats targeting UN Forces and civilian populations that fall into the risk criteria of likely, highly likely, or imminently to happen and pose a severe or catastrophic impact.

Slide 18



To 'Identify Key Actors' steps for the FP and POC the analysis should include:

For Force Protection:


- Spoilers and hostile groups against UN forces, bases
- Potential IED locations and facilities that manufacture IED
- Host Nation State Forces as both perpetrators and as possible protectors
- Other Protection Actors
- Potential Perpetrators – those who may potentially present a risk to UN personnel, facilities, and UN forces
- Host Nation Security Forces – determine their ability and/or willingness to assist in the FP role
- Other Protection Actors – these are other Actors in the AOR whose are neutral or supportive of the UN

Protection of Civilians :

- The Civilian Population

- Vulnerable groups
- High risk individual groups (women / Children)
- Potential Perpetrators
- Host Nation State Forces as both perpetrators and as possible protectors; determine their ability and/or willingness to protect civilians
- Other Protection Actors, all of which can be enhanced with the contribution
- Civilian communities, to provide understanding of where and who they are, their location and make-up
- Hospitals, schools, IDP / refugee camps all should be analysed (armed groups recruitment and areas of kidnapping etc.)
- Potential Perpetrators – those who may potentially present a risk to vulnerable civilians (threat actors who present a risk to the force may not present a risk to civilians, and some actors may not present a risk to the force, but do present a risk to civilians)
- Other Protection Actors – these are other Actors in the AOR whose purpose is to protect civilians

Slide 19



In the 'Threat Analysis' step the UNIBAT staff focuses on the potential effect that identified threat actors:

Force protection (FP):


- Provide an overview of the situation, including a summary of threats that can have an impact on the UN forces, UN military operations and bases (capabilities and vulnerabilities)
- Analysis of the potential areas of concern between threat groups and UN forces
- Threat Matrix summarizes threat actors that may target the UN military operations and how
- To assist the FP planning process, we can improve the understanding of the Threat Actors in the AOR, nature of population and possible perpetrators and how they may interact in a way that presents risk to UN forces
- The only difference between a normal threat-based analysis and analysis in support of FP is that we must orientate our thinking to focus on potential threats to the UN forces because of the UN involvement in the host nation. Certain factions may not support what the UN is trying to accomplish (mandate) and because the

military is often operating throughout the AOR and on the ground with the local communities

Protection of Civilians (POC):

- Provide an overview of the situation, including a summary of threats that can have on civilian communities
- Analysis of the potential areas of concern between threat groups and civilian populations that may develop into abuses against vulnerable civilians – key areas of potential conflict include ethnical, religious, political or any other identified differences that may place specific civilian communities at risk from specific threat groups
- Threat Matrix summarizes threat actors and which communities they may target civilians and how they will do it
- To assist the POC planning process, we can improve the understanding of the Threat Actors in the AOR, nature of civilian communities, and how they may interact in a way that presents risk to civilians
- The difference between a normal threat-based analysis and analysis in support of POC is that we must orientate our thinking to focus on potential threats to civilians from specific threat groups

Slide 20



In the 'Risk Analysis' step of Mission Analysis consider how vulnerable civilian, and UN Forces may be, how much protection they can rely on from other protection actors, and how dangerous each threat group is to each community, or UN military unit or UN force operation which put together allows planners to assess risk to each civilian / military unit / operation community, driving planning priorities.

Under the Risk Analysis step, planners consider the following:

Force Protection planning:

- How vulnerable are specific UN forces to each identified threat group
- How capable is the host nation police and forces of protecting UN forces
- The UNIBAT Commander must consider operational risks to his forces and find ways to mitigate those risks
- What is the level of harm / risk (based on the capability, intent, and historical actions against those identified as possible threats to UN forces and personnel
- Identified threat actors present to that will present risk to UN forces

- The level of harm and risk contributes to determining the priority to act appropriately IAW ROE to mitigate / neutralise the perpetrator
- Take into consideration all the MDMP steps, focus on what is the likelihood and impact of threat actions against UN, and UN forces which determines the **Commander's priorities**
- The difference between normal threat-based analysis and analysis in support of FP is that we must orientate our thinking to focusing on potential threats and the possible perpetrators who carry out those threats to the UN forces and or UN military operational vulnerabilities

Protection of Civilian planning:

- How vulnerable are specific civilian communities to each identified threat group
- If a civilian community is not vulnerable to a threat group, do they require protection
- How capable are other protection actors, such as Host Nation forces, of protecting the identified vulnerable civilian communities
- If other agencies and actors cannot protect vulnerable civilians, the UNIBAT Commander will need to plan to use their resources to protect those communities
- What is the level of harm / risk (based on the capability, intent, and historical actions against those identified vulnerable civilians) that identified threat actors present to identified vulnerable civilians
- The level of harm and risk contributes to determining the priority to protect
- Take into consideration all the MDMP steps, focus on what is the likelihood and impact of threat actions against vulnerable civilians, which determines the **Commander's priorities** for Protection of Civilians
- The difference between normal threat-based analysis and analysis in support of POC is that we must orientate our thinking to focusing on potential threats to vulnerable civilians at risk

Slide 21

Take Away

- Tactical planning in a PKO requires unique guidance and considerations to help supplement a TCC's national planning process
- All levels of command conduct FP and POC planning, higher HQs commanders must approve a subordinate unit's plans
- Understand the unique PKO planning considerations and guidance for FP / POC; analytical focus includes threats, vulnerabilities, and protector actors that can assist
- The phase approach is a helpful tool for tactical planners

Summary

- The tactical planning considerations and guidance addressed in this lesson is a systematic process to help plan operations in peacekeeping and account for the POC and FP frameworks
- All levels of UN forces / command will conduct FP and POC planning, and their higher HQs must approve subordinate unit plans
- We should understand the special tactical planning consideration for POC and FP and the unique analytical focus that includes threats, possible perpetrators, vulnerabilities, population and UN military units at risk, and protector actors
- Threats to the force and threats to civilians take on a unique PKO perspective; planners are required to identified risks and how best to mitigate those risks with the measures within the UN ROE
- POC / FP Phases can be effective tools to assist the tactical planner

Learning Activity

3.1A

RESOURCES

Chalk Board, white board or butcher / chart paper and markers

TIME

10-15 minutes

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS

Break the class into two groups.

SITUATION

UNIBAT Commander and his staff are considering the likelihood and impact of threat actions by two likely hostile groups of perpetrators (Snowy Dragons and Night Hawks) against vulnerable civilians in the AOR. The Commander is to determine his priorities for Protection of Civilians. What are some of the factors to consider and how can the staff help the commander prioritize efforts to mitigate the risk to civilians?

Instructor notes-possible answers:

Analysis the Threats- Perpetrators

- Who is being targeted and/or harmed?
- Who is the most vulnerable group?
- Who are the actors harming civilians?
- Who is the actor posing the greatest threat to civilians?
- Is their harm to civilians intentional or unintentional?
- If harm is intentional, what is their rationale to target civilians?
- If harm is intentional, what strategy and tactics do these perpetrators of violence use against civilians?
- What capabilities do they require to target civilians?

Analysing the most likely targeted civilian populations:

- How imminent is the threat to civilians?
- Where is the threat to civilians most imminent?
- Who are the civilians, where are they, and where are they moving?
- **What are the population's basic needs?**
- How do men, women, girls and boys define their needs differently?
- What needs are not being met?
- Who can meet these needs?
- Who is providing these needs?
- What are the threats to the provision of these needs?
- What are the security implications if these needs are not met?

Learning Activity

3.1B

RESOURCES

Chalk Board, white board or butcher / chart paper and markers

TIME

15-20 minutes

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS

Break the class into two groups.

SITUATION

You are the UNIBAT S2, your battalion received the FRAGO below.

Using the tools provided in this lesson, and the information in this FRAGO, conduct a hasty analysis as it pertains to POC and provide the following to the UNIBAT Commander:

- Identify the key actors in the AOR based on their relevance to attacks on Civilians and select those key actors that represent a threat

Instructor Facilitation Notes: After the examination of the FRAGO the here are possible solution sets"

Key Actors in the AOR


- 3FN: hundreds of heavy-armed elements (RPG, 14,5 MG, AK 47). Good mobility (PUs). Maybe a threat to the population of KABAKBA (they attacked the town on 22 February) but they only killed two leaders of UFN
- UFN: hundreds of lightly armed elements (artisanal weapons and A 47). Particularly good mobility especially in the bushes (use of motorbikes). A good relationship with the population of KABAKBA (they were implanted in the town) but can be a threat to this population in case they suspect contacts between the population of KABAKBA and elements of 3FN
- AFN: less than one company lightly armed (AK 47 / light MG). They are acting as protectors to the population; their presence complicates the situation
- FO/GABANSSI: MINSUN Field Office of GABANSSI a key protector of the population in the whole prefecture

KEY ACTORS THAT REPRESENT A THREAT: 3FN and UFN

Learning Activity 3.1B Handout

FRAGO N° 12/2021

SITUATION



Background

On 22 February night, the locality of KABAKBA, 140 km south of GABANSSI was attacked by 3FN (Fighting for Free Nonounga) combatants arriving from NSOURA (52 km south of KABAKBA). Despite the presence of approximately one hundred UFN, the town was allegedly taken quickly. At least two people died, including the Sheriff of KABAKBA, Jean MAKAMRI who was the spiritual leader of the UFN (Union for Nonounga) for KABAKBA sub-prefecture. The other casualty was Junior MAKAMRI the UFN leader on KABAKBA- ZARI axes. These events have created tensions and resentment in GABANSSI. Several motorbikes with three men each had been seen heading towards KABAKBA from GABANSSI.

On 24 February, 3FN general Hussein KORANGA proclaimed that the offensive was requested by the population of KABAKBA who according to him were continuously looted by UFN. Their intent was to extend the operation to GABANSSI IOT clean the area from UFN, AFN (Armed forces of Nonounga) and prevent their supply of arms and ammunition from Republic of MENARA. He had also said that the population would be returning home under the 3FN security and mentioned that the 3FN intended to establish a permanent base in KABAKBA to prevent UFN return.

AGs strength

- 06 March. Hundreds of UFN members observed at PK 15 North of KABAKBA.
- 07 March. Weloba (East of KABAKBA) around one hundred 3FN elements observed (AKA 47, RPG).
- 07 March. PUs with 14,5 MGs + 20 3FN elements were observed in KABAKBA. Since the beginning of that attack, population left the town and is now, in the villages around, at PK 10 under XBAT protection and in GABANSSI for several thousand.
- 10 March. A peaceful demonstration took place in GABANSSI against MINUSN inefficiency. The security situation deteriorated on 11 February when a violent demonstration took place in front of Kayota TOB in GABANSSI.

Current situation

During the last patrolling in the town, (18 March morning) no presence of civilian or 3FN was observed in KABAKBA. Houses and proprieties inside the KABAKBA are intact (no burnt or destroyed houses were seen), allowing the return of population. Currently there are no indications on the location of 3FN elements. UFN elements are likely always in the bush IVO of KABAKAB.

Likely course of action

The installation of a MINUSN TOB will not be opposed by 3FN and will be supported by both the population in GABANSSI and IDPs coming from KABAKBA. However, presence of AFN (Host nation armed forces) may create tensions as 3FN is opposing their employment.

Most dangerous course of action

In the wake of population's return to KABAKBA, UFN could use the opportunity to re-establish themselves in KABAKBA. Resultantly, 3FN is likely to oppose presence of UFN in town and could launch fresh wave of attacks against UFN and population.

In either case, AFN's presence will be opposed by 3FN and could lead to armed actions against AFN.

MISSION

XBAT will establish a Temporary Operating Base (TOB) in KABAKBA IOT create conditions for safe return of inhabitants NLT 22 March 2021.

COMMANDER's INTENT

While maintaining a strong posture at GABANSSI, establish a temporary TOB at KABAKBA IOT deter any attacks from AGs. Simultaneously, create conditions and assist inhabitants to return to KABAKBA town ICCW FO. END STATE: Inhabitants return to their homes safely.

EXECUTION-Tasks to Units

XBAT

- Ensure security of KABAKBA and POC at all costs
- Establish a TOB at KABAKBA NLT 22 March 2021
- ICCW FO GABANSSI, foster inhabitants of KABAKBA to return to KABAKBA
- Secure both axes from KABAKBA to GABANSSI IOT facilitate return of population from GABANSSI and its vicinity
- Create conditions and assist safe return of inhabitants
- Deter AGs elements, threatening to attack KABAKBA through aggressive patrolling and reconnaissance
- Deter infiltration of any armed UFN elements attempting to move in or around KABAKBA
- ICCW FO GABANSSI, take all necessary measures to prevent any retaliation from AGs IVO KABAKBA
- ZAVN: BPT provide CAS, CASEVAC and MEDEVAC

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- Coordinate with HoO/FO GABANSSI IOT enable safe return of inhabitants
- Established TOB will remain deployed until safe return of inhabitants. After stabilization of the town, reassessment of TOB closure will be carried out. Thereafter, presence of MINUSN will be maintained through regular weekly joint patrols to KABAKBA, ICCW AFN
- The weekly patrols will have a stay over of minimum 48 hours at KABAKBA
- Established TOB will only be closed on orders from FHQ

ADMINISTRATION& LOGISTICS

- Units maintain their self-sustainment capability for the duration of the operation
- Units to ensure sufficient tents are deployed to support all berthing and sustainment operations. Ensure coordination with Field Office prior to departure

- Rations unit will not move beyond GABANSSI in support of the temporary TOB, TCC ensure adequate planning and logistical assets to resupply the TOB with COE
- Log officer to ensure fresh rations feeding plans are developed to ensure no dependence on CRPs for the temporary TOB to include fresh drinking water and Bulk water for other uses

Lesson 3.2



Threat Based Approach, Risk Mitigation and MPKI

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Overview



For an interactive start to this lesson, engage participants to seek their understanding of what they consider are the threats to a UN Mission and Civilian population. Also, ask them how proper Intelligence and a threat assessment of their AOR is essential for planning tactical operations and why. Let the students figure out what particular benefit intelligence has towards any peacekeeping operation. Record the capabilities provided on a white board. As a note, at the end of the lesson review the list again as a group to see if many items came out in the lesson. Always try to emphasize the importance of threat-based intelligence, combined with a logical risk assessment is the bases of planning all tactical operations and is the bases of the POC and FP.

Suggest that you emphasize that for threat assessments and peacekeeping intelligence processes / system must be integrated and effective; that is all UN Mission components must work collaboratively. Intelligence is considered a 'Team Sport'. The Force, Sector and UNIBAT intelligence organisations, UNMO, UN police, and mission components etc. should all support and learn from each other. Recommend that the instructor review the UN DPO Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy, the Military Peacekeeping Intelligence Handbook, and the UN policy on the Protection of Civilians before giving this lesson.

Slide 1



Military Operations are Intelligence driven and more specifically threat based. Only a constant flow of processed data and information, hence intelligence allows a commander to make appropriate decisions. A constant drive to improve situational awareness in a mission or region has been a goal of the UN since the Srebrenica Massacre and the Genocide in Rwanda. The UN has had to rethink the concept of operations in a complex peace operations environment.

It is crucial that military decision-makers, staff officers, and tactical level unit leaders are aware of their capabilities and contribution the United Nations Peacekeeping-intelligence. The MPKI refers to the Military Peacekeeping-intelligence framework.

In this exceptionally long lesson, we will give an overview of the operational imperatives for a threat based and risk analysis of the AOR. You should be in the mind-set of wearing the Blue Beret and being fully integrated into the mission concept, operational and information, and intelligence frameworks. The UNIBAT has unique capabilities to patrol and collect information that add a dimension in the analysis of the AOR and the accomplishment of the Mission's mandate. The UNIBAT can provide a perspective of what is happening on the ground and help populate the common operating picture (COP). With these observations and perspective, they are key to feeding information into the MPKI framework.

Slide 2

Lesson 3.2 Content

- Threat-based analysis
- Key definitions
- Risks and priorities
- Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (MPKI) overview
- Applications and implementation
- Threat and risk assessments and MPKI products in support of the MDMP

2

Here are the major components of this lesson. As stated earlier, this is a long lesson, and we will take routine breaks and questions throughout the lesson.

Slide 3

Learning Objectives

- Explain how a threat-based approach / risk mitigation impacts tactical planning and military decision-making process
- Explain the difference between risks and threats
- Describe the MPKI cycle and management tools
- Describe the UN MPKI structures, roles and responsibilities
- Explain how the MPKI products support and are integrated into the MDMP
- Explain why the Phase 1 brief is important
- Explain why it is important to vet military tactical options / COAs within the 3 strategic UN Mandate pillars

The success of a peacekeeping tactical operation is linked to a solid threat and risk-based assessment, and the execution, accuracy, timely dissemination of intelligence. The UNIBAT, with their patrolling capability, is a good source of non-covert, non-clandestine human peacekeeping-intelligence that helps contribute towards the COP, and the ground picture on a daily base.

This slide displays the learning outcomes. We should be able to do this at the end of the lesson.

Slide 4



What is the rationale behind implementing threat-based analyses and a robust intelligence framework into the concept of UN Peace Operations (UNPO)? According to the Cruz Report that addressed the current complex UNPO environment, intelligence should be conducted as an integrated, crosscutting process. The report identifies these reasons:

- To prevent casualties
- To transform information into tasks and actions that boost security
- As UN Missions lack high-tech collection platforms; the basics human peacekeeping-intelligence, informant networks become important
- Situational awareness and capacity to communicate with the population
- Where UN mandates address the Protection of Civilians (POC); it is important to be able to predict and prevent violence on a vulnerable population; intelligence gathering, and analysis will help in protecting civilians
- The lack of high-tech collection platforms; and that human peacekeeping-intelligence and informant networks become important

Slide 5

Mission Threat-based Analysis Overview

UNIBAT Staff and Commanders at all levels should all do an analysis within the unit's Area of Responsibility (AOR)

- 1. Identification of Key Actors**
 - a. Civilian population
 - b. Potential perpetrators
 - c. Host State security forces
 - d. Other protection actors
 - e. Cyber
- 2. Threat Analysis**
 - a. Overview
 - b. Key Elements
 - c. Include cyber and natural occurring hazards (example earthquakes, flooding)
 - d. Matrix
- 3. Risk Analysis**
 - a. Vulnerability assessment
 - b. Protection actor capability and ability to prepare or reduce effects of natural hazards /occurrences, (example-flooding) assessments
 - c. Danger level assessment
 - d. Risk analysis matrix

After receiving the mission, analysis of that mission must be done. In every conventional decision-making process, this step is crucial as it defines the tactical problem and shows possible courses of action, considering FP, POC, Child Protection and CRSV considerations. These next few slides will give you an overview of the threat-based approach and the fundamentals of risk mitigation. We will go into more detail in this discipline when we discuss military peacekeeping-intelligence (MPKI) and its contribution to threat analysis.

The details of mission analysis in the context of UN Peacekeeping will be covered shortly, at this point it suffices to list its key components:

- Using the MPKI products of the terrain analysis and human terrain analysis, Identification of key actors in the area of operations, which includes the civilian population, potential perpetrators, host state security forces, and other protection actors
- Threat analysis, which will consider the main elements determining the threat environment and result in an overview matrix.
- Risk Analysis, which determines the risk associated with each threat identified. In order to analyse the risk, planners should assess for each threat

the capabilities of the host state security forces, the vulnerability of the civilian population to this threat, and the danger level of potential perpetrators. Findings of these assessments should then be reflected in a risk analysis matrix.

For military planners in Peacekeeping Operations, whilst making their own analysis, they should also consider information provided and analysis undertaken by other mission components, such as the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), the force HQs, and Sector HQs.

Slide 6

Threat Analysis Overview

1. Priority consideration to threats identified at the mission level
2. Additional threats identified at the unit's AOR

For each threat determine:

- Situation and type of threat (What)
- Potential perpetrators (Who)
- Potentially affected population to include: civilians, UN personnel, UN facilities, Key Government / Religious facilities, UN Forces (Whom)
- Areas where they may be targeted (Where)
- Days and time of day attacks are most likely (When)
- Motivation behind threat (Why)
- Possible movements and tactics of the armed groups (How)

Having identified and analysed the component groups (civilian populations, potential perpetrators, host state security forces, and other protection actors) present in the area of operations, the next step is the analysis of particular threats. This lays the foundation for the formulation of a response plan.

When analysing threats, those threats identified at the level of senior mission leadership and valid for the whole mission area of responsibility need to be given priority. However, additional threats identified in the respective area of operations of a specific unit will be considered as well.

For each threat, the following should be determined:


- Always Situation and type of threat (What)
- Potential perpetrators (Who)
- Potentially affected population and groups to include civilians, UN personnel, UN forces, UN facilities NGOs, (Against whom)
- Areas where they may be targeted (Where)
- Days and time of day attacks are most likely (When)

- Motivation behind physical violence (Why)
- Possible movements and tactics of the armed groups (How)

When analysing particular threats, killings are always assumed a threat when other threats of physical violence are identified. The threat analysis, along with visual tools such as tables and maps, needs to be updated routinely and whenever the situation in the area of operations changes.

As a note, the commander and the staff should all do their assessments in these areas; however, the S2 should drive much of the threat-based analysis. We will go into much more detail in the tools and products that the S2 can provide to assist in this analysis.

Slide 7



A handy tool to use to help visualize risk is the Risk Analysis Matrix. This risk combination of likelihood and impact of threats on a designated population of civilians or could be used for UN forces or facilities. As such, risk is a function of both the vulnerability of specific groups and the threats they face. We can break it down using this graph as shown on the slide.

The Impact as shown via the vertical “Y” axis of the graph refers to the consequences the materialization of a threat would have on the civilians at risk.

The likelihood, shown as the “x” axis refers to the probability of a threat to materialize. An assessment of the likelihood is based on existing human rights reporting, intelligence, and historical analysis.


In terms of risk, threat 2 on the graph is low as it has a low impact and not likely to happen. While Threat 1 is designated as high because it is likely to happen and there is a high impact. The graph / matrix you see here on this slide is a sample risk analysis graph, we will be using this when we get to the lessons on POC and FP in this module 3.

Slide 8

Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (MPKI)

Now let us get into more detail about the Military Peacekeeping-intelligence (MPKI) framework. We will discuss the key documents, why it is important, the MPKI cycle, structure, and management.

Slide 9



Intelligence is processed data and information that is analysed and packaged for decision-makers. For a Military Operation intelligence means to filter the signal from the noise. Proper analysis and assessment of data and information into intelligence helps us better understanding the operational environment. As such, intelligence (knowledge) is a key to the success of any operation; and hence, UN operations need to be considered as "Intel driven".

What is Intelligence and why does a Military Operation rely on it? Military Intelligence uses collection and analysis approaches to provide guidance and direction to assist commanders in their decisions to use or employ resources where and when they are most effective.


The analysis processes exist to offer a set of tools to help the human mind deal with vast quantities of data. The data available includes both basic and current peacekeeping-intelligence, and unprocessed or raw incoming data.

For commanders to use intelligence, predictive analysis becomes important. Predictive intelligence not only establishes capabilities of the threat and other actors but determines intentions and probable courses of action/scenarios.

It is also important to note as we go through this lesson and show you examples of intelligence products that the human mind is better equipped to deal with large quantities of data by visualizing them. It is important to note that visualization

techniques do not replace solid analysis. Rather they are tools to reduce ambiguity and help to make sense of vast quantities of data.

Slide 10



Here is the United Nations Department of Peace Operations policy on Peacekeeping-intelligence. Why has the UN embraced Intelligence instead of Information? Mandates and operating environments of United Nations peacekeeping missions have evolved, so too have the capabilities, processes and procedures required to gather and analyse information.

In high-tempo, complex and dangerous environments, where asymmetric, hybrid and transnational threats pose serious dangers to peacekeepers and the population and impact the mandate implementation. In these environments, there is a need for peacekeeping missions to better understand their operating environments. This also includes, maintaining a strategic overview of developments, and anticipated strengths, weaknesses of threats / spoilers that may impact on the ability of peacekeepers to effectively execute their mandate.

The Department of Peace Operations (OMA), has developed the UN Military Peacekeeping Intelligence Handbook, which supports the military component and UNIBATs that interact with the MPKI systems. The UN conducts peacekeeping-intelligence may differ from your own national methodology; it is crucial to understand these differences.

Slide 11


Why UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence

- Supports planning and the MDMP
- Identifies and accesses threats, risks
- Supports the Common Operational Picture (COP)
- Supports information operations
- Early warning of imminent threats

The fundamental purpose of peacekeeping-intelligence in United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations is to enable missions to take decisions on appropriate actions to fulfil mandates effectively and safely. Commanders and leaders who have access to good intelligence are better able to take appropriate actions, provide early warning of threats to safeguard UN personnel. Specifically, peacekeeping-intelligence is intended to:

- Provide situational understanding and predictive intelligence products to enable peacekeeping planning and decision making in support of implementing the UN mandate
- Help in the Protection of Civilians (POC); by providing early warnings or conduct preventive operations against threats targeting the local population
- Give early warning of any planned destruction to critical infrastructure or necessary natural resources
- Support information and communications operations. MPKI can have a supporting role in enabling the UN to communicate the truth and potentially counter disinformation or untrue reporting
- Enhancing mission leadership understanding of the strategic and operational landscape through the early identification of relevant trends and threats. This will facilitate decisions making about preventing threats and capitalizing on opportunities in support of the mandate

Slide 12



Peacekeeping-intelligence is the non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed mission intelligence cycle to meet requirements for decision-making and to inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate. This framework facilitates threat and risk analysis / assessments and support of the commander in the development of their POC and FP planning.

Slide 13


A rectangular box containing a slide titled "MPKI Analysis & Products". The title is in a blue, sans-serif font. Below the title is a bulleted list of seven items, each preceded by a black dot. The list items are: "Population make-up and threats", "Integration of threat patterns, predictive assessments", "Trends of violence against groups, government, and UN", "Intentions, capabilities of perpetrators", "Dynamics of conflict", "Potential threats", and "Priorities of information requirements".

MPKI Analysis & Products

- Population make-up and threats
- Integration of threat patterns, predictive assessments
- Trends of violence against groups, government, and UN
- Intentions, capabilities of perpetrators
- Dynamics of conflict
- Potential threats
- Priorities of information requirements

Here are just a few areas where MPKI products can help support UNIBAT commanders and staff view and develop plans in their AOR.

Slide 14



The peacekeeping-intelligence cycle or Intel cycle is the process by which peacekeeping-intelligence is acquired, examined / collated, analysed, and disseminated based on clearly identified Intelligence Requirements.


Standards, tools, techniques, and procedures for the effective and efficient completion of each stage of the cycle by individual mission components are the subjects of mission SOPs.



Note to Instructor:

The UN Intelligence Policy includes a five step Intelligence Cycle; however, the authors of the MPKI Handbook and Military Intelligence Officer Training Packet agreed a 4-step cycle was more common and best practice.

Slide 15




Direction refers to the process of identifying questions that require an answer, "Information / Intelligence Requirements (IRs)" in relation to those questions, and the quest for information through a variety of means. Decisions on intelligence activities shall be taken under the authority and accountability of the Head of Mission or the delegated authority.

Direction ensures central control of the peacekeeping-intelligence cycle, tying the requirements of the Head of Mission and the Senior Leadership Team to the management of peacekeeping-intelligence. It provides the basis for IRs; prioritisation of tasks and timeframes drive the peacekeeping-intelligence management structures. IRs can be Mission Critical, Mission Essential, or Mission Desirable. IRs can also be time sensitive, and often include a 'Not Later Than' (NLT) or 'Last Time Information is of Value' (LTIOV) label.

Clear direction at all levels is the start point for the Intel cycle. Direction tells the staffs what the commander wants to know and ensures the staffs and intelligence staff are focus on their efforts. Direction leads to the process through which the acquisition effort is planned against following the identification of Information or Intelligence Requirements (IRs) and Requests for Information (RFIs). It is important to understand that intelligence acquisition, analytical capabilities are usually limited, and therefore Direction should ideally include prioritization.

Slide 16



After ascertaining the requirements and assigning priorities the next step is Acquisition of the data or information that feed the Analytical step of the cycle. While many PKMI acquisition resources will be the same across missions (e.g., UN Military patrols and observers), some acquisition capabilities will only be available, in certain mission areas, it should be noted that data and information should be sought from the broadest capabilities, and sources available.

Effective acquisition depends on the clarity of the requirements to ensure that the resources assigned are used in the most effective manner. Experience suggests some requirements warrant a specific type of acquisition, whereas others may require several types. It is important to highlight that Acquisition can be broken down into two types:

- An Information or Intelligence Requirement (IR) is acquired using an organic PKMI asset / capability. The e.g. the Force HQs / U2 tasking a battalion to conduct a patrol
- A Request for Information (RFI); is acquired using an external request to another interlocutor of the PKMI architecture in form of an RFI
-

More than one acquisition capability can be applied to a single requirement. If an organisation does not have the capability to cover an IR, it should request support from

the higher HQs for assistance. Specific capability can include Unmanned Aerial System (UAS).


The prioritization of requirements is important in the acquisition process. Prioritizing provides focus and clarity in the process. RFIs / IRs should be assigned a priority and time value. Also, a formal review process should be included in prioritization that will also include a procedure to add and removal RFs / IRs. These activities at the mission level are usually concentrated and directed in the JMAC.

The Priority Information Requirements (PIR) designation process is a special case. At the mission level, the HoM together with the MLT, are responsible for designating PIRs. Usually, PIRs are few and tied to a high-level decision trigger point.

Information requirements are established and prioritised to support the decision-making. Staff and technical resources to fulfil these requirements are defined by task, assignment, and timeline. The use of collection assets is planned and coordinated to respond to various simultaneous requirements. In the field, this will be coordinated (pending the set-up of a mission between FHQ-U2, JOC and JMAC).

Military Units, UNMO, UN police as well as civilian components are considered sensors for the intelligence cycle. The commander directs the periodization of IR's to better understand the situation, anticipate future impacts, and gain overall knowledge of threat against civilians.

Slide 17



Key Message: Data acquired by missions shall be recorded and stored in a manner that permits convenient comparison, evaluation, assessment, retrieval, analysis, and reporting.

During analysis, the collected information turns into a finished product that ideally gives meaning to the individual pieces of information and data. Peacekeeping-intelligence analysts apply the processes of reasoning, integration and interpretation using qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Ultimately, the analyst's goal is to provide predictive analysis on the evolving tactical and operational situation.

There are two common frameworks to ensure factors are considered include:

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
- Political
- Military
- Economic
- Religious
- Social
- Culture
- Gender specific
- History

- Infrastructure
- Information
- Physical
- Time

The other is ASCOPE:

- Areas- physical locations and terrain that effects actors e.g., boundaries, police districts
- Structures- significant infrastructure e.g., bridges, religious sites, hospitals, schools
- Capabilities- key functions such as administration, food/water supply, and health / welfare provisions
- Organisations- political, social, religious, tribal
- People- the local population, tribes, groupings, political parties, threat actors and further broken down into leadership, intentions, relationships, pattern of life
- Events- harvest season, market timings, holidays, elections, and religious festivals

Slide 18



Dissemination or distribution is the process of packaging / presenting intelligence products to decision-makers and personnel. Intelligence, which is not being disseminated to those that have a need to know, has no value. Equally, intelligence that cannot be understood has no value. Intelligence delivered at the right time, in the right format and quality is effective. Here are some components of dissemination:

- **Timely-** intelligence must be delivered in a timely fashion so planners and decision-makers can act rather than react. For this reason, it is important to understand the time frames of the decision that the intelligence is supporting. This may be defined in the RFI or IR
- **Relevance-** is determined by the needs of the recipients as defined in the ISP or SOP
- **Brevity-** kept as brief as possible, but at the same time include everything that the recipient needs to know. Use summaries and attach traces, annexes to cover additional details
- **Interpretation-** facts must be correctly evaluated and their significance interpreted before dissemination. In intelligence reports, oral or written, a clear distinction must be made between established facts and deductions / assumptions

- Standardization. Reports are understood quickly if they are in logical sequence, with standard formats, using the same language. The format should be covered in SOPs
- Recipients- distribution is based on a thorough knowledge of the Intelligence requirements of units, planners, and decision-makers. This knowledge is based on the Intelligence Acquisition Plan (IAP) and Requests for Information (RFI)
- Need-to-Know- access to classified intelligence should be limited to those who have a need-to-know to carry out their duties
- Need-to-Share- intelligence can be shared within UN and with non-UN entities in accordance with the Mission policy. The source of the information might be protected and the intelligence itself might be sanitised to protect the source

The UN uses standard report formats to guarantee multinational interoperability. Reports may operate on a push or pull method, meaning. Here are a few:

- Verbal briefings are useful for timeliness and for providing an opportunity to emphasize significant issues and receive immediate feedback
- Written dissemination encompasses Intelligence Reports (INTREP), Intelligence Summaries (INTSUM) and Thematic Reports that address relevant aspects of the operational environment, such as a region or town, a political or religious movement or an organisation.
- Immediate flash reports- Intelligence indicating an assessed imminent threat to life must be conveyed immediately. The source and any classified information may be left out / protected as required, but the threat to life must be passed on by the fastest means

Slide 19

MPKI Management

- **Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Support Plan (MISP)- an intelligence concept of operations, tool for intel and information management**
- **Mission Information Acquisition Plan (MIAP)- direction tool for MPKI cycle, changes per developing situations, acquisitions assets, execution orders**

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The MISP describes the boundaries within which the peacekeeping-intelligence cycle will be executed and identifies key considerations to be observed when providing direction to the peacekeeping-intelligence cycle or executing tasks within it. This document may be classified if deemed appropriate by the chair of the Mission Peacekeeping-intelligence Coordination Mechanism, in consultation with the Head of Mission.

The MIAP is the most important direction tool and is the catalyst for the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Cycle. It is a living document, constantly changing in line with a developing situation, new Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIRs), new plans, and new operational tasks. The Commander signs the CCIR (direction) because it requires resources. When ready, it is important that the IAP is communicated to all acquisition sensors according to their capabilities, and in such a way that makes sense.


Mission components should produce their own Component Peacekeeping-Intelligence Acquisition Plan bringing all Mission-imposed and deducted tasks and including Component leadership new CCIRs and tasking Component assets, according to the commander's priorities and assets capabilities.

IAP is the basis for an executive order. It may be written and published in the operation order format following the mission's SOP. The staffs use the IAP to task, direct, and manage acquisition assets (both assigned and attached assets) to acquire against the

requirements. It is worth noting that the Operations Officer tasks information acquisition assets that are not OPCON to the MPKI cell. Generally, the MPKI cell will only have tasking authority over PKISR assets.

 *Note to Instructor: Some students will be accustomed to referring to an IAP as an Information Collection Plan (ICP). The instructor can explain they are one and the same, but the UN uses the word 'acquisition' rather than 'collection' due to political sensitivities connected to the word 'collect'.*

Slide 20



The MICM coordinates the mission-wide PKI function. This chart highlights the importance of a Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism. As you can see, there are various peacekeeping-intelligence entities in a UN Peacekeeping Mission, each with its own roles and responsibilities.

It is imperative that a Mission Peacekeeping-intelligence Coordination Mechanism is established to exercise centralised control of peacekeeping-intelligence activities to ensure unity of peacekeeping-intelligence effort throughout the mission.

Individually the components, organisations, staffs, and cells of a UN Mission are good providers of operational intelligence. When these entities work together, the result is an effective operational intelligence system. This co-operation is achieved through the Mission Intelligence Co-ordination Structure (MICS). The exact nature of the MICS may vary from mission to mission, but the fundamentals are the same:

- Entities responsible for acquisition, analysis, and dissemination; including the JMAC, JOC, UNDSS, MSC, mission components, U2 staffs
- To provide centralised control, allowing de-centralised execution
- Direction and co-ordination of the mission's intelligence system
- The JMAC may act as the MICS

- Have a civilian chair and will be the Chief JMAC in cases where JMAC functions as the MICs
- Draws strategic guidance from senior mission leadership, and translate this guidance into Intelligence Requirements
- Manages the Mission Intelligence Acquisition Plan and the Acquisition effort, satisfying IRs
- Develop and maintain the mission's Intelligence Support Plan (ISP)



For Interaction. Ask the students how the MICM might coordinates mission PKI entities. Among the responses required here are, the imposition of a mission-level Information Acquisition Plan (IAP), which gives each entity the duty for acquiring information for one or several HoM PIRs (seen on the earlier slide); ensuring that regular meetings are held between all entities, which ensure that information is shared. For example, often political information acquired by the JMAC can enhance the U2's situational awareness and understanding.



Note to Instructor: The Chief of the JMAC will normally be a civilian, assisted by a specified number of information analysts and collection officers (civilian and military). Since most mission information gathering is either coordinated through, or processed by the JMAC, it is important to understand the structure and staffing of a generic JMAC. Ideally, all JMACs will have a separated analysis section from collection and data management.

Missions without an established JMAC, have a requirement to conduct integrated analysis. This could be done through strategic meetings and individual components are tasked with drafting assessments.

Slide 21



Here is a diagram on this slide to help portray the MICM organisation. At the centre of the OPKI management mechanism is the Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM), which is designed to direct and oversee the peacekeeping-intelligence cycle within the mission.

This slide shows the generic structure of MICM organisation. The exact nature of the MICM will vary from mission to mission, but the fundamentals are as follows:


- The structure is comprised of mission entities responsible for peacekeeping-intelligence acquisition, analysis, and dissemination. This will typically include the JMAC, JOC, UNDSS, and the relevant military and police components (such as the U2). Other mission entities may be invited to participate, as required
- The purpose of the MICM is to provide centralised control (allowing de-centralised execution), direction and coordination of the mission's peacekeeping-intelligence system
- The functions of the MICM shall preferably be coordinated by the Mission Chief of Staff in his/her role as the Chair of the Mechanism, or maybe played by the JMAC, while in other cases, a stand-alone body may be necessary

The primary responsibilities of the MICM are outlined in the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy, but include the following:

- Draw strategic guidance from senior mission leadership, and translate this guidance into Priority Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and IRs
- Manage the IAP and the acquisition effort, satisfying all senior leadership IRs
- Develop and maintain the MISP

It is important to note that some of the MPKI IRs will originate from the MICM and that these IRs will form part of the Force IAP. Representatives of the Force Commander (most likely the Chief U2) must also participate in regular MICM meetings.

Slide 22



The G2 peacekeeping-intelligence branch in a Sector is engaged in all matters concerning peacekeeping-intelligence and military safe and secure operations at tactical/ operational level within the UNIBAT's AOR. Its recommended structure is depicted above, and roles and functions for the cells/sections are like the U2 sections/cells.



Ask students what the structural differences between Sector G2 and UNIBAT S2 staffs' and why such differences exist are?

Slide 23


Roles/Responsibilities

- Produces timely, relevant, predictive intelligence
- Identifies trends
- Ensure Intel estimates are complete / current
- Conducts AOE and actor analysis
- Ensure a gender, POC and Force protection perspective in products
- Provided products to higher / subordinate HQs

Roles and Responsibilities of the MPKI staffs:

- Manages the MPKI Cycle, in line with the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy and Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook, through the direction, acquisition, analysis and dissemination phases. This is to ensure that the Force Commander's decision-making process is fully supported with timely, succinct, and relevant peacekeeping-intelligence products
- Ensures that its information acquisition activities are conducted in support of mission and force Priority and other IRs. To this end, the cells will maintain an IAP that fully aligns with Sector, HoM and FHQ IRs. This will be regularly updated
- Ensures that appropriate acquisition assets are tasked to acquire relevant information
- Ensures that all incoming information is collated on a central database, and available to the relevant personnel

Slide 24



The S2 section at the UNIBAT level supports the battalion commander and staff with peacekeeping-intelligence products. The S2 also deals with security tasks within the battalion. Outside the battalion staff, the S2 is responsible for directing and coordinating the MPKI needs and information acquisition at the company level. AS TCCs often design and organise their own structure, we have provided an example on this slide of a suggested organisational structure for Peacekeeping Operations.

Chief S2: Head of S2 MPKI command group

Deputy S2: Counterintelligence and information security

IRM & AM: Information requirement and acquisition management

Acquisition: All acquisition functions

Analysis: military peacekeeping-intelligence support to current and future operations

Similar to the Sector G2 Cells here are suggested roles and responsibilities for the S2 staff section for a UNIBAT S2:

- Manages the Battalion MPKI Cycle, in line with Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy and this Handbook, through the direction, acquisition, analysis and dissemination phases. This is to ensure that the Battalion Commander's

decision-making process is fully supported with timely, succinct, and relevant peacekeeping-intelligence products


- Ensures that its information acquisition activities are conducted in support of Sector Priority and other IRs. To this end, the S2 section will maintain an IAP that fully aligns with Sector Headquarters IRs. This will be regularly updated
- Ensures that appropriate acquisition assets are tasked to acquire relevant information
- Ensures that all incoming information is collated on a central database, and available to the relevant personnel
- Maintains its own source registry and registers its sources with the G2
- Produces timely, relevant, concise, and predictive peacekeeping-intelligence products to support effective mandate implementation relating to the protection of UN personnel and civilians, as required
- Identifies relevant trends
- Supports all operations with an SPIE
- Conducts a full AOE and Actor Analysis for the entire AOR
- Ensures that a full AOE, and Actor Analysis is carried out by all subordinate units down to Company level, or whenever a new FOB is established. A detailed AOE must be carried out for all areas of interest for the military component, to include Protection of Civilian sites, all FOBs, and other areas related to mandate implementation, and as directed by the FC
- Works with the Military Gender and Protection Advisor, if resources permit at Sector-level, to ensure that a gender and protection perspective is mainstreamed into all peacekeeping-intelligence products
- Ensures that all relevant information and peacekeeping-intelligence is provided to higher and subordinate HQs in a timely fashion

Slide 25



This portion of the lesson will outline how the UN MPKI supports the UN Military Decision Making Process. This includes the Phase One brief, which will be explained and highlighted as a major tool in assisting the leadership in making decisions to confront threats and their associated risk.

Slide 26



Key Message. The importance of the integration between the intelligence and operation branches is critical for success. The peacekeeping-intelligence support for the MDMP provides inputs that should be integrated during all phases of the planning process, as shown in the slide (right column).

Here is the Military Decision-Making Process as annotated on the slide. It shows key MPKI staff input. Keep in mind that intelligence is a continuous process and does not stop with the conduct of the Phase One Brief. We will go into more detail in the following slides.

MPKI staff must ensure they own and control the MPKI processes – ensure that common assessment exist at all levels. Proactivity and personal relationships are key to ensuring effective intelligence flows between the intelligence community of interest.

Concurrent activity. Once MPKI staff become more experienced and familiar with the MDMP processes, they will be able to identify areas where concurrent activity can take place. MPKI products should stand-alone and be understood by those with limited knowledge. Identify how a Commander likes the analysis to be presented and to produce appropriate products.

The input of the MPKI staff does not stop with the delivery of the Phase One Brief. AOE does not stop. MPKI staff need to engage at all levels to provide expert input to inform and test the planning.

Slide 27

Receipt of Mission

- Receipt of Mission Brief to leadership and staff
- What do we already know
- Collection assets and mapping products available
- Commander Intel guidance
 - PIRs/SIRs to initial IAP
 - Mission specific planning begins
- Start the analysis of the AOE
- Assist in developing Warning Order 1

The Receipt of the Mission Brief is conducted at the start of the MDMP and should not last more than 30 minutes.

It is unlikely that the MPKI cell will have all the information or a detailed analysis at hand, but they should brief the following key/critical information in general terms. In other words, tell what we already know about:

- The physical and human terrains
- Threat actors
- Acquisition assets and mapping that is currently available to the staff for planning

This is the first opportunity for the MPKI staff to start the peacekeeping-intelligence dialogue with the Commander. At this stage, it is important to identify initial requirements, prioritize acquisition, focus analysis confirm reporting procedures. The drafting of initial PIRs, CCIRs and IRs will follow, and the intelligence cycle will begin to function.

Slide 28

Mission Analysis

- MPKI products for mission analysis
- Mission specific AOE done
- PIR confirmation
- “Phase One” brief

Warning Order 2 – Situation paragraph – if change / update from Warning Order 1

Here is where the commander provides greater direction to their staff. This will enable the staff to understand the commander's thinking and identify the required COAs for further development.

MPKI cells support is critical to assist the commander and the planning staff. The MPKI staff should be aware that the commander will ask themselves at least four questions:

- What is my higher commander's intent?
- What are my specified and implied tasks?
- What are my freedoms and constraints?
- Has the situation changed, and in doing so, has it influenced my mission?

The MPKI staff should ensure that the Commander understands the threats and risks.

MPKI staff will confirm with the commander that the current PIRs are correct.

MPKI staff should look to update the situation paragraph for warning order 2 if that is required.

Slide 29

Mission Analysis-Phase One Brief

- After Receipt of Mission Brief / Early on in Mission Analysis
- Informs / situates commander and staff
- Mission specific, 45 minutes, key topics only
- AOE foundation – ‘Golden Thread’ products”:
 - Physical, human, information terrain analysis
 - Actor evaluation
 - Situation integration with assessed ML/MD COAs

Key Message. The Phase One brief (P1B) is the MPKI cell's moment to present the intelligence picture to the commander and staff and inform them of any intelligence issues prior to the conduct of planning.

The Phase One brief comprises of the work done during terrain and actor evaluations, overlaid with the situation integration and Actor COA development, as it pertains to a specific UN Mission or task. It will be covered in more details in the next few slides, and you will be provided with a rough example to illustrate the key elements. The P1B situates the commander and the staff before they develop UN COAs to meet the mission requirement.

The AOE foundation will ensure the creation of 'golden thread' products – those products that assist in the P1B such as physical, human and information terrain overlays, key actor capabilities including POC considerations etc.

Slide 30

Phase One Brief – Template

Serial	Topic
01	Scope: Overview of what the Phase 1 Brief is going to cover and what briefing aids are going to be used.
02	Intelligence foundation: What intelligence the brief has been based on and inform the Commander of any intelligence gaps that are pertinent to the mission. Include Vital Intelligence
03	Key assumptions and outputs: Inform the Commander of the key deductions and judgments you have identified from conducting AOE.
04	Ground in general: The Physical Terrain: Orientate the Commander and Planning Staff to the ground including weather effects. Physical Terrain Analysis
05	Ground in detail: The Mission Specific Physical Terrain in more detail. Depending on the type of mission to be conducted (Defensive / Offensive), Inform the Commander of the specific ground detail that will affect his/her mission including any key infrastructure.
06	Human and Information Terrain: Factors that are pertinent to the mission are likely to include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tribal and ethnic laydown • Displaced persons and refugees • NGOs • Key leaders • Patterns of life • HN armed forces • Infrastructure (Beehive, Water, Electricity, Academic, Refuge, Medical, Security, Other) • Information environment – social media trends (supportive/hostile to UN presence), media reporting, local communication capabilities Human and Information Terrain Analysis
07	Threat Evaluation: Analysis of all threat actors that are pertinent to the mission, to include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat actor descriptions • Threat actor organizations and hierarchies including Key Leaders • Threat actor TTPs • Threat actor equipment and capabilities • Strengths and Weakness and Centre of Gravity Analysis Actor and Threat Actor Evaluation
08	Situation Integration: How will the threat actors and Human factors affect the mission when considered in relation to the physical environment? To include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actors' Courses of Actions, Most Likely and Most Dangerous • Updated intelligence Acquisition Plan based on known intelligence gaps Situation Integration

Key Message. The Phase One Brief (P1B) has a specific structure. This can be amended when looking at conventional or asymmetric environments, i.e., with a human-centric focus. What must be expressed is the importance of the Situation Integration element of the P1B.

Here is the P1B template in the UN MPKI handbook. This is a guide but provides a structure that the MPKI staff can follow to ensure that all relevant factors are included in the P1B. The red star highlights that situation integration is the most important element of the P1B and should have 50% of the time allocated to it. For example, if the P1B is 45 minutes in length, then 20 minutes should be allocated to the briefing of the situation integration.

The instructor should identify that other staff branches can assist in the production of the P1B, e.g., Physical terrain analysis can be assisted by the inclusion of engineering input, the human terrain can be assisted by POC or CIMIC expertise inclusion.

During the conduct of their P1B, the intel staff should look to draw out the key analysis for each heading, i.e., how the factors analysed during each heading effect the Commander's missions and tasks.

The P1B must be mission-specific – the AOE must be focused on the mission area.

A P1B should last no longer than 45 minutes – the focus of the P1B is the situation integration should have at least 20 minutes allocated to the briefing of the ML and MD COAs. The MPKI staff should be mindful of the audience being briefed. How does the Commander like the information to be briefed? Keep the brief simple. Ensure that relevant analysis is briefed coherently and simply.

Slide 31

COA Development

- MPKI supports planning team
- Confirm Actor's COAs
 - Most Likely
 - Most Dangerous
- Supports own forces COA brief
- Inputs from Phase One Brief / continuous AOE
- Supports COA analysis, relevant threat/actors
- Draft situation paragraph for WARNO 3

The commander will receive a back briefly from the COA development teams. The commander will assess and analyses each brief and provide direction on which COA has been selected. The commander could also ask the staff to combine COAs and provide further development.


The MPKI staff should provide input to test the chosen COA. This will enable the identification and mitigation of known threats and risks. The MPKI staff should look to inform the commander where MPKI activity needs to take place during each stage of the chosen COA, such as acquisition activity. The MPKI staff should provide an update to the situation paragraph for warning order 3 if required.

Slide 32

A Key MPKI Product That Supports
Mission Analysis and COA
Development

Product Examples


Slide 33



This slide is to illustrate that the MPKI staff are not to brief the entire Area of Operations but to focus on the analysis to the area of terrain that is pertinent to the mission.


The ground in general. The briefer (as it could be the engineer staff that briefs the ground) should look to provide key analysis of the ground in a structured manner; this could be from north to south, east to west; or by using acronyms such as ROBOT and OCOKA. In any case, the briefer should only brief that ground, in general, that is important to the conduct of the mission.

Slide 34



We should highlight the Combined Obstacle Overlay. This representation shows any areas of key or restricted terrain. This should be identified from the point of view of the (threat) actor and our (UN) capabilities. This diagram informs the commander how relevant actors can manoeuvre through the mission area, including our forces.

Slide 35



The briefer should draw out the pertinent analysis such as assessment on route capabilities and whether knowledge gaps exist that require additional staff consideration (e.g., engineer recce to provide route assurance). The briefer should look to highlight any known timings to transit main and secondary routes to inform the staff about transit timelines.

Slide 36



The ground in detail. This is where the briefer should look to focus on the relevant mission area in more detail. In this example, the briefer should draw out the key analysis relating to the physical terrain required for the specific missions and tasks.

Slide 37



This is a continuation of the previous slide.


Slide 38

Information Terrain – Mission specific

How do population communicate?
How robust is this network?
How secure is it?
How does it affect our mission?


The briefer should explain what key analytical deductions are required. They are highlighted on the slide.

Slide 39




Within the human terrain analysis, the briefer should draw out the key ethnic and tribal groups that live within the mission area.

Slide 40



A tribal overlay enables the commander to understand the tribal and ethnic lay down within the AO. Within this mission context, the commander should be made aware of all the possible drivers for friction. This should include all the IDP camp considerations and understanding.

Slide 41



Ask these questions when it comes to human terrain:

- Any complexities that could affect our mission?
- Movement through the town, e.g., pattern of life activity? The situation within IDP camp?
- HN Security Force laydown? What does this mean to the commander?
- How will the human terrain situation affect their plan?


Slide 42

Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
Weather type					
Max Temp °C / °F	22°C / 81°F	24°C / 75°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F
Min Temp °C / °F	17°C / 63°F	16°C / 61°F	12°C / 54°F	11°C / 52°F	11°C / 52°F
Clouds	Clear	Scattered	Broken	Overcast - Rain	Overcast - Rain
Precipitation	0 - 15 mm	0 - 15 mm	0 - 15 mm	225 - 250 mm	250 - 300 mm
Humidity	25 %	25 %	60 %	75 %	75 %
Wind direction	SW	SW	SE	E	E
Sunrise and set	06:07 / 18:58 hour LT	06:08 / 18:59 hour LT	06:09 / 19:00 hour LT	06:10 / 19:01 hour LT	06:11 / 19:02 hour LT
Moonrise and set	20:26 / 07:47 hour LT	21:04 / 08:33 hour LT	21:37 / 09:19 hour LT	22:17 / 10:04 hour LT	22:57 / 10:51 hour LT
Illumination % night	Illumination 88.5 %	Illumination 81.4 %	Illumination 73.4 %	Illumination 64.1 %	Illumination 53.9 %
Weather effects matrix					
Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
UN Personnel	Variable	Variable	Variable	Unfavorable	Unfavorable
UN Material	Variable	Variable	Variable	Unfavorable	Unfavorable
Rotary wing & MV	Variable	Variable	Variable	Unfavorable	Unfavorable
Fixed wing - transport	Variable	Variable	Variable	Unfavorable	Unfavorable
UAV	Variable	Variable	Variable	Unfavorable	Unfavorable
Movements (roads)	Variable	Variable	Variable	Flooding risk	Flooding risk
Movements (off-road)	Variable	Variable	Variable	Distance reduction	Distance reduction
Communications	Variable	Variable	Variable	Distance reduction	Distance reduction
Specific effects on UN Operating Environment	Variable	NSTR	NSTR	DPRC / Flooding	DPRC / Flooding / NBCR / etc.
Legend:	Not-assignable / NSTR	Variable	Marginal	Unfavorable	

How does it affect the mission?
What pertinent detail is included here?

The briefer needs to explain the impact of the weather during the mission period—for example, any effect on acquisition assets and manoeuvre. The briefer should draw out the critical analysis that would inform the commander of the specific freedoms and constraints provided by the weather.

Slide 43




Here are some questions the intel staff should answer when briefing:

- Known locations? Have they assessed locations?
- Known numbers?
- How old is the data that forms the basis of that assessment?

Ensure a Mission specific actor evaluation and outlining the detail above for all known relevant actors.

Slide 44



The hierarchy of the group. Draw out key conclusions about the efficiency of the group.... What is currently known and unknown and how the group is likely to arrange itself. Key actors, whom the UN should look to affect.

Slide 45


IK – COWARD – Key Takeaways					
Capability	Organisation	Weapons + Equipment	Asymmetric TTPs	Reinforcement / Logistics	Dispositions / Doctrine
Little is known about its key leaders, but the 'Nimr' (NFDK) is known to be the overall military leader.	Katibats – operating in respective clan areas	Small Arms – AK variants, Sophisticated Sniper capability SIEDs	Hit and run ambush attacks against host nation security forces	Each Katibat has a religious and military leader.	Standard insurgent / guerrilla TTPs.
religious leaders to deliver propagandistic sermons targeting its enemies Limited campaign given size of grouping No evidence of capability to conduct a spectacular	IK has a decentralized leadership model, with key leaders – of which little is known - based in Abusir; Katibats don't operate as a single entity – each comprises sub-groups. Excellent COMSEC	use females in SPBIEDs SVBIEDs	IK not capable of large-scale conventional operations against UNMIGAR or the GAF. IK asymmetric attack capabilities have increased as a result of the recent influx of combat-hardened jihadist fighters from the 6 th	Support from population who believe in their ideology. the group utilizes caches of weapons, hidden on both sides of the border, enabling personnel to evade detection at GAF checkpoints	Unlikely to surrender

Here we ask the questions:

- What are the key capabilities that the group have?
- How are they likely to be employed?

The answers will be key to the briefing.

Slide 46



Here note the RPG 7 variants are a threat to UN aviation and vehicles which lack the defensive aid suites and armour to counter the HEAT variants. Effective weapon ranges. How is the threat actor likely to use its capabilities on the UN?

Slide 47



Here is an example of what might the intel cell brief on a generic armed group.

Strengths:

The decentralised leadership model means that networks reconstitute quickly, even after key leaders have been eliminated. Moreover, even if they are critically weakened due to intel-led Security Force operations, others remain untouched and can assume the weakened Katibat's operational responsibilities.

Combat Experience. The group has access to combat-hardened fighters making them more effective fighters; their tactical-level engagements are generally successful.

Ideology. The group's hard-line religious ideology makes them effective fighters. It also facilitates recruitment and the deployment of suicide bombers.

Access to sophisticated weaponry. The group's links to extremists and its control of desert trafficking routes means that it has access to increasingly modern firearms and ammunition.

Reputation/Propaganda. Fear of the group means that host nation security forces do not project force at night, and rarely stand and fight if a retreat is possible. This allows the group significant freedom of movement and action.

Ethnic make-up. The group's ethnic make-up allows it to use the local population as cover. This assists reconnaissance operation, and its ability to raise funds in urban areas through legitimate businesses.

Weaknesses:

The requirement for religious justification acts as an operational constraint. The group needs to justify its operations and target set to its base, let them lose popular support. The group is, therefore, vulnerable to effective counter-narratives.

Physical Terrain. Considering its Area of Operations comprises of the desert, there is little natural foliage to cover the large-scale movement. This is exacerbated during the wet season when the group is forced to use metaled roads. This makes the group vulnerable to aerial surveillance and attacks, undermining its ability to scale its operations.

Human Terrain. Support for is far from universal. Indeed, most resent the group for making them a pariah ethnic group. This has the potential to erode as both UNMIGAR, and they are likely (if security in outlying areas improves) to find sections of the population willing to act as informers.

Composition. The fact that some personnel have fought in and been radicalised by the war; this makes the group less ideologically coherent than has been the case in the past. Evidence of this comes in the content of sermons of religious leaders associated with those that have fought and those that have not. It is assessed that tensions between these groups make fictionalisation an increasingly realistic possibility.

Limited access to modern armour defeating weapons systems.

Opportunities:

Weak host nation security presence in the border and other inaccessible areas means the group has the potential to expand its presence.

Expanding links with the AWF. The group has the potential to widen its AO and to conduct operations that will put additional pressure.

Lack of formal economic opportunities available to the local population means that the group can at least maintain and probably increase its recruitment. It is a realistic possibility that IK could widen its recruit and support base to non-traditional support groups.

Structural causes of the conflict (political and socioeconomic isolation) remain unchanged across the country.

Threats:

As the region stabilises, economists expect Foreign Direct Investment in extractive industries to increase. This will increase employment opportunities for minority groups in the country. In time, this is likely to lead to the increasing integration of minority groups into the formal economy. Typically, this reduces the appeal of extremist groups.

Agreement with Security Forces to work together on cross border operations. This reduces space for reorganisation and consolidation.

Ongoing International CT efforts will reduce drone attacks and are expected to erode existing C2 structures at a rate that is faster than the group's ability to reconstitute – the group's decentralised structures notwithstanding.

Centre of Gravity:

COG – support of the population.

Sufficient revenues to pay recruits, maintaining the support of religious leaders to justify operations, maintaining a narrative of success, maintain the freedom to proselytise, capacity to deliver underlying security and some services to the population under its control.

Vulnerability to sophisticated counter-narratives/strategic messaging, expansion of state security, economic development, expansion of government services, fringe group operations, criminal activity of some members/exploitation of the local population.

X-border (international) CT kinetic operations and the professionalisation of the GAF should create the operational space necessary for economic development, the expansion of government services to minorities, and an end to impunity for criminal/terrorist activity. This should reduce the group's appeal to its base, thereby undermining recruitment, and its ability to raise funds.

Sophisticated counter-narratives can undermine the group's religious reason to deter and reduce the group's coherence.

Slide 48

Situation Integration
MPKI Products that Support COA
Development

(Examples)

Slide 49

MLCOA		IK will conduct harassment ATTACKs and widespread DISRUPTION activity in order to ISOLATE UN forces.	
	<p>Intent/Purpose: DISRUPT UN activity without becoming decisively engaged. UNDERMINE UN presence within the Sector.</p> <p>MSN: Conduct small arms ATTACK on UN bases IOT REINFORCE their IO campaign.</p> <p>Endstate: UN being forced to increase security at its bases makes UN a static force, unable to deploy to more than a handful of urban areas. IK increases its control to more areas of Sector west.</p>	<p>Scheme of Manoeuvre:</p> <p>Shaping:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Hate speeches. UN as the target. ● Small teams will forward mount to urban areas to prepare. ● Surveillance of UN base and UN force movements. <p>Decisive:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Once recon screen is in place, the attack teams will move forward to conduct attack. ● Use of VHF radios to control the attacks. Assessed firing point will be from southern edge of urban area. ● Attack will last NMT 5-10 minutes as per previous attacks. Wpns will be dropped or taken to local caches. <p>Sustaining:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teams will withdraw before decisively engaged using terrain to cover movement. ● Increased messaging and propaganda will follow shortly after attack claiming responsibility undermine UN credibility. 	
	<p>I & W:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Increase in anti-UN propaganda. ● Increased surveillance of UN TOBs. ● Testing of UN security procedures involving unarmed personnel by day and night. ● Significant change to pattern of life in and around UN bases. 	<p>IHI:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Weapons caches. ● Sniper rifles <p>Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● VHF radios can be intercepted. <p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Ability to blend in with population. ● Cover provided to East iot support withdrawal 	<p>Tactical Functions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. C2 – decentralised command structure. Use of VHF. 2. Info & Int – Population support base 3. Firepower – Sniper rifles (U/K variant) and AK47 variants. 4. Manoeuvre – Urban – use of motorbikes, light role 5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC 6. Sustainment – Use of population and hides to secure lethal aid.

MDCOA.

IK will conduct an aggressive campaign of sophisticated attacks on UNMIGAR FOBs throughout Sector West. These sophisticated attacks will involve IDF, SVBIEDs, PBIEDs, and ground troops to assure maximum casualties, denying UNMIGAR access to most urban areas.

Intent/Purpose. To deny UNMIGAR access to all rural and most urban areas of Sector West, and to disrupt TCC political willingness to sustain UNMIGAR.

End state. Being forced to increase security at its bases makes UNMIGAR a static force, unable to deploy to more than a handful of urban areas. IK increases its control to more areas of Sector west.

SOM:

Shaping. Online hate speech targeting UNMIGAR increases. UNMIGAR becomes the target of radical preachers. The local population is warned not to cooperate with UNMIGAR, and those that do are targets for reprisal. IK moves weapons caches and many fighters into key urban areas and increases IED/SVBIED/PBIED construction. Several safe houses are occupied. Reconnaissance and surveillance of UNMIGAR FOBs are conducted. IDF launch sites are prepared, and target registration begins from multiple launch sites.

Decisive. A series of attacks on UNMIGAR FOBs occur.

Sustainment. IK increases its control throughout the sector west, including in urban areas.

Messaging/propaganda campaign to undermine UNMIGARs standing as a credible security provider in the eyes of the local population is maintained and increased.

Tactical Functions:

Protection. The group has no access to armour, but its structure, disposition, and ethnic composition provide a high level of OPSEC. The group also has good COMSEC.

Information and Intel. Can move within the local population—benefits from a local, albeit relatively small, support base which offers information on UNMIGAR movement.

Firepower. Small arms and IEDs (PBIEDs and SVBIEDs). Effective against UNMIGAR convoys.

Manoeuvre. IK is highly mobile. 4x4 vehicles offer an off-road capability, which reduces in the wet season. IK can also operate on foot over long distances and in urban areas.

Logs. Fighters can self-sustain for short periods. Use of local population/services possible due to support network and strong financial position.


C2. The group is widely dispersed, and its decentralised command structures offer operational freedom to individual groups.

Identifying Indicators & Warnings:

- Increase in anti-UNMIGAR propaganda (online, graffiti, religious sermons)
- Reports of increased movement of IK cadres into urban areas, including the presence of extremists. Reports of IK taking over safe houses in the area
- Increased surveillance of UNMIGAR operating bases
- Testing of UNMIGAR security procedures involving unarmed personnel by day and night
- Reports of movement of arms/explosives into urban areas
- Reports of large-scale attack rehearsals taking place
- IDF attacks from multiple launch sites indicative of ranging and target acquisition ongoing
- A significant change to the pattern of life in and around UNMIGAR bases
- Large gatherings of military-aged males in and around UNMIGAR bases
- Vehicles are moving at speed towards UNMIGAR gates

Items of High Importance List: Weapons caches, IED makers, Religious leaders, Military commanders, and Financial enablers (financiers, front businesses).

Slide 50



Here are designated Named Areas of Interest (NAI) and Target Areas of Interest (TAI) transcribed on the event overlay. The MPKI staff should inform the commander what are the current PIRs relating in place and what are the PIRs relating to the upcoming mission. This is an opportunity for the commander to confirm/change the acquisition / collection priorities. In addition, the MPKI staff should inform the commander where they have critical intelligence gaps, and this will enable the commander to redirect acquisition assets.

Slide 51



The MPKI staff need to help vet all UNIBAT COAs against impacts that may affect the Mission as a whole. Each COA should take into consideration the impacts that they may have on the Political and Humanitarian Mission objectives. A successful military operation at the tactical level may have some negative impacts on a humanitarian or political operational at a strategic level. In all cases, the higher HQs / commander should endorse and approve all tactical plans.

Slide 52

Orders Production & Execution

- MPKI guidance on control measures
- De-confliction of acquisition and operational activities
- Situation paragraph, peacekeeping-intelligence annex
- Supports staff branch annexes
- Supports Mission Rehearsal – raise scenarios and contingencies (Red-teaming / war-gaming)
- During Execution phase- Intel cells monitor situation / refines products, makes changes and adjusts information requirements as situation on the ground changes, supports a new planning cycle as required

At this point in time, the staff will be writing an Operation Order to inform subordinate elements what missions and tasks are to be conducted, and the MPKI staff will draft the supporting intelligence annex and situation paragraphs. The MPKI staff should also look to provide guidance to the commander and planning staff regarding control measures, such as deconfliction of acquisition capabilities. Mission rehearsal – the role of the MPKI staff, is to raise realistic / testing scenarios. This confirms that the plan and its contingencies are viable.

Slide 53

Take Away

- Threat-based assessments drive and influence tactical planning
- Mission analysis of threats is a critical step for assessment of perpetrators, civilians and other protection actors
- Risk analysis guides prioritisation of threats
- MPKI cycle is the process by which MPKI is acquired, analyzed and disseminated based on clearly identified requirements
- MPKI management tools ensure effective intelligence support to military decision-making process
- MPKI support for the MDMP provides inputs to be integrated during all phases of the planning process

Summary

The MPKI staff support all stages of the MDMP process. The MPKI staff must be proactive and look to provide expert situational awareness inputs.

The P1B is the MPKI staff's initial opportunity to situate the commander and the planning staff. The P1B products can be used throughout the MDMP to further assist planning.

Throughout, the MPKI staff should look to provide updates when new intelligence is raised or where the situation changes. The MPKI staff should also look to test the plan by including realistic actor scenarios to mitigate the identified risks and threats.

Lesson 3.3



Protection of Civilians (POC) Planning Considerations

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Ask participants how POC response and use of force in peacekeeping differ from conventional military operations. Discuss how the mind set of peacekeepers needs to go beyond the typical attack-defend approach of infantry operations. Peacekeeping missions are typically not the target of violence and therefore do not engage in the same type of actions like conventional infantry battalions. Rather, the use of force in UN peacekeeping is typically directed at (potential) perpetrators of violence against a third party, i.e., the civilian population.

The DPO Policy, The POC in UN Peacekeeping is an essential document to UNIBAT staffs and leaders in executing an POC strategy in a Mission.

This policy focus on the physical Protection of Civilians against violence in any form and irrespective of the perpetrator, including but not limited to armed groups, non-state actors and state actors (where applicable) individually or collectively at operational and tactical levels. While discussing military planning processes, the policy also leaves enough room for planners and commanders to incorporate changes in the planning and execution of operations as the situation evolves. The planning process will determine resource requirements – troops and equipment required to achieve the task.

In each troop contributing country, national doctrine has established military decision making as a distinct analytical process. This lesson seeks to highlight how commanders and their staff should integrate POC considerations into their decision-making process.

This is a large lesson that may take several hours. This lesson can be broken into several distinct sections, so breaks and practical exercises can be incorporated into the lesson as the instructor sees fit. It is recommended to go in instructional blocks of 30 to 45 minutes dependent on the level of the student skill sets.


Slide 1



Lesson 3.3 Tactical Planning Considerations for the Protection of Civilians (POC)

The lesson does not aim to create or train participants on a particular decision-making process for UN Peacekeeping and does not discuss particular military doctrines, which may vary between troop contributing countries. Rather, the lesson offers considerations that commanders and their staff should consider during the application of the decision-making process as per their national doctrine. The lesson provides tactical level considerations as they relate to the POC, meaning Battalion level and subordinate units.

Slide 2



Content

- UNIBAT Implementing guidelines
- Phases of response and use of force
- POC Tactical decision-making process considerations

Here is the content of the lesson. In module 1 we discussed the conceptual framework for POC. In this lesson we will continue to discuss POC from an operational framework and provide a methodology for planning.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Explain why the myriad of POC guidelines are important to the UNIBAT commander and staff
- Give examples of Do's and Don'ts when engaging communities
- Explain the phases of response and why they are important
- Identify key aspects in a threat assessment for POC
- Explain how POC considerations impact tactical planning

Here are the learning objectives for this lesson.

Slide 4



Key Message: For the tactical focus of this module, it is important to note that the POC Strategy provides the operational level framework for the development of plans and orders at the tactical level. To frame tactical level planning and operations, missions need to provide clear guidance of who is expected to do what in a peacekeeping mission, and whom, how and what peacekeepers are expected to protect.

For instance, the UNIBAT is typically expected to conduct the following activities amongst others:

- Ensure patrolling in priority areas as identified in the mission's threat analysis and POC Action Plan
- As appropriate, conduct joint or unilateral operations to detect the presence and capacity of non-state armed groups and according to threat and risk analysis / assessments, prevent, pre-empt, or stop violence against civilians
- Create the security conditions conducive to the immediate, full, safe, and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance in coordination with the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator

- Create the security conditions conducive to voluntary safe, dignified, and sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees, in close, coordination with the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator
- Monitor and report violations of international law, including as stipulated in the monitoring and reporting mechanisms that were established under the Child Protection and Women, Peace and Security mandates

Slide 5

Guidance for Tactical Level Commanders

- Planning at sector and unit level
- Conduct of POC tasks/operations
- Early Warning
- Engaging communities



The Guidelines provide guidance on:

- Planning at the sector and unit levels
- Conduct of POC tasks/operations
- Early Warning
- Engagement with communities

These aspects will be covered in more detail in the coming slides.

Slide 6

Planning at sector and unit level

- Production of own POC plans and contingency plans based on directives from higher level
- POC intent of higher command reflected




Sector HQs and Battalions must produce their own POC plans based on higher directives. These plans need to clearly specify tasks, locations, reserves and liaison, and they must be presented to and approved by higher command. The plans need to reflect POC, CP and CRSV concerns. This will be discussed later in this module.

Slide 7

POC Operations

- 4 phases of operations
- Presence and posture
- Reporting on all threats, including Child Protection and CRSV concerns
- Adherence to ROE



We will spend a little more time on slide to introduce an important operational POC concept.

The Four phases

When considering POC at the tactical level, the specific roles played by sectors and units can be categorised in four phases:

- Phase 1: Assurance and Prevention
- Phase 2: Pre-Emption
- Phase 3: Response
- Phase 4: Consolidation

All of the phases are discussed in detail later in the package. The phases are not sequential and may be undertaken simultaneously or independently, depending upon the nature or imminence of the threat.

Presence and Posture

UNIBAT must convey a state of readiness and professionalism. They should have operating bases in proximity to vulnerable populations and must sustain a presence in the local community. Military units should focus on the high-risk areas and at the same time, be able to respond quickly through their area of operations.

UN military should present an approachable image amongst civilians whilst maintaining military alertness to respond to any situation. Operating Base commanders should be prepared to assist the local population rapidly within their capabilities. This includes, for instance, security patrols for livelihood activities, such as firewood patrols. To facilitate engagement with communities and in particular with regard to violations against women and children, the deployment of mixed gender engagement teams has proven successful as have Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs).

Commanders should also engage constructively with potential perpetrators to advocate for respect for human rights and IHL. Commanders should ensure that all parties know that human rights monitoring is taking place, that violations are documented and that parties will be held accountable for their actions.

Reporting

Military should record all allegations of human rights violations or signs of deterioration or impending violence and should report these along the chain of command and to the human rights component. Monitoring and reporting need to consider the particular considerations under the CP and CRSV mandates. Coordination with the special reporting mechanisms for these mandates needs to be established to ensure consistent reporting and follow-up. As a general rule, all reporting should be disaggregated at least by gender and age.

Adherence to ROE

All military personnel must understand the guiding principles and rules for the use of force. Each soldier must carry a pocket card with the necessary extracts of the mission ROE translated into their language and be regularly tested on its contents. Commanders must clarify areas not easily understood in the ROE.

Slide 8

POC Operations

Do

- Intervene when armed elements or criminals are threatening civilians
- Prioritize actions to prevent and halt violence
- Distinguish between civilians and combatants
- Ensure your protection efforts support existing community mechanisms as much as possible
- Coordinate your actions with other components of the mission (police and civilian)
- Treat all civilians with dignity and respect and abide by the Code of Conduct

While conducting POC tasks and operations, peacekeepers are expected to follow principles:

- Always intervene when armed elements or criminals are threatening civilians, and if necessary, engage with force as authorised by the Rules of Engagement (ROEs). If force must be used, ensure that your plan includes measures to prevent negative consequences civilians and collateral damage
- When faced with a limitation of resources to accomplish your tasks, prioritize actions to prevent and halt violence against civilians
- Distinguish between civilians and combatants to safeguard civilian populations and property; treat civilians with care, without regard to race, religion, sex, creed, or status
- Local communities often have their own protection mechanisms. Peacekeepers must plan their activities in harmony with and help support these existing mechanisms (e.g., alert systems, conflict resolution processes, etc.)
- Coordination is an essential aspect of effective protection. Military plans need to be coordinated with police and civilian components of the mission to ensure complementarity and efficient use of resources. POC coordination mechanisms are in place to facilitate this coordination

- Treat all civilians with dignity and respect and ensure all your troops and officers strictly abide by the UN Code of Conduct and the Zero Tolerance Policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Any alleged violation by UN personnel must be reported. Specifically, rape, forced prostitution, any form of sexual assault, sex slavery, and sexual exploitation or abuse are strictly prohibited in all circumstances and at all times

Slide 9

Conduct of POC Operations
Child Protection Considerations

Do	Don't
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist child soldiers when they surrender or get captured • Inform CP Unit and hand over to nearest CP actor as soon as possible • Share CP techniques / humanitarian framework / knowledge with host state military • Encourage host state military not to use schools as bases 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Send children away and tell them to come back the next day after you informed CP Unit • Hand children over to host state army without consulting CP Unit • Underestimate your role as role model • Use schools as bases

During the conduct of POC tasks or operations, peacekeepers need to remember the particular aspects of Child Protection. They have been covered in the section on Special Considerations for Child Protection in Module 1, but they are worthy reviewing again.

Do:

- Assist child soldiers or children associated with armed groups when they surrender or get captured
- Inform the Child Protection Unit and hand over children to the nearest Child Protection actor as soon as possible
- Share your Child Protection knowledge with the host state military
- Encourage the host state military not to use schools as bases

Do not:

- Do not send children away and tell them to come back the next day after you had a chance to report to the Child Protection Unit; avoid follow-up and do not create any expectations

- Do not hand over children to the host state military without first consulting with the Child Protection Unit
- Whenever you are in the field carrying out tasks and conducting operations, do not underestimate you as a role model
- Do not use schools as military bases; this represents one of the six grave violations against children

Slide 10

Early Warning

- **Situational awareness and early warning indicators**
- **Outreach and advocacy**
- **Early Warning Centers**
 - Information hub in POB and TOB
 - Produce database including threats and vulnerabilities
 - Manage cell phone hotline
 - Maintain information collection plan

Key Message: Early warning is a critical aspect and the most effective form of POC, CP and CRSV. Given their vast presence across the area of operations, the military component plays a critical role in this context.

Peacekeeping Operations should develop a comprehensive early warning strategy, encompassing all mission components and the local population. At the very least, activities carried out by the Force should include the following:

Situational awareness is the foundation for early warning and all units need to ensure they understand local dynamics in their area of operations. Building on this situational awareness, early warning indicators for POC, Child Protection and CRSV threats need to be developed. To create these indicators, POC Officers, Child Protection Officers and Women Protection Advisers should be consulted to create a meaningful list of indicators to be monitored by the military.

Organise regular meetings with local authorities to conduct outreach and advocacy efforts in line with missions' communication strategies.

Establish Early Warning Centres (EWC) in Permanent and Temporary Operating Bases (POB/TOB) to serve as the information hub for POC. The EWCs provide a common operational picture for patrolling, check points and other activities conducted in the area of operations. Through local engagement (see next page), the EWCs have the potential to create a reciprocal relationship between the troops and the local population. EWCs should have POC capacities including:

- A database of prominent local persons and security issues, including threats to civilians and vulnerabilities
- A cell phone hotline (where there is coverage and in consultation with the human rights and other mission components) to establish a direct link to the local community and receive early warning on threats
- An information collection plan, based on Unit Information Requirements, to be achieved with the help of experts in the Mission
- Manage early monitoring of early warning indicators and organise meetings with local authorities

Slide 11

Engaging Communities

Regular interaction, liaison, consultation with communities, local leaders

- UNIBAT Engagement Platoon (EP)
- Community Alert Networks (CAN)
- Community Liaison Assistants (CLA)
- Joint Protection Teams (JPT)
- Cultural Awareness Teams (CAT)



Key Message: Positive engagement with the local population is critical for peacekeeping missions and for effective protection in particular. Military units must develop reliable contacts and relationships with the local population and especially community leaders. This engagement should be aligned with a mission-wide community engagement strategy and other guidance issued by Mission Headquarters.

Community engagement best practices from UN field missions include the following tools:

- The UNIBAT EP is an effective asset when reaching out to local communities and their leaders. Working with the battalion staffs, the platoon can help integrate a battalion engagement plan
- Community Alert Network (CAN) is a network established in local communities for wider engagement, exchange of information and to alert the community and protection actors in times of emergency. Dedicated communication equipment could be provided to vulnerable communities in order to communicate with UN Peacekeeping bases. Such alert networks should be established in a way that

does not expose local partners to retaliation and should be consulted with the human rights component

- Community Liaison Assistants (CLA) are national staff provided by the mission's Civil Affairs Section, usually two per POB who act as interlocutors and provide interface between the deployed UN military and the local communities. CLAs are a useful tool for effective liaison and engagement with local communities. In the context of a mission's community engagement strategy, CLAs carry out a wide range of tasks, including information gathering, information dissemination to the local population, or the management of the CAN. They also participate in Joint Protection Teams (JPT) missions and monitor impact of protection activities
- Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) are small teams comprising civilian, police and military peacekeeping personnel that can be deployed ad-hoc to investigate threats or follow-up on reports. UN civilian staff on the JPT often have a better understanding of local security dynamics having been assigned for longer periods in the mission area compared to military and police
- Cultural Approach Teams (CAT) help the unit recognize, access, and understand the sensitive interest of the local cultures and their effect on the social environment. The CAT could recommend conducting educational programs, medical assistance, culture familiarization etc.

Slide 12

Engaging Communities

Do

- Ensure safety and security of interlocutors
- Know your mandate
- Act as a role model
- Report through the chain of command and focal points
- Collect evidence
- Assist survivors of child abuse and sexual violence
- Respect dignity and confidentiality
- Know referral arrangements



When engaging communities, peacekeepers need to keep some basic Dos and Don'ts in mind. Throughout their engagement, peacekeepers should prioritize the communities' safety and well-being and their best interest should guide their interactions. While some situations may not appear harmful at first, they may cause harm to communities, or to the children or women amongst them.

Do: An important aspect of community engagement is to ensure the safety and security of the interlocutors. If engagement with peacekeepers puts sources at risk, missions must find a way to mitigate this risk.



Divide participants into three groups and ask each group to come up with three ways to mitigate potential risk for interlocutors. Possible answers include:

- *Assess the level of threat and risk of harm to the informant and other cooperating persons before, during and after establishing contact with*

them. If you assess that you will not be able to ensure the safety of the person you are cooperating with, or you do not have sufficient information to make an informed determination do not collect the information

- *Choose the most appropriate and safest method to establish contact with the informant (i.e., directly or through a third party/intermediary)*
- *Consider minimizing his/her exposure, for instance establish direct contact in a manner that may seem coincidental; consider developing secure methods of communication to keep in touch*
- *Choose the safest place to obtain/gather the information from the informant (i.e., should interaction with the source be visible or discreet?)*
- *Guarantee confidentiality and security of information: if there is a risk of endangering the informant(s), information should not be disclosed or done in a manner that removes the risk (i.e., providing information on a general pattern without revealing specific details; ensuring that only trusted intermediaries are used). Confidentiality with regard to individual protection cases also covers information on the protective measures taken, including any support given by partners external to the field presence to strengthen the protection of a person at risk*
- *Always consider the knowledge and views of cooperating persons by involving them in the risk and threat assessment and the choice of measures to be taken to ensure their safety (i.e., the source/witness/informant or victim may have family members elsewhere who could be contacted if there is a need for his/her relocation)*
- *Do not raise expectations (upon establishing contact and before proceeding with the gathering of information, consider informing victims, witnesses, and other cooperating persons of the limitations in guaranteeing protection)*
- *Share information on personal details of sources, victims and witnesses in line with relevant information sharing and reporting protocols (consult HRD and CPS for further guidance). For instance, details that would allow for*

identification of witnesses and victims, such as picture, names, etc. should be only shared with human rights, child protection or POC colleagues

Do

- Know the protection mandate of your Peacekeeping Operation, in particular with respect to Child Protection and CRSV
- Be a 'Role Model' in your engagement with communities; be respectful towards community members and customs
- Report any incidents that threaten civilians, in particular the six grave violations against children and incidents of sexual violence or threats thereof through the chain of command the designated mission focal points (e.g., Child Protection Adviser, Women Protection Adviser, Human Rights)
- Collect, record, and preserve evidence
- Assist survivors of child abuse and sexual violence
- Respect the dignity and confidentiality of the local community members, in particular survivors of child abuse or sexual violence; for instance, keep information on children confidential, as this information is often sensitive (e.g., names, locations, images)
- Assist and protect the survivor(s) of child abuse or sexual violence and follow referral pathway arrangements; inform survivors of available response/assistance mechanisms – or – where nothing is available – provide basic medical care

Slide 13

Engaging Communities

Do


- Obtain informed consent
- Think of creative community outreach options
- Work with local NGOs and communities
- Consider possible consequences of your actions for local communities
- Ask for guidance if uncertain



Do (continued):

- Obtain informed consent for the use of information related to victims of child abuse or sexual violence (informed consent is voluntarily and freely given based upon a clear appreciation and understanding of the facts, implications, and future consequences of the consent).
- Think creatively about engaging local communities beyond the standard mission tools and soccer games; examples include Integrated Agricultural Land Development, build or rehabilitate public facilities, engage with local communities (friendly sport, medical campaign, religious activities, etc)
- Liaise with local NGOs and community representatives when you seek to engage communities.
- Always consider possible consequences of your actions for local communities; they may be harmful even if this is not the intention.

- If you are uncertain about what to do or how to react in certain situations, do not hesitate to ask focal points (e.g., Military Child Protection Officer, Child Protection Adviser, Women Protection Adviser, Human Rights).

 *Note to instructor – Familiarize yourself with the below information on the concept of informed consent before presenting this slide.*

The 2016 Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Policy on Protection in Humanitarian Action defines INFORMED CONSENT as:

“Consent signifies the approval by the participant for the information to be used as explained. Consent is often given with limitations. It must therefore be specified whether all the data and information provided can be used, including the identity of the participant, or whether the information may be used on condition that the identity of the participant is kept confidential. The participant may deem some parts of their information to be confidential, and others not: this should also be clarified and recorded. For example, recent violations occurring in an IDP camp, where the perpetrators are still in the vicinity, may be judged to be confidential, whereas previous violations relating to the cause of displacement may not.

Informed consent is voluntarily and freely given based upon a clear appreciation and understanding of the facts, implications, and future consequences of the consent. In order to give informed consent, the individual concerned must have all relevant facts at the time consent is given and be able to evaluate and understand its consequences. They also must be aware of and have the power to exercise their right to refuse to engage in an action and/or to not be coerced (i.e., being persuaded based on force or threats) or unduly influenced. Children’s informed consent should be considered in light of their evolving capacities. In the case of children (under age 18), informed consent must be voluntary, with the informed consent of the child and a parent or guardian when in the best interests of the child. Persons with disabilities may need specific support based on the nature of their impairment whether it be physical, intellectual, or mental, to give consent.

In specialised protection work, risks to affected individuals linked to information sharing may be higher than risks associated with other humanitarian work. In these cases, “informed” implies the information provider receive explanations in simple, jargon-free language, as to the following:

- The identity of the information collector, along with a brief explanation of the mandate of the organisation
- The purpose of the information collection, its scope and method, and intended use of the information collected (to present cases, for statistical purposes, etc.)
- The details of the potential risks and benefits of participation in the process, including those related to using the information provided
- The meaning of confidentiality, and how it applies, with special emphasis on the fact that the person interviewed can request any information that may reveal his/her identity to be kept confidential
- Contact information so that the participant can reach the information gatherer
- Details on how long the information will be used, and how and where it will be kept (stored)
- Reminders that the participant can cease participating at any time, and request that his or her information be destroyed, whenever feasible

Even if informed consent is granted, the information collector has an obligation to assess the potential implications of the use of that information on the safety of the person providing it, and on others involved, and to minimize any additional risk to the participants that may be incurred.

Slide 14

Engaging Communities

Don't

- Interview
- Follow-up or investigate
- Share with authorities details of victims of human rights violations
- Take pictures of child victims
- Act on behalf of victims without informed consent
- Engage in activities that may harm local communities



Do not:

- Do not interview the survivor(s) of child abuse or sexual violence or investigate the incident; note down the basic information and share this with relevant units
- Do not follow up or investigate incidents you witnessed or were informed about; this is the responsibility of human rights officers, Women Protection Advisers (WPAs), or Child Protection Advisers (CPAs)
- Do not inform local authorities of any details regarding victims of human rights violations, including survivors of child abuse or sexual violence
- Do not take pictures of child victims of human rights violations, or victims of sexual violence; if you obtain pictures, do not use them in reports; this includes pictures of children in custody or children associated with armed forces or armed groups
- Do not act on behalf of the victims without their informed consent – particularly, do not reveal the particulars of the survivor; in other words, maintain

confidentiality of name, details of the family, village, personal identification, photos, etc

- Engage in activities that may harm local communities; keep in mind how your actions can impact children in particular

Slide 15

Engaging Communities

Don't

- Be discouraged if you cannot help immediately
- Be discouraged if you think the mission should do more to help
- Casually spend time with children
- Give money, food or employment to children
- Have any sexual contact with children



Do not (continued):

- Do not be discouraged if you cannot help immediately; your support to provide security is important
- Do not be discouraged if you think the mission should do more to help; report through the appropriate channels, other mission partners have particular mandates to help
- Do not spend time casually with children
- Do not give money, food or employment to children; explain that you are not allowed to give employment to children if needed
- Do not have any sexual contact with children; if you note any instance of sexual contact with children amongst your colleagues, it is your duty to report this immediately

Slide 16

Phases of Response and Use of Force

The DPO POC Policy as well as the Implementing Guidelines for Military Components emphasise the four phases of response as a centre piece of POC mandate implementation in UN Peacekeeping. The four phases categorize the response to POC threats by peacekeepers.

POC is a whole-of-mission activity and as such the four phases apply to all components (military, police and civilian) of a peacekeeping mission. For instance, Political Affairs and Human Rights sections as well as police units are involved in the preventive aspects of a POC response as much as in the response and consolidation aspects. Nevertheless, the four phases hold a particular meaning to the military component, where operational planning and execution occurs along the distinct phases.

Ask participants how POC response and use of force in peacekeeping differ from conventional military operations. Discuss how the mind set of peacekeepers needs to go beyond the typical attack-defend approach of infantry operations. Peacekeeping missions are typically not the target of violence and therefore do not engage in the same type of actions like conventional infantry battalions. Rather, the use of force in UN Peacekeeping is typically directed at (potential) perpetrators of violence against a third party, i.e., the civilian population.

Slide 17



POC action is implemented along four operational phases:

- Prevention
- Pre-emption
- Response
- Consolidation

Across all four phases, the goal is to either eliminate a threat or mitigate the risk to civilians associated with it. These phases do not necessarily occur in sequential order and may be undertaken simultaneously or independently. Activities and objectives under these phases will vary along with the specific nature of each threat.

Prevention

Prevention and assurance activities shall be conducted in areas where risks to civilians are suspected or latent, but no clear threat to civilians has been

identified. Measures in this phase are aimed at providing a visible presence to deter threats and assure the population of the mission's intent to protect them from physical violence.

Pre-emption

When likely threats to civilians are identified, active measures are required to apply credible deterrence and pre-empt the threat. In order to undermine the capacity and intent of potential perpetrators, all necessary deterrence and offensive operations may be considered, including through engagement, rapid deployments, joint or unilateral security operations by host state or mission components.

Response

When physical violence against civilians is apparent, responsive measures will aim at deterring and stopping aggressors from conducting hostile acts. Should the mission lack the capacity or political space to do so, it may also provide direct physical security to civilians at risk or accompany and secure their movement to more stable areas.


Consolidation

To accompany the progressive return to stability and normalcy, the mission will support the provision of humanitarian, rehabilitation, and recovery assistance, create the conditions conducive for the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees, but also take initial steps to restore the authority of the state and the rule of law.

The application of the four phases is most prominent in Tier II of the POC operational concept, but it is also relevant for Tiers I and III. Actors in those tiers must adjust their activities to reflect changes and escalation of the real time challenges in the mission's area of responsibility. Given peacekeeping's multi-disciplinary approach to POC, the four phases involve all mission components.

Another way to look at the four phases is to look at the proactive steps in prevention and pre-emption, which intend to reduce the likelihood of an attack or incident, and the reactive steps, which intend to reduce the effects of any such attack or incident. The most effective form of POC is being proactive; taking action to prevent and pre-empt threats of physical violence against civilians.

Slide 18



Key Message: Civilians are best protected when threats of violence against them are prevented through coordinated action from all mission components. The measures in the phase of prevention are aimed at reassuring the local population of the mission's intent to protect them and intend to resolve potential tensions before a threat develops.


Activities conducted in the prevention phase include:

- Regular communication with key stakeholders and potential perpetrators, political negotiations, and alerting POC actors as necessary; commanders remind all actors of their obligations under international law and consequences for violations
- Military shows presence, conducts routine patrols, and deploys forces in a strategic manner
- Check points can be erected in coordination with other protection actors, information is gathered and shared with relevant partners, and public outreach activities are undertaken

Many of the activities that are typical for the prevention phase will carry on throughout the other phases as well. For instance, in all cases, good information sharing and coordination with other actors deployed in the area of operations is critical. HUMINT (human sources including CLAs, CANs, community leaders etc) is normally the main source of information in peacekeeping and remains decisive to have an accurate picture of the situation.

The effective prevention and deterrence of violence against civilians requires a functioning early warning system and a consistent, credible, and proactive (as opposed to reactive) operational approach and mobile posture (e.g., Forward Operating Bases can improve mission reach and enhance deterrence/response capabilities).

Slide 19



Key Message: Where preventive activities prove insufficient, or when heightened risks are detected, more active, pre-emptive measures may be required.

It may also be the case that an infantry battalion has a company conducting preventive activities in one part of its area of operations, while another company is carrying out pre-emptive measures in another part of the area.

Pre-emptive measures include:

- Ensuring heightened situational awareness and intensifying information gathering
- Increase high-profile patrolling to act as a deterrent; organise joint patrols with civilian components of the mission, including human rights and civil affairs; intensify communication with government and nongovernment armed actors and potential parties to the conflict to increase pressure and inform them that the international community and UN peacekeepers are watching; strengthen human rights monitoring, reporting and advocacy.
- Pre-emption is pro-active; military forces should intercept, neutralise, or defuse situations before hostile acts can be carried out. The pre-empted deployment / use of intervening forces, Quick Reaction Forces (QRF), Special Forces or Reserves can deter or prevent a pending incident

Slide 20




Key Message: In some situations, a POC threat may not have been anticipated or could not be prevented due to a lack of proper capabilities such as communications, intelligence, and mobility. When the threat of physical violence to civilians is apparent or underway, more active measures aimed at deterring potential aggressors from conducting hostile acts may be necessary. The level of response may need to escalate to the use of lethal force depending upon the threat and the ROE.

The following are exemplary activities that can be undertaken in the response phase:

- Direct military action against (potential) perpetrators
- Positioning troops to create a buffer zone and deter attacks on civilians
- Swift action through the speedy movement of forces such as attack helicopters, QRFs, and reconnaissance
- The level of response may need to escalate up to the use of lethal force in line with the ROE as a last resort. It is worth noting here that the POC mandate authorizes peacekeepers to use all necessary means to stop physical violence against civilians

Slide 21



Key Message: Activities in the consolidation phase address the stabilization of a post-crisis situation. The aim is to assist the local population and host authorities to return to a state of normalcy and create the conditions in which a return to crisis is diminished.

Consolidation activities are typically multidimensional responses involving political, humanitarian, military, and police activities to create the conditions in which a return to crisis is diminished. Follow-up remains crucial. After an attack or hostile act, the local population will require continued support, aid, protection, and reassurance.

The UNIBAT must consult with humanitarian protection partners to ensure complementarity of actions and respect for humanitarian principles. Military forces can assist in the stabilization of the post-crisis environment by assisting the local population and host nation authorities to help normalize the situation.

Measures in this phase may include:

- Immediate medical care
- Establishing cordons, local security and or defence positions
- Notification of appropriate civilian experts, including to conduct human rights
- investigations and promote accountability for violations as appropriate (Human Rights, POC Advisors, Child Protection, WPAs and Gender)


- Assessment of remedial and preventive measures
- Collection of evidence
- Drafting of formal reports for follow-up with relevant authorities


Slide 22



This slide provides examples of possible activities under the four phases of response. It will be critical for commanders to translate the spectrum of military operations into these phases of POC activities and provide clear guidance to units under their command. The UNIBAT operational tasks and missions are relevant across the phases and should be relied upon when formulating plans. Basic military tactical tasks such as patrolling, observation and liaison, amongst others are necessary tools to understand the environment and are important across all four phases.

Slide 23



 *Note to instructor: The Table in this slide is taken from the DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Use of Force.*

Graduated force can be applied along a continuum of three broad levels beginning with physical authoritative presence, progressing to non-deadly force and finally the use of deadly force. Depending upon the nature of threat, peacekeepers sometimes may not have enough time to embrace gradual application of force and may have to act immediately by resorting deadly force to avoid greater harm. The authorization to use force without following graduated procedures, which is reflected in mission-specific ROE, only applies where the attack or threat of an attack comes so unexpectedly that even a moment's delay could lead to the death of, or serious bodily injury to, oneself, other United Nations personnel or any other person who require protection. If the mission has a POC mandate, the following explanation sets forth the continuum for the use of force. Each mission can create a chart of their specific use of force continuum as shown in the DPKO-DFS Guidelines on the Use of Force by Military Components in UNPKOs.

Authoritative Presence (including verbal commands)

Authoritative presence maximizes the effect of peacekeeper presence in a given situation. The physical presence of a contingent with the credible capacity to use

appropriate force may be sufficient to deter or de-escalate a volatile situation. Every effort must also be made to use verbal commands to dissuade aggressors from committing violent acts and persuade them to act peacefully. Verbal commands and authoritative presence are applied as long as they are effective in deterring aggressors or crowds from posing a threat of physical harm and/or physical violence. Engagement with both male and female key stakeholders, through culturally appropriate messaging and posture, is critical to defusing a situation and avoiding the use force.

Non-Deadly Force

Non-deadly force, including unarmed force, is that force necessary to compel compliance or dissuade aggressors that is neither intended nor likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. Employment of riot control measures and agents (Hard), such as tear gas, stun grenades, smoke grenades, soft kinetic projectiles and/or other non-lethal measures can be used (if specifically, authorised) if the on-scene commander considers their use necessary and effective in preventing or stopping the hostile activity. Units and individuals must be trained and equipped in the application of non-deadly techniques and maintain the necessary refresher training. The military commander should always attempt to resolve the situation in peaceful ways with the key stakeholders. Actions in the non-deadly force category may also require the demonstration of tactical strength (Soft) to show a significantly stronger capability to gain control over or cooperation from aggressors. Therefore, troop reinforcement and a show of force by other available mission assets (such as aviation) may be required. Non-deadly force must also be used in accordance with mission-specific ROE.

Deadly Force

Deadly force is the level of force, which is intended, or is likely to cause death, regardless of whether death actually results. It is the ultimate degree of force. The use of deadly force, including armed force, is a last resort in situations against a hostile act or intent likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. Such force must be used in accordance with mission-specific ROE.


To ensure the appropriate use of force in Peacekeeping Operations, TCCs should prepare their troops in terms of mindset and skills. TCCs must understand and embrace the approved mission-specific ROE since the appropriate application of these ROE is mandatory for all deployed military units in a Peacekeeping Operation. All United Nations peacekeepers operate strictly under the United Nations chain of command. TCCs are not permitted to augment, restrict or modify ROE according to national interpretation(s), nor should TCCs impose any caveats on the authorization on the use of force that are contained in the ROE, without formal consultation with UNHQ and the express written agreement of the DPKO.

Takeaways from Phases of Response and Use of Force include the following:

- The four phases are at the heart of POC mandate implementation in UN peacekeeping. While they apply to all mission components, they hold a particular significance for the military
- The four phases are not necessarily sequential, but rather should be understood as four categories of activities that can operate independently or simultaneously depending on the nature of the threats
- Use of Force training for peacekeepers is essential for proper performance
- Ensuring the troops understand the ROE is a command responsibility

Slide 24


Tactical decision-making process considerations

 Note to instructor:

In a traditional military operation, the planning process will determine resource requirements – troops and equipment required to achieve the task. In the context of a UN Peacekeeping Mission many of these factors would have been determined as part of the strategic planning in UNHQ, and provided as guidance through relevant documents like the Security Council Resolution outlining the mandate of the mission, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Integrated Strategic framework (ISF), Mission Concept, etc.

As a reminder, in each troop contributing country, national doctrine has established military decision making as a distinct analytical process. This lesson does not aim to train participants on a certain decision-making process, but rather seeks to highlight how commanders and their staff should integrate POC, Child Protection and CRSV considerations into their decision-making process. The lesson therefore relies on the conventional military decision-making process, while acknowledging that national doctrine of troop contributing countries may deviate.

Slide 25



We showed you in earlier lessons that the tactical decision-making process that we are using as a model consists of five steps. The process is depicted cyclically because of its continuous nature in Peacekeeping Operations.

- Receipt of mission
- Mission analysis
- Course of Action production
- Order production
- Execution

The following slides will detail each step in the process and how comprehensive POC considerations need to be considered in each step.

A focus will be placed on the step of 'Mission analysis', which is at the heart of effective Protection of Civilians activities. As such, we will briefly discuss each of the five steps, before conducting an in-depth examination of the mission analysis.


The earlier discussion on the difference between UN Peacekeeping and conventional infantry operations showed why it is important to integrate comprehensive POC considerations into the planning process. The different requirements in UN Peacekeeping

demands troops to adopt a different mind-set, which must be reflected in planning and operations.

Because UN Peacekeeping Operations are diverse in nature, to function effectively military units need clearly defined structures regarding leadership, staff procedures and resources. Depending on national doctrine, these structures will look differently for different armies, but they are always the fundamental building blocks for conventional armies. The red arrow in the graphic represents the conventional military tasks armies carry out in the face of an opponent. The five steps of the tactical decision-making process are clear in this regard.

The blue arrow represents the decision-making process for POC military tasks. Unlike conventional military operations, UN peacekeepers normally do not engage in typical attack/Defence engagements with an adversary. Instead, the UN peacekeepers defend a third party, civilians, against the threat of physical violence from a potential perpetrator. To ensure operations are tailored to this particular situation, POC, Child Protection and CRSV considerations need to influence every step of the decision-making process.

Slide 26



This graph shows the flow from a mission's mandate to the operational plans for military units. It shows the series of planning processes in peacekeeping missions, many with emphasis on POC.

The building blocks of any mission include the Security Council Mandate, Mission Concept, Mission Plan, Concept of Operations (CONOPS), as well as the Mission POC Strategy, accompanying plans and the related Operations Orders for Mission Headquarters, sectors, and units. The first step in the conventional military decision-making process is the receipt of mission.

In UN Peacekeeping, the mission is derived from the strategic documents discussed earlier, beginning with the Security Council mandate. Guided by the strategic and operational level documents shown on the graph (some of which were already discussed earlier), the relevant higher headquarters in a field mission will then determine the order for a military unit.

Slide 27



The next progressive step after the receipt of mission is to analyse the mission.

In every conventional decision-making process, this step is crucial as it defines the tactical problem and shows possible courses of action, considering POC, Child Protection and CRSV considerations.


The details of mission analysis in the context of POC in UN Peacekeeping will be covered shortly, at this point it suffices to list its key components:

- Using many of the MPKI products such as AOE, human terrain analysis products to assist, the identification of key actors in the area of operations, which includes the civilian population, potential perpetrators, host state security forces, and other protection actors
- Threat analysis, which will consider the main elements determining the threat environment and result in an overview matrix
- Risk Analysis, which determines the risk associated with each threat identified. In order to analyse the risk, planners should assess for each threat the capabilities of

the host state security forces, the vulnerability of the civilian population to this threat, and the danger level of potential perpetrators. Findings of these assessments should then be reflected in a risk analysis matrix

For military planners in Peacekeeping Operations, whilst making their own analysis, they should also consider information provided and analysis undertaken by other mission components, such as the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC, UN Security management System (UNSMS), the UN police and the Human Rights Component, as well as other relevant protection actors.

Slide 28



Having analysed the mission, planners at this stage develop Courses of Action (CoA) for analysis, comparison, and approval. Plans should follow the commander's intent, and they need to be comprehensive, flexible, in identifying the key operational issues and implications to protect civilians in the area of operations. This should be based on operational factors from the Mission Analysis stage and ensure that POC, Child Protection and CRSV considerations are at the centre of developed COAs.

Military force is only one of the mission's instruments available to protect civilians.

Assessment of approaches help planners determine the role of the military vis-à-vis other mission components in different situations. The Force will have the biggest role to play in cases where physical protection against a threat dominates. In situations where there is no physical protection required, the role of the force might be in support of Tier I and III activities.

During the planning phase for specific operations, Force activities should be analysed for situations that may exacerbate local civilian vulnerabilities in coordination with other mission components. Steps should then be taken to reduce potential harm (done in consultation with communities at risk). When conducting joint operations with the host state, Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) must be applied.



Discuss with participants what kind of steps can be taken to reduce potential harm to civilians. Answers should include safe corridors, protected areas, secure humanitarian access, etc.

All COAs should include:

- Plans to reduce the likelihood of physical violence
- Plans to reduce the impact of physical violence if it does occur
- Plans to use resources in the most effective way and in support of synchronization with mission components
- Coordination with protection actors outside the mission (e.g., humanitarian actors, state authorities)
- Consultations with communities at risk are critical to ensure the CoA is comprehensive and represents a thorough analysis of all relevant aspects, including their own protection capabilities

Fundamentally, COAs aim to reduce or eliminate the risk of physical violence against civilians. Development of COAs is considered under each of the four phases of response. Even preventive and pre-emptive action requires careful planning. For all COAs, civilian casualties and collateral damage must be considered rigorously.

After COAs have been developed, analysed, and compared, the commander selects the strongest CoA and presents it to the higher command for approval.

Guiding questions for the analysis and comparison of COAs include:

- Which COAs will reduce the threat to civilians
- Which COAs may increase the threat to civilians
- What are the risks to the mission, and its personnel

Slide 29




The next step in the conventional military decision-making process is to get approval of a CoA and reflect it in the Operations Order (OPORD).

The steps include:

- Approval of plans by higher command, either Force HQ, Sector HQ or the Brigade Commander
- Production of OPORD, based on final guidance from higher command. The OPORD describes how the force or unit envisions the plan to be carried out
- Sub-unit decision making processes follow the instructions laid out in the OPORD.
- Rehearsals of plans, as plans are only effective when they have been rehearsed and practiced
- Plans may require adjustment and updates after the rehearsal and definitely need adjustments and updates as the situation evolves

Slide 30



The final stage in the military decision-making process is the execution of the approved CoA. Execution of POC operations is triggered by different circumstances in different missions. Therefore, it is critical for military components to establish mechanisms to inform about situations that may trigger the execution of a CoA. This can include for instance:

- Early warning mechanisms to discover potential threats
- Local community alert networks
- Monitoring of armed groups and their behaviour or movement
- Instructions from Sector or Force HQ
- Decision of the commander on scene, especially if reasonable belief exists that a crime has been or will be committed
- Lastly, all POC operations should be accompanied by an After-Action Report as soon as practical after its completion


The execution of POC operations must always consider host state security forces and their willingness and capability to protect civilians.

Slide 31



This section explores in detail the implementation on POC aspects into Step 2 of the military decision-making process, Mission Analysis. We will focus on mission analysis because it drives the planning process. As mentioned before, this stage in the process plays a crucial role as it defines the tactical problem. As seen earlier, these are the steps contained in Mission Analysis, which will be examined in more detail over the coming slides.

Slide 32



Mission Analysis begins with an identification of the key actors in the area of operations. Planners must consider the overall human rights situation including the vulnerability of civilian and the risks/threats they are facing in the operation area from a POC perspective. Child Protection and CRSV considerations, a logical first step is to identify the civilian populations in the area.



Before building the slide, ask participants which information about civilian populations they think is most relevant for Mission Analysis.

To begin with, understanding the locations of civilians within the area of operations, as well as the areas within and between which they frequently move (for livelihood production or other reasons) is critical. This information will assist in identifying potential threat areas.

Furthermore, the following should be determined:


- Numbers of civilians, segregated by gender and age

- Ethnicity, religions, and political affiliations
- Type of settlement – town, village, farming communities etc.
- Identification of facilities of tactical importance, such as hospitals, schools, water points, etc.
- Self-protection mechanisms, as communities have had to protect themselves before the deployment of peacekeeping missions and therefore often have existing mechanisms that peacekeepers can tap into and strengthen
- Historical background of violence committed and suffered, as feuds with other civilian populations can provide an indication of future violence

Additionally, identification of civilian leaders at the local level is an important step in this process to gather information, generate respect and cooperation, and manage expectations.

Besides liaison with local communities, the necessary information for the identification of civilian populations will come from a range of sources. To this end, Priority Information Requirements (PIR) need to be established. In response to the PIRs, patrols and recce operations are conducted, while information is also requested from and offered to other mission intelligence and information management mechanisms, as well as to particular protection actors.

Slide 33



As part of the identification of the civilian populations, determining their location relative to mission units and bases is important. For the purpose of tactical level planning, distance plays a critical role. Mapping the locations provides a simple way of demonstrating spatial relations in the area of operations.

The red line represents the area of operations of a particular unit in the peacekeeping mission. The blue circles represent civilian communities. As indicated in the map, the locations of some of the communities may overlap with the area of responsibility of other peacekeeping units. The development of protection plans for these communities will require close coordination with the units responsible for adjacent areas of operations.

Slide 34

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graph TD
    A[Receipt of Mission] --> B[Mission analysis]
    B --> C[Course of action]
    C --> D[Orders production]
    D --> E[Execution]
            
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Key actors

Civilian populations


For each civilian population identified within the unit's AOR.

Civilian Population	Location	Number Children Gender	Ethnicity Religion Political	Schools	Hospitals	Markets
Community A						
Community B						
Community C						

To facilitate the systematic analysis of the civilian population in the area of operations, the development of a table is useful. This slide shows what an example analysis of three different communities could look like, reflecting the factors discussed in the previous slides. Such an analysis has to be conducted for all communities in the area of operations.

Additionally, it is useful to examine other factors that impact the protection needs of civilian populations, such as health, livelihoods, or shelter for example. Other mission and non-mission protection actors may have useful information and early consultation with them will strengthen the military analysis.

Slide 35



The next step in Mission Analysis will be the identification of potential perpetrators. Military planners should apply the same process as for the identification of civilian populations.



Before building slide, ask participants which information about potential perpetrators they think is most relevant for Mission Analysis.

To begin with, understanding the locations of potential perpetrators within the area of operations, as well as any recent or current operations they are involved in is critical. This information will assist in identifying potential threat areas.

Furthermore, the following needs to be determined:


- Details of their numbers, composition and command and control arrangements and capacity
- Ethnicity, religions, and political affiliations
- Hostile intent and historical background to understand what conflict patterns have occurred in the past

- Capabilities to carry out their intentions
- Use, if any, of child soldiers

Identification of the leaders of potential perpetrators will be vital. Outreach and advocacy for the Protection of Civilians are important tools for POC action. Peacekeeping commanders, for instance, have the responsibility in their interaction with armed group leaders to remind them of their responsibilities under international law and to point out potential consequences in case of violations.

Besides liaison with local communities and the leaders of potential perpetrators, the necessary information for the identification of armed groups will come from a range of sources. To this end, Priority Information Requirements (PIR) need to be established. In response to the PIRs, patrols and recce operations are conducted, while information is also requested from and offered to other mission intelligence and information management mechanisms, as well as to particular protection actors.

Slide 36




As the next step, it is important to determine the location of potential perpetrators relative to the following:


- Peacekeeping mission bases and units
- Civilian populations
- Areas of interest, such as water points, grazing areas, markets, firewood areas etc.

Mapping the locations will facilitate outreach and provide military planners with a sense of which areas could potentially be protected by host security forces, freeing up mission assets for areas with little or no coverage.

The red line represents the area of operations of a particular unit in the peacekeeping mission. The circles indicate the area of influence of potential perpetrators. As indicated in the map, these areas of influence may overlap with the area of responsibility of other peacekeeping units. In such cases, planning processes will require close coordination with the units responsible for adjacent areas of operations.

 Note to instructor: In practice, planners are likely to build on the map with civilian populations and mark the locations of potential perpetrators there. For clarity and didactical reasons, this module presents a separate map for each key actor identified in the Mission Analysis step.

Slide 37



To facilitate the systematic analysis of potential perpetrators in the area of operations, the development of a table is useful. This slide shows what an example analysis of three different armed groups could look like, reflecting the factors discussed in the previous slides. Such an analysis has to be conducted for all potential perpetrators in the area of operations. Other mission and non-mission actors may have useful information and early consultation with them will strengthen the military analysis.

Slide 38



The next step in Mission Analysis will be the identification of host state security forces. Host government actors are critical players in POC, noting that they bear the primary responsibility for the Protection of Civilians.



Before showing the slide, ask participants which information about host state security forces they think is most relevant for Mission Analysis.

The impact of host state security forces on the POC environment is determined by their capability and willingness to protect. Military planners, considering information provided by non-military mission components, need to assess these factors as part of the Mission Analysis stage.

To begin with, understanding the locations of potential perpetrators (that may include host nation security forces) within the area of operations, as well as any recent or current operations they are involved in is critical


Furthermore, the following needs to be determined with respect to host state security forces:

- Details of their numbers, composition and command and control arrangements
- Ethnicity, religions and political affiliations of the troops and their leaders
- Capabilities and will to operate to protect civilians in their AO
- Human rights record of the security forces
- Use, if any, of child soldiers

Identification of the leaders of host state security forces, particularly at the local levels, will be vital. Outreach and advocacy for the Protection of Civilians are important tools for POC action.

The necessary information for the identification of host state security forces will come from a range of sources. To this end, Priority Information Requirements (PIR) need to be established. In response to the PIRs, patrols and recce operations are conducted, while information is also requested from and offered to other mission peacekeeping-intelligence and information management mechanisms, as well as to particular protection actors.

Slide 39




Like other key actors identified before, the next is to determine the location of host state security forces relative to:

- Peacekeeping mission bases and units
- Civilian populations
- Potential perpetrators
- Areas of interest, such as water points, grazing areas, markets, firewood areas, etc.

Mapping the locations will facilitate outreach and provide military planners with a sense of which areas could potentially be protected by host security forces, freeing up mission assets for areas with coverage.


The red line represents the area of operations of a particular unit in the peacekeeping mission. The green circle represents the de-facto area of operations of the host state security forces. While the area which the host state security forces are mandated to protect while normally overlap with the mission area of responsibility, their de-facto reach and influence may be limited in reality due to resource restraints, security conditions, terrain, and other factors. The green rectangle indicates a host state security forces deployment at the battalion level, while the elliptical shape indicates a company level deployment.

Slide 40



To facilitate the systematic analysis of host state security forces the development of a table is useful. This slide shows what an exemplary analysis of three different entities of host state security forces could look like, considering the factors discussed in the previous slide. Such an analysis has to be conducted for all deployments of host state security forces in the area of responsibility. Other mission and non-mission actors may have useful information and early consultation with them will strengthen the military analysis.

Slide 41



As discussed in Module 1, Peacekeeping Operations are not the only protection actors in their area of operations. The next step in Mission Analysis is therefore the identification of other actors with a protection mandate, which can include the UN Country Team and non-UN humanitarian partners, international and national NGOs, and other international forces authorised by the UN Security Council or forces from other countries in the area due to bilateral agreements.

 *Before showing the slide, ask participants which information about other protection actors they think is most relevant for Mission Analysis.*

As with the other key actors identified before, the first step is to determine the locations and areas of influence of other protection actors.


The following needs to be determined with respect to host state security forces:

- Exact mandate of each protection actor in the area of operations, and whether they possess the capabilities to carry out their mandate

- Other protection actors have the capacity and will to support our operations
- Whether they rely on peacekeeping support to carry out their mandate

The necessary information for the identification of other protection actors will come from a range of sources. Peacekeeping missions typically have established coordination mechanisms that will facilitate outreach and information collection on their capabilities. To maximize the potential of complementary activities, planners need to coordinate with the relevant protection actors in their area of operations.

Slide 42




Like for the other key actors identified before, the next step is to determine the location of other protection actors relative to:

- Peacekeeping mission bases and units
- Civilian populations
- Potential perpetrators
- Areas of interest, such as water points, grazing areas, markets, firewood areas, etc.

Mapping the locations will facilitate outreach and provide military planners with a sense of which areas could potentially be protected by host security forces, freeing up mission assets for areas with little or no coverage.


The red line represents the area of operations of a particular unit in the peacekeeping mission. The blue circles represent the areas of operations for other protection actors. Planners should also consider areas of influence, as humanitarian service delivery can create pull factors that draw civilians towards them.

Slide 43



To facilitate the systematic analysis of other protection actors the development of a table is useful. This slide shows what an exemplary analysis of three different protection actors could look like, considering the factors discussed in the previous slides. Such an analysis has to be conducted for all protection areas in the area of responsibility. Other mission and non-mission actors, such as members of the UN Country Team, host state security forces, NGOs, or parallel forces, may have useful information and early consultation with them will strengthen the military analysis.

Slide 44



Having identified and analysed the component groups (civilian populations, potential perpetrators, host state security forces, and other protection actors) present in the area of operations, the next step is the analysis of particular threats. This lays the foundation for the formulation of a response plan.

When analysing threats, those threats identified at the level of senior mission leadership and valid for the whole mission area of responsibility need to be given priority. However, additional threats identified in the respective area of operations of a specific unit will be considered as well.

For each threat, the following should be determined:


- Situation and type of threat (What)
- Potential perpetrators (Who)
- Potentially affected population (Against whom)
- Areas where civilians may be targeted (Where)
- Days and time of day attacks are most likely (When)

- Motivation behind physical violence (Why)
- Possible movements and tactics of the armed groups (How)

When analysing particular threats, killings are always assumed a threat when other threats of physical violence are identified.

The threat analysis, along with visual tools such as tables and maps, needs to be updated routinely and whenever the situation in the area of operations changes.


Slide 45



The threat analysis needs to include an assessment of relationships between groups in the area of operations. This includes relationships between groups of civilians (communities), between groups of civilians and armed groups, and between armed groups (while peacekeepers are not mandated to protect armed groups, fighting between armed groups typically causes grave direct or indirect threats to civilians and therefore becomes a POC issue).

For instance, how 'compatible' is Civilian Population A with Armed Groups X, Y and Z? This can be identified through factors including ethnic, religious, and political aspects, as well as other factors such as historical incidents between the groups. A similar analysis can be conducted for all identified groups in the area and how they 'match up' with each other. This analysis feeds into the broader threat analysis.

Slide 46




Tabulating this information will facilitate a systematic and robust analysis. Each identified threat needs to be included in this table.

At Mission Headquarters, operational POC coordination fora should maintain a POC Threat Matrix, which should be consulted during the compilation of this threat analysis table at the tactical level.

Now that the potential threats have been identified, response options need to be developed. Based on the analysis previously done, a table should be created to determine the capability of protection actors, including potentially host state security forces. For all protection actors, and in particular for each particular deployment of host state security forces, planners need to determine whether they have the capacity and willingness to respond in their areas of operations. The analysis also needs to include whether these actors would need mission support to do so. Conversely, they may be unable and /or unwilling to respond without mission assistance, or at all. This information should be tabulated for each actor in the area of operations.


Slide 47



As the next step, the vulnerability of each of the identified population groups locations against the identified threats must be assessed. Again, a table of results is a useful tool to quickly establish the highest vulnerability group. Civilian population groups may be more vulnerable against certain threats than against others, due to their particular characteristics.

It is worth recalling from Module 1 that vulnerability is a combination of factors that can change over time and depend on specific operational contexts. Situations of vulnerability are based on the characteristics of a person's individual and community factors (age, gender, sex, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, social status) and the factors that can lead to and compound those vulnerabilities (environmental factors, internally displaced person or refugee, geographic location, level of urbanization, level of state authority and capacity in that area, level of infrastructures). Access to assistance also influences vulnerability, including issues such as language barriers, freedom of movement, social or political barriers to communication with outsiders, gender stereotypes and social norms.


Slide 48



To get a full picture of the risk levels, peacekeepers need to analyse the capabilities of other protection actors. For the range of protection actors identified previously, an analysis needs to be conducted to establish their intention to protect, their distance and mobility relative to the areas of interest, their overall capability, and whether or not they require assistance from the peacekeeping mission to be operational in the area (e.g., force protection).


Once the capability of protection actors is established, missions will be able to decide whether support can be expected from some actors in some areas, which influences the level of risk attached to threats, which in turn will have an impact on the prioritization of activities.

Slide 49



Each of the potential perpetrators can now be assessed in terms of how dangerous they are to particular population groups or locations. This is assessed by again looking at their capabilities, intentions, and historical background.

Slide 50




Peacekeepers cannot be everywhere or protect everyone at the same time. Resource constraints and difficult terrains make this impossible. Realistically, therefore, missions need to prioritize protection threats in order to identify those situations where their action is most needed. This process is facilitated by a risk analysis, which determines (a) the likelihood a threat materializes, and (b) the impact the threat would have if it materialised. The combination of those two factors allows missions to determine the risk associated with each threat identified. As per the 2019 DPO Policy on POC, Missions shall prioritize threats to civilians that pose the highest level of risk to civilians, which will then guide the deployment of resources.

In the sample graph here, the highest priority is assigned to the threat that is the most likely, with the most impact – Threat 1. This threat was previously identified in the threat analysis table as a situation in which Armed Group X constitutes a threat of physical violence against Civilian Population Group A. The UNIBAT commander should priorities efforts and risks that cannot be addressed should be discussed and mitigated by the higher HQs (Sector or Force).

Slide 51

Projected Protection Site

- Part of TOB Defense Plan
- Part of POC plan
- To prevent population from entering TOB during crises
- Main Features:
 - Close to TOB
 - Easy access
 - Within defense capabilities
 - Coordination with local leaders



In some missions you may hear the term, Projective Protection Sites or PPT, you should make it part of the Defence Plan for the TOB and should be include within POC planning. The purpose of a PPT is to plan for an area to protect civilians in case of a crises and to prevent the population from entering the TOB. PPT is established close to TOB and within the defence capabilities of the TOB. All plans should be coordinated with the local leaders.

Slide 52

Take Away

- Implementing guidelines provide guidance for strategic, operational and tactical levels are found in a myriad of mission documents
- Robust presence, posture and early warning are key factors for success
- Ensure sensitivity to Child Protection and CRSV threats and challenges
- The four phases of response are not sequential and are categories of activities providing protection from physical violence
- Use of force training is essential
- Mission analysis is a critical step for assessment of perpetrators, civilians and other protection actors
- Plans need to be approved and risks underwritten by higher command
- Risk analysis guides prioritization of threats
- Consultation and liaison with other mission and non-mission actors is critical

- The UNIBAT need to consider the implications of POC, Child Protection and CRSV for every step of the military decision-making process
- Mission analysis is a critical step in the development of military plans. A thorough assessment of civilian populations, potential perpetrators, and other protection actors is necessary. Using visual tools such as tables and maps helps to ensure a systematic and thorough analysis. As things change in the mission, tables and maps need to be updated in order to keep them relevant as planning tools
- At the tactical level, the UNIBAT develop plans for courses of action, which have to be approved by higher command. Following approval, plans need to be rehearsed to be effective
- Risk analysis is a critical step in the Mission analysis process that prioritizes those threats with the highest risk associated to them. This will in turn inform how commanders deploy their resources to the best effect
- The overall designation of priority threats as well as other mission components through their access to and understanding of critical information play an important role and need to be consulted with during the decision-making process. The same applies to non-mission protection actors and local communities themselves

Learning Activity

3.3

The techniques and planning considerations that are described and discussed in this lesson will be predominantly used and exercised during the end of course TTX / SBE.

Lesson 3.4



Force Protection (FP) Planning Considerations

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Ask participants what FP is and how might the UNIBAT plan for it and how might it differ from conventional military operations. Discuss how the mind set of peacekeepers should go beyond the typical attack-defend approach of infantry operations. More often in the current peacekeeping environment, UN forces are at risk and are specifically targeted using violence. The use of force in UN peacekeeping is typically directed against third parties, i.e., the civilian population; and groups that do not comply to their goals and objectives. According to studies and DPO reports, peacekeepers are increasingly the target. Example: the use of IEDs against UN forces in Mali.

While discussing tactical planning considerations and guidelines leave room for planners and commanders to incorporate changes in planning and execution of operations as the situation evolves. The planning process will determine resource requirements – troops and equipment required to achieve the task. Each TCC, national doctrine has established military decision making as a distinct analytical process. This lesson seeks to highlight how commanders and their staff should integrate PKO FP considerations into their decision-making process (rather than dictate a process).

This is a large lesson that may take several hours. The lesson can be broken into several distinct sections, so that breaks, and practical exercises can be incorporated as the instructor sees fit. It is suggested to go in instructional blocks of 30 - 45 minutes dependent on the level of the student's skill sets.

Of note, there are documents in DPO that describe FP to include measures to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities equipment, material, operations, and activities from harm caused by threats and hazards to preserve freedom of action, movement, and enhance operational effectiveness thereby contributing to the mission success. However, in this STM, we will focus on operational threats and not hazards. Note the key words and the importance each have in shaping the discussion on Force Protection.

Slide 1




Lesson 3.4 Tactical Planning Considerations for Force Protect (FP)

Today, the peacekeeping environment requires the active protection from many threats (at times are difficult to categorize). The military component in coordination with other UN departments, offices, and mission components to approach in the analysis of threats and mitigating to risks to the UN forces. In this lesson, we will provide guidance, considerations, and tools to help in the tactical FP planning. Remember that FP is integrated and considered in all military operations both static and mobile.



Note to Instructor: The lesson does not aim to create or train participants on a particular decision-making process for UN Peacekeeping and does not discuss military doctrines, which may vary between troop contributing countries. Rather, the lesson offers planning guidance and considerations that commanders and their staffs should consider during the application of their own decision-making process, per their national doctrine.

Slide 2



Content

- Definitions
- Planning tools and guidelines
- The use of phases and the use of force
- Tactical planning considerations
- Base defense planning considerations
- IED
- UNSMS

Here is the content of the lesson.

Slide 3

Learning Objectives

- Explain FP and its importance to the UNIBAT
- Explain using phases as a tool / consideration for planning FP
- Identify key aspects in the FP threat-based assessment; and why the risk assessment helps prioritize planning efforts
- Explain why all military operations must consider FP
- Describe measures to mitigate IED risks
- Explain UNSMS and how might the UNIBAT support


Here are the learning objectives for this lesson. Take a few minutes to review.

Slide 4

Force Protection (FP)

- **Cyclic process**
- **Detecting threats**
- **Assessing risks, applying mitigation measures**
- **Preserve freedom of action for operational effectiveness**
- **Contributes to mission success**

A robust threat and risk analysis is the foundation



Key Message: The focus of this module is to examine FP tactical planning considerations, a cyclic/ continuous / methodology / process of detecting threats to UN forces, facilities, equipment, resources, freedom of movement, and activities, assessing their risk, and risk mitigation measures. These measures include threat prevention, pre-emption, and response / reactive, and consolidation to preserve the UN forces' freedom of action to remain operationally effective to execute any given mission successfully.

FP is a fundamental principle of all military operations and a way to ensure the operational capabilities and survivability of UN military forces. This FP planning process consists of a threat assessment, risk analysis and applying risk mitigation measure. Risk mitigation involves planning, preparing, coordinating, rehearsing, and executing actions to reduce the likelihood and/or impact of identified threats.

Protection is not linear – planning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is continuous and enduring. Protection preserves capability, momentum, and tempo which are important contributors to operational reach. Synchronizing, integrating, and organizing protection capabilities and resources throughout the operations process preserves combat power and mitigates the effects of threats and hazards to enable freedom of action.

Protection is an enduring quality that differentiates it from defence and specific security operations. While a tactical force defends only until it can resume the offense and a formation provides security in a manner that maintains freedom of action, protection has a persistent character that serves one dominate purpose—the preservation of the protected asset. Commanders incorporate protection when they understand and visualize threats and hazards in the operational environment (OE), evaluate available protection capabilities, and apply the elements of combat power to deter or mitigate these threats or hazards from negatively impacting friendly operations.

This process consists of threat assessment, risk analysis and risk mitigation. Risk mitigation involves planning, preparing, coordinating, rehearsing, and executing actions to reduce the likelihood and/or impact of identified threats. These actions will result in proactive and reactive tactical actions to reduce the risk of security incidents against the tactical composition of the unit. Other threats and hazards should be considered and adequately mitigated, but those may not require a tactical approach, but procedural actions.

It is a unit commander's responsibility to plan actions, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats that can reduce or eliminate the unit's operational capabilities, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect the UN Mission.

For the purpose of this training, we will focus on the tactical aspects of protection and planning considerations. Therefore, we will concentrate on threats that intentionally could disrupt temporally or permanently the tactical capability of the affected units to discharge its mandated tasks.

To ensure the units can execute their tasks, commanders need to identify threats to the force and plan actions to mitigate the risk they pose to the operational capabilities of the unit. These will result in proactive and reactive tactical actions to reduce the risk of security incidents against the tactical composition of the unit. Other threats and hazards should be considered and adequately mitigated, but those may not require a tactical approach, but procedural actions.

Slide 5

Definitions & Terminology Review

Perpetrator: Actors to attempt, manifest or cause harm

Protection: preservation from injury, harm by person, thing



Security: protection against intentional damages


Safety: protection against non-intentional accidental / hazard events

Vulnerability: weakness which makes one susceptible to harm

Hazard: potential cause of harm from non-deliberate action / acts of nature

Difference between the two

THREAT	RISK
Things that could harm us	Likelihood of being harmed by THREAT and impact of it
	



Let us review the FP definitions used in the UNPKO FP framework.

- Hazard is a potential cause of harm resulting from non-deliberate actions (example- a natural disaster such as an earthquake).
- Threat is a potential cause of harm initiated by deliberate actions; a Threat can also be an incident or acts that are likely to lead to the damage or destruction of equipment or a facility that impacts the accomplishment of a mission
- Protection is the act of protecting or the state of being protected; preservation from injury or harm a thing, (event), person, or group
- Security. Freedom from, or resilience to potential harm caused by others
- Safety: protection against accidental or hazard events
- Vulnerability is a weakness which makes one susceptible to harm

If more review is required:

Security

Security incidents are those that have malicious intent. A security incident occurrence result from an intentional act that harmed or had the potential to have harmed UN personnel, programmes, activities, premises, facilities, and assets.

Safety

Safety incidents generally do not have a malicious or intentional component and are classified as accidents, hazards, or occupational safety events. These are defined as occurrences in which no intentional behaviour is involved and are caused by accidents, natural or human-made hazards that harmed or had the potential to harm UN personnel, programmes, activities, premises, facilities, and assets. Security vs Safety: note that there is a distinction between Security Incidents and Safety Incidents.

Threat

In the context of this subject, threats of security incidents encompass all acts or situations that are likely to lead to death or serious bodily injury of the unit's personnel impacting to the unit operational capability to discharge its mandated tasks. Such situations may include direct / indirect fire attacks, IEDs, assaults, and raids against UN military units, either during mobile or static operations and the restriction of the unit's movement necessary to accomplish its mandated tasks. A Threat can also be an incident or acts that are likely to lead to the damage or destruction of equipment or a facility that impacts the accomplishment of the mission.

Risk

Risk is the combination of the likelihood and impact of threats to developing. While impact refers to the consequences of the materialisation of a threat would have, likelihood refers to the probability of a threat to materialise. Impact can be determined by the analysis of the unit's vulnerabilities towards the danger level that potential perpetrators present. In a Force Protection analysis, the latest should consider the intention, capabilities, and historical background of the potential perpetrators. While a threat exists or not, the risk is a level or degree that the threat possesses against the unit's capabilities and it is frequently assessed as low, medium, or high.

Threat Assessment

Threat assessment is the process of identifying potential security incidents that can affect the operational capabilities of the unit or disrupt mandated tasks.

Risk Analysis

Risk analysis is the evaluation process to determine the degree that should be considered for each identified threat. The analysis should clearly identify high-risk threats, which should be given priority.

Risk Mitigation

Risk Mitigation is the process of designing proactive and reactive COAs to reduce the risk of a threat. Risk mitigation does not aim to eliminate risk but to reduce it. These risk mitigation COAs should consider measures to reduce the likelihood of a threat to materialise and its impact if it could not be avoided.

Proactive measures include COAs to reduce the likelihood of a threat development and reactive measures focus on reducing the impact of the security incident.

Risk Management

Risk Management is the process to manage the risk of security incidents and involve the preceding tasks of threat assessment, risk analysis and risk mitigation. Risk management should result in be logical, feasible and relevant COAs that preserve the operational capabilities of the unit. Experience, judgement, and creativity play a critical role in this process.

Slide 6

FP Rationale

- A core function / consideration for all ops
- Preserve freedom of movement and action
- Critical in adapting and understanding threats
- Systematic / cyclic approach for risk mitigation
- Security / FP a culture in most combat units especially for Infantry Battalions


- FP is a core function for all military units and needs to be integrated in all military operations to preserve the force and freedom of action. Units need to operate with their local security and have confidence that they can neutralise any attacks against them
- FP strategies are important because they preserve the tactical freedom of military units to effectively conduct their operations, thereby contributing to the UN Mission's success. The lesson will help guide the UNIBAT tactical leadership to better understand how to use their own MDMP to better analyse threats and risks within a PKO environment; and develop COAs to mitigate those threats against their own forces
- Systematic approach to reducing risks Threat based analysis and determination of acceptable risk while effectively executing their tactical military operation (mission / tasks). Provision of proper training and adequate / sustainable resources to manage the risks
- UN forces have the authority and responsibility in protecting their personnel, unit, and equipment in their areas of deployment where they are conducting operations in support of the mandate, where the government is unable or unwilling to protect

- FP must be consonant with the principles of peacekeeping and international law and the use of force in self-defence according to the ROE and / or as authorised by the Security Council
- FP protection should be a whole-of-mission activity, all components have a duty to help set the conditions that minimize / reduce risks to all UN personnel. Civilian and police components can assist in the prevention and mitigation of risks to UN forces
- The UNIBAT leadership are responsible for protecting their unit personnel and ensure FP is a part of the UN force culture and considered in all operations (not just some). To achieve this goal, military units shall maintain a robust and cohesive FP strategy. Provision of proper training and adequate / sustainable resources to manage the risks

Slide 7

Tactical FP Planning


- MPKI, threat / risk analysis drive the planning
- Higher command intent
- FP is inherent / incorporated in all UNIBAT mission planning
- Action vs inaction
- Coordinate with others



By analysing past incidents in the AOR, UNIBAT commanders can better plan a FP strategy. A strategy of both proactive and reactive tactical actions can help to reduce the risk of future security incidents against the tactical composition of the unit. As we categorize security incidents, planners can better prioritize action plans.

Sector HQs and UNIBATs must produce their own FP plans based on higher directives, their own MDMP, to include the MPKI processes / cycle, and analysis that is threat based. These plans need to clearly specify tasks, to prevent, be proactive, and reactive to actions on contact. The UNIBAT plans must be presented to and approved by higher command. The plans need to be coordinated and rehearsed.

Slide 8



FP Tactical Planning Considerations – Use of Phases


FP is a whole-of-mission (total) activity to mitigate risks to UN forces and as such, we can use a phased planning tool to consider helping apply all components of a mission in the strategy (military, police and civilian). For instance, Political Affairs and Human Rights sections, as well as police units can be involved in the preventive aspects of a FP strategy.

Because FP is a holistic mission strategy, FP is a cyclic process of detecting threats to UN forces to include their personnel, bases, resources, equipment, and activities, assessing the risk, and applying mitigation measures. These measures include prevention, pre-emption, and reaction to preserve the freedom of action. However, often at the tactical level, in reality many components can assist but ultimately it is the responsibility of the unit commanders.

Ask participants how FP measures / risk mitigating strategies and the use of force in peacekeeping differ from conventional military operations. Discuss how the mind set of peacekeepers needs to go beyond the typical attack-defend approach of infantry operations. Peacekeeping missions are typically not the target of violence, and therefore do not engage in the same type of actions like conventional infantry battalions. Rather, the use of force in FP in UN Peacekeeping are more in terms of actions on contact IAW ROE to neutralise the threats / perpetrators of violence against the UN force.

The unit commanders are responsible to plan actions, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats that can reduce or eliminate the unit's operational capabilities, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect the UN Mission.

Slide 9



FP actions are implemented along four phases:

- Prevention
- Pre-emption
- React / Actions on contact (Response)
- Consolidation

Across all four phases, the goal is to either eliminate a threat or mitigate the associated risks. These planning consideration phases do not necessarily occur in sequential order and may be undertaken simultaneously or independently. Activities and objectives under these phases will vary along with the specific nature of each threat.

Prevention

Prevention and assurance activities shall be conducted in areas where risks to UN forces are suspected or latent, but no clear threat has materialised. Measures in this phase are aimed at providing a visible presence to deter threats. During this phase, other mission components can greatly contribute to creating an environment that manifests this deterrence / preventive measures.

Pre-emption

When likely threats to UN forces are identified under the Flashpoint matrix, active measures are required to apply credible deterrence and a more proactive approach than the prevention phase to neutralise the threat. In order to undermine the capacity and intent of potential perpetrators, deterrence may be considered, including through engagement, rapid deployments to show force and a robust posture, joint or unilateral security operations by host state or mission components. Again, other mission components can be used to assist in focusing on these identified areas of potential risks.

Response

When physical violence against UN forces / UN military units is apparent, reaction drills and actions on contact measures aim at deterring and neutralizing aggressors / perpetrators from the hostile acts. The unit commanders can react against actions, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats that **can reduce or eliminate the unit's operational capabilities, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect the UN Mission.**

Consolidation

To accompany the progressive return to stability and normalcy, the mission will support the provision of political engagement, and if required because civilian population areas were affected -humanitarian support, rehabilitation and recovery assistance, create the conditions conducive for reducing the tensions, but also take initial steps to restore the authority of the state and the rule of law.

Actors in all mission components must adjust their activities to reflect changes and **escalation of the real time challenges in the mission's area of responsibility.** The four phases involve all mission components.

Another way to look at the four phases is to look at the proactive steps in prevention and pre-emption, which intend to reduce the likelihood of an attack or incident, and the reactive steps, which intend to reduce the effects of any such attack or incident. The most effective form of FP is being proactive; taking action to prevent and pre-empt threats of physical violence against UN forces.

Let us focus on the Preventive phase first. An effective FP strategy includes preventive measures through coordinated action from all mission components. The measures in this phase aim to take a more robust and deliberate approach to reduce the threats posing a higher risk of violence before they are becoming a predominate problem for the UN forces by resolving potential tensions before a threat develops.

A decision support tool that could be used to perform criticality assessment in support of the vulnerability assessment process:

Criticality, accessibility, recoverability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER). The CARVER Acronym is a valuable tool in determining criticality and vulnerability. For criticality purposes, CARVER helps assessment teams and commanders (and the assets that they are responsible for) to determine assets that are more critical to the success of the mission. This also helps determine which resources should be allocated to protect critical assets (personnel, infrastructure, and information). The CARVER targeting matrix assesses a potential target from a terrorist perspective to identify what the enemy might perceive as a good (soft or valuable) target.

Actions conducted in the preventive phase may include:

- Regular directed communications with key stakeholders and potential perpetrators, political negotiations, and alerting interlocutors and actors as necessary; commanders remind all actors of their obligations under the mandate
- Military shows a more robust presence, conducts specific patrols, and deploys forces very deliberately to the higher risk areas
- Check points can be erected in coordination with other protection actors, information is gathered and shared with relevant partners, and outreach activities are undertaken

Many of the activities that are typical for the prevention phase will carry on throughout the other phases as well. For instance, in all cases, good information sharing and coordination with other actors deployed in the area of operations is critical. Good MPKI operations and HUMINT (human sources including CLAs, CANs, community leaders etc) is a good source of information in peacekeeping and remains decisive to have an accurate picture of the situation

The effective plans for this phase require a functioning early warning system and a consistent, credible operational approach and a more mobile posture (e.g., Forward Operating Bases can improve mission reach and enhance deterrence/response capabilities)

Of note, planning is the first step, but also a continuous process that must include an understanding of the threats and hazards that may impact operations and prevent effective protection. To ensure continual and consistent protection measures commanders will consider the most likely threats and hazards and then decide which


personnel, physical assets, and information to protect. They establish protection priorities for each phase or critical event of an operation. An effective scheme of protection and risk decisions is developed based on the information that flows from mission analysis.

Personnel from all staff sections and warfighting functions help conduct threat and hazard analysis. Threat and hazard assessments are continuously reviewed and updated as the operating environment changes.

Some additional planning considerations can include:

- Consulted intelligence cells to ascertain products on threats and the likelihood of those threats
- The Engineering Section should be consulted to ascertain what improvements need to be made to the FP of Operating Bases to defend against threats
- Incorporate C-IED personnel in planning operations, as required.
- OPs, and patrols, including indirect and direct fire support, personnel and equipment
- UNIBAT commander prioritize resources to ensure that the threats that have the highest impact are mitigated first. All high impact threats must be planned for
- Use of technology, such as UAS and radio jammers (electronic counter measures) on all operations
- Establish a Protection Cell that forms the core membership of the protection working group, which includes other UN representatives/agencies, as required. Key to note: The protection working group calls upon existing resources from the staff

Slide 10



Where preventive activities prove insufficient, or when heightened risks are detected, and more imminent, more active measures may be required.

In the General Santos Cruz DPO report that we discussed in Module 1; General Cruz, made several observations about the state of the UN's current FP status and explained that the operational behaviour on the ground should be based on a risk assessment, according to the specific situation and threat environment. Each mission is unique, and even within each country, different situations require different actions given the threat that prevails in an area. But what never changes is that the interpretation of mandates, rules of engagements and other documents should support acting, and not be used to justify IN-ACTION. We now will look at a more active / proactive approach.

Pre-emption measures include:

- Ensuring heightened situational awareness and intensifying information gathering in dedicated areas. Key NAIs maybe executed
- Increase high-profile, robust, dedicated patrolling in areas requiring attention; joint patrols that require additional skill sets on the ground using members / resources from other mission components, intensify communications with armed actors, known perpetrators in the area and potential parties to the conflict to increase

pressure and inform all that the international community and UN peacekeepers are executing the mandate according to international law

- The UN forces, if required, intercept, neutralise, or defuse hostile acts before they happen; ensure preparedness of a Quick Reaction Force or Force Reserve to move to counter other actors' violent intent

It may also be the case that a UNIBAT has a company conducting preventive activities in one part of its area of operations, while another company is carrying out pro-active measures in another part of the area.

Preparation during this phase can include increased application and emphasis on protection measures. During preparation, operations to shape, and operations to prevent, the protection working group:

- Provides recommendations to refine the scheme of protection.
- Makes changes to the protection prioritization list based on the commander's priorities and
 - changes during the phase of an operation.
- Recommends systems to detect threats to the critical assets.
- Proposes the refinement of OPSEC measures.
- Monitors quick-reaction force or tactical and troop movements.
- Provides recommendations for improving survivability
- Liaisons and coordinates with adjacent and protected units
- Determines protection indicators and warnings for information collection operations
- Confirms back briefs
- Analyses and proposes vulnerability reduction measures
- Provides recommended revisions to tactical standard operating procedures
- Conducts personnel recovery rehearsals

Preparation requires commander, staff, unit, and troops actions to ensure that the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations. Preparation in support of protection is not a linear activity—protection preparation is a continuous and enduring activity. Preparation activities help commanders, staffs, and Soldiers to understand a situation and their roles in upcoming operations.

They focus on deterring and preventing the enemy or adversaries from taking actions that would affect combat power during future operations. The execution of protection tasks with ongoing preparation activities helps prevent negative effects. Commanders ensure the integration of protection peacekeeping function to safeguard TCC/PCC forces, civilians, and infrastructure while forces prepare for operations. Active defence


measures help deny the initiative to the adversary, while the execution of passive defence measures prepares the force against threat and hazard effects and accelerates the mitigation of those effects.

Some considerations:

Commanders exercising mission command direct and lead throughout the operations process. Commanders' actions during preparation, operations to shape and operations to prevent, may include—

- Reconciling the threat assessment with professional military judgment and experience.
- Providing guidance on risk tolerance and making risk decisions.
- Emphasizing protection tasks during mission rehearsals.
- Minimizing unnecessary interference with subunits to allow maximum preparatory time.
- Circulating throughout the environment to observe pre-mission inspections.
- Directing control measures to reduce risks associated with preparatory movement.
- Expediting the procurement and availability of resources needed for protection implementation.
- Requesting higher headquarters support to reinforce logistical preparations and replenishment.

Slide 11




Key Message: In some situations, a FP threat may not have been anticipated or could not be prevented due to a lack of proper capabilities such as communications, intelligence, and mobility. When the threat of physical violence is apparent, more reactive measures aimed at deterring potential aggressors from conducting hostile acts may be necessary. At this stage, the violent behaviour is underway, and steps must be taken to stop the physical violence and compel the aggressor to comply.

The following are exemplary activities that can be undertaken in the response phase:

- Direct military action against (potential) perpetrators to neutralise the effects, actions on contact, battle drills
- Inter-positioning of troops to create a buffer zone and deter attacks
- Swift action through the speedy movement of forces such as attack helicopters, QRFs
- Lethal force may be used as a last resort in line with the ROE. It is worth noting that up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats that can reduce or eliminate the unit's operational capabilities, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect the UN Mission

Slide 12



Key Message: Activities in the consolidation phase address the stabilization of a post situation. The aim is to assist the UN force affected and any of the local population that might sustain collateral damage from the violence inflicted by the perpetrators, and to assist host authorities to return to a state of normalcy and create the conditions in which a more safe and secure environment exists. Includes medical aid were needed to wounded or injured personnel.

Consolidation activities are typically multidimensional responses involving political, humanitarian, military, and police activities. Because of this, UN peacekeepers must consult with partners to ensure complementarity of actions and respect for humanitarian principles.

Activities in this phase typically involve:

- Stabilization of the post-crisis environment to assist those affected and assist host nation authorities to help normalize the situation
- Deliver within capabilities medical support and offer support in assisting the delivery of medical care as appropriate
- Report, collect information, assess remedial and preventive measures to help the stabilisation process, draft reports for follow-up with relevant authorities

- Establish cordon, defensive positions and or local security


Commanders who exercise mission command decide, direct, lead, access, and provide leadership to organisations and Soldiers during execution. As operations develop and progress, the commander interprets information that flows from systems for indicators and warnings that signal the need for the execution or adjustment of decisions. Commanders may direct and redirect the way that enablers and support is applied or preserved, and they may adjust the tempo of operations through synchronization. The continuous and enduring character of protection makes the continuity of protection capabilities essential during execution. Commanders implement control measures and allocate resources that are sufficient to ensure protection continuity and restoration.

The staff monitors the conduct of operations during execution, looking for variances from the scheme of manoeuvre and protection. When variances exceed a threshold value, adjustments are made to prevent a developing vulnerability or to mitigate the effects of the unforested threat or hazard.

Peacekeeping actions begins with the commander's intent and concept of operations. As a unifying idea, actions provide direction for the entire operation. Based on a specific idea of how to accomplish the mission, commanders and staffs refine the concept of operations during planning and determine the proper allocation of resources and tasks. Leaders must have a situational understanding in simultaneous operations due to the diversity of threat, the proximity to civilians, and the impact of information during operations. In other operations, the threat or hazard may be less discernible, unlikely to mass, and immune to the centre of gravity analysis, which requires a constant and continuous protection effort or presence.

Commanders must accept risk when exploiting time-sensitive opportunities by acting before adversaries discover vulnerabilities, take evasive or defensive action, and implement countermeasures. Commanders and leaders can continue to act on operational and individual initiative if they make better risk decisions faster than the threat, ultimately breaking the adversary's will and morale through relentless pressure. Commanders can leverage information collection capabilities, such as geospatial intelligence products or processes, to minimize fratricide and increase the probability of mission accomplishment.


Slide 13



On this slide you will see a list of examples of FP measures that a UNIBAT has in its toolbox to help mitigate risks.

Slide 14



 Note to instructor:

In a traditional military operation, the planning process will determine resource requirements – troops and equipment required to achieve the task. In the context of a UN Peacekeeping Mission many of these factors would have been determined as part of the strategic planning in UNHQ, and provided as guidance through relevant documents like the Security Council Resolution outlining the mandate of the mission, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Integrated Strategic framework (ISF), Mission Concept, etc.

AS a reminder, in each troop contributing country, national doctrine has established military decision making as a distinct analytical process. This lesson does not aim to train participants on a certain decision-making process, but rather seeks to highlight how commanders and their staff can integrate FP in a PKO environment. The lesson relies on the military planning tools, considerations and guidance, while acknowledging that national doctrine of troop contributing countries may deviate.


We showed you in earlier lessons a planning tool that consisted of five steps. The process is depicted cyclically because of its continuous nature in DPKO:

- Receipt of mission
- Mission analysis (analysis of the Operational Environment included)
- Course of Action production
- Order production
- Execution

The following slides will explain each step in the process and how you might integrate FP planning considerations.

As we discuss FP the focus will be placed on the step of 'Mission analysis', at the tactical level which is at the heart of effective FP strategy. As such, we will briefly discuss each of the five steps, before returning for an in-depth examination of the mission analysis. It is important to integrate FP planning considerations into the process. The different requirements in UN Peacekeeping demands troops to adopt a slightly different mind-set, which must be reflected in planning and operations.

Slide 15




This graph shows the flow from a mission's mandate to the operational plans for military units. It shows the series of planning processes in peacekeeping missions.

The building blocks of any mission include the Security Council Mandate, Mission Concept, Mission Plan, Concept of Operations (CONOPS), as well as the Mission POC Strategy, accompanying plans and the related Operations Orders for Mission Headquarters, sectors, and units. The first step in the conventional military decision-making process is the receipt of mission.

In UN Peacekeeping, the mission is derived from the strategic documents discussed earlier, beginning with the Security Council mandate. Guided by the strategic and operational level documents shown on the graph (some of which were already discussed earlier), the relevant higher headquarters in a field mission will then determine the order for a military unit. The list on the bottom left of the slide show examples of guidance / documents that should be considered.

Slide 16




This section explores mission analysis of the planning process. This stage in the process plays a crucial role as it defines the tactical problem. As seen earlier, these are the steps contained in Mission Analysis, which will be examined in the coming slides. As discussed in an earlier lesson the MPKI cycle diagram is a reminder that the Analysis of the operating Environment and threat assessments are a continuous process that generates updated products to assist the staff during mission analysis.



Note to Instructor: If you find that the students require a review of MPKI / planning cycle and their associated products, return to lessons 3.1 and 3.2 for further explanation and details.

Slide 17



The planning process begins with an identification of the key actors in the area of operations. From the angle of FP, a logical first step is to identify the UN Forces.

To begin with, understanding the locations of UN forces within the area of operations, as well as the areas within and between which they frequently move (supporting others, logistical or other reasons). This information will assist in identifying potential threats in the same areas.


Furthermore, the following should be determined about the forces

- Unit, type, numbers, capabilities, (number military females in unit or operation); composite / joint UN force with other component civilians
- The TCC, ethnicity, religions, history with population, history with the host nation
- Type of base, type operation, size location (example, CP, TOB, routine convoy escort)
- Identification of facilities of tactical importance, such as hospitals, schools, key Government buildings
- Other protection mechanisms, or capabilities

- Historical background of violence committed against the location or UN Force
- Large concentrations of UN or international community personnel; UN forces may be employed in future security operations

Besides liaison with local communities, the necessary information for the identification is coordination with other UN components. Patrols and recce operations are conducted, while information is also requested from higher headquarters.


Slide 18



As part of the identification of the UN Forces and UN populations, determining their location relative to mission units and bases is important. For the purpose of tactical level planning, distance plays a critical role. Mapping the locations provides a simple way of demonstrating spatial relations in the area of operations.

As indicated in the map, the locations of some of the communities may overlap with the area of responsibility of other peacekeeping units. The development of protection plans will require close coordination with the units responsible for adjacent areas of operations.

Slide 19




Here is an example of a matrix tool that will help visualize the analysis.

To facilitate the systematic analysis of the UN forces and UN population in the area of operations, the development of a table is useful. This slide shows what an exemplary analysis of three different communities could look like, reflecting the factors discussed in the previous slides.

Additionally, it is useful to examine other factors that impact the protection needs of UN population, such as living areas, UN offices, UN DDR sites, UN humanitarian food storage areas for example. As UN Forces may be involved at these locations in future security operations in support of the mandate.

Slide 20



The next step in Mission Analysis will be the identification of host state security forces. Host government actors are critical players, as the host nation must ensure UN peacekeepers have access and are safeguarded in their execution of the mandate. This does not always happen; however, they bear the primary responsibility.

The impact of host state security forces on the FP environment is determined by their capability and willingness to protect. Military planners, considering information provided by non-military mission components, need to assess these factors as part of the Mission Analysis stage. To begin with, understanding the locations of potential perpetrators within the area of operations, as well as any recent or current operations they are involved in is critical


The following needs to be determined with respect to host state security forces:

- Details of their numbers, composition and command and control arrangements
- Ethnicity, religions and political affiliations of the troops and their leaders
- Capabilities and will to operate to protect civilians in their AO
- Human rights record of the security forces
- Use, if any, of child soldiers

Identification of the leaders of host state security forces, particularly at the local levels, will be vital. Outreach and advocacy for the Protection of Civilians are important.

The necessary information for the identification of host state security forces will come from a range of sources. To this end, Priority Information Requirements (PIR) need to be established. In response to the PIRs, patrols and recce operations are conducted, while information is also requested from and offered to other mission intelligence and information management mechanisms, as well as to particular protection actors.

Slide 21




Like other key actors identified before, the next is to determine the location of host state security forces relative to:

- Peacekeeping mission bases and units
- Potential perpetrators

Mapping the locations will facilitate outreach and provide military planners with a sense of which areas could potentially be protected by host security forces, freeing up mission assets.


The red line represents the area of operations of a particular unit in the peacekeeping mission. The green circle represents the de-facto area of operations of the host state security forces. While the area which the host state security forces are mandated to protect while normally overlap with the mission area of responsibility, their de-facto reach and influence may be limited in reality due to resource restraints, security conditions, terrain, and other factors. The green rectangle indicates a host state security forces deployment at the battalion level, while the elliptical shape indicates a company level deployment.

Slide 22



To facilitate the systematic analysis of host state security forces the development of a table is useful. This slide shows what an example analysis of three different entities of host state security forces could look like, considering the factors discussed in the previous slide. Such an analysis has to be conducted for all deployments of host state security forces in the area of responsibility. Other mission and non-mission actors may have useful information and early consultation with them will strengthen the military analysis.

Slide 23



As discussed in Module 1, Peacekeeping Operations are not the only protection actors in their area of operations. The next step in Mission Analysis is therefore the identification of other actors that may contribute and support FP efforts especially during the preventive and proactive phases. This list could include international security forces, other regional partners that are assisting in security effort, the UN Country Team and non-UN humanitarian partners, international and national NGOs, and other international forces authorised by the UN Security Council.

As with the other key actors identified before, the first step is to determine the locations and areas of influence of other protection actors.


The following needs to be determined with respect to host state security forces:

- Exact mandate of each protection actor in the area of operations, and whether they possess the capabilities to carry out support efforts in their mandate
- Other protection actors have the capacity and will to support our operations
- Whether they rely on peacekeeping support to carry out their mandate

The necessary information for the identification of other protection actors will come from a range of sources. Peacekeeping missions typically have established coordination

mechanisms that will facilitate outreach and information collection on their capabilities. To maximize the potential of complementary activities, planners need to coordinate with the relevant protection actors in their area of operations.

Slide 24



Like for the other key actors identified before, the next step is to determine the location of other protection actors. Mapping the locations will facilitate outreach and provide military planners with a sense of which areas could potentially be protected by other security forces, freeing up mission assets for areas with little or no coverage.

The red line represents the area of operations of a particular unit in the peacekeeping mission. The blue circles represent the areas of operations for other protection actors. Planners should also consider areas of influence, as humanitarian service delivery can create pull factors that draw civilians towards them.

Slide 25

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graph TD
    A[Receipt of Mission] --> B[Mission analysis]
    B --> C[Course of action]
    C --> D[Orders production]
    D --> E[Execution]
            
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Key actors

Other Protection Actors

Other protection actors


Other protection actors	Location / time to assist	Mandate	Capabilities	Support capacity
Protection Actor A				
Protection Actor B				
Protection Actor C				

For each security force deployed within the unit's AOR

To facilitate the systematic analysis of other protection actors the development of a table is useful. This slide shows what an example analysis of three different protection actors could look like, considering the factors discussed in the previous slides. Such an analysis has to be conducted for all protection areas in the area of responsibility. Other mission and non-mission actors, such as members of the UN Country Team, host state security forces, NGOs, or parallel forces, may have useful information.

Slide 26



 Ask participants which information about potential perpetrators they think might be most relevant? Answer – all the information is important as the pieces of the puzzle help build the picture of the HT that in turn help understand threat patterns and predictive analysis.

The next step in Mission Analysis will be the identification of potential perpetrators. To facilitate the systematic analysis of the potential perpetrators in the area of operations, the development of a table is useful. This slide shows what an example analysis of the actors that could look like, reflecting the factors discussed in the previous slides.

Other mission and non-mission protection actors may have useful information and early consultation with them will strengthen the military analysis. To begin with, understanding the locations of potential perpetrators within the area of operations, as well as any recent or current operations they are involved in is critical.

This information will assist in identifying potential threat areas. Furthermore, the following needs to be determined:


- Details of their numbers, composition and command and control arrangements and capacity
- Ethnicity, religions, and political affiliations

- Hostile intent and historical background to understand what conflict patterns have occurred in the past
- Capabilities to carry out their intentions
- Use, if any, of child soldiers

Identification of the leaders of potential perpetrators will be vital. Peacekeeping commanders, for instance, have the responsibility in their interaction with armed group leaders to remind them of their responsibilities under international law and to point out potential consequences.

Besides liaison with local communities, UN agencies / offices and the leaders of potential perpetrators, the necessary information for the identification of perpetrators and armed groups will come from a range of sources. To this end, Priority Information Requirements (PIR) need to be established. In response to the PIRs, patrols and recce operations are conducted, while information is also requested from and offered to other mission intelligence and information management mechanisms, as well as to particular protection actors.


Slide 27




As the next step, it is important to determine the location of potential perpetrators relative to the following:

- Peacekeeping mission bases and units
- Areas where UN forces routinely operate
- UN sites, NGO sites and international community sites
- Areas of interest where UN forces may operate

Mapping the locations will facilitate outreach and provide military planners with a sense of which areas could potentially be of interest. The red line represents the area of operations of a particular unit in the peacekeeping mission. The circles indicate the area of influence of potential perpetrators. As indicated in the map, these areas of influence may overlap with the area of responsibility of other peacekeeping units. In such cases, planning processes will require close coordination with the units responsible for adjacent areas of operations.


 *Note to instructor: In practice, planners are likely to build on the map with the locations of potential perpetrators. For clarity and didactical reasons, this module presents a separate map for each key actor identified in the Mission Analysis step.*

Slide 28



To facilitate the systematic analysis of potential perpetrators in the area of operations, the development of a table is useful. This slide shows what an exemplary analysis of three different armed groups could look like, reflecting the factors discussed in the previous slides. Such an analysis has to be conducted for all potential perpetrators in the area of operations. Other mission and non-mission actors may have useful information and early consultation with them will strengthen the military analysis. Other tools that the UNIBAT planning staff maybe exposed to are products from the Force and Sector HQs Intelligence cells. Lesson 3.2 goes into detail on some of these products.

Slide 29




Having identified and analysed the component groups (UN forces, concentrations of UN personnel / sites, potential perpetrators, host state security forces, and other protection actors) present in the area of operations, the next step is the analysis of particular threats. This lays the foundation for the formulation of a response plan.

When analysing threats, those threats identified at the level of senior mission leadership and valid for the whole mission area of responsibility need to be given priority. However, additional threats identified in the respective area of operations of a specific unit will be considered as well. For each threat, the following should be determined:

- Situation and type of threat (What)
- Potential perpetrators (Who)
- Potentially affected population (Against whom)
- Areas where civilians may be targeted (Where)
- Days and time of day attacks are most likely (When)
- Motivation behind physical violence (Why)
- Possible movements and tactics of the armed groups (How)


When analysing particular threats, killings in all locations in the AOR are always a concern and assumed to be a potential threat when other threats of physical violence are identified. The threat analysis, along with visual tools such as tables and maps, need to be updated routinely and whenever the situation in the area of operations changes.

Slide 30



The threat analysis needs to include an assessment of relationships between the UN and actors / groups in the area of operations. This includes relationships between perpetrators / armed groups as fighting between these groups typically causes grave direct or indirect (collateral) threats to UN forces and the stability of the mandate and therefore may become a FP issue.


Slide 31



Tabulating this information will facilitate a systematic and robust analysis. Each identified threat needs to be included in this table. At the UNIBAT HQS a Threat Matrix should be consulted during the compilation of this threat analysis table at the tactical level.

Now that the potential threats have been identified, response options need to be developed. Based on the analysis previously done, a table should be created to determine the capability of protection actors, including potentially host state security forces. For all protection actors, and in particular for each particular deployment of host state security forces, planners need to determine whether they have the capacity and willingness to respond in their areas of operations. The analysis also needs to include whether these actors would need mission support to do so. Conversely, they may be unable and /or unwilling to respond without mission assistance, or at all. This information should be tabulated for each actor in the area of operations.


Slide 32



As the next step, the vulnerability of each of the UN force's locations against the identified threats must be assessed. Again, a table of results is a useful tool to quickly establish the highest vulnerability group. Some UN forces / UN military units may be more vulnerable against certain threats than against others, due to their particular characteristics (example Transportation units, engineers, EOD, etc.)

It is worth recalling from Module 1 that vulnerability is a combination of factors that can change over time and depend on specific operational contexts. Situations of vulnerability are based on the capabilities, readiness, planning ability, training etc. Relative location, and historical patterns of violence against the UN (pattern analysis) can all be factors. Access to assistance also influences vulnerability, including the UN forces capabilities to deter or respond to attacks.


Slide 33



To get a full picture of the risk levels, peacekeepers need to analyse the capabilities of other protection actors. For the range of protection actors identified previously, an analysis needs to be conducted to establish their intention to protect, their distance and mobility relative to the areas of interest, their overall capability, and whether or not they require assistance from the peacekeeping mission to be operational in the area (e.g., force protection).


Once the capability of protection actors is established, missions will be able to decide whether support can be expected from some actors in some areas, which influences the level of risk attached to threats, which in turn will have an impact on the prioritization of activities.

Slide 34



Each of the potential perpetrators can now be assessed in terms of how dangerous they are to particular population groups or locations. This is assessed by again looking at their capabilities, intentions, and historical background.

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Threat = Capability x Intent and all threats to the force's current and future operations need to be identified. A potential adversary group with intent to cause harm but with minimal capability is a limited threat, whereas a group with significant capability but no intent poses almost no threat. The capability of the peacekeeping force to counter threats also needs to be considered, because again, even if an adversary has every intent to oppose a peacekeeping force, if that peacekeeping force is able to prevent the militant group from operating effectively, they again pose little threat to the operation.


The UNIBAT need to prioritize FP threats in order to identify those situations where mitigating action is most needed. risk is a product of the likelihood of an event occurring and the impact if that event does occur This process is facilitated by a risk analysis, which determines (a) the likelihood a threat materializes, and (b) the impact the threat would have if it materialised. The combination of those two factors allows missions to determine the risk associated with each threat identified.

Risk Management is a process that takes reasonable operational measures to reduce risk to personnel, equipment, and the mandate. The probability and severity levels of a threats are estimated based on the available knowledge on the probability of its occurrence and the severity of its consequences.

In the sample graph here, the highest priority is assigned to the threat that is the most likely, with the most impact – Threat 1. This threat was previously identified in the threat

analysis table as a situation in which Armed Group X constitutes a threat of physical violence against UN Force unit A.

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


Having analysed the mission, planners at this stage develop Courses of Action (CoA) for analysis, comparison, and approval. Plans need to be comprehensive and flexible, identifying the key operational issues and implications. This should be based on operational factors from the Mission Analysis stage and ensure that FP considerations are developed in all CoAs.

Assessment of approaches help planners determine the role of the military vis-à-vis other mission components in different situations. Of course, the UN Force is responsible for its own FP but a whole mission strategy will facilitate FP.

During the planning phase for specific operations, Force activities should be analysed for situations that may exacerbate the relationships with potential perpetrators / actors and the COAs should be vetted in coordination with other mission components (political / humanitarian, rule of law etc.).

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The final stage in the military decision-making process is the execution of the approved CoA. Execution of certain FP CONOPs may be triggered by different circumstances in different missions. Therefore, it is critical for military components to establish mechanisms to inform about situations that may trigger the execution of a CoA. This can include for instance:

- Early warning mechanisms to discover potential threats
- Alert networks
- Monitoring of armed groups and their behaviour or movement
- Instructions from Sector or Force HQ
- Decision of the commander on scene, especially if reasonable belief exists that an attack is imminent


Execution of FP operations always have to consider host state security forces and their willingness and capability to assist.

Slide 38



Another helpful tool you might consider for FP planning is to incorporate FP into every phase of the lifecycle of a military operation.

Slide 39



A helpful tool for FP planning consideration is to incorporate into every phase of the lifecycle of an operation these steps shown on this slide.

- Planning
- Preparation
- Execution
- Assessing

Plan / Planning

Let us look at Plan as the first step, but also note it is a continuous process that must include an understanding of the threats and hazards that may impact operations and prevent effective protection. To ensure continual and consistent protection measures commanders will consider the most likely threats and hazards and then decide which personnel, physical assets, and information to protect. They establish protection priorities for each phase or critical event of an operation. An effective scheme of protection and risk decisions is developed based on the information that flows from mission analysis.

Personnel from all staff sections and operational functions help conduct threat and hazard analysis. Threat and hazard assessments are continuously reviewed and updated as the operating environment changes.

Planning considerations at the Tactical Level could include:

- MPKI Section consulted to ascertain intelligence products on all relevant threats, and the likelihood of the threat
- Engineering Section consulted to ascertain what improvements need to be made to the FP of Operating Bases to defend against threats
- Incorporate C-IED personnel in planning operations, as required
- OPs, and patrols, including indirect and direct fire support, personnel, and equipment
- Commander prioritizes resources to ensure that the threats that have the highest impact and most likely to happen are mitigated first
- Use of technology, such as UAS and radio jammers (electronic counter measures) on all operations
- Keeping the perimeter in good repair, free of vegetation falls

A good technique to consider is to form a Protection Cell from representatives from the staff. The Protection Cell then forms the core membership of the protection working group, which includes other UN representatives/agencies, as required. Protection cell and protection working group members bring in additional staff officers with certain specialities. These additional officers meet operational requirements for threat assessments, vulnerability assessments, and protection priority recommendations.

Another way to look at the four steps during the operations process is to look at the proactive steps in prevention and pre-emption, which intend to reduce the likelihood of an attack or incident, and the reactive steps, which intend to reduce the effects of any such attack or incident. The most effective form of FP is taking action to prevent and pre-empt threats of physical violence against UN forces.

Let us focus on the Planning step. An effective FP strategy includes preventive measures through coordinated action from all mission components. The measures in this step take a robust and deliberate approach through assessing the environment to reduce the threats posing a higher risk of violence before they are becoming a predominate problem for the UN forces by resolving potential tensions before a threat develops.

A decision support tools to perform criticality assessments: Criticality, accessibility, recoverability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability or (CARVER). The CARVER matrix is a valuable tool in determining criticality and vulnerability. For criticality purposes, CARVER helps assessment teams and commanders (and the assets that they are responsible for) to determine assets that are more critical to the success of the mission. This also helps determine which resources should be allocated to protect critical assets

(personnel, infrastructure, and information). The CARVER targeting matrix assesses a potential target from a terrorist perspective to identify what the enemy might perceive as a good (soft or valuable) target.


Actions to prevent may include:

- Regular directed communications with key stakeholders and potential perpetrators, political negotiations, and alerting interlocutors and actors as necessary; commanders remind all actors of their obligations under the mandate
- Military shows a more robust presence, conducts specific patrols, and deploys forces very deliberately to the higher risk areas
- Check points can be erected in coordination with other protection actors, information is gathered and shared with relevant partners, and outreach activities are undertaken

Many of the activities that are typical for the Planning Step will carry on throughout the other steps as well. For instance, in all cases, good information sharing and coordination with other actors deployed in the area of operations is critical. Good MPKI operations and HUMINT (human sources including CLAs, CANs, community leaders etc) is a good source of information in peacekeeping and remains decisive to have an accurate picture of the situation.

The effective plans for this step require a functioning early warning system and a consistent, credible operational approach and a more mobile posture (e.g., Forward Operating Bases can improve mission reach and enhance deterrence/response capabilities)

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In the General Santos Cruz DPO report that we discussed in Module 1; General Cruz, made several observations about the state of the UN's current FP status and explained that the operational behaviour on the ground should be based on a risk assessment, according to the specific situation and threat environment. Each mission is unique, and even within each country, different situations require different actions given the threat that prevails in an area. But what never changes is that the interpretation of mandates, rules of engagements and other documents should support taking ACTION, and not be used to justify INACTION. We now will look at a more active / proactive approach.

Let us now look at the Prepare step in the life cycle model. Preparation includes increased application and emphasis on protection measures. During preparation, operations to shape, and operations to prevent, the protection working group:

- Provides recommendations to refine the scheme of protection
- Makes changes to the protection prioritization list based on the commander's priorities and
- changes during the phase of an operation
- Recommends systems to detect threats to the critical assets
- Proposes the refinement of OPSEC measures

- Monitors quick-reaction force or tactical and troop movements
- Provides recommendations for improving survivability
- Liaisons and coordinates with adjacent and protected units
- Determines protection indicators and warnings for information collection operations
- Confirms back briefs
- Analyses and proposes vulnerability reduction measures
- Provides recommended revisions to tactical standard operating procedures
- Conducts personnel recovery rehearsals

- Increase high-profile, robust, dedicated patrolling in areas requiring attention; joint patrols that require additional skill sets on the ground using members / resources from other mission components, intensify communications with armed actors, known perpetrators in the area and potential parties to the conflict to increase pressure and inform all that the international community and UN peacekeepers are executing the mandate according to international law

- The UN forces if required intercept, neutralise, or defuse hostile acts before they happen; ensure preparedness of a Quick Reaction Force or Force Reserve to move to counter other actors' violent intent

Preparation, operations to shape, and operations to prevent/create conditions that improve UN TCC/PCC and Civilian opportunities for success. Preparation requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to ensure that the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations. Preparation in support of protection is not a linear activity—protection preparation is a continuous and enduring activity. Preparation activities help commanders, staffs, and Soldiers to understand a situation and their roles in upcoming operations.


They focus on deterring and preventing the enemy or adversaries from taking actions that would affect combat power during future operations. The execution of protection tasks with ongoing preparation activities helps prevent negative effects. Commanders ensure the integration of protection peacekeeping function to safeguard TCC/PCC forces, civilians, and infrastructure while forces prepare for operations. Active defence measures help deny the initiative to the adversary, while the execution of passive defence measures prepares the force against threat and hazard effects and accelerates the mitigation of those effects.

Considerations:

Commanders exercising mission command direct and lead throughout the operations process. Commanders' actions during preparation, operations to shape and operations to prevent, may include:

- Reconciling the threat assessment with professional military judgment and experience
- Providing guidance on risk tolerance and making risk decisions
- Emphasizing protection tasks during mission rehearsals
- Minimizing unnecessary interference with subunits to allow maximum preparatory time
- Circulating throughout the environment to observe pre-mission inspections
- Directing control measures to reduce risks associated with preparatory movement
- Expediting the procurement and availability of resources needed for protection implementation
- Requesting higher headquarters support to reinforce logistical preparations and replenishment

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In some situations, a threat may not have been anticipated or could not be prevented due to a lack of proper capabilities such as communications, intelligence, and mobility. When the threat of physical violence is apparent, more reactive measures aimed at deterring potential aggressors from conducting hostile acts may be necessary. At this stage, the violent behaviour is underway, and steps must be taken to stop the physical violence and compel the aggressor to comply.

The following are example activities that can be undertaken in the Execution step:

- Direct military action against (potential) perpetrators to neutralise the effects, actions on contact, battle drills
- Inter-positioning of troops to create a buffer zone and deter attacks
- Swift action through the speedy movement of forces such as attack helicopters, QRFs,
- Lethal force may be used as a last resort in line with the ROE. It is worth noting that up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats that can reduce or eliminate the unit's operational capabilities, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect the UN Mission

The execution of protection is continuous and must occur throughout operations to shape and prevent ground combat operations and operations to consolidate gains, with a focus on deterring and preventing adversaries or hazards from actions that effect the unit. Commanders implement control measures and allocate resources that are sufficient to ensure protection continuity and restoration. Employed mitigation measures that have been planned and prepared for allow the force to quickly respond and recover from the threat or hazard effects, ensuring a force that remains effective and continues the mission.

What is the role of the commander?

Commanders who exercise mission command decide, direct, lead, access, and provide leadership to organisations and Soldiers during execution. As operations develop and progress, the commander interprets information that flows from systems for indicators and warnings that signal the need for the execution or adjustment of decisions. Commanders may direct and redirect the way that enablers and support is applied or preserved, and they may adjust the tempo of operations through synchronization. The continuous and enduring character of protection makes the continuity of protection capabilities essential during execution. Commanders implement control measures and allocate resources that are sufficient to ensure protection continuity and restoration.

What is the staff doing?

The staff monitors the conduct of operations during execution, looking for variances from the scheme of manoeuvre and protection. When variances exceed a threshold value, adjustments are made to prevent a developing vulnerability or to mitigate the effects of the forecasted threat or hazard.

Peacekeeping (PK) action begins with the commander's intent and concept of operations. As a unifying idea, PK action provides direction for the entire operation. Based on a specific idea of how to accomplish the mission, commanders and staffs refine the concept of operations during planning and determine the proper allocation of resources and tasks. Leaders must have a situational understanding in simultaneous operations due to the diversity of threat, the proximity to civilians, and the impact of information during operations. In other operations, the threat or hazard may be less discernible, unlikely to mass, and immune to the centre of gravity analysis, which requires a constant and continuous protection effort or presence.

Commanders must accept risk when exploiting time-sensitive opportunities by acting before adversaries discover vulnerabilities, take evasive or defensive action, and implement countermeasures. Commanders and leaders can continue to act on operational and individual initiative if they make better risk decisions faster than the threat, ultimately **breaking the adversary's will and morale through relentless pressure.** Commanders can leverage information collection capabilities, such as geospatial

intelligence products or processes, to minimize fratricide and increase the probability of mission accomplishment.


The activities in the final phase of any operation must address the stabilization of a post situation. The aim is to assist the UN force affected and any of the local population that might sustain collateral damage from the violence inflicted by the perpetrators, and to assist host authorities to return to a state of normalcy and create the conditions in which a more safe and secure environment exists. Includes medical aid were needed to wounded or injured personnel.

Consolidation activities are typically multidimensional responses involving political, humanitarian, military, and police activities. Because of this, UN peacekeepers must consult with partners to ensure complementarity of actions and respect for humanitarian principles.

Activities typically involve:

- Stabilization of the post-crisis environment to assist those affected and assist host nation authorities to help normalize the situation
- Deliver within capabilities medical support and offer support in assisting the delivery of medical care as appropriate

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The Assess / Assessment step occurs throughout each of the previous steps in the operational lifecycle. FP assessment is an essential activity that continuously occurs throughout the operations process. While a failure in protection is typically easy to detect, the successful application of protection may be difficult to assess and quantify.

Actors in all mission components must adjust their activities to reflect changes and escalation of the real time challenges in the mission's area of responsibility. The four steps involve all mission components.

Throughout the operations process, commanders integrate their assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other unified action partners. The primary tools for assessing the progress of the operation include the operation order, the common operational picture, personal observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan. Staff members develop running estimates that illustrate the significant aspects of a particular activity or function over time.

These estimates are used by commanders to maintain situational understanding and direct adjustments. Significant changes or variances among or within running estimates can signal a threat or an opportunity, alerting commanders to act.

Assessment During Planning Activities

- The staff conducts analyses to assess threats, hazards, criticality, vulnerability, and capability to assist commanders in determining protection priorities, task organisation decisions, and protection task integration
- Members of the protection cell evaluate COAs during the MDMP against the evaluation criteria derived from the protection warfighting function to determine if each COA is feasible, acceptable, and suitable in relation to its ability to protect or preserve the force

Assessment During Prevention Activities

- Assessment occurs during preparation, operations to shape, and operations to prevent and includes activities required to maintain situational understanding; monitor and evaluate running estimates, tasks, MOEs, and MOPs; and identify variances for decision support. These assessments generally provide commanders with a composite estimate of preoperational force readiness or status in time to adjust
- During preparation, operations to shape, and operations to prevent, the protection working group focuses on threats and hazards that can influence preparatory activities, including monitoring new Soldier integration programs and movement schedules and evaluating live-fire requirements for precombat checks and inspections. The protection working group may evaluate training and rehearsals or provide coordination and liaison to facilitate effectiveness in high-risk or complex preparatory activities, such as movement and sustainment preparation

Assessment During Execution Activities

The protection working group monitors and evaluates the progress of current operations to validate assumptions made in planning and to continually update changes to the situation. The protection working group continually meets to monitor threats to protection priorities, and they recommend changes to the protection plan, as required. It also tracks the status of protection assets and evaluates the effectiveness of the protection systems as they are employed. Additionally, the protection working group monitors the actions of other staff sections by periodically reviewing plans, orders, and risk assessments to determine if those areas require a change in protection priorities, posture, or resource allocation.

Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Performance (MOP)

Criteria in the forms of MOEs and MOPs help determine the progress toward attaining end-state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. An MOE helps determine if a task is achieving its intended results, and an MOP helps determine if a task

is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria; they do not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant information in the form of indicators for evaluation. They are developed during planning, refined during preparation, and monitored during execution by the protection cell and working group.

Lessons Learned Integration

The manner in which organisations and Soldiers learn from mistakes is key in protecting the force. Although the evaluation process occurs throughout the operations process, it also occurs as part of the after-action review and assessment following the mission. Leaders demonstrate their responsibility to the sound stewardship practices and risk management principles required to ensure minimal loss of resources and battalion assets due to hostile, nonhostile, and environmental threats and hazards. Key lessons learned are immediately applied and shared with other commands. Commanders develop systems to ensure the rapid dissemination of approved lessons learned and TTP proven to save lives and protect equipment and information.

Slide 43



IEDs have become the leading cause of casualties for the United Nations. Their improvised nature makes them easy to construct and emplace – and they can have a deadly impact on a mission and UN forces. A UNIBAT operating in a IED environment must take unique and special considerations when developing their FP strategy. We will help familiarize you with IED and some of the FP measures to mitigate risks to the UN force.

IEDs are categorised into 3 categories determined by how they are designed to function:

- Victim operated
- Command initiated
- Time initiated

Slide 44

IED

- Placed or fabricated
- Improvised manner
- Destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals
- To destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract
- May incorporate military stores
- normally devised from non-military components

Here are some of the characteristics of an IED. There are certain signatures or commonalities that aggressors may leave or change in the area that they intend to emplace an IED and conduct an attack. These signatures are known as IED indicators. Certain indicators have been consistently recorded which may be used by those required to operate in an IED threat environment to assess when an IED attack is imminent. IED indicators are not necessary always present for an attack nor are all used by aggressors in each area of operations.

Slide 45

IED Safety and Best Practice

IED indicators use - AWARE

Atmospherics

Warning Signs

Aiming Markers

Recognise Ground Signs

Examine surrounding for items out of place

When an IED is emplaced a local pattern of life may change resulting in Atmospheric or attitude of the local population and there are changes in the area. This may then be accompanied by Warning Signs left to notify locals of a pending attack. The presence of Aiming markers is needed for triggermen for a command IED. Recognition of ground signs by UN forces or host nation security forces of IED emplacement is important. Examination of their surroundings for objects out place can also act as an IED indicator.

It is important that UNIBAT leaders involved in operating in an IED threat environment are AWARE of the possible IED indicators in use and report such observations

The possible IED indicators described by 'AWARE' are an aid to planning and maintaining a high degree of situational awareness. The purpose of AWARE is to recognize IED indicators and communicate the FP risk.

Slide 46

IED Indicators / Ground Signs

- **Ground Sign, most essential indicators**
- **Evidence of change from natural state**
- **Emplacement & concealment leaves signs**

Always look where you are walking. Disturbed earth is one of the most important indicators of an IED – freshly dug holes or dirt used to conceal a wire are often visible when you are paying attention.

Slide 47

IED Warning and Aiming Markers



Warning Marker



Aiming Marker


- Different warning markers
- Used by locals / terrorists to warn population
- Aiming markers- to initiate IED accurately at intended target

In addition to the ground signs, attackers often leave other markers to indicate the presence of an IED. Rocks that seem out of place, cloth tied to a tree and markings on a wall have all been used to warn the local population of an IED.

For Command Operated IEDs, an attacker will often emplace the device next to a clearly visible marker such as a telephone pole. This is to assist them in detonating the device at the right time after they have moved a safe distance away.

No one sign or indicator is a guarantee of an IED. You must use your experience, observations, and instinct to avoid the threat. Finding an IED can be difficult – it is best to develop practices to avoid becoming a target. These will be covered in the coming slides.


Slide 48



Key message in the next few slides is simple; the UNIBAT units must avoid setting patterns. It is important to understand that it is not about IED avoidance but mitigating the risks that make you an aggressor target. In the past, your "UN" helmet and flak vest provided a degree of protection. However, in today's asymmetric environment, the UN are often specifically targeted in missions by armed groups.

- An UNIBAT patrol leaves at 1:56pm on Monday using the green route
- On Tuesday, the UNIBAT patrol departs same time and takes same route
- On Wednesday, the UNIBAT patrol leaves at the same time and again takes the same route, making the patrol an easy target for an attacker

Slide 49




Make yourself a “hard target” by making it more difficult for would-be attackers to target you. The best and easiest ways to avoid becoming a target is by taking simple measures to avoid setting patterns. When heading out on patrol, vary your times of departure and the route you take – especially if you are going to the same location. Before all patrols you should conduct a FP threat and risk analysis to include IEDs that covers who, what, when, where and why.



For an interactive event, ask the participants if they have other ideas on how to avoid setting patterns and other means to mitigate risks of being a target.

Slide 50



If you find an IED, do not approach or touch. There is often a 2nd IED placed nearby. Ensure you know the mission's reporting procedures for IEDs. Special units need to have certain information to safely find the location and disarm the IED.

The purpose of the 5-C drill is to carry out a risk assessment to mitigate risk if an IED initiates.

Confirm. Never put yourself or others (not trained in EOD or explosives) in danger at any time to confirm, gain knowledge from other sources means where you can keep a safe distance. To the best of knowledge, once you make an assessment that it is a probable IED safety and security and protecting personnel should be your main concern.

Clear. Ensuring that there is stand-off distance, and it is maintained. One must take charge and clear people away to a safe distance. You should consider the following factors. (Approx. Estimation - 500 meters of clearance from the explosive for explosive the size of a backpack; these 500 meters is not a rule as there may be multiple IEDs and other threats in the area) Conduct a risk analysis in the area to better determine safe areas and areas for evacuation? For more specifics on clearing use the 5C guide in the reference Annex.

Cordon. Having cleared the area around a possible IED, a cordon to control access is required. Civilians would not normally be allowed into the cleared area. The location of the cordon positions should avoid obvious locations which may be predictable and targeted with secondary IEDs.

Control. If UN or security forces are available, they are the best source for controlling the area. A key action in controlling the scene of a suspected IED is the need to continually reassess the situation and potential threats for any changes that need to be made to the clearance, cordon or other security measures implemented.

Call. Report who, what, when, where, and why to your higher / reporting HQs or operations centre.

Slide 60

Take Away

- Use the tools and considerations as guidance to help plan for FP in a PKO
- Robust posture and early warning are key to FP success
- Use phases as a tool in planning, they are not sequential and can be understood as categories of activities providing protection / neutralization of threats
- In mission analysis, the assessment of perpetrators and consider other protection actors
- Risk analysis help guide the planning efforts in prioritization of threats
- Plans need to be approved by higher command
- Consultation / coordination with mission and non-mission actors
- Use of Force training is essential
- IEDs are significant threats ; components-SPIC; IED signs; use AWARE

Summary

Students should retain the following from this lesson; let us review these topics:

- These FP planning considerations provide guidance
- Robust posture and early warning are key
- Phases may not be sequential and can be understood as categories of activities providing protection / neutralization from physical violence
- Mission analysis critical step for assessment of perpetrators and other protection actors; risk analysis guides prioritization of threats
- Plans need to be approved by higher command
- Consultation / coordination with other mission and non-mission actors are crucial
- Use of Force training is essential
- IEDs are significant threats; components-SPICE
- Know IED signs; use AWARE
- UNIBAT may be involved in supporting UNSMS

RESOURCES

- Chalk Board, white board or butcher/chart paper and markers
- General Situation (handout)

TIME

Approximately 45 minutes

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS

Break the class into two groups.

- Introduce participants to sets of impending tasks and challenges in the situation provided (suggest given it to them as a read ahead the night before)
- Encourage students to use the methods explained in the lesson, threat, and risk assessments
- Promote importance of practical planning considerations.
- Reinforce logistic considerations

Requirement:

- Develop (each group) one COA for FP of an operating base / static facility and include possible contingencies
- Include QRF and other support in the COA
- Discuss IEDs and convoy protection

General Situation (Extract from a recent OPORD)

DARLAN is a country which has poor economy with limited resources and development infrastructure. She got independence in 1969. The Darlan People's Party (DPP) ruled the country since independence. Right from the independence period has been facing **continuous armed conflict**. It's not only DARLAN but because of conflict its neighbouring countries are also affected in some or other way. Despite a regional attempt for peace on Cease Fire and Cessation of Hostilities in DARLAN, recent reoccurrence of violence creating humanitarian crisis and threatening peace and stability in the region. But UN managed to get New York Agreement although the major concerning party MDP has not participated in the agreement. Domination of MATRA tribal, whose armed struggle is led by MDP and was supported by neighbouring states and other vested groups. Recent discovery of minerals and bid to control the mine land in Southern part of county has further aggravated the conflict as well fuelled some intense inter-communal clashes in

recent past. The SC has passed resolution 2511 (2006) in DARLAN for restoring peace and security in the country.

Humanitarian Overview. The present Humanitarian Situation in DARLAN is very chaotic and deteriorating with heavy influx of people being internally displaced and with heavy number of people being refugee in nearby UN premises in search of safety and security.

UNMID deploys a sector HQ and an infantry battalion (A BATT) in the SecS, which is one of the most volatile sectors. Other deployed adjacent units are:

- B COY (Engineer Company from X TCC)
- C LOGCOY (Logistic Company from Y TCC)
- D RDB (Readily Deployable (Light) Infantry Battalion from Z TCC, a three-company battalion with one company deployed for protection of FHQ.

A BATT is deployed at SecS with its three COBs in different locations. As commander

A BATT, your tasks are:

- Conduct domination operations, area control and security operations, including securing lines of communication (main supply routes).
- Provide force protection and operate observation posts where applicable and conduct area domination, observation, and manoeuvre operations in the area of interest around the bases.
- Establish check points and required for the conduct of operations and while ensuring force protections.
- Conduct community outreach and engagement, including mixed gender patrols.
- Maintain situational awareness in area of operation to support planning and execution of the mandated tasks.
- Provide escort to logistic convoys, human right actors, humanitarian operations and as directed.
- Establish forward/temporary operation bases.
- Provide security to critical infrastructure of civil utilization like hospitals, IDP Camps and other installations.
- Monitor IDP movements and coordinate with all relevant actors for provision of essential security to camps and related infrastructure.
- Conduct operation and provide support to local national armed forces in support of their actions of protecting population.
- Conduct or assist riot control and crowd management operations.
- Extract/evacuate and protect UN personnel.
- Protect civilian under threat of violence and conduct operations to deter threats to the population.
- Conduct airlift operations.
- Reinforce other units/sectors on orders.

Specific Situation #1

After initial assessment, you realised that a definite improvement in FP planning is required.

The intelligence assessment of the area for last two months states that the area has relative higher threat as compared to other parts of the country. Some dissident armed elements from peace talk signatory groups, aided by violent extremists across the border are operating in the area. Some of them are specialists in mines and IED plantation. Ease of crossing the border and weaker presence of security infrastructure coupled with lack of will of neighbouring states adds further to this. Based on this threat your sector commander desires you to directly supervise the operation. He authorised you to employ the reserve company should the need arise. You may choose to move out with adequate protection if operational situation warrants so but should not get inextricably engaged with convoy and maintain communication with sector HQ at all times. GoD forces can help and are cooperative. They are neither well equipped nor fully organised.

On M-1 (a day prior to convoy move) the company commander has successfully led his force to DARLAN TOWN and after a night stay and coordination, departed at 0700 hrs M Day.

At 1020 hrs, while reaching near Village 1, company commander sensed an unusual calm in the area. While he was sharing his observation with you through satellite phone, lead APC of the protection group ran over an IED. After initial assessment company commander informed you that after an IED some intense fire was received from unknown armed elements from the direction of NE. Some elements tried to close in while taking cover of the houses. The force successfully repulsed the assailants and damage assessment was carried out. Three soldiers are critically injured and five minor injuries. Two civilian staffs are also reported injuries. While organizing first aid and expanding security parameter, the force informed that two of the local villagers received bullet injuries as collateral. An APC is completely damaged while tires of a military and civil vehicle also got busted.

The logistic flow of the sector is dependent upon the only major route in area which is in your AOR. A logistic convoy of thirty civilian trucks loaded with foods and fuel has left border and is required to be escorted from your base to DARLAN TOWN. Road conditions are not good and threat of armed elements including mines and IED is prevailing.

Your Battalion is routinely tasked to escort convoys from PAPPY TOWN to your Sector HQ.

You are required to spell out:

- a. Situation update.
- b. Plan for logistics arrangement
- c. Plan to reinforce the company.

- d. Plan for CASEVAC and priorities.
- e. Site securing till recovery and final clearance of the area.
- f. Recovery of broken-down vehicles.
- g. Assistance required from aviation including UAV, engineers, local GoD force and other.

After initial settlement and acquiring enough situational awareness, you realised that a definite improvement is required to improve camp protection plan. Once you shared your thoughts with sector commander, he appreciated the fact and asked you to revise the plan and present him your detail plan. He further added that plans should include mechanism of coordination with various stakeholders.

You are directed to present a FP plan for your force base camp site including identifying the major threats and risks; coordination required with UNDSS, UNPOL and other stakeholders. How do you prepare the mission? Discuss details of your plan with sector commander including situation awareness update, convey orders, protection arrangements, mechanism of coordination in case of reinforcement and CASEVAC.

RESOURCES

Chalk Board, white board or butcher/chart paper and markers /Handouts

TIME

Approximately 30 minutes

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

This learning activity is based on an experienced by a UNIBAT (X) deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo DRC, MONUSCO, in the city of Goma/North Kivu that served as the Force Reserve.

Break the class into two groups. Using the tools provided in this lesson, and the information in the handout, conduct a hasty analysis as it pertains to FP and POC provide the following to the UNIBAT Commander:


- Identified possible threats in the route Kitchanga - Pinga by whom, that could affect the forces movement
- Identify the predominant threats to the force and threats to the civilian population
- Identify the key actors in the AOR based on their relevance to attacks on Civilians.
- Select those key actors that represent a threat.
- What are the higher risks and describe the possible actions to reduce those risks

Handout FP Learning Activity- Force Protection

General Situation (Extract from a recent OPORD)

After the successful actions carried out against the armed group M23 by the FARDC - Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the support of MONUSCO, the Mission leadership decided to continue with the offensive actions to demobilize the armed groups that operated in the province of North Kivu, particularly in the area of responsibility of mentioned unit. The Infantry Battalion X Force Reserve had its headquarter in the city of Goma under operational control of the Force Commander and kept two COB and one TOB under operational control of the KIVU Brigade.






The HOMC decided to launch operations to declare the town of Pinga weapons-free, clear the Kitchanga-Pinga route and disarm the armed groups operating in the region, voluntary or by force.

The area was dominated by two coalitions of armed groups, fighting for territorial dominance. Both coalitions maintain control over the population in their area of influence and significant abuses are reported against them, particularly from the northern coalition. They have shown some hostility against the United Nations. Two incidents have been reported on the Kitchanga-Kalembe route, in which the population is encouraged to block the route and attack UN personnel with stones and sticks.

The groups that are members of the southern coalition maintain control over certain areas of the AO, carry out illegal exploitation of minerals, and collect taxes, particularly on the Kitchanga-Kalembe route, which is under their control.

These groups unify their forces to defend themselves against the actions of the Northern coalition which wants to take control of their area to continue their actions against the foreign armed group (D) and take control of mineral exploitation.

Armed groups



Southern Coalition



Integrated by 4 armed groups of ethnic origin Hunde and Hutus (A, B, C, D). Group D is a foreign AG and maintains an important structure in the province of North Kivu, being able to quickly reinforce the existing means in the AO. Similar situation for the AGs A, which maintains its main means to the west of the AO with the capacity to quickly mobilize them to its original area in the general region of Kitchanga. Reference Figure N ---Groups A and D maintain a basic military structure with the presence of ex-soldiers from the FARDC, while the rest are militias with little training. The identified armament consists of AK-47 and RPG 7. 81mm mortars were seen displayed in the organised positions. The ammunition supply is unknown. The leaders of these groups maintain relationships with FARDC authorities.

Northern Coalition

Integrated by 2 armed groups, maintains control of the region from Kalembe Village to the Northwest. Some of its members are pro-Tutsi and they are against the HUTO ethnic and those who support them. They state that their fight is to free the population from the foreign presence.

It keeps the population isolated and its leader is accused of serious human rights violations. Information is available about his contacts with FARDC authorities.

The weapons are like the southern coalition.



Population

The highest concentrations of population are on the Kitchanga-Pinga route, the main town was Kitchanga, with 80,000 inhabitants and where the population sympathizes with the United Nations. From the town of Mweso to Kalembe, the hostilities towards the United Nations began to appear. This situation was caused and exploited by the Armed Groups that controlled route. From Kalembe - Pinga the population presence was limited due to the massive displacements that have occurred due to clashes between armed groups and the abusive practices of the Northern Coalition.

Government Forces

There are FARDC and NP presence from the city of Goma to the Kitchanga Village, being extremely limited until the town of Kalembe. From Kalembe to Pinga there was no Government presence.

Military and police leaders were known to engage in illegal activities with armed groups.

Other actors

The presence of humanitarian actors and international NGOs can be seen up to the proximity of the town of Mweso, being null to the NW of this reference.

Mission

The UNIBAT Mission is to reinforce the COB Pinga with two mechanised sections of the Battalion Reserve Coy, in preparation for future operations.

Lesson 3.5



Planning Considerations for Select UNIBAT PKO Tasks in Support of the Mandate

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Preface

We have selected a set of UNIBAT military tasks that are often associated with a UNPKO and that require special planning considerations. These tasks often become routine and have led to Mission/Force HQ SOPs. These selected PKO tasks help facilitate other mission components and UN stakeholders in their execution of the mandate. The tasks in this lesson are not all inclusive; and depending on the mission, additional tasks can be added.

In this lesson we will take a closer look at several of the UNIBAT PKO tasks required to support a safe and secure environment. Also, we will address some of the key planning considerations and guidance on their conduct and execution. Some of these tasks are best planned and executed at the UNIBAT level due to their complexity and/or resource requirements, while others are typically delegated to the company. However, almost all tasks require battalion-level support and/or combat service support, and battalion staff must provide MPKI support and plan to facilitate supporting the COYs.

Regardless of its role, the UNIBAT is required to plan according to the planning principles as discussed in the MDMP lesson. It is important to note that these guidelines complement and do not replace national training and should be considered the 'blue helmet' overlay.

Slide 1



Lesson 3.5
Planning Considerations for PKO
Tasks in Support of the Mandate



Ask participants to give examples of specialised or PKO tasks that the military might perform in support of a UN mandate or tasks that facilitate other mission components to conduct their operations.

Slide 2

Content

- UNIBAT PKO tasks (Select)
- Planning considerations
- Patrolling
- Liaison / Coordination / Engagement
- Cordon and Search (C&S)
- Convoy Escort
- DDR support
- Observation point (OP)
- Check Point (CP)
- Establish Temporary Operating base (TOB)

Here is the content of this lesson.

Slide 3

Learning Outcome


- Describe types of specialised PKO UNIBAT tasks that facilitate others to support the execution of the mandate
- Explain how these tasks impact tactical planning
- Describe inappropriate tasks for the UNIBAT
- Describe planning considerations for conducting liaison, coordination and engagements
- Describe types of patrols; explain why patrols need a purpose
- Describe the primary purposes for C&S, Check Points, OPs
- List the possible DDR tasks for a UNIBAT
- Explain the purpose of a TOB and key planning considerations

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson.

Slide 4

Conduct of Tasks

- There are a set of select military tasks that are associated with a UNPKO to facilitate the mandate execution for mission components, UN stakeholders
- MDMP / threat based, planning at tactical level and approved by higher command
- May conduct several tasks for one mission / operation
- Close coordination with stakeholders
- Adherence to FP / POC strategies



UN Forces in PKO overtime have tailored specialised military tasks that support the mission components, international / regional organisations, and host nation to better implement the UN mandated tasks. In this lesson, we have selected several of the UNIBAT operational tasks required to support the UN mandates are outlined in this lesson.

Also, we have outlined key planning considerations and guidance on their conduct and execution. Some of these tasks are best planned and executed at the UBIBAT level due to their complexity and/or resource requirements, while others are typically delegated to the company. However, almost all tasks require battalion-level support and/or combat service support, and battalion staff must provide MPKI support and plan to facilitate supporting the COYs.

For example, the establishment of a Temporary Operating Base (TOB) will require engineering and medical support, together with incorporation into the battalion-level indirect fire plan. Similarly, some tasks, may also have to be executed at the battalion level. For example, the battalion will also have to establish an Operating Base and may have to conduct a cordon and search operation that involves several COYs and other civilian mission components.


Regardless of its role, the UNIBAT is required to plan according to the planning principles as discussed in the MDMP lesson. To understand how the planning principles and tasks combine to enable mission completion, consider the following example. A UNIBAT

deploys to uphold the POC aspect of its mandate, in line with international humanitarian and human rights law (IHL/IHRL).

While deployed, the UNIBAT will be required to execute several tasks, either concurrently or sequentially, involving units of different sizes and capabilities. To execute a POC strategy / plan, the UNIBAT will have to set up a TOB, Check Points, Observation Posts, and Conduct Patrols in a high-risk area. These tasks will all require the units to execute Force Protection, while working with other contingents (interoperability). The UN Inf Bn may also have to deploy an Engagement Platoon (EP) to interact with community leaders (engagement).

The purpose of this lesson is to provide general guidance on planning considerations for these common enabling peacekeeping tasks. It is important to note that these guidelines complement and do not replace national training and should be considered the 'blue helmet' overlay.

Slide 5



This slide portrays the hierarchy of roles starting with the UN Mission on the left to the UNIBAT COY in the bottom right on the slide. The Mission has three pillars of responsibility for executing the mandate. As we discussed in the MC lesson, the MC's primary function is to provide support to the security framework of the mandate; in short execute plans and operations that create a safe and secure environment, thereby creating the conditions necessary for the implementation of other elements of the mandate, like the monitoring of human rights, the Protection of Civilians, national reconciliation, Security Sector Reform, and institution building. Additionally, the MC supports the secure tasks associated with POC and FP strategies.

Sector HQs (SHQ) operates at the tactical level within its designated AOR, commanding and guiding subordinated UNIBATs and other units. The main responsibilities of the Sector HQ are to conduct planning, C2 and execution of Force HQ operations orders (OPORDs) or fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) in close cooperation with other mission components and partners.

A UNIBAT technically has two core / primary lines of operation: offensive and defensive. Also, they facilitate the FP and POC strategies. There are tactical sub-tasks that are threat oriented and terrain oriented in achieving the end states. Also, there are specialised tasks that are tailored to PKO operations. We will look at several of these key PKO tasks. A general understanding of these tasks will facilitate TCC planning and preparation, task organisation, and the conduct of task-oriented training. All planning for these operations must be approved and supported by the higher HQs.

Slide 6

Select PKO Tasks in Support of the Mandate

- Patrolling
- Liaison and coordination
- Conduct Convoy escort (C&S)
- Cordon and Search
- DDR support
- Observation point (OP)
- Check Point
- Establish TOB

All MPKI and MDMP driven

Here we list some of the specialised / tailored PKO tasks that are other than attack and defend that support battalion operations and sub-tasks. Leaders at all levels should understand on how the UNIBAT and COYs plan and execute some of the most common peacekeeping tasks. It is important to note that many of these tasks may often have Force / Sector / Battalion SOPs or formal Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) associated with them. A clear understanding of these tasks will facilitate TCC planning and preparation, task-organisation, and the conduct of task-oriented training for the COYs.

All these tasks take systematic planning and preparation. They should all be driven by MPKI, threat-based analysis and MDMP driven. If there are shortcuts in MDMP, it can result in higher risks to peacekeepers. This includes a solid risk analysis and mitigation strategy is required for all operations.

Slide 7

UNIBAT / INF COY-
Inappropriate
Missions / Tasks

**Normally not capable,
trained, equipped for:**

- **Hostage rescue operations**
- **Military assistance**
- **Personal Security Detachment tasks**
- **Special Forces (SF) type operations / task**
- **Crowd control unless properly trained and equipped**



Hostages Radisson Hotel, Bamako, Mali

In November of 2015, Islamist militants took hostages and killed many of them at the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, the capital city of Mali. Many UN officials and civilians were guests of the hotel. The UN / UNIBAT was asked to intervene to assist with a hostage rescue mission. In the end, the Malian commandos raided the hotel and liberated the surviving hostages.

The lessons learned here were that the UN Mission Civilian leadership expected the UNIBAT to conduct an operation that they were untrained or equipped to perform the actual hostage rescue. Now having said that, our military leadership can counsel and provide guidance to the leaders – the UNIBAT can support the overall operations with outer layers of security and providing enabling support enabling to the specialised units conducting the hostage rescue raid,

Here are some of the tasks or activities that the UNIBAT is not trained or equipped to perform. Of note, military assistance to host nation is not normally done; however, there are some UN Missions that have UNIBAT do some limited training of host nation security forces. Crowd control is not a normal task given to the UNIBAT; only with proper training, equipment, rehearsals, and plans briefed in detail to the higher HQs should this be an option. It is important for the mission to routinely review and update force requirements with the UN HQs to ensure that the UNIBAT / and infantry COYs have the capabilities required for any mission. Note that some of these “inappropriate” tasks can be included in a force requirement and UN HQs can force generate a TCC that can provide a specific unit that are trained and equipped for some of these non-traditional UNIBAT tasks.

Under certain circumstances the UN provides support to the host nation security forces and the UNIBATs may provide some of this support. However, the UN policy, of Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) is always applied. A UNIBAT that plans to or are already providing support to non-UN security forces must jointly conduct a risk assessment with the UN Mission. This assessment needs to consider the risk of the recipient entity committing grave violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law, or refugee law. Furthermore, the UN must consider whether there are any mitigation measures that can reduce the risk of violations (e.g., by increasing training or excluding problematic units from support).

Slide 8



Patrolling

- Not a task in itself
- Requires purpose, objective, end state
- Types- reconnaissance, security, combat
- Types of reconnaissance- area, zone, route

In the UN, too much emphasis is put on achieving high numbers of patrols and not the desired effects, which among others is to protect vulnerable groups. In general, the planning and execution needs to improve so that patrols are carried out with a purpose or end state, predominately on foot and include night operations. To realize these changes, the UNIBAT should take more initiative to improve the patrol framework in its AOR.

DEFINITION OF A PATROL

A patrol is a detachment of UNIBAT/INF COY forces sent out by a larger unit for the purpose of gathering information or carrying out a security or pre-emptive operation to neutralise hostile forces. Patrols vary in size, depending on the type, equipment, terrain, and task. Some patrols can be platoon-sized, reinforced with crew-served weapons.

TYPES OF PATROL

Patrols are classified according to the nature of the mission/task assigned. The three types are Combat, Security and Reconnaissance. Combat Patrols - usually assigned missions to prevent/neutralise hostilities. Reconnaissance Patrols - collects information about the population, hostile groups/perpetrators of violence, general environment, terrain, and resources. Security patrols provide point or area security for a specific reason and purpose.

ORGANISATION

- Patrol leader
- Security Elements – provides early warning, secures objectives, rally points, covers movements
- Support Elements - provides supporting observations and if need be, covering fires
- Recon Element - maintains surveillance
- Civil-Mil, Human Rights, POC expertise
- Language assistance personnel / teams
- Medical team
- Logistics team

TYPES OF RECONNAISSANCE

Area Reconnaissance – obtain information of activity within a specific location.

Area reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain, civilian and hostiles activities within a prescribed area. An area reconnaissance when information on a situation is limited or when focused reconnaissance will yield specific information on the area in question

Route Reconnaissance – obtain information on conditions, activities along lines of communication- roads, railways, canals, waterway, trails, and routes of travel. Route reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which could influence movement along that route. Route reconnaissance provides new or updated information on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge classifications, adversary, and civilian activity along the route.

Zone Reconnaissance - obtain information on routes, obstacles, terrain, and population, hostile groups in a zone defined by boundaries.

Zone reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, civilian activities, hostile groups, and armed forces within a zone defined by boundaries. Obstacles include existing, reinforcing, and areas with CBRN contamination. Zone reconnaissance is the most time- and resource-intensive form of reconnaissance.

Note: Always to be observed by all patrols are any human rights, mandate or ceasefire violations; Also, any predatorial actions against civilians.

These are examples of a patrols purpose:

- Supplement observation-Cover gaps between fixed observation posts
- Confirm reports

- Investigate/observe/report alleged breaches of the armistice
- Monitor agreed actions and report
- Occupy a designated NAI provide early warning of an armed group moving into a populated with a vulnerable civilian population; in order to move a reserve force to interdict the group to deter possible violence
- Dominate a specific area in order to deny the access to belligerent/armed groups
- Show UN presence in a particular area or show of force

Slide 9

Principles of Patrolling

- Planning
- Reconnaissance / Situational Awareness
- Security
- Control
- Common Sense



**Not an event in itself
-must have a task and purpose**

Patrols gather information, provide security or to conduct combat operations. Not an event in itself, they must have a task and purpose. UNIBAT patrols integrated in the acquisition plan are a key PKISR asset for the Mission. The Infantry platoons and squads conduct three types of patrols: reconnaissance, combat, and security.

Planning

The MDMP and effectively, get approval from higher HQs, and communicate the plan to the lowest level. A great plan that takes forever to disseminated is not a great plan.

Reconnaissance

Your responsibility is to confirm what you think you know and to find out what you did not.

Security

Preserve your force and your assets to stay on task, early warning

Control

Clear concept and commander's intent coupled with sound C2 to react to any situation

Common Sense

Be flexible, training and ROE knowledge supports common sense when reacting to a situation

Slide 10

Patrolling Planning Considerations

- Task organisation
- Patrol order / tasks
- Movement plan
- Coordination with others
- Routes
- MPKI / threat driven
- Risk analysis / mitigation
- Focus on PIR / IRs
- FP / security
- Medical evacuation
- Logistic support
- IEDs, mines, EOD
- Pre-inspections
- Rehearsals
- Patrol report /de-briefs
- S2 part of de-briefs
- C2
- Working with other components

Patrol Planning considerations should include these items. Let us take a moment to review; and if there are other areas you feel are important, please share with the group.

- Organisation – tailored to fit the task and purpose of the patrol
- Patrol order – MDMP used, approved by higher, disseminated
- Movement- tactics and duration, day, or night
- Coordination with others
- Civilian Population
- Routes
- MPKI / threat driven, part of the PKISR planning supporting IRs
- Risk analysis / mitigation, FP planning considerations
- FP / security
- Medical evacuation
- Logistic support
- Are IEDs, mines fields. Obstacles in the routes and locations
- Pre patrol inspections
- Rehearse / train and rehearse actions on contact

- Patrol Report / debrief HQs, help populate MPKI requirements / PIRs
- Situational Awareness. Patrols are the primary means of maintenance of real time situational awareness
- Command, Control and Communications. An adequate redundancy of communications should be catered for, to deal with emergencies. Command and control responsibility has to be clearly stipulated

Working with other components is an important tool for engagement and community outreach

- *Other Mission Components' Working Modalities.* When escorting UNMOs and CIMIC teams, all individuals should be aware of each other's working modalities / SOPs
- Civil Military Interface. Being the eyes and ears of the mission, patrols should be able to facilitate effective civil military interface and meaningful outreach and engagement
- Grouping. Women interpreters and women military personnel will invariably be grouped with the patrols when interaction with local women is expected
- Joint Patrolling. Joint patrolling with human rights and other civilian components offers the advantage of building on complementary expertise and develops a shared understanding of threats and vulnerabilities

Slide 11

Patrolling Control Measures

- Register marks
- Primary route
- Alternate route
- Rally points
- Checkpoints
- Pre-planned fire support
- Time of departure
- Time of return
- Call signs and frequencies box
- Brevity codes
- Target list
- Routine radio calls

When planning a patrol, it is essential to have a solid C2 structure with control measures. Here are some examples of possible control measure that can be considered in the planning phase.



Ask participants if there are other measures that we might include? Reinforce the idea of always planning patrols in detail, using their MDMP. Risks increase when steps are skipped.

Slide 12



The UNIBAT is required to establish, maintain, engage, and coordinate within a network of key personnel and organisations. The task of engagement, liaison and coordination is important to the success of their military operations. On this diagram you will see some of the relevant stakeholders. It is important that the UNIBAT not only focuses on their AOR, but also include their area of interest. As this area and the interlocutors operating in these areas do impact and have ramifications on the UNIBAT's military operations. When planning these tasks, the engagement platoon/teams described in module 1 can be especially useful and have the capabilities required to effectively plan and execute an engagement strategy in a PKO environment.

- Local authorities/leaders of religions, ethnicities, population groups, civil organisations
- UN and other agencies-liaison and coordination with civil components and UN / international organisations
- Military and other armed elements- Cross-boundary liaison and coordination; across the chain of command
- Police and local militia(s)
- Belligerent and armed groups
- Civilian organisations-liaison and coordination with civil authorities and international organisations

Let us review the concept of integrating the Engagement Platoon (EP) into UNIBAT operations. The EP is currently in development. The command-and-control structure of the EP includes an Officer in Charge, along with a 2IC. The OIC should at least be of the rank of Captain, while a Senior NCO is recommended for the 2IC post. At least one of these personnel shall be a woman. The EPs shall have a minimum of 50 per cent women.

The section will operate as teams, containing four personnel per team. Battalions with three companies will have four ET sections. Battalions with four companies will have five ET sections. The number of engagement teams accompanying a patrol will depend on the task and situation on ground. The teams can be made up of men and women from any branch of the military and any rank however, teams must have the appropriate rank structure to establish a C2 hierarchy. ETs are normally attached to Inf COYs to participate in patrolling. ETs are normally under the tactical control of the receiving COY for the period of their attachment.

"Engagement is the interaction of the UN Inf Bn with representatives of the population and other government and non-government actors within the AO to improve cooperation, and reporting. The intent of military engagement is to deconflict military activities with those of other actors in the AO, ensure the military does not negatively impact the local population and other actors, and that military operations are not affected by the activities of others.

Engagement can improve force protection through better situational awareness and ensure that violations of UN policy or international law are recognised and reported. Engagement with the host government, parties to the conflict and other armed groups may help improve the relationship between the Force and the local community. Engagement should seek to deter and prevent Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) and other Human Rights abuses and conduct advocacy of peaceful processes, inclusion of women in dialogue and conforming to international humanitarian Law. Collecting information from the local population can help identify the unique needs and risks of men, women, boys, and girls. Monitoring and analysing those risks can identify 'hot spots' that can be targeted by increased military presence to prevent escalations of violence.

Engagement includes, but is not limited to, interaction with local community authorities, local community organisations, key political and community leaders, national military and police, parties to the conflict, and the local population, including women and men. Engagement with children should be limited and should focus on advocacy and the prevention of the 6 Grave Violations of a child (killing and maiming of children; recruitment or use of children as soldiers; sexual violence against children; abduction of children; attacks against schools or hospitals; denial of humanitarian access for children.) Appropriate coordination is required with other UN entities, and with International and Non-Governmental Organisations (IOs/NGOs) to ensure that the community (especially children) are not placed at further risk.

All UN Inf Bn engagement tasks should be coordinated with the Sector and Force, in accordance with mission priorities and directives, utilizing mission-designated liaison

processes. A UN Inf Bn normally includes both a Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) Section and an Engagement Platoon (EP) that is comprised of women and men in order to facilitate interaction with the entire community (this concept is described further in paragraph 3.6). The scope of engagement activities performed by CIMIC, and EP capabilities are closely aligned, though the scale of expertise and experience to be found in CIMIC Sections is usually of greater depth than the tactical 'first responder' capability offered by EPs. It is expected that CIMIC and EP capabilities can work together or separately, and alone or on UN Inf Bn patrols to provide comprehensive engagement results. UN Inf Bn Commanders can determine the most effective means of utilizing these capabilities, either by attaching EP teams at the Coy level for concurrent activities or basing them at HQ with the CIMIC Section.

For current guidance on CIMIC, refer to the DPKO/DFS Policy: Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated peacekeeping missions (2013). Handbooks for the CIMIC Section and EP have not yet been published. The UN Inf Bn must include engagement in its planning and operations to enhance the battalion's situational awareness. This will assist with minimizing the impact of civilian actions on military operations and minimizing the impact of military operations on the civilian population. UN Inf Bn and Coy commanders must be prepared to task its CIMIC Section and/or EP, as well as other mission military assets (including Military Observers, Military Liaison Officers, and interpreters) to support the below actions, normally in close coordination with other UN offices, agencies and programs, as well as national and IO/NGO partners."

Slide 13

ENGAGEMENT SYNC	PHASE 1	PHASE 2	PHASE 3	AUDIENCE	PRIORITY OF ASSETS	THEMES/ MESSAGES	INDICATOR & METHOD	MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS MOE
Secure Security forces Freedom of Movement (FoM) on main supply routes (MSR)				AA1, AA2, AA16	UN-EP MEDIA OPS UN-CIMIC Manoeuvre Elements	T8, T9 -Stay alert, stay safe; UN forces are working in the area. Cooperation is the way ahead. (SMS and Posters) -Road signs to increase UN forces FoM (livestock crossings) -For the safety of you and your families, do not interfere with UN convoys. (Radio)	-Known 80% saturation -DSR, media monitoring of how many people listen to the radio on a day-to-day basis. -UN-EP report from LN that observed the product.	- Decrease in reported interference with freedom of movement on MSR.
	→							



Ask participants what is the meaning of synchronizing engagement effects? ANSWER: Synchronization in a military context is the coordination of events to achieve a specific desired outcome. These outcomes may also be referred to as effects.

Engagement planning is done to synchronise the desired Mission engagement effects across the battalion commander's area of responsibility. We identify the threats, have information requirements that go into the MDMP and planning processes. The engagement plans should include POC and FP strategies, as these strategies are connected to the greater mission objectives.

A holistic integrated MPKI and engagement strategy will help meet the commander's information requirements by providing timely, accurate and relevant information and ensure the engagement effects support the commander's intent.

Planning for engagement is essential to ensure the UNIBAT remains consistent in their approach with Mission objectives. An engagement effects plan integrated in a table / matrix is an effective tool to be used to organise and synchronise efforts. This tool assists in integrating the staff to consider all available ends, ways and means to be applied to

an engagement strategy. This slide shows an example of an engagement tool that can be used by planners.

Let's discuss this tool shown in more detail. For example, we may want to ensure roadways are clear so that the force can maintain security along them. The outcome we want is for people to participate in local level governance initiatives in phase two and three. Having a safe secure route to get to and from will support this engagement effect. In this example, communicating with or directing the themes and messages toward the target audience AA1, AA2 and AA6 we will ensure there are cascading effects. The UDNİK population will keep pedestrian traffic and livestock off the roadways, The leadership of the communities will see the force is supporting their governance initiatives and the rural population will see they are being included in the governmental process. In this example, using the radio as an information dissemination method to decrease interference on those routes HELIOS and ARETEMIS, we are setting the conditions for a later engagement objective of representative participation in in local level governance.

This shows that the main target audience we want to work with to achieve this objective is General Udnik Population; GOODO municipal leaders and institutions; and Rural community leaders/elders.

It states that the PIO will execute a media campaign first, then KLE/ face-to-face will be conducted to shape the information environment then UN-CIMIC will coordinate with Mission partners and then the manoeuvre elements will secure the routes.

During the Media campaign, the face-to-face/ KLEs and the UN-CIMIC engagements the message that must get across is, "Stay alert, stay safe; Security forces are working in the area. Cooperation is the way ahead." SMS and Posters will be used. Billboard to increase Security forces Freedom of Movement for crossing areas will be placed at strategic locations. "For the safety of you and your families, do not approach military convoys," will be broadcast through civilian Radio stations.

The last two columns are the measurements the staff will use to assess if the objective is met. This data can be collected by different means but your reports and returns should address and identify them so the staff can know if the plan is working.

Given the nature of social dynamics, the engagement plan must have flexibility built in so UNIBAT can account for changing dynamics among stakeholders. The plan must be detailed enough that it can execute their required task, but not so rigid that small changes to the civil environment will prevent the team from achieving the desired effect. A flexible plan can manage risks, address issues as they arise, and create opportunities for more focused, meaningful engagement.

Slide 14

Engagement, Coordination, Liaison Planning Considerations

- Engage diverse organisations / groups
- Understand cultural sensitivities
- Different groups have different perceptions of the same topic
- Understand cultural and political roles in a community
- Who is in my AOR (military units, security forces), can they help
- Deconflict movement on MSRs
- Integrate / build human terrain / actor evaluation analysis products
- Supports FP and POC planning

Here are a few examples of tactical planning considerations for the UNIBAT staff:

- When consulting local communities and gathering information on perceptions, needs, and concerns, it may be necessary to undertake additional separate consultations with different individuals, groups, or identities (e.g., youth, elders, women, informal community leaders)
- While respecting and working with local structures and representatives, be careful about exacerbating power dynamics already at play within a community. Take care in selecting the interlocutor(s) from the community and how they are perceived by the entire community, including women and vulnerable groups
- Data gathered from community engagement should be disaggregated according to age, gender, ethnicity, religion, etc., as, and when relevant to the context, conflict, or planned intervention
- Protection of Civilians analysis should consider the relationship between gender and diversity issues, risk, and vulnerability while accounting for the roles different groups play in early warning and prevention
- It is useful to map organisations or networks that represent minorities or marginalised groups and assess the critical issues they are engaged in, the role they play in decision making, and the level of influence or capacity

Slide 15

Convoy Escort-Tactical Planning

- **Not a routine task, requires a well-planned operational approach**
- **No short cuts in MDMP**
- **Task organisation tailored / based on threats**
- **Security and C2 established**
- **Many missions have SOPs and established TTPs**

Convoy operations are conducted to escort a column of vehicles, often non-military, in a secure manner from a designated start point to an intended destination. A tactical move of the unit to a destination is conducted based on the same principles/ standards. Convoy escorts facilitate all mission components the freedom of movement to accomplish their political and humanitarian tasks.

The unit is organised based on the threat level. An all-round security is always maintained during the execution of the task. At halts, an overwatch element is providing security for the convoy. The convoy avoids unnecessary stops. If required, freedom of movement is enforced. Exercise solid C2 during the execution of the task is important.

The MDMP and Troop-Leading Procedures (TLPs) are used by leaders to prepare their unit for the mission. Many of the things that need to be done, such as pre-checks may already be in unit SOPs and preparation. Weapon engagement skills require planning and preparation. Sectors of observation and fires need to be followed to ensure continuous fires are placed on target. The employment of gun trucks is the responsibility of the convoy commander. Gun truck crews should be trained on the weapons systems to be employed, movement techniques, Use of Force and ROE.

Currently, many attacks are initiated by IEDs. Some of these attacks include direct-fire attacks immediately following the detonation of the device and more and more IEDs are being used as a standalone means to engage a convoy. Convoys need to conduct

awareness training to better understand what to look for and what actions to take when encountering IEDs.

The enemy has used the following TTPs when employing IEDs:

- Using command-detonated devices, both hardwired and radio controlled
- Using mortar rounds, artillery projectiles, and other explosive-filled ordnance
- Using locally purchased battery-powered doorbell devices to remotely initiate
- Using speaker and similar type wiring
- Using hide positions that most likely have line of sight to the kill zone (whether a building or abandoned vehicle) and an easy escape route.
- Camouflaging IEDs in bags of various types to resemble garbage along roadways
- Using decoy devices (“bait devices”) out in the open to slow or stop convoys in the kill
- Zone of the actual device that is hidden along the route of travel
- Placing the devices during darkness and detonating in daylight

The bottom line is to protect the convoy. All personnel must remain constantly vigilant; look for these devices or places where they may be hidden. Varying routes and times,

Tactical techniques and practices (TTPs):

- Adjust formation and distances based on threat level or incidents
- Maintain communication with convoy elements during the move.
- Provide regular movement updates
- Receive and provide situation updates to convoy elements
- Report situational developments to higher HQs
- React quickly to situation developments
- Provide clear tasking to convoy elements

Slide 16

Convoy Escort Planning Considerations

Sections, elements, attachments could be included:

- Advance guard, close protection, rear guard, C2
- Interpreters
- Host Nation representatives
- EOD Team / Counter -IED Teams
- Engineering attachments for mobility
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAS/ISR) support
- Engagement, human rights teams
- Logistics / medical teams

The unit is organised based on the threat levels. All-round security is always maintained during the execution of the task. The unit may organise by elements that have subtasks of providing specific areas of security for the convoy.


- Advance guard (providing the safety of the route and able to identify threats advance of the column. The element may be required to reconnoitre detours and secure halt positions)
- Close protection group (the unit commander may be in this group)
- Rear guard

As the Task Organisation is tailored toward the mission at hand. The following attachments to the convoy could include:

- Interpreters
- Host Nation representatives
- EOD Team
- Counter-IED Teams
- Engineering attachments for mobility
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAS)/ISR support
- Engagement Team, including females

Convoy personnel prepare themselves and their equipment and need to rehearse immediate actions / actions on contact supervised by the convoy commander. Engineer/ EOD assets, if available, are located near the front of the convoy to respond quickly to obstacles or for IED/UXO disposal. A sustainment plan is in place and the convoy escort is fully self-sustaining for the duration of the operation.

Slide 17



To The primary purpose of a Cordon & Search (C&S) is to isolate a location to search the area for arms, perpetrators of violence, or materials of evidentiary and/or peacekeeping-intelligence value. Site exploitation is a series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyse information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of C&S operations. Should always considers the threats and risks (MPKI driven).

Slide 18

Cordon

- Used to isolate an area
- Usually precedes other operations, such as search, EOD
- Normally a COY
- Can protect the actions of HN security forces
- Can be a joint operations

Establishing the cordon. An effective cordon is critical to the success of the search effort. Cordons are designed to prevent the departure of individuals to be searched, and to protect the forces conducting the operation. In remote areas, the cordon maybe established without being detected.

- Used to completely isolate an area
- It can be an operation in a rural or urban area
- Usually, precedes other operations, such as Search, EOD, and detainee handling
- Normally a COY used in the Cordon
- Will likely be a combined and joint operation that helps protects the actions of the Host Country Police; the outer cordon is performed by the UNIBAT element, while others do the search and investigations

Slide 19

Search

- Performed after cordon is set
- Site exploitation
- Arms, perpetrators of violence, evidence, illegal items, MPKI value, unexploded ordnance
- Normally, local police, FPU and UNPOL are employed
- May include detainee handling

Once the cordon is set and in place, the search portion of the operation can be initiated. Site exploitation is a series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyse information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the search. The search can include arms, perpetrators of violence, or materials of evidentiary, materials / information for military peacekeeping-intelligence value, or unexploded ordnance. Local Police, FPU and UNPOL are normally employed to conduct the searches in UN PKO; however, it can be a joint operation with mission civilian and military components and the host nation security forces. Search operations normally include detainee handling.

Slide 20

C&S Planning Considerations

Cordon

- Area / point security
- Cover avenues of approach
- Inner cordon-entry / exit from area
- Snipers for observation and FP
- QRF central local
- Set early, night before operation; information operations with locals; possible include CIMIC activities
- Responsibilities understood for cordon and search elements, Command post established; control measure set C2
- Plan for crowd control

Here are some tactical planning considerations for an effective C&S operation. Let us focus first on the cordon:

- Look at both area and point security tactical methods of execution. Cover avenues of approach that allow for concealed and swift approach to the isolated area
- A force (element) establishes an outer cordon perimeter and covers routes leading into the area to prevent outside interference or reinforcement; another element establishes an inner cordon around the objective and controls entry or exit from the objective area through observation or its physical presence
- Early isolation of the objective area; might occupy at night
- Liaison / coordination required with local population / consider a surprise dilemma (yes, or no?), if situation deems it, information operations should be considered will inform the local population about the reason for the C&S operation, in some cases, the local population should not be warned
- Wherever possible, the C&S efforts should link to appropriate identified welfare and CIMIC activities (medical assistance, distribution of food and necessities, assistance to the elderly, women, and children etc.) in support of well-being and confidence-building—all in line with presence, posture, and profile
- QRF force on standby in a central area

- Clear C2 responsibilities understood for cordon and search elements
- Be prepared for crowd control

Slide 21

C&S Planning Considerations

Search

- Task organisation- special capabilities
- Support teams close-in security
- Search teams assist authorities
- Detainee handling teams, collection point
- Clear instructions to occupants – robust posture, dignity, respect, gender sensitivity
- Inform operations-local population
- Dignity and respect toward the population
- Records, confiscated items, chain of custody, tagging kits

Here are some tactical planning considerations for an effective C&S operation. On this slide we will focus first on the search framework:


- The task organisation of the force is important. Many specialised elements make up a search operation
- Search teams will include subject matter experts depending on the item or information being searched for; example IED or unexploded ordnance expert; also, search teams may assist local authorities or police; ensure guard teams are included in the task organisation
- Close-in security teams support and assists the search teams with overwatch
- Special teams should be designated to handle detainees or evidence; any detained persons should be transfer as soon as possible to respective local authorities; collection and transfer points planned ahead of time
- EOD maybe used to assist in the disposal of explosives
- Occupants within the area should be asked to gather at a central location to facilitate the search; in some cases, the head of households are requested to accompany the search parties to prevent accusations of theft; occupants of houses that will not be searched should be requested to remain indoors
- Search teams, including female searchers (if appropriate and available) are assigned

- Any material confiscated is recorded in line within Mission SOPs, and a chain of evidence is maintained. Consequently, material and records are handed over to legal authorities; cameras and tagging kits are effective tools to assist in this process
- Units will need to protect sources and civilians who cooperate during these operations, in close coordination with the human rights component. These operations will generally be more effective if host nation security forces play a prominent role. However, such integration may undermine operations security and can be counterproductive if these forces are not respectful of human rights and international humanitarian law. Information sharing on a need-to-know basis is important to reduce the risk of these occurrences. Operations should be **conducted in a manner that does not reduce the local population's support** or result in civilian harm; however, these missions can quickly become violent when perpetrators are located

The following should be considered as possible requirements in support of C&S operations:

- UN military / UNPOL, including female elements
- Local police personnel
- Military police
- Civilian and military interpreters
- CIMIC officers / EP teams
- MPKI / PKISR cells
- Local population coordination element
- Firefighting team
- EOD teams
- Working dog teams
- Medical teams
- Legal assistance personnel

Slide 22



Ask the participants how might they cordon this area off? What avenues might they be concerned about? What areas facilitate mounted operations and what areas are better suited for dismounted infantrymen? Where would you put a QRF?

Slide 23

UNIBAT Support to DDR

Demobilization

Disarmament

Reintegration



- Reintegrating following a conflict
- Ex-combatants, armed groups, abductees, dependents, civilian returnees , communities
- Political, military, security, humanitarian, socio-economic dimension

The objective of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian, and socio-economic dimensions.

DDR aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks - other than their former comrades - during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. UN uses the concept and abbreviation 'DDR' as an all-inclusive term that includes related activities, such as repatriation, rehabilitation and reconciliation that aim to achieve sustainable reintegration.

Through a comprehensive process of disarming combatants, preparing them for civilian life and providing them with opportunities for sustainable social and economic reintegration, DDR aims to support this high-risk group so that they become stakeholders in the peace process. DDR should support the following:

- Planned and coordinated in the framework of the peace process
- Linked to security sector reform (SSR)
- Comprehensive approach

- Linked to processes of national capacity-building, reconstruction, and development
- Encourage trust and confidence in communities receiving ex-combatants
- Deal with root causes of the conflict
- Be flexible to meet specific needs of a particular country (and region)

An integrated DDR is part of the United Nations (UN) system's multidimensional approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. It is based on a set of principles for planning and implementing integrated DDR processes and concrete mechanisms to guarantee coordination and synergy in these processes among all UN actors. This may also include supporting tasks by the military component and the UNIBAT.

Slide 24

Possible UNIBAT Contributions to DDR

- **Monitoring separation**
- **Monitoring withdrawal and disbandment**
- **Security at reception centers**
- **Collecting / inventory / transporting weapons, ammunition and explosives**



The UNIBAT can contribute to DDR operations in many capacities and in supporting efforts.

Reconnaissance patrols / Ops / Information-gathering and reporting. UNIBAT can contribute to DDR operations by seeking information on the locations, strengths and intentions of former combatants who may or will become part of a DDR program. Parties to the conflict are often reluctant to fully disclose troop strengths and locations, and it would also be naive to assume that all combatants fully accept or trust a peace process. As a result, accurate figures on weapons and ammunition which are expected to be collected during the program may never be available; hence there must be some degree of flexibility included in the technical part of the program.

Information Dissemination. UNIBAT patrols are normally widely spread across the AOR / post-conflict area and therefore are postured to conduct and or assist and secure UN DDR cell personnel while they or UNIBAT patrols distribute information. This is particularly useful when command chains and communications are lacking. An information campaign should be planned and monitored by the mission DDR cell and public information staffs.

Security. The UNIBAT can provide security in or around reception centres and weapon collection sites. If explosives or mines are in the inventory, the UNIBAT may also provide security for EOD, UNMASS, and engineer personnel. The UNIBAT may be tasked to secure helicopter landing sites that support DDR.


Transportation and logistic support. The UNIBAT in coordination with the UN DDR cell, may be tasked to support with transportation assets, such as trucks.

Let us review. In this lesson we discussed the different aspects of DDR, its purpose, who benefits from the process and how UNMO can contribute to the process. We also focused on some key considerations that UNMO should maintain in the screening process. Good planning practices and integration into the other aspects of the mission.

Slide 25

Observation Post (OP)

- Not a task in itself; has purpose / end state
- Types- permanent, temporary, static, mobile
- Observe / report – vigilant to change
- FP / security
- Plan for day, night, bad weather
- Patrol and logistics plans to support site
- Medical / C3 / QRF planned / rehearsed



n Observation Post (OP) is a manned peacekeeping operations position established to monitor and observe a certain area, object, or event. An OP can be permanent, temporary, static, or mobile. Reports from OPs provide timely, accurate and relevant information to higher HQ and adjacent units. It facilitates increased security in the area of operations (AO) by demonstrating a vigilant and visible peacekeeper presence to all parties and populations in the area. Observing and reporting from OPs is a cornerstone Peacekeeping Operations task. Forces must be vigilant and ready to a changing situation and any escalation of violence.

Planning Considerations:

- FP
- Patrol around the OP
- Plan for day, night, and adverse weather conditions
- On occupation the OP personnel constantly work to ensure that:
 - OP defences are improved.
 - Obstacles to UN removed
 - Obstacles to threat reinforced and covered
 - Fields of observation and fire

- A logistic support plans
- C3 planning and checked
- QRF and medical planned and rehearsed

Observation Posts. These must be sited for maximum view of the surrounding area, for clear radio communications, and for defensibility. Their locations are recorded; any relocation must be authorised by the peacekeeping force commander. OPs are manned at all times. They are marked with the peacekeeping force flag and with signs on the walls and roof. OPs are protected by field fortifications. Access to them is limited to peacekeeping personnel. An OP is usually manned by one squad, and a log of all activities is maintained. Personnel are continuously accountable for weapons and ammunition. When the personnel in an OP are relieved, they conduct a joint inventory for the record. If weapons are discharged, this fact is reported immediately to headquarters, and a written record is made of the circumstances. (SOPs include details on these and similar matters.)

Slide 26

Check Point

- UNIBAT high-frequency PKO task
- Two types; static and mobile
- Must be a self-contained position
- Inspect/search personnel, vehicles and control movement in a designated area
- Helps establish a "safe area" that stays immune from outside
- Disadvantages: establishes a pattern as UN forces are static, procedures and equipment on display to possible threat actors

The establishment and operation of check points are a high-frequency task for a UNIBAT, particularly when they must establish area security during operations. A check point is a point used as a means of controlling movement in support of UN operations. A check point is a manned and self-contained position deployed on a road or a location to observe/check, inspect/search personnel or vehicles and control movement into and out of a designated area. A check point can be either permanent or temporary. It is usually manned by a platoon size (or less) formation. Deliberate check points are permanent or semi-permanent. They are typically constructed and employed to protect an operating base or well-established routes. Hasty checkpoints are planned and will be for a set period of short duration. Hasty checkpoints are frequently employed during the conduct of a patrol. Here are a few planning considerations:

- Based on MPKI threat-based analysis approach
- Specific task organisation should include a search team, local security, overwatch, reserve
- Search and control procedures, must include procedures for women and children
- Consider interpreters
- Inclusion of UN Police and/or local police, civil administration officials
- Positioned where traffic cannot turn back or leave the road
- Good observation area and clear fields of fire

- Use armoured vehicles for overwatch position
- Obstacles are placed on the road to slow direct traffic; anti-ram barriers to protect the check point from VBIED and other threats.
- Signs in local language(s)
- Search areas designated
- An early warning system
- Defensive positions in case of attack
- C2 with other elements in the area and higher HQs
- Reserve / QRF established
- Sustainment plans
- Records all searches and captured material, tagging kits
- Display respect local customs/traditions, know some phrases
- Collected information for the S2 cells to analyse
- Establishment a "secure area" that will stay immune from outside
- Security of the populace in the area of operations:
- Personnel and vehicle search procedures should not show patterns to the population; make daily adjustments
- Coordination with local authorities, UNPOL and local law enforcing agencies
- Cultural awareness, considerations
- Mission detainee handling SOPs
- Documentation / reporting


There can be some disadvantages of establishing check point:

- Establishes a pattern when UN forces are in static locations
- Procedures, and equipment are on display; this gives any potential threats the ability to gather information on the way to attack
- Risks can increase from direct attack on these static locations

Slide 27

Check Point Planning

- Search, security, overwatch
- Search, control process
- Consider women, children
- Language assistance
- UN / local police, civil officials
- No U-turns or leaving road
- Observation / fields of fire
- Armored vehicles overwatch
- Obstacles / barriers
- Signs
- Search areas
- Early warning system
- Defensive positions
- C2 / reserve
- Sustainment plan
- Reports



The diagram illustrates a check point layout on a yellow background. A central grey road runs vertically, with a 'Checkpoint (UN/Police)' sign at the top and bottom. The road has several lanes and turns. On the left side, there are 'Security / Overwatch' icons and a 'Authorized Vehicle Passage' sign. On the right side, there are 'Security / Overwatch' icons, a 'Holding Area', a 'Waiting Area', and a 'Female/Children Area (if appropriate)'. The road is flanked by 'Obstacles / Barriers' and 'Search Areas'.

This slide shows an example of a check point and some tactical planning considerations.

Slide 28

Temporary Operating Base -TOB

- **Military position, secure location to project military force**
- Sustainable / logistical operations
- FP / defence plans
- Medical / QRF rehearsals
- Work plans

A Temporary Operating Base (TOB) is a military position, which can be used as a secure location from which the UN Inf Bn projects military power in support of operational goals and tactical objectives. The establishment and maintenance of a secure and functional base of operations for the battalion and its sub-units is an important responsibility of the UNIBAT Commander. Remember the TOB is temporary and must not be consumed by internal security and housekeeping tasks where it cannot project military capabilities to do tasks associated with boots on the ground to support the mandate.


Security Measures. Special attention is given to the security of arms, ammunition, and other equipment of critical value. To economize on manpower, the sites selected for TOBs must be readily defensible. To conserve personnel, physical obstacles; restricted areas; and aids such as, illumination, and searchlights are used. Fields of fire are cleared, and field fortifications are constructed for guards and security forces.

The guard or security system should be supplemented by a vigorous patrol system. All security measures are kept ready, and all troops keep their weapons available for instant use. A TOB must be defensible, meets all operational and support requirements, with a sustainment plan to ensure it can be maintained for a period up to 30 days (depending on the situation). Accomplishment of this task is validated also in line with FP and defence of a base. Because TOBs are often isolated in remote areas, a reinforcement / QRF plan is required. Direct and indirect weapons plan- to include the emplacements of crew weapons; indirect fire plans must take into considerations of civilians; Attack

helicopters if available should also be considered an integrated into plan (Very effective in the DRC, Congo); ensure mutually supporting, positions or sectors.

The most important task in a TOB is to prepare the unit for future operations.

Slide 29



The defence or security of a specific site in PKO should be the norm. The principles and planning considerations that are done for the defence are the same the FP of a TOB. they go hand in hand. A TOB usually is occupied by a COY. As mentioned before, the TOB is a position that gives the unit a secure location to prepare for the next mission or operation. Priorities of work are established. Unique considerations should be made in the subtasks. Some of the following tasks might be:

- Execute work plan to include security, sleep, pre combat checks, planning / prepare for future operations
- Improve defensive positions- emplace wire obstacles to deny entry into the area (both protective wire and obstacle wire; If one of the positions or sectors must be evacuated or is overrun, limit the penetration with wire
- Engineer assets to construct barriers
- Preparing and maintaining equipment
- Conduct planning
- Security Plan-Provide inner and outer security patrols; Establish Ops / observation; In a perimeter base defence as part of a security / protection force maintains the appropriate level of security, for example, 100 percent, 50 percent, or 30 percent, consistent with the commander's plan and threat situation.
- Conduct ambushes to interdict any enemy forces moving toward the base camp.

- Restrict access to locations within the base camp and conduct surveillance of these locations
- Establish and improve primary, alternant, and supplemental positions
- Rehearse- future operations; Roc drill / Tabletop Exercises; conduct reaction force rehearsals inside and outside the perimeter of the camp
- In country training
- C2; a secure location for unit leadership to maintain a command post. Have several means of communication to higher headquarters to include radio, wire, and other signals

Slide 30

Defense Planning Considerations

Defense planning supports FP Planning

- Intelligence - threat based
- Command and control
- Movement / flexibility
- Use terrain advantages
- Disrupt attacker to regain initiative
- Integrated fires
- Sustain effort / protection
- Transition quickly

Defence planning is a basic infantry task. When establishing a tactical base of operations, check points, OPs or other tasks explained in this lesson, the principles and planning considerations that are done for FP can be carried over / applied in defence planning. An Infantry unit may defend key terrain or be part of a perimeter defence around a facility, operating base, a public / government / UN facility, or DDR site. Normally, the unit size is a COY that can occupy and defend these areas, or it can establish and operate checkpoints and OPs in conjunction with this defence.

For example, an Infantry unit can defend a traffic circle or similar terrain to prevent perpetrators or armed groups from using it. This is characterised by the occupation and defence of a roundabout / rotary and an area that controls avenues of approach into and out of the area. This defence might be an adjunct to a mission to other security operations.

Also, in planning the establishment of an operating base, appropriate UN senior leadership should incorporate FP considerations which must include the emplacement of effective physical security measures early in plans. Base protection plans for FP will vary according to the operating environment but should generally comprise of a threat scenario encompassing armed groups, perpetrators of violence, and terrorist actors with


asymmetric capabilities. An operating base should be sited to maximize tactical advantages. Commanders must ensure the planning in the preparation of bunkers, sectors of fire; entry control points; observation, and utilization of sensors etc.

The purpose of the defence is to create conditions for other proactive operations. The common defensive planning considerations are normally the result of detailed planning and preparation among the various units participating in operation. While these activities may be separated in time and space, they are synchronised at decisive times and places. The defence is a mix of static and dynamic actions, as well as FP risk mitigation measures.

Slide 31

Defence Planning

- Outer / inner security patrols
- Establish observation plan
- Civilian engagement / coordination
- Establish primary, alternant and supplemental positions
- Direct / indirect weapons plan
- Emplace obstacles to deny
- Sustain ops- example, security 100 %, 50% consistent with threats
- Conduct ambushes to interdict
- Restrict access to locations
- Reaction force rehearsals
- Several means of comms to higher HQs



Effective defence planning supports FP

Unique considerations should be made in defence subtasks. On this slide are a few examples:

- Provide inner and outer security patrols
- Establish Ops / observation plan
- Establish checkpoints
- Conduct civilian engagement and coordination with local authorities.
- Establish primary, alternant and supplemental positions (rehearse-occupation plan and disengagement criteria) Reinforce each position (to include alternate, subsequent, and supplementary to withstand small-arms fire, mortar fire fragmentation)
- Direct and indirect weapons plan- to include the emplacements of crew weapons; indirect fire plans must take into considerations of civilians; Attack helicopters if available should also be considered an integrated into plan (Very effective in the DRC, Congo); ensure mutually supporting, positions or sectors
- Emplace wire obstacles to deny entry into the area (both protective wire and obstacle wire; If one of the positions or sectors must be evacuated or is overrun, limit the penetration with wire
- Engineer assets to construct barriers

- In a perimeter base defence as part of a security / protection force maintains the appropriate level of
- 24-hour security- example, 100 percent, 50 percent, or 30 percent, consistent with the commander's plan and threat situation
- Conduct ambushes to interdict any enemy forces moving toward the base camp.
- Restrict access to locations within the base camp and conduct surveillance of these locations
- Conduct reaction force rehearsals inside and outside the perimeter of the camp
- Plan and test several means of communication to higher headquarters to include radio, wire, and other signals

Slide 32

Take Away

- The troop leading procedures, mission analysis and threat assessments are critical steps in planning all tasks (no short cuts)
- Plans need to be approved by higher command
- DDR is an important aspect of PKO and the UNIBAT may play an important security role in the process
- Consultation, liaison, coordination with mission and non-mission actors are crucial in a PKO
- All tasks must include FP planning

Summary

The takeaways include the following:

- The troop leading procedures, mission analysis and threat assessments are critical steps in planning all tasks (no short cuts)
- Plans need to be approved by higher command
- DDR is an important aspect of PKO and the UNIBAT may play an important security role in the process
- Consultation, liaison, coordination with mission and non-mission actors are crucial in a PKO
- Check Point, TOB, OP tasks all need to plan for FP

RESOURCES:

TIME: Approximately 15-20 min. If time permits

PREPARATION:

Break into two groups. Assign a separate situation to each group. Give the students time to read the situations, answer the questions. Have each group report back to the plenary. Assign an instructor aide or you move around to each group during the process to help facilitate, bring in your personal examples, reinforce topics or discuss as needed. Help the student focus on the preventive and pre-emptive planning considerations.

Situation and tasks for the students:Situation # 1 Convoy Escort, Patrols, Check Points

A UNIBAT is deployed in a sector that is one of the most violent areas in the provinces. As such, all road movements for humanitarian workers require security. The Sector HQ tasked your UNIBAT to provide plan for the security of WFP convoys moving through the AOR. The WFP convoy is made up of 6 trucks carrying humanitarian supplies and travel for 30km. The armed groups in the area are avowed secular organisation with broad appeal that has a total strength of 500 fighters and has vowed that no supplies of WFP should move through their area. The convoys travel by both day and night. You are a planner in the UNIBAT: What tactical planning consideration / factors should the planning staff include for the preparation of orders to subordinate units?_How might you direct, organise and coordinate efforts with others for the task?

Suggested notes for the instructor to facilitate discussions:

- Threat based approach, assessing locations that pose the greatest risks
- Threat/Actors, weapon ranges, dispositions, capabilities, and intent
- Access routes, ambush sites, vulnerable points, and choke points (Known Areas of Interests- NAI)
- Detect. To identify and/or locate MPC fighters. along routes
- Find Bypasses. Plan / Locate / manoeuvre routes around obstacles, position, or threats
- Look at all the tasks that support security in the AOR, do not just focus on the escort itself
- Recommend mitigating measures to avoid issues / incidents during execution and to reduce risks

- Determine the right size / capable force to escort and other forces to man CHECK POINTs, patrol NAIs to prevent and or pre-empt attacks
- Plan patrols with a task and purpose, occupy NAIs, organise the escort to include Reconnaissance Advance guard, Close protection group. Rear guard
- Who else can help avoid incident in the mission, in the country, other stakeholders, host nation security forces etc.

Situation #2 DDR Support

The mission has been successful in brokering a ceasefire agreement between the govt and belligerents. A DDR camp is being established. The ceasefire agreement has caused differences within the belligerent groups. A faction has broken off and made a new group under new leadership and is likely to interfere with the process and disrupt the DDR program underway. You are given responsibility to assist in the security and safe conduct of the DDR site.

As a planner for the UNIBAT staff, what tactical planning considerations might be appropriate? How might you layout the DDR Site. What coordination id required?

Lesson 3.6



Tactical Planning Considerations for QRF and RES

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Slide 1



Lesson 3.6
Tactical Planning Considerations
for Quick Reaction Forces (QRF)
/ Reserve Forces (RES)

We have discussed in Module 1 the conceptual framework for both the QRF and RES. Now let us look at the operational framework where we will be exploring some of the tactical planning consideration for deploying and employing the QRF and RES.

Slide 2

Lesson Contents

- QRF tactical planning considerations
- QRF control measures and special consideration
- RES tactical planning considerations
- RES control measures and special consideration
- Learning Activity

Here are the topics we will be covering in this lesson.


Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Explain the importance of existing mission and higher HQs documents when conducting mission analysis for QRF / RES
- Explain reinforcement operations in line with United Nations operational requirements
- Explain key tactical planning consideration for QRF and RES deployment and employment

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on this slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This will help to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson. The learning activity at the end of the lesson will help reinforce these learning outcomes.

Slide 4




This graph shows the flow from a mission's mandate to the operational plans for military units. It shows the series of planning processes in peacekeeping missions.

In UN Peacekeeping, the mission is derived from the existing documents discussed earlier, beginning with the Security Council mandate. Guided by the strategic and operational level documents shown on the graph (some of which were already discussed earlier), the relevant higher headquarters in a field mission will then determine the orders for a military unit. The list on the bottom left of the slide show examples of guidance/documents that should be considered for units/UNIBAT designated as a QRF.

Note that there may be CONOPs and plans on the shelf at both FHQs and Sector HQs that require and have on order or be prepared missions for the QRF. Also, important are the documents that layout the administrative, security and logistical requirements for Air travel in the mission. Often, commanders do not set conditions and coordinate early for rapid deployment of the QRF with the civilian components of mission. This also applies to mission analysis for the RES; however, a more strategic/operation level of the Mission AOR and situational awareness is required.

Slide 5



The mission analysis stage in the process plays a crucial role as it defines the tactical problem for the QRF deployment and how it supports on the ground once employed. As discussed in an earlier lesson the MPKI cycle diagram is a reminder that the Analysis of the operating Environment and threat assessments are a continuous process that generates updated products to assist the staff during mission analysis. Often times these MPKI products are only a baseline as the running estimate and common operating picture (COP) / current situation prevail in an extremist situation prior to the deployment of a QRF. UNIBAT staff will need to be “plugged into” the changing situation and have access to the updated MPKI products.



Note to Instructor: If you find that the students require a review of MPKI / planning cycle and their associated products, return to lessons 3.1 and 3.2 for further explanation and details.

Slide 6



The planning process begins with an identification of the key actors in the area of operations. From the angle of POC, FP and UN sites we begin logical steps in identifying where the QRF may be deployed.

To begin with, understanding the locations of UN forces, vulnerable populations, and UN civilian sites within the area of operations, as well as the areas within and between which they frequently move (supporting others, logistical or other reasons). This information will assist in identifying potential threats in the same areas.


Furthermore, the following should be determined:

- type, numbers, density, capabilities, transportation hubs and routes
- If it is the civilian population- density, female numbers, Ethnicity, religions, history with population, history with the host nation
- Type of base, type operation, size location (example, CHECK POINT, TOB, routine convoy escort)
- Identification of facilities of importance, such as hospitals, schools, key Government buildings, UN bases, International civilian populations, Humanitarian NGO, and World Food Program storage / operational sites etc.

- Historical pattern analysis / background of violence committed against the location, UN, international, civilian population
- Large concentrations of UN or international community personnel; UN forces may be employed in future security operations
- Transportation nodes, LZs, airfields, MSRs etc.

Besides liaison with local communities, the necessary information for the identification is coordination with other UN components. Patrols and recce operations are conducted, while information is also requested from higher headquarters.


Slide 7



As part of the identification process, determining their location relative to units and bases is important. For the purpose of tactical level planning, distance plays a critical role. Mapping the locations provides a simple way of demonstrating spatial relations in the area of operations. As indicated in the map, the locations of some of the communities and transportation nodes may overlap with the area of responsibility of other peacekeeping units. The development of QRF plans will require close coordination with the units responsible for adjacent areas of operations.

Additionally, it is useful to examine other factors that may impact the deployment of the QRF, such as living areas, UN offices, UN DDR sites, UN humanitarian food storage areas for example. As the QRF may be involved at these locations in future extremis / security operations.

Slide 8




The next step will be the identification of host state / nation security forces. Host government actors are critical players, as the host nation must ensure UN peacekeepers / QRF will have access and are safeguarded in their execution. This does not always happen; however, they bear the primary responsibility. The impact of host state security forces on a possible QRF deployment is determined by their capability and willingness to support. Military planners, considering information provided by non-military mission components, need to assess these factors as part of the Mission Analysis. Furthermore, the following needs to be determined with respect to host state security forces:

- Capabilities, composition and command and control arrangements
- Ethnicity, religions, and political affiliations
- Will to assist
- Human rights record

Identification of the leaders of host state security forces, particularly at the local levels, will be vital.

The necessary information for the identification of host state security forces will come from a range of sources. The higher HQs MPKI products are a good start in this analysis.

Slide 9




Like other key actors identified before, the next is to determine the location of host state security forces relative to:

- Peacekeeping QRF base, mission bases and units
- Potential perpetrators

Mapping the locations will facilitate outreach and provide military planners with a sense of which areas could potentially be protected by host security forces, freeing up mission assets. The red line represents the area of operations of a particular unit in the peacekeeping mission. The green circle represents the de-facto area of operations of the host state security forces. While the area which the host state security forces are mandated to protect while normally overlap with the mission area of responsibility, their de-facto reach and influence may be limited in reality due to resource restraints, security conditions, terrain, and other factors. The green rectangle indicates a host state security forces deployment at the battalion level, while the elliptical shape indicates a company level deployment.

Slide 10




The next step will be the identification of potential perpetrators. To facilitate the analysis of the potential perpetrators in the area of operations. This slide shows what an exemplary analysis of the actors that could look like, reflecting the factors discussed in the previous slides. The higher HQs may have existing MPKI products that will help QRF planners.

To begin with, understanding the locations of potential perpetrators within the area of operations, as well as any recent or current operations they are involved in is critical. This information will assist in identifying potential threat areas. Furthermore, the following needs to be determined:

- Details of their numbers, composition and command and control arrangements and capacity
- Ethnicity, religions, and political affiliations
- Hostile intent and historical background to understand what conflict patterns have occurred in the past
- Capabilities to carry out their intentions
- Use, if any, of child soldiers

Besides liaison with local communities, UN agencies / offices and the leaders of potential perpetrators, the necessary information for the identification of perpetrators and armed groups will come from a range of sources. To this end, Priority Information Requirements (PIR) need to be established. In response to the PIRs, patrols and recce operations are conducted, while information is also requested from and offered to other mission intelligence and information management mechanisms, as well as to particular protection actors.

Slide 11




Determine the location of potential perpetrators relative to the following:

- Peacekeeping mission bases and units
- Areas where UN forces routinely operate
- UN sites, NGO sites and international community sites
- Areas of interest where UN forces may operate

Mapping the locations will facilitate outreach and provide military planners with a sense of which areas could potentially be of interest. The red line represents the area of operations of a particular unit in the peacekeeping mission. The circles indicate the area of influence of potential perpetrators. As indicated in the map, these areas of influence may overlap with the area of responsibility of other peacekeeping units. In such cases, planning processes will require close coordination with the units responsible for adjacent areas of operations.

To facilitate the systematic analysis of potential perpetrators in the area of operations, other mission and non-mission actors may have useful information and early consultation with them will strengthen analysis. Other tools that the UNIBAT planning staff may be exposed to are intelligence products from the Force and Sector HQs Intelligence cells. Lesson 3.2 goes into more detail on some of these products.

Slide 12



Having identified and analysed the component groups (UN forces, concentrations of UN personnel / sites, transportation nodes, possible LZs Airfields used by QRF, potential perpetrators, host state security forces) present in the area of operations, the next step is the analysis of particular threats. This lays the foundation for the formulation of a possible QRF deployment.

When analysing threats, those threats identified at the level of senior mission leadership and valid for the whole mission area of responsibility need to be given priority. However, additional threats identified in the respective area of operations of a specific QRF CONOP deployment is a priority.


For each threat, the following should be determined:

- Situation and type of threat (What)
- Potential perpetrators (Who)
- Potentially affected civilian, population, UN site, International, government sites / personnel etc. (Against whom)
- Areas targeted (Where)
- Under what circumstances attacks are most likely (When)
- Motivation behind physical violence (Why)

- Possible movements and tactics of the armed groups (How)

When analysing particular threats, killings in all locations in the AOR are always a concern and assumed to be a potential threat when other threats of physical violence are identified. The threat analysis, along with visual tools such as these slides /maps, can be updated routinely and whenever the situation in the area of operations changes. Updated/continuous **running estimates/analysis are key to the QRF's deliberate and** hasty planning process.

Slide 13




Threat = Capability x Intent and all threats to the force's current and future operations need to be identified. A potential adversary group with intent to cause harm but with minimal capability is a limited threat, whereas a group with significant capability but no intent poses almost no threat. The capability of the peacekeeping force to counter threats also needs to be considered, because again, even if an adversary has every intent to oppose a peacekeeping force, if that peacekeeping force is able to prevent the militant group from operating effectively, they again pose little threat to the operation.

The UNIBAT QRFs need to prioritize threats in order to identify those situations where mitigating action is most needed. Risk is a product of the likelihood of an event occurring and the impact if that event does occur. This process is facilitated by a risk analysis, which determines (a) the likelihood a threat materializes, and (b) the impact the threat would have if it materialised. The combination of those two factors allows missions to determine the risk associated with each threat identified.

Risk Management / Mitigation is a process that takes reasonable operational measures to reduce risk to personnel, equipment, and the mandate. The probability and severity levels of a threats are estimated based on the available knowledge on the probability of its occurrence and the severity of its consequences.

In the sample graph here, the highest priority is assigned to the threat that is the most likely, with the most impact – Threat 1. constitutes a threat of physical violence against a target and likely to happen and have the largest impact. QRF planners need to prioritize efforts here, along with already identified future missions directed by higher HQs, pre-planned CONOP o/o or be prepared taskings.

Slide 14




Having analysed the mission, planners at this stage develop Courses of Action (CoA) for analysis, comparison, and approval. Plans need to be comprehensive and flexible, identifying the key operational issues and implications. This should be based on operational factors from the Mission Analysis, and higher HQs' **directed tasks**.

Assessment of approaches help planners determine the role of the military vis-à-vis other mission components in different situations. During the planning phase for specific operations, Force activities should be analysed for situations that may exacerbate the relationships with potential perpetrators/actors and the COAs should be vetted in coordination with other mission components (political / humanitarian, rule of law etc.).

Slide 15

Execution

- Alert cycle (Red, Amber, Green)
- Early warning mechanisms
- Running Estimates / Monitoring COP
- Deployment triggers / phased deployment
- Movement / transportation Admin requirements (example: MOV CON / Manifesting/ Civilian safety requirements etc.)
- C2- Commander on the scene vs QRF; reporting
- Phased deployment
- Higher HQs order process, back briefs, approval process
- CONPLANS rehearsal
- Fire support planning / control measures / coordination points (fratricide risks, helicopters use, observed fires, etc.)
- Actions on contact to neutralise



```

graph TD
    A[Receipt of Mission] --> B[Mission Analysis]
    B --> C[Course of Action]
    C --> D[Decision/Authorization]
    D --> E[Execution]
  
```

The final stage in the military decision-making process is the execution of the approved CoA. Execution of certain FP CONOPs may be triggered by different circumstances in different missions. Therefore, it is critical for military components to establish mechanisms to stay in an alert cycle, or often called red, amber, green cycles. This system identifies and designates either elements of the QRF or the entire unit on standby or timeline for deployment. Also, running estimates and a good COP of the extremis situation will help keep planners and leaders up to date and informed about situations that may trigger the execution of a CoA. This can include for instance:

- Early warning mechanisms, triggers- criteria for deployment
- Alert networks
- Monitoring of armed groups and their behaviour or movement
- Instructions from Sector or Force HQ
- Decision of the commander on scene, especially if reasonable belief exists that an attack is imminent
- Deployed to deter a situation that may become a future issue to the UN Mission

Execution of a QRF operation always has to consider host state security forces and their willingness and capability to assist in marshalling, deployment, and employment.

Slide 16



Reinforcement-
UNIBAT Units Assigned as
Reserve Forces (RES)

Now let us take a look at the RES.

Slide 17

Introduction Reserve Forces

- Strengthen, additional forces, assistance, material, support; make stronger or more pronounced
- Relocating forces to area at risk
- Prevention, crisis management or defence
- Maintain flexibility
- Maintain structure to carry out FP / POC / assigned tasks
- The build-up of forces, a primary military instruments available to UN operations

It is the process of locating forces to any area at risk within the alliance group in order to strengthen the military capabilities as a means of preventing violence, mitigating risks, and reinforcing operational and strategic objectives.

The success of a military operation is dependent on the effectiveness of planning and the strategies employed. In contemporary operational environment, organizing and tailoring forces for future operations and the holding reinforcement capabilities for future operations is one of those strategies. RES provides the mission flexibility.

The purpose of reinforcement in peacekeeping environment is to ensure UN troops and police are well maintained and have the ability to put resources when and where they are needed as the situation evolves.

Slide 18



A key factor or planning consideration for the employment of the RES is to deploy in time to exploit or capitalize on both FP and POC objective strategies is to ensure planning focuses on the Prevention and Pre-emptive phases of response. The RES takes time to deploy, and normally is done in a phased manner; therefore, it is essential that planners maintain good situational awareness in the entire Mission and Sector AORs. Also, key to a timely deployment, are the maintenance of real time PKI / MPKI products that following indicators that assist decision-makers to trigger the deployment of a RES.

Slide 19

Planning Consideration for RES

- Unit with module task organisation
- Equipment for multipurpose / all terrain
- Robust deployable logistic framework
- Planning and Intelligence cells
- C2 / Coordination

Very similar to the planning considerations for the QRF, the planning considerations for a RES mirror many of the same factors.

Slide 20

Coordination

- MPKI products
- Transportation / routes
- Geographic constraint
- C2 / communications assets/ reporting
- AOR adjustments
- Logistics
- Attachments and detachments
- Liaison

MPKI Products- UNIBAT Planners need to maintain coordination with the MPKI cells at all levels

Geographic Constraint. Sometime the distances and accessibility to an area will cause problems in the deployment and may affect a good plan. As such, when planning, consider suitable routes in the preparatory stage and conducting a phased deployment of the RES, i.e., quartering teams, engineer assessment teams etc.

Transportation- like the QRF, prior administrative arrangements and rehearsals are required to ensure the RES can deploy on both civilian and military transport.

Unhindered Communication. There should be a sound communication plan that would allow flow of information between the supporting and supported troops. A well-established net would enable smooth flow of timely information.

Logistics Constraint. All equipment to be used must be tested and operationally ready. Tents and an initial self-sustainment plan should be a priority.

Attachments and Detachments. It should be clear who is supporting what from the onset. The unit where the supporting troops originate from must be made known and the benefiting/receiving unit must be ready to receive.

Effective Liaison. Liaison officers must be appointed at all levels to ensure a seamless deployment.

Slide 21

Intelligence Requirements / Assets

- MPKI products and assessments
- Air Recce
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
- Recce / Patrols
- Terrain products / maps

Air Recce. Essential real-time intelligence using aircrafts and UASs.

HUMINT. Human intelligence could be a veritable source of information for any operations been planned. Inhabitants could have vital information that could aid planning of reinforcement missions.

Patrols. As the situation normally changes once a RES starts to deploy; active patrolling is in the employment AOR is vital for adjustments to the plan and subsequent planning.

Terrain products. Satellite photos/Maps/Models/sketches all are useful. Often, an operation is initially planned from maps/sketches and models in addition to other available intelligence.

Slide 22

Control Measures

- Assembly areas
- Assigned location of the legally obtained land for TOB
- Approach routes
- AOR / boundaries
- Legal agreements (use of land)

This slide shows possible control measures that might be used in the deployment and employment of the RES.

Slide 23

Take Away

- Tactical planning considerations are based on threat and risk analysis
- Maintaining situation awareness throughout the phases of deployment is key
- Coordination with higher HQs, mission interlocutors, local authorities and units on the ground is key to success
- Clarity in C2 is imperative

Summary

- Tactical planning considerations are based on threat and risk analysis
- Maintaining situation awareness throughout the phases of deployment is key
- Coordination with higher HQs, mission interlocutors, local authorities and units on the ground is key to success
- Clarity in C2 is imperative

Learning Activities

3.6

RESOURCES

Situations- Slide Handouts (map, situations); chalk board or butcher paper and markers

TIME

Suggested time 30 min to one hour (dependant on the discussions).

PREPARATION


Divide the class into groups and give them the necessary time to review the materials. Ask the students to discuss and report back to the plenary. Provide the students with the Handout (slides) below (option give them the slides as a read ahead the day prior to the lesson presentation).

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Have the Students Explain and give options on how best to alert, prepare and deploy the QRF / RES. How best can they be integrated into the mission / AOR framework. What is the best C2? How best to Task organise, include support elements that may be needed? Who should the commanders, planners and whom should planners / unit leadership coordinate with? Reinforce the learning outcomes and access the knowledge of the group and individuals. Here are some suggested topics / solution sets to help facilitate the discussions.

- Early reconnaissance
- Tasks organise- EP team, civil military affairs team, engineer section, riot gear, detainee package
- Sending coordinating / quartering party
- Sending EP team
- Coordinating with- Regional CT, WFP Representative, Commander on ground, Village leadership, host nation security leadership
- Dominate the area to deter additional violence, Isolate the area through patrols and Check Points
- Set up a joint command post
- Coordinate fire control and control measures... areas of responsibility etc,
- Timelines and duration; QRF does the task and consolidates; reserve force can be mobilised and give the AOR for longer period or until the area is safe and secure
- The reserve once committed has to be regenerated at Sector HQS or FHQs

Slide 24- Learning Activity #1 Map



Slide 25 - General Situation

General Situation

- The UN Mission in Carana has been tasked to maintain a safe and secure environment, and to help neutralise armed groups attacking the civilian population, unilaterally or assisting the Host State Forces (HSF)
- The UN force maintains 3 UNIBAT in the Sector; each with a designated (rotating) QRF COY
- In a village, an IDP Camp about 500x500 meters size is located 5 Km away from a QRF COY
- UNIBAT TOB Company that is responsible for the AOR is also located 3 km from IDP camp and is spread out and over tasked
- The terrain near the IDP camp has small hills / mounds, a river that passes close by the south of the camp, and a village with houses 300 m south & 200m north of the camp

Slide 26 - Specific Situation

Specific Situation


- Recently an Armed Group called Maise Force (MF) has been attacking a UN sponsored UN sponsored medical response team of humanitarians in surrounding area
- Civilians are constantly under threat of physical violence in neighboring villages
- MPKI has confirmed that there is a high probability that the MF will attack the IDP Camp within the week
- IDPs have started to travel to the UNIBAT TOB for protection and food
- UNIBAT has tasked the QRF to reinforce and secure the IDP camp to prevent and or neutralise MF attack on IDP Camp

Slide 27 - Requirements

Requirements

- The UNIBAT and QRF staff and leadership conducts a mission analysis to determine the MF most likely (ML) COA and most dangerous (MD) COA; list some of the tactical planning considerations, and provide key factors that the MF might consider in their approach to the IDP camp
- How might you task organise the QRF for the impending attack; what additional support / resources might the QRF commander ask for from UNIBAT, and what might the UNIBAT commander ask for from Sector HQs and FHQs
- What C2 arrangements should be considered
- Outline your deployment / employment plan in the area
- Who might you coordinate with before and during the deployment

Slide 28 – Learning Activity #2 Map



Slide 29 - General Situation

General Situation

- A refugee camp with 1000 population
- A UN forces –UNIBAT COY is deployed to the outer security of the camp
- The TOB is on the northern side of the camp
- 4 watch towers at camp manned by host country security, 2 check points on road passing near the camp
- Camp is 100 m away from road and connected by a dirt track
- Refugee camp is 500x500 meters
- UNIBAT HQs, 5 km from camp where the QRF is also stationed
- Area has small mounds in near vicinity of refugee camp
- A river is in the area which passes just south of the camp, Village of 20 houses located 300 m from camp
- Church is located southeast of the camp approx 200 m
- WFP distribution point is southwest camp across the main road
- Sector HQs has a UNIBAT in the Sector that has unengaged COY designated as a Sector Reserve and the Force HQs has additional reserve force assets

Slide 30 - Specific Situation

Specific Situation

Yesterday

- Villagers are at church and rations are being distributed to the refugees at a World Food Programme (WFP) distribution point nearby
- Fights by two groups break out at the distribution point and camp
- Groups start to demonstrate / protest near the WFP distribution point, the WFP personnel said that they have heard they may be in danger if the situation escalates
- Host nation forces do not have the security forces to reduce tensions and secure the distribution point
- Local village leader said he has information that other activist groups outside the local area are planning to travel to the site
- The UNIBAT COY has requested additional support

Slide 31 - Requirements

Requirements

- Is this going to be a long-term problem or a short-term problem? What resources might the UNIBAT commander consider, QRF, or RES forces, what criteria should be used when employing these forces
- List planning considerations, C2 / AOR concerns
- Outline your deployment / employment plan in the area
- Who might you coordinate with before and during the deployment
- If Sector and or Force HQs provide RES units? Who should plan the operation, what should the C2 arrangement be; what should the AOR be; does it need to be redesignated?

Lesson 3.7



MILEOD Planning Considerations

Lesson



Starting the Lesson



For an interactive start to this Lesson engage participants to seek their understanding of what they consider are the elements of MILEOD support in a UNPKO. And what special planning considerations should a UNIBAT staff include for working with MILEOD. Note: they may not differ too much from their own military.

To aid participants' learning, prior to the lesson have participants work in small groups and ask each group to come up with two or three elements. Record on a chart / white board and have them discuss just before you start the lesson.

Also, time permitting ask the participants if they have had experience in a UNPKO. Ask them to tell the group about their specific challenges with command and control, tasking orders, and the employment of the MILEOD.



Note to instructor – recommend that lesson be presented by a trainer who has experience operating with UN MILEOD. Review “DPKO/DFS policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. MILEOD is considered an enabling unit. Therefore, there are dual tasking authorities for the MILEOD; the FC has OPCON authority (inherent in OPCON is tasking authority; and the Civilian support leadership; Director, Chief, Service Delivery / DMS / CMS) may have tasking authority for day-to-day tasks / assignments. There must be a good working relationship between the Mission HQs and FHQs in UN Missions for this concept to work properly. Currently, in most missions MILEOD are tasked primarily by the Force Commander.

Slide 1




Lesson 3.7
United Nations Military Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (MILEOD)
Planning Considerations

1

Key Message: Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units (MILEOD) can contribute to the UNIBAT PKO and support the successful achievement of the battalion's missions and tasks. To date, MILEOD have deployed to Peacekeeping Operations in many of the UN Missions. To acknowledge the nature, characteristics of MILEOD and their complementarity support to the force, UNIBATs the other components in the mission it is essential for us to be familiar with their operational framework.

The aim of this lesson is to provide you an overview of the MILEOD and planning considerations a UNIBAT staff / leadership must consider when they are being supported or supporting MILEOD operations.

 For all practical purpose, throughout the Specialised Training Material **documents, lessons, and slides, we will use the abbreviation/ acronym “MILEOD”** to refer to the United Nations Military Explosive Ordnance Unit both in singular and in the plural forms.

Slide 2

Content

- MILEOD Overview
- Capabilities
- MILEOD / UNIBAT mutual support arrangements
- Planning considerations

2

Here are the topics we will be covering in this lesson.

Slide 3


Learning Outcomes

- Explain the role / aim of MILEOD in PKO
- Describe support provided by EOD activities
- Outline what planning considerations should be included when deploying / working with MILEOD
- When an infantry unit is conducting an outer security operational cordon for an EOD (IEDD) incident; explain the C2 and coordination considerations while working with an EOD unit

3

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on this slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This will help to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson. MILEOD is an enabling asset that provides UNIBAT commanders with unit that facilitates force protection, POC and mobility. We should consider EOD as a unique asset presenting specific capabilities.

Slide 4



In order to properly counter the threats posed by conventional and improvised explosive threats, a comprehensive approach must be utilised that includes the three pillars of Counter-IED:

Prepare – Training the force and affected populations on the hazards present

Prevent – defeating the hazards placed throughout the operational area and gathering as much evidence from those devices as possible

Protect – using a whole of mission approach to gain any & all technical intelligence from the devices to build a proper threat picture of the enemy faced and support the UN's and host nation's Rule of Law (RoL) process.



Engage -- MILEOD should engage with stakeholders and partners in a comprehensive approach to develop counter explosive threat capabilities. Close coordination with HN security forces is essential to raise their level of expertise. Within the general scope of UN Peacekeeping Missions, the HN must be able to take responsibility for countering threats.

The fundamental role for MILEOD is to counter threats posed by Explosive Ordnance in support of Peacekeeping. MILEOD should always operate under a framework of four interrelated lines of operation (Prepare, Engage, Protect and Prevent).

Slide 5

EOD Philosophy

- Save Life- #1 priority
- Preservation of property
- Removal of the threat
- Recording / Recovery
- Return to normality

*UNIBAT leaders / planners working with MILEOD
need to be aware of UN PKO EOD philosophy*

Saving life is paramount. An EOD operator will risk their life to save the life of another. This is the first tenant of the job.


Preservation of critical infrastructure is given the next highest consideration, where it is vital that piece of infrastructure remain intact.

Removing the threat, recording and recovery (all evidence), and return to normality all naturally flow as a result of the EOD response. Return to normalcy occurs once EOD has departed the scene.

Slide 6

MILEOD Supports the UNIBAT PKO

Mitigates EO effects / threats via advice, reconnaissance, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, disposal



- Enhance operational effectiveness & efficiency
- EOD response
 - Best used when provided a dedicated security element
- Embedded EOD

Key Message: As EOD are a limited special asset creating effects that contribute to the achievement of operational-level objectives, it is crucial that UNIBAT staff and decision-makers, and tactical level unit leaders who employ, or work with MILEOD are aware of how they can support the force and planning considerations. The MILEOD must be fully integrated into the mission concept and operational and information / intelligence frameworks. The MILEOD has its own unique characteristics that add a dimension in the accomplishment of the Mission's mandate.

The two primary methods that EOD will support a UNIBAT PKO are:

EOD response – EOD teams remain inside base and are dispatched either through ground or air mission once a hazard is identified. This allows the area commander to keep EOD in reserve to respond to any requirement that may arise. This is most effective when provided a dedicated security and medical resource so the units can train together and develop efficient and effective SOPs to respond as quickly as possible.

Embedded EOD – This provides a dedicated EOD force to a particular mission (infantry patrol, logistic convoy, Route clearance patrol) where EOD is historically needed. This greatly decreases the time necessary for EOD to respond since they are already present in the convoy.

Slide 7

Terminology – Key Terms

- *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)*
 - *Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD)*
 - *Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD)*
- *Counter-IED*
 - *Train the Force*
 - *Defeat the Device (DtD)*
 - *Degrade the Network*
- *Explosive Ordnance (EO)*
 - *Explosive Remnants of War*



7

Explosive Ordnance Disposal – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Conventional Munitions Disposal – Any EOD operation conducted on ammunition that is used as a conventional weapon, includes both Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Ordnance (AXO)

Improvised Explosive Device Disposal – Locating, identifying, rendering safe and disposing of IEDs, using specialised IEDD procedures and equipment by qualified specialists.

Counter-IED – The collective efforts to defeat an improvised explosive device system by degrading threat networks, defeating improvised explosive devices and preparing a force to operate in an explosive threat environment

Train the force – The risk education and training of civilians in public safety; training the military and police in the methods of identifying, protecting against, and safely reacting to the IED threat; and development of national capacities of specialised enablers such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal / IED Disposal

(EOD/IEDD) teams, with training and mentorship provided by experienced and trained EOD/IEDD subject matter experts.

Defeat the Device – A defensive line of operation undertaken as part of IED Threat Mitigation activities which include all actions and activities designed to decrease the likelihood and reduce the effects of IED detonations for safe operations, including:

Search activities;

Conventional Munition Disposal activities;

IEDD activities (including neutralizing and hazard disposal, as appropriate);


Support to mission partners

Degrade the Network – Includes capabilities of EOD/IEDD enablers to safely collect devices, components, and material for final disposal, verify components are free of explosive material, produce relevant reports for designated UN Mission entities and authorised stakeholders to support the Rule of Law efforts and mission mandates.

Explosive Ordnance - All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature.

Explosive Remnants of War – Any ordnance left within the area of operations (UXO/AXO) that can be used by a force either as designed or in an IED against a PKO.

Slide 8



This slide shows the three pillars that build the structure or framework for counter IED operations. The next three slide will explain how the pillars support and are integrated in a UN Mission.

Slide 9

Train the Force (TtF)

MILEOD can help train UNIBAT

Includes:

- Intelligence / situational awareness / threat analysis
- Identification
- Actions / drills
- Planning considerations
- Local population outreach (POC)
- Best practice's

Both for training all uniformed peacekeepers on hazard identification and technical EOD forces on render safe procedure, and for training the civilian populate on hazard identification and reporting methods.

Train the Force (TtF) is a core lifesaving task that MILEOD can and SHOULD be doing in the mission for UNIBAT commanders, other forces, civilian components, and the civil populace, as part of an outreach to mitigate IED risks.

Slide 10

Defeat the Device (DtD)

A defensive line of operation for IED risk mitigation activities to reduce effects of IED initiations

Includes:

- Search activities
- CMD activities
- IEDD activities
- Support to mission partners

Key Message: The term “Defeat the Device” is in common use and is a C-IED term that refers to one of the pillars of C-IED; however, the term is mistakenly used in reference to EOD and/or IEDD.

These are actions taken once a conventional or improvised device is found. The term “defeat the Device (DtD)” is often used in relation to EOD and IEDD activities. For clarity, it is defined here to avoid misunderstanding. DtD refers to a defensive line of operation undertaken as part of IED risk mitigation activities. They include all actions and activities designed to reduce the effects of IED initiations for safe operations, including:

- Search activities
- CMD activities
- IEDD activities
- Support to mission partners

Of the four named activities here within DtD, all are included in the EOD core capabilities.

Slide 11

Degrade the Network (DtN)

Includes:


- Partnerships
- UNPKI / MPKI
- Evidence collection
- Exploitation
- Disrupt / reduce
- Preventive / Pre-emptive

The most important part of the C-IED process. This utilizes Weapons Technical Intelligence to analyse all evidence collected by EOD forces using proper forensic collection measures to;

Determine the device makeup and designed functioning to inform the force to upgrade their protection TTPs


Identify any biometric evidence left behind (fingerprints, DNA, etc) to identify the emplacer and/or bomb maker and to build a threat network that fuses multiple intelligence disciplines to see a larger IED/terror network, with the goal of support in the process and bringing all actors to justice.

Slide 12



This slide displays a generic MILEOD structure containing a HQ element with CMD, IEDD and EOD support cell components. This next section of the lesson we will discuss how the MILEOD supports the UN forces, more specifically the UNIBAT, and the UN Mission / Mandate.

Slide 13



The MILEOD capabilities / support activities refer to the knowledge, skillsets, attitude, and competencies of the EOD unit that they are certified and qualified to perform. In addition, these qualifications are in conjunction with the specialised EOD equipment that is used and the ability to execute and safely respond to an CMD or IEDD activity.

Here are their Core Activities:

- CMD
- IEDD

And here are examples of the support activities that contribute to mitigating the IED threats:

- Mobility planning advice
- Force protection (FP) advice
- Electronic warfare support in countering RCIED threats – CREW assets
- Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)
- Host nation support
- Local population engagement

The next few slides will go into more detail to explain the areas in the black circle that can involve the UNIBAT.

Slide 14

CMD-Support to IED Threat Mitigation

- CMD not only remove hazards from AO also removes IED components & precursors
- Key enabler in IED TM
- Mines & ERW items can be used in IEDs









The most important aspect to remember that the CMD troops / units are not IEDD troops. These are two different skillsets. CMD troops can operate on Conventional ordnance only NOT IEDs. IEDD troops can operate on both conventional ordnance and IEDs. The EOD forces must match the threats faced.

Slide 15



IEDD is a specialised skill requiring specific training and equipment. Normally, this equipment includes the use of remote control / operated vehicles (RCV / ROV).

The EOD IED Disposal Definition is the process in the location, identification, rendering safe and final disposal of IEDs. Final disposal refers to the final elimination of explosive ordnance hazards by explosive ordnance disposal personnel. This may include demolition, neutralization, burning, or other proper means. In some cases, the RSP is the final disposal.

IED neutralization refers to the process of preventing an IED from functioning as intended by the application of an external force which changes the environment around an IED. It can be permanent or temporary. It may not be possible to confirm neutralization purely by visual means.

IEDD capabilities should be driven by the assessed IED threat. The capabilities of an EOD unit will determine the tasks to which they are appropriately qualified and equipped to respond to the threats effectively and safely. IEDD trained personnel should not be put under pressure to operate outside their capabilities except in extreme circumstances. When facing a significant and sophisticated IED threat, a well-trained, equipped, and supported IEDD capability will be required to respond to such a threat.


Slide 16

Mobility Planning Advice

Mobility & effort to maintain FoM in an IED threat environment is key operational activity

Contribute to FoM in an IED threat environment, advice for:

- **Terrain, route analysis to identify VP & VA**
- **Reduce IED risks at VP & VA**
- **Advice route clearance and use of assets**
- **Planning support**



A key input into the overall UN COP

Mobility and the effort to maintain FoM in an IED threat environment is one of the key EOD operational activities. Combatants and armed groups often deploy IEDs to reduce or prevent the UN FoM.

The loss of FoM often produces local security vacuums and non-permissive or semi-permissive environments. This in turns, provide the aggressors freedom to operate. As such the maintenance of FoM within an IED threat environment is always a key focus of IED threat mitigation and one that considerable effort in relation to EOD activities are invested.

MILEOD activities facilitate the maintaining FoM in an IED threat environment. The advice the MILEOD provides in mobility planning is a direct support function that contributes to FoM.

Such advice comes in terms of terrain and route analysis to identify Vulnerable Points (VP) and Vulnerable Areas (VA). Based on MILEOD advice, countermeasures can be taken to reduce the risk of IEDs at these locations. From the advice, measures could include the deployment of engineer assets to clear such VP and VA.

Because of their importance, let us explore in more detail the definitions of VP an VA.

- VP are those specific points where it is particularly advantageous for an adversary to position an ambush, using either IEDs, SALW, or both. VP are typically characterised by prominent or a restrictive feature to force a choke point on the ground.
- VA are those areas where the ground lends itself to IED or SALW attack. Common characteristics of vulnerable areas include previously used tracks & patrol routes; often used positions; linear features; Interior of buildings; canalised routes; extended long stretches of road; tactically important areas; high ground dominated areas; escape routes into and out; successive VPs in close proximity; and; exit or entry of areas of urban / rural interfaces


Slide 17

Force Protection Advice

**Technical EOD expert assistance WITH IED threats;
intended to mitigate the threat against personnel,
vehicles and friendly force locations**

FP advice may involve technical details on the level of PPE required or simple IED or wider explosive hazard threat awareness

FP advice can also extend to advice in relation to the provision of tactical advice in terms of the TTPs to be utilized by troops operating in an IED threat environment



A key input into the overall UN COP

FP advice is a broad area that involves the assistance of technical experts in EOD activities. For example, personnel FP advice may involve provision of technical details on the level of personal protective required to reduce IED risks and explosive hazard threat awareness.

MILEOD can provide proper ammo storage advice, barricade, and standoff distance advice. They can provide technical advice on the level of armour protection required to mitigate IED blast threats, effects of Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFP), and Directionally Focused Fragmentation Charges (DFFC).

In terms of FP measures at UN locations, technical advice can be provided in terms of the level of overhead protection required to protect against indirect fires and the use of IEDs at entry points. MILEOD can assist in the layout of blast barriers to help counter Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) threats.

All MILEOD advice and assistance provides essential information and input into the overall UN COP.

Slide 18

EW Support Countering RCIED Threats

- Exploiting the electromagnetic spectrum
- Search, interception, identification of electromagnetic emissions
- Employment of electromagnetic energy to reduce / prevent hostile use of the spectrum
- CREW assets mitigate RCIED threats
- CREW assets use electronic: jamming, deception, neutralisation

Definitions for this slide include:

RCIED – Remote Controlled IED

ECM – Electronic Counter Measures


CREW – Counter RCIED Electronic Warfare

EOD can advise if CREW assets are needed in the area, but for full support the force should use their frequency manager who (if RCIED threat is present) should have the proper electronic load to provide each ECM device to counter the most common RCIED frequencies used.

Slide 19

Force Protection Using CREW Assets


- CREW assets used as an all arms IED TM asset on vehicles or personnel moving through an area with an assessed RCIED threat
- Use of CREW assets require additional planning
- Considerations for commanders using CREW assets is covered in UN EOD Military Manual



Best practice - expert advice be sought when planning movements requiring CREW assets

CREW assets can be used as an all arms IED threat mitigation asset on vehicles or on personnel that are required to move in an area with an assessed RCIED threat. When CREW assets with vehicles move, additional planning considerations are required. It is best practice that expert advice be sought when planning moves requiring CREW assets. To properly use, the CREW system, operators must deconflict frequencies with all other systems in the vicinity. If not, the CREW system will not operate properly.

Slide 20



This slide describes some of the key planning considerations that leaders should use when deploying CREW assets.

CREW asset deployment typically involves the employment of a suite of systems appropriately chosen to mitigate the risk posed by RCIED threats. CREW provides a degree of assured protection against RCIEDs in a virtual ‘envelope’ surrounding the personnel and equipment. There are many complex and competing factors that determine the effectiveness of this protective envelope.

The use of CREW assets is done in line with UN Mission guidance. An accurate RCIED threat picture should be determined, and the required fill developed for the technology type to be deployed.

Slide 21

Planning Considerations- CREW Assets

- Use by search or IEDD personnel
- Environment assessed to have RCIED threats
- Separate planning required
- Man-pack vs vehicle mounted systems
- EOD can give expert advice to UNIBAT leadership

Specialised EOD use of CREW assets refers typically to the use of ECM by either search or IEDD personnel operating in an environment that is assessed to have a potential RCIED threat.

Typically, such CREW sets will be man portable and are referred to as man-packs; however, it is also common for such personnel to deploy in CREW fitted vehicles to mitigate such threats while in transit or when stationary in the area that they establish their Incident Control Point (ICHECK POINT).

Separate planning considerations are required in the deployment and use of man-pack compared to vehicle mounted CREW systems. Expert advice must be sought by commanders when they deploy such assets.

Both stationary, vehicle mounted, and man portable CREW systems exist and should be used in support of each other to strengthen the forces CREW strength.


Slide 22

Support Considerations

EOD deploys on short notice in semi/non-permissive environments

EOD units need earmarked support for

- Force Protection (FP)
- Communication via VHF & HF
- Logistical & Medical support



UNIBAT may provide support to the EOD unit for the duration of mission

MILEOD require additional enablers and support assets to deploy and require FP, Logistical, medical, and communications support. When planning operations with MILEOD; planners should consider that EOD units require support. The EOD capability can be employed on short notice to hostile, semi- and non-permissive environments. There are two types of operational environments that are of concern when deploying MILEOD:

- Semi-permissive refers to operations in a potentially hostile environment where the support from the local population cannot be depended upon
- Non-Permissive refers to a hostile environment where both adversaries and unsupportive local population pose a continuous threat

MILEOD require dedicated non-organic assets for security / FP that are allocated to support their operations. This may include UNIBAT assets and crew-served weapons. The provision of FP capabilities must be determined in the planning phase. There are two options for this FP capability, a dedicated organic security element or a named parent unit charged for the security of the MILEOD element.

Dedicated security provided by a UNIBAT is preferred and allows for EOD teams to integrate with their security, conduct TTP rehearsals and become a more effective response force.

Slide 23

Planning Consideration-Common Requests by EOD for Support

- Security Forces / Recce
- Search teams
- Transportation
- Engineer Assets
- Communications
- CREW
- Language Assistants
- CASEVAC

Security is for MILEOD is the most common request; however, depending on the mission, there may be a requirement for additional the communications via VHF / HF, logistical and medical support. These provisions need to be determined in the planning phase of a mission. Can you think of other requirements that should be considered? We will cover some of these in more detail. Now let us discuss C2.

Slide 24

Tactical Level C2 with UNIBAT

- UNIBAT Leadership must recognize MILEOD technical expertise / recommendations
- MILEOD typically tasked with other assets
- Considerations related to location

EOD working with Search & Force Protection

Who has C2 during phases of operation and how is C2 handed over?

The importance of establishing an efficient and effective C2 structure prior to the employment of any unit in the AO is essential for operational success.

Based on the mission analysis the force commander defines the best C2 necessary for operational success. Furthermore, the force / sector commander must assign a suitably qualified EOD focal point to oversee and coordinate EOD activities. Clear delineation of C2 for MILEOD is essential to ensure operational effectiveness and efficiency.

To best illustrate the need to clearly delineate who exercises C2 over MILEOD in a UNPKO; here are a few potential areas that should be considered. Location; Is the MILEOD in a sector with units from their own TCC? If so, is the MILEOD an organic asset of a larger unit or organised with other assets? Is the MILEOD designated to be employed only for the specific use by that unit commander?

United Nations Tactical Control (TACON) is the detailed and local direction and control of movement, or manoeuvre, necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. As required by operational necessities the HoM may delegate the tactical control of assigned military forces personnel to the subordinate sector and or unit commanders

Administrative Control. The authority over subordinate or other organisations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations

When MILEOD teams / elements (CMD or IEDD) are task organised, it is likely that it is in conjunction with other UN military assets such as a force protection cordon and security or search elements.

A unit employing MILEOD assets must give special consideration to the tactical C2 of the MILEOD team commander and their relationship to other units and subunits at an EO / EOD scene / activity. Unit commanders must appraise themselves of the technical expertise of the EOD commander and take due cognizance of their recommendations.

MILEOD may have Counter Radio-controlled Warfare (CREW) assets and search elements organic with an established C2. In all situations, a clear C2 relationships is required prior to an operation or task.

Of note, some EOD references use the term remote-control (RC) in place of radio-control. CREW assets are often referred to as Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) assets. It is possible that in many cases where CREW and search assets / elements are not organic to MILEOD, they can be attached / in direct support of MILEOD.

In the cases where an MILEOD is working with a search unit, it is essential to establish and adjust the C2 during the various phases of the operation. That is to say, we must consider prior how and when the C2 responsibility is handed over to what unit or commander during each phase of an operation or activity. The C2 relationship between the force protection cordon and security element / unit, and the MILEOD is to be addressed prior to the operation.


In the case that the local infantry commander has C2 of an operation, does this extend inside the cordon and evacuation, or is this under the C2 of the MILEOD commander? A common approach to these C2 issues during an EOD task is to establish an Incident Control Point (ICHECK POINT). This is a location selected by the Incident Commander (IC) that makes the best tactical sense and facilitates command, control, and coordination.

It should also be understood from a legal perspective that no EOD operations will begin until the IC has evacuated the area. This is to ensure there is no liability on the force if the device should prematurely detonate and injure civilians in the cordon area.

Typically, the tactical commander of the unit providing local security is the IC and has C2 of the overall IED incident. The IC will coordinate the operation with advice from the EOD operator and other supporting capabilities. The EOD operator will advise the IC and it is best practice to have C2 within the EOD cordon. At the completion of the task, full incident reporting is submitted to the EODCC and the FHQ, in accordance with, mission standard operating procedures (SOPs).

It is paramount that the EOD team leader, on the ground has command of the inner cordon, where the EOD task is being conducted. EOD operators have lost their lives when this is not clearly defined and understood. UNIBAT ICs or ranking officers cannot interfere in EOD operations and order unsafe actions to hurry the response. This is highly dangerous and will result in loss of life.

Slide 25



Standard EOD security and C2 practice;

Discovering unit establishes initial security cordon (will become the outer cordon upon EOD arrival) and resumes C2 of the scene upon completion of EOD actions. Security MUST maintain vigilant, outward facing posture to ensure no threats slip past the cordon, all civilians are evacuated, and no EOD procedures are monitored once the EDO team begins work.

EOD arrives and establishes the inner security cordon with escorting security force. Assumes inner cordon C2. Advises outer cordon if any actions need to be taken (such as expanding the outer cordon due to the hazards present). The EOD Team Leader holds absolute C2 authority over the EOD scene from start to finish of EOD actions. No actions should be taken until the scene is fully secure and no civilians are present.

* EOD Security force maintains C2 during all movements to and from the EOD response.

Clear C2 between multiple commanders on the scene of an EOD task is essential. The scene is often involving junior leaders in a high-pressure environment. This slide helps outline the concept of the IC and MILEOD.

Solid Security plans and SOPs help reduce the risk to the MILEOD operator and the risk to the mission. During mission planning, local security must be coordinated to ensure the

MILEOD operator can focus on the threat device and not worry about bystanders or threat actors. The local security must understand the requirements of the MILEOD operator.

In some cases, the element of the supported unit now becomes the local supporting unit to the MILEOD element. They must understand the local threat, as well as the requirements of the EOD team. These include EOD / Operational Cordon distances, safe wait times, CREW, and communications procedures. Area security may also require preventing external actors from exploiting the time required to complete an EOD event.

UNIBAT forces ground are to be considered. Area security could also include host nation security forces. When an MILEOD element responds to an explosive hazard from a remote location, transportation and route security are required. This could include both UN elements, as well as HN security forces.

Let us go through a tactical level C2 drill that is common:

- Incident Commander (IC) sets Incident Coordination Point (ICHECK POINT) at location
- Typically, tactical commander providing local security is IC and has C2 of overall IED / CMD incident
- IC coordinates operation with advice from EOD operator and other support capabilities
- EOD operators advise IC on EO threats. IC establishes control of the Operational cordon
- Best practice EOD cordon within operational cordon where EOD commander exercises C2
- Task completion, full incident report submitted according to SOPs

Slide 26

C2 Relationships-Planning Considerations

- **Articulated in orders**
- **MILEOD typically tasked with other assets**
 - Dedicated security or embedded in patrols/convoy
- **FP, search, medical, comms, transport, logistics, CREW operators**
- **When not organic, C2 needs to be clarified**
- **MILEOD has scalable capabilities**
 - IEDD vs CMD
- **Air transportation**

EOD teams are typically tasked with other assets in hostile environments. It is essential that clear C2 relationships are set and understood by all involved at the EOD activity. C2 within the MILEOD needs to be addressed and the C2 relationship between the MILEOD and attached assets. Examples are CREW operators, FP assets, communications specialists, and medics. This is important considering that EOD capabilities need to be scalable and have the flexibility to increase in size seamlessly to achieve the capability to defeat the threat.

Other examples of the importance of ensuring proper C2 considerations include the MILEOD working with support elements and non-organic transportation units. MILEOD deployed by non-standard means e.g., helicopter, boat, and armoured vehicle can pose C2 challenges. In such cases, the C2 between the MILEOD commander and the support element commander must be resolved prior to the operation. Also, such C2 relationships need to be articulated and written in an appropriate operations order, etc.

Consider CREW expertise with each deployment. EOD use of CREW assets often involves personnel going into areas with an assessed RCIED threat. The highest levels of assured protection from CREW assets are required and may consist of multiple systems to provide redundancy to allow specialist techniques to be applied.

Also, consider qualified CREW operators. If units are deployed with multiple CREW systems, special consideration should be given to ensure all CREW assets, both mounted

and dismantled, are de-conflicted with each other and UN / HN communication systems.

This deconfliction must be emphasised. The CREW system often does not “talk” between different types and can reduce or completely cancel each other out, giving the operators a false sense of security. In fact, there may be zero protection. Also, the leadership should understand “active” (always on) and passive (selective) jamming should be provided.

Particularly important is frequency management. To effectively use CREW there needs to be SIGINT capability to detect (often from recovered IED components) the frequencies the RCIEDs in the area are using. The frequency manager is responsible for maintaining frequency allocations and deconflicting systems.

The Mission must ensure that a proper life cycle budget is allocated to sustain and maintain CREW assets. Similarly, as part of the complete life cycle budget, the level of expert technical support needs to be included in the planning. The level and number of dedicated technical experts required will be dependent on the type of CREW asset. The consequences of not financing this capability initially and long term can be extremely detrimental. Other considerations in deploying CREW include:

- Vehicles not tactically dispersed are exposed to the effects of one non-RCIED
- Not upgrading the hardware, firmware and software as the threat evolves can lead to troops being exposed to RCIED threat they believe they have protection against
- The deployment of inappropriately trained and experienced personnel charged with the responsibility of deployment, use and maintenance of these assets resulting in its ineffectiveness in mitigating the RCIED threat
- When CREW assets are resourced and financed appropriately, commanders must be aware that it is likely since the RCIED threat has been successfully mitigated, the IED threat aggressor is likely to change their tactics. It can then appear that the significant financial and other resource investment in CREW assets was wasteful.

Slide 27

Specific Support

Engineering	Communications
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Route Recce • Route Clearance • Vulnerable Point / Area threat mitigation • General Engineering for Force Protection • Heavy Engineer Equipment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equipment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – UN Force / Inter-Sector Communications – Communications with HN Security Forces • CREW (ECM) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Employment – Frequency spectrum management

27

These slides show an example of some of the required engineering and communications support that an MILEOD may require. The UNIBAT staff may need to assist and or coordinate for the support.

Slide 28

Take Away

MILEOD PKO involve CMD & IEDD activities in conjunction with FP

MILEOD supports:

- Mobility and FP planning, advice and support
- Electronic warfare countering RCIED threats – CREW assets
 - Proper CREW utilization supported by a spectrum manager
- Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)

Planning Considerations

- Support requirements for EOD operations – Dedicated Security
- C2 relationships at force, tactical, support levels
- C2 delineation / establishing IC and cordons – EOD & security C2
- UNIBAT - MILEOD partnership; coordination is key to success

28

Summary

We should understand the planning considerations for both receiving and providing support to the MILEOD. Early coordination reduces risk to the EOD element, the UNIBAT units and to the mission. Liaison officers are key facilitators to help assist in this coordination and communication. Staff coordination with the MILEOD is a continuous process. The situation on the ground is dynamic and therefore, planning and support for MILEOD operations are constantly in flux requiring constant coordination.

Slide 29

Team Exercise

Situation Following increase IED attacks in FOLSA (UNIBAT AOR), the National Police searched a suspected bomb maker's house. One police officer was killed, another wounded when a box was opened near a workbench. The arrested bomb maker gave info about another location storing IED components and warned the police to be careful. The police have no bomb squad. They requested you, the UNIBAT Commander for help in searching / protecting the local population. Force HQs gave permission and directed you TACON of UN forces that are available to support an operation. You direct your staff to start planning. What tactical planning considerations should the staff include; how best to integrate EOD assets, and how best to mitigate risks to the population and UN forces.

LEARNING ACTIVITY: UNIBAT working with UN MILEOD


RESOURCES Projector to show slides or print and handout; 1 flip chart, markers

TIME Total: approx. 30 minutes

PREPARATION: Present the situation and backup slides. Break out into two subgroups; present the situation and back up slides. Have groups discuss and write down their planning considerations for the future operations. Have them return to plenary and discuss their finding / COAs

NOTES TO INSTRUCTOR: Some of the answers will not be clear-cut, demonstrating the challenge

Slide 30



Slide 31




Instructor Note: Use slide 35-37 to generate analysis of the relative safe distances to site and civilians, UN forces and other key areas. Consideration on where the inner and outer cordons should be. EOD personnel will assist in SME input to blast radius

Slide 32



Slide 33



Instructor notes to help facilitate- The situation should generate the following discussion points:

- The military force assets which are available and what other non-organic assets are required. The battalions EP team, EOD IEDD assets, for sure, but what about engineer search teams, additional UN POL and military police, Explosive detection dogs
- Engaging local population leadership to direct population away from blast areas
- Aerial photos of the Compound & the Area and other PKISR / MPKI products
- Assets from Sector / FHQs to support civilian engagement and Liaison
- A Warning Order to the relevant elements of the Battalion should be sent by Battalion HQ
- Establishing an Incident Control Point
- C2 established, EOD personnel briefed and part of the orders process
- Cordon established both outer and inner
- Organise for Search of Compound
- Briefing to all troops to emphasis the IED threat
- Personnel must be trained on the “5C Tool” (covered in the FP Lesson 3.4)
- Actions on an IED being found should be considered-IED found during Search, IED found on cordon, and IED exploding
- Based on the maps provided the operation will take place on across the river away from the UN Camp and local Hospital. What is the CASEVAC plan? Does it account for protests?
- Has fire service support requested

Lesson 3.8



Tactical Planning Considerations-Crowd Control

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson



Ask the students what some of the tactical planning considerations are that we might apply when going into a UN peacekeeping crowd control operation.

Aim

The aim of this lesson is to provide the participants with possible planning considerations for the employment of UNIBAT forces in a crowd control situation.

Slide 1



Lesson 3.8
Tactical Planning
Considerations for Crowd
Control

Because Infantry units have such diverse tasks and missions, often the UNIBAT is deployed to conduct crowd control operations. Normally, the UNIBAT augment the police (already deployed in crowd control). The police should retain the overall responsibility of crowd control and the UNIBAT will be in a support role. Only with the proper planning, authorizations, training, and equipment on hand should a UNIBAT execute such an operation. This lesson will describe the operational framework for such operations with an emphasis on tactical planning considerations.

Slide 2

Lesson Contents

- Conceptual- review
- Task organisation considerations
- Tactical planning considerations
- Command and control considerations
- Logistical considerations

Here is the lesson content addressing the operational framework for crowd control.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Explain crowd control in a UNPKO
- Explain how to apply MDMP in planning crowd control operations
- Explain command and control demands for crowd control

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4

Principles

- Speed
- Mission and Objective
- Cooperation with Host Nation (HN)
- Defense / protection
- Warning
- Security
- Surprise / manoeuvre
- Minimum use of force / graduated manner
- Domination of the area

To review from an earlier lesson, there are six principles governing crowd management, control, and dispersal they are as follows:

1. Speed. Speedy arrival at the point of incident should be a matter of priority since crowd likely and inevitably are bent to loot and destroy.
2. Mission and Objective. Conveyed by superiors to accomplish the mission
3. Cooperation with the Host Nation. UN forces can only intervene when they ask the UN forces for support, are non-existent or unwilling to create order.
4. Defence / protection /security. Approach and action must be taken to achieve all around security and to isolate the crowd. FP planning consideration / FP strategies.
5. Warning. Commander must use all available means to warn the crowd. This entails the use of bugle, public address system or whistle. The warning must be given in a language that the local population understands. A magistrate or legal officer if available may be involved to read the riot act to the crowd. A warning banner or interpreter can also be used to interpret the Riot Acts as the magistrate reads. One of the most effective deterrents to a crowd, however, is

the sight of a smart, highly trained, and efficient body of soldiers carrying out their riot control drills with precision and determination.

6. Use of Minimum Force (graduated manner). The use of force is to be reserved as the last resort and where necessary, force must be kept at the barest minimum and must cease once the immediate objective is achieved. More force than necessary should never be used for crowd control or dispersal though there may be instances where rigid adherence to the principle of use of minimum force may result in high casualties. The existing rules of engagement must be invoked where such situation exists. Always refer to the approved ROE.
7. Dominating the Area. It is of no use dispersing the crowd and leaving immediately, as there is the likely tendency of the crowd to regroup. A joint plan must, therefore, be made by the military and police forces for patrolling the area. This may be carried out by the troops or police or both. Whenever the commander is satisfied that the crowd is not reassembling or that the police alone can carry out the patrolling, the military force is to be withdrawn to a predetermined location.

Slide 5



The host nation's security forces have primacy for crowd control and must comply with their country's crowd control deployment regulations.

UNPOL can normally be used in joint actions with the local police and security forces to help coordinate, reinforce, or pass on knowledge.

The UN formed police units (FPU), have the possibility of being employed at the first level or, in support of the local police / security units.

The military contingents, in the mission, are the last possibility of employment for crowd control. If there is a need for employment, it must be planned and briefed to the higher HQs for approval. The UN force most likely will be tasked to reinforce the local police / security forces or FPUs.

Slide 6

Conditions for Use of Military Components in Crowd Control

- Absence or willingness of law enforcement authority in host country
- Capacity limitations of UNPOL/FPU
- Armed elements / potential violent actors
- Tasked by UN Mission authority
- **Only** if unit is trained and equipped for crowd control

Conditions that could warrant the use of the military component in crowd control operations are the lack of host nation, UNPOL and UN FPU capabilities, or the presence of armed groups that require military force / deterrence.

The conditions of employment of the military component to act in crowd control operations must be clearly specified by the Mission / Force HQs and the unit must be specifically trained and equipped for the task.

Slide 7

Purpose for Crowd Control

- **Maintain mobility of UN operations**
- **Maintain stability in areas on interest**
- **Deter violence**
- **Secure sensitive infrastructure- electric plants, bridges, food supply, ports, UN facilities**
- **Support FP / POC strategies**

Here are a few of the reasons that may drive the UN Mission to support or engage in crowd control operations.

Normally when demonstrations take place in all parts of the Host Country, UNIBAT has the main mission of maintaining the mobility of UN personnel, initially to protect facilities, key points in the country such as power plants, radio and cell phone antennas, airports/ ports, facilities responsible for logistics and support, among others.

The Military Component is of fundamental importance in maintaining a safe and stable environment. On some occasions the Civil Component has difficulties in its mobility. It is essential to keep the Mobility Plan updated. In these cases, the Military Component needs to support the Civil Component mobility through escorts and other activities.

Slide 8

Task Organization Considerations

- MPKI / threat based / crowd size
- Risk assessment
- C2 / joint operations
- Host nation support
- Forces available
- Terrain / weather
- Capabilities and equipment available

The areas highlighted on the slide are important when considering the task organisation. We are familiar with many of these as they echo our own MDMP and troop leading procedures. However, in a PKO, the threat / risk analysis is the predominant factor. The MPKI links between the battalion intelligence officers, sector intelligence cells and with the Mission Coordination Centres (JMAC, JOC, JLOC) are critical. The integration of knowledge through the transfer of information is essential.

Information about the demonstrations is passed on at the intelligence coordination meetings. The exchange of information between the intelligence sections is essential. As in all military operations, the human terrain, physical terrain, and weather are all taken into consideration. Are there other considerations that may be missing?

Slide 9

Tactical Planning Considerations

- Review joint policies / SOPs
- Conduct a threat / risk analysis
- Focus on Human Terrain / Key Actors
- Task organise teams and units for contingencies
- Conduct a joint reconnaissance
- Designate teams- record, take photos, collect evidence (chain of custody); prepare for detainees
- Defense support package- sandbags, wire, barriers
- Plan for reinforcements / QRF

Here are some of the areas that the UNIBAT should consider while planning for crowd control operations.

Slide 10

Tactical Planning Considerations Cont.

- Pre-position support packages
- Actively patrol prior, during, post operation
- Plan for redundant communications
- Include- engagement teams, legal, civil / military organisations, language assistance
- Cordon and isolate the area of operations
- Plan for detainees- processing kits, teams, guards, collection points, food / water, female search teams

Continued.

Slide 11

Command, Control and Coordination Considerations

- C2 established early and understood by all
- All plans briefed and approved by higher HQs
- Clear understanding of risks / use of force
- Shared common operating picture
- Responsibilities assigned and understood by all
- Reporting mechanisms
- Support- UN mission civilian components, Force HQs, ISR assets, trained negotiators, UNMOs, legal, Public Affairs, Investigation Officers (NIO)

The Head of Mission (HOM), through the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC), should be responsible for ensuring that the necessary command and control arrangements are developed between military and police components at the start of a peacekeeping mission.

On some occasions a task force may be created, under specific and temporary conditions, under the command of a senior United Nations police officer or military officer. On some occasions the Police and Military Component will carry out joint operations. The Mission should have SOPs on these operations. Detailed joint planning must be carried and plans briefed and approved by the higher HQs. The UNIBAT is required to brief their plans and get approval from the Sector or Force Commander. Risks and use of force must be discussed and understood by all mission civilian and uniformed components prior to any operation.

It is important to reach out to all interlocutors to help plan and monitor the situation. The last bullet on the slide shows some examples of possible support. It might be prudent to have the NIO (if deployed within the contingent) at the scene to see first-hand the

operation to preclude any unsubstantiated claims against the force. Information between the various mission units must be shared. A problem that occurred in each location may occur in another place while conducting future operations. This is particularly critical in the most populous cities or in the country's capital.

When you identify a problem in your area about manifestations, immediately inform the chain of command, and the intelligence channels for dissemination throughout the mission area.

Slide 12

Coordinate- local / host nation
authorities / security forces

- Collaborate actions; if appropriate / authorized, share MPKI products
- Expected outcomes
- Expectations of population in relation to UN
- Consequences of demonstrations / press coverage
- Coordination / control mechanisms
- Explain UN responsibility related to POC and FP

On this slide we show a list of considerations for coordination when planning for crowd control operations. During the coordination process and when conducting meetings with local leaders, several aspects should be addressed. We must always reinforce to all concerned that UN forces are impartial and that we have an obligation to protect vulnerable civilians and the human rights of all.

These meetings should be coordinated with the battalion's operational staff, Civil-Military section, and EP leadership. Meetings with local leaders should be intensified with the proximity of the demonstrations.

UN troops' responses to violence should be highlighted, such as the crowd's possible use of lethal weapons or items, such as Molotov cocktails. Explaining the red lines to authorities may manifest a peaceful demonstration and help all respect and ensure the safety of civilians and troops. Often, local leaders can help influence the potential crowd.

Slide 13

Considerations for the Use of Force

- Minimal and proportional use of force (graduated)
- Self-defense
- Prevention of unfavorable results
- Support to host government security forces
- Responsibilities- human rights, POC
- Criteria / framework briefed to and approved by higher HQs

The framework for the use of force in crowd control operations must be discussed and approved by the higher HQs before any operation. There must be clarity when the use of force by contingents is applied. For all crowd control operations orders must be clear and understood.

The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation has political implications that can give rise to unintended consequences. Therefore, judgments concerning the use of force must be made at the appropriate Mission-level, guided by UN principles governing the use of force and applied in the tactical planning considerations.

Individuals on the ground always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise self-defence or to protect civilians, in accordance to the Rules of Engagement.

The minimum use of force in a proportional, graduated manner must be adhered to. If at all possible, a commitment between the parties (local leaders and contingent commanders) must be sought at every opportunity, including during demonstrations. The mission civilian and police components, and the FHOs must be part of any plan and the sector / force commander must approve the use of force criteria and framework prior to any operation.

Slide 14

Logistics / Support Considerations

- Planning- include Force HQs and DMS reps
- Locate forward logistic trains to support operation
- Pre-stocked supplies and secure
- Increase- drinking water and medical
- Possible support for detainees and crowd injuries
- Non-lethal weapons and specialised equipment requirements- parts / maintenance

In planning logistics for crowd control, the UNIBAT staff must consider the unique challenges in supporting the operation. On this slide we have listed a few of these considerations.



Ask the students what other logistic and support considerations could be included?

Slide 15

Actions / Checklist Before Operations

- Check lethal / non-lethal arms and ammunition
- Automatic weapons set to single shot
- Respirators and masks serviceability
- Coordinate with host nation authorities
- Equipment for night operations
- Review MPKI products / acquisition collection plan
- All briefed on the Use of Force
- Medical supplies / hasty defense kits on hand
- Teams assigned to handle detainees / kits inventoried

This last slide does not fall into the category of tactical planning considerations; however, it provides “food for thought” on ensuring that we are ready to execute a crowd control operation.



Ask the students what other items should be included? Break up in a few sub-groups; have the students take 10 minutes to discuss, record and report back to the plenary.

Slide 16

Take Away

- Consider the principles when planning for crowd control
- Coordination with civilian components, host nation and interlocutors is important
- Approved plans by higher HQs and all understand use of force framework
- Prepositioning of support and logistics

This lesson has provided a basis for understanding of the UNIBAT and crowd control operations. Because Infantry units have such diverse tasks and missions, the UNIBAT may be deployed to conduct crowd control operations. Normally, the UNIBAT augment the police. The police forces should retain the overall responsibility of crowd control and the UNIBAT will be in a support role. Only with the proper planning, authorizations, training, and equipment on hand should a UNIBAT execute such an operation.

The framework for the use of force in crowd control operations must be discussed and approved by the higher HQs before any operation. There must be clarity when the use of force by contingents is applied. For all crowd control operations orders must clear and understood.

RESOURCES

Situations- Handout; chalk board or butcher paper and markers; Learning Activity Slides (can be hand-outs or projected)

TIME

Suggested time 30 min to one hour (dependant on the discussions). The instructor / facilitator can select the number of specific situations to be presented based on time available.

PREPARATION

At the end of the lesson, choose some of the following situations / activities for review and discussion. Depending on the time available and the student's level of understanding, select all or the appropriate number of situations or activities below. Divide the class into groups

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and access the knowledge of the group and individuals. There are a series of slides. You brief the general situation and ask the group the plenary question and discuss. Briefly go over the specific situations with the plenary. Break up into sub-groups and assign the sub-groups one or two specific separate situations (A, B, C, D). Give the sub-groups time to answer the question, have them report back to the plenary to brief the plenary and discuss their planning considerations. You facilitate the discussions. Attempt to focus the discussions on preventive and pre-emptive measures / tactical planning consideration versus the reactive approach to the situation.

LA Slide 17

Learning Activity

LA Slide 18

General Situation

- You are deployed as a planner in a UNIBAT
- UNIBAT strength is 755, with 3 motorised companies and one mechanised
- After a crisis that hit the host country with a UNPKO, the President decided to increase fuel prices by 70%, and 55% for basic food items. The Patriotic Movement of (MPC), a group of ex-combatants dissatisfied with the government, is planning massive demonstrations to take place in three days. The roads are currently clear, and traffic is normal
- The FC ordered your UNIBAT to secure and the road open between the capital center and the airport (5 km)
- There are no FPU's assigned to the mission

LA Slide 19

Specific Situation A

Upon leaving the base, the UNIBAT force came across obstacles on the road that blocked the troop's passage. The force receive stones from 15-20 civilians demonstrating. Vehicle windshields were hit by stones and damaged.

- What considerations and measures (preventive / preemptive) might you have planned for to neutralize the threats / reduce the risks

LA Slide 20

Specific Situation B

Arriving to an assigned location to secure a key chock point, the force ran into larger demonstrations with newly built obstacles (that morning) blocking the road. The protesters threaten to throw Molotov cocktails if the force passed through the barricade. Some of your soldiers were injured by stones being thrown by the protestors.

- What considerations and measures (preventive / preemptive) might you have planned for to neutralise the threats / reduce the risks

LA Slide 21

Specific Situation C

The neighbouring country's embassy, requested UN support to move its personnel and 20 civilian vehicles to the airport. The FC ordered your UNIBAT to secure the embassy premises and provide a security escort for the civilian convoy to the airport.


- What are the necessary coordination's measures might you take
- How might you task organise the force and what are some of the key tasks
- What support should the UNIBAT ask for from the FHQs / mission

LA Slide 22

Specific Situation D

Demonstrations continue in large numbers, the economic situation is deteriorating, the population demands for the president's resignation. A large demonstration is expected in the upcoming days. The UN Police Component assets were deployed to the interior of the country. Protesters now surround the Government Palace in GALASI (capital). A small number of demonstrators are inside the 1st Minister's Palace. The palace is assigned a national security force (50 police officers) that are trained in crowd control. The UNIBAT has received orders from the Force Commander to help secure the presidential / government facility.

LA Slide 23



LA Slide 24

Specific Situation D

- What tasks should be issued to company commanders; how might you task organise the UNIBAT for success
- What coordination needs to be done
- What are the planning considerations for support
- What might be some of your key request for information, IR and additional ISR assets
- What are some of the C2 considerations
- How would you plan to handling detainees
- What event might trigger the employment of a QRF and where should the QRF be positioned

Lesson 3.9



Tactical Planning Considerations for Handling Detainees

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson



For an interactive start to the Lesson engage participants to seek their understanding of what they consider are the elements for planning the handling of detainees. Ask what other special planning considerations should a UNIBAT staff include in planning operations. Note: they may not differ too much from their own military. To aid participants' learning, prior to the lesson have participants work in small groups and ask each group to come up with two or three elements. Record on a chart / white board and have them discuss just before you start the lesson.



Instructor Notes: Recommend that lesson be presented by a trainer who has some personal experience in planning or conducting operations that had to handle detainees in a UN Mission. Also, the trainer should review the Standard Operating Procedure on the Handling of Detention in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, by DPO, DPPA and UNDSS with an effective date of 1 January 2021 (or updated version).

Slide 1




Detention involves the detention of a person or group that pose some level of threat to the population or military operation. The handling of detainees is a complex task for the UNIBAT to properly apprehend, guard, protect, and transfer / handover a detained individual to the proper authorities.

The UNIBAT Commander should consider detainees in any military operation. Planning for detainees should be in place prior to the start of the operation. The commander and staff should analyse the wide array of logistical and operational requirements associated with the handling of detainees. DPO has an SOP that provides a framework for handling detainees; however, in most cases, UN Missions have their own SOPs that provide more specific guidance for handling detainees within the mandate and or agreements with the host nation / state.

We should be aware of the special planning considerations that have been proven to be essential in handling detainees. Commanders should anticipate operational and logistical requirements well in advance. Site selection for detainee collection points and temporary facilities is critical and must incorporate a wide range of factors including human rights, logistical supportability, medical, security, and the safety of all concerned.

Slide 2

A rectangular box with a black border containing the title "Lesson Content" in blue text at the top. Below the title is a bulleted list of four items: "Planning phases", "Tactical planning considerations", "Special considerations", and "Coordination".

Lesson Content

- Planning phases
- Tactical planning considerations
- Special considerations
- Coordination

Here are the topics we will be covering in this lesson. The aim of this presentation is to provide participants with a baseline of tactical planning considerations.

The handling of detainees must be supervised and carefully controlled, and the use of force must be in line with the ROE. There are a very important ramifications for the UN at all levels — strategic, operational, and tactical.

The capability to plan, execute, and support the handling of detainees in military operations is essential. UN forces must be ready and prepared to apprehend, process and transfer / handover detainees. All units and their personnel must treat detainees humanely, properly safeguard / control, and account for detainees in accordance with the applicable UN DPO / Mission SOPs.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Describes the planning phases for the handling of detainees
- Explain key planning considerations for each phase
- Explain unique considerations for females and children
- List key actors that the UNIBAT should consider coordinating with when handling detainees

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on this slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This will help to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson.

Slide 4

Possible Circumstances for Detention

- POC- threat to civilians
- Protection- human rights
- Checkpoints / cordon & searches
- Offence in presence of a UN force / unit
- Support public order / crowd control
- Carrying out a disarmament
- FP- threat to UN forces / property

Within the UN Mandate and Agreements

On this slide we show possible situations in a UN PKO that may result in the handling detainees. One of the most important circumstances is within the framework of the POC. Under certain UN Resolutions, Peacekeeping Operations are required, under the POC Mandate, to prioritize the Protection of Civilians that are under threat from physical violence.

To protect civilians, missions are provided with the authority to afford direct physical protection, including using force under certain conditions and in some cases disarming and detaining individuals that are a threat to civilians. “Without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the host state, integrated and coordinated activities by all civilian and uniformed mission components to prevent, deter or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians within the mission’s capabilities and areas of deployment through the use of all necessary means....”.

It is important to note that during routine military operations you may be confronted with handling detainees and military units must be trained, plan for it and be prepared to execute procedures.



Ask the participants / class if there are other circumstances where a UNIBAT may detain individuals. Also, ask if the class has UNPKO / UN Mission examples.

Slide 5

Planning Phases for Handling Detainees

- Apprehension
- Processing
- Transfer / handover

Conduct a threat-based analysis approach and use UN MPKI processes and products

Let us first emphasize that we should consider detainees as we go through the MDMP / threat-based analysis approach. During the mission analysis portion of any operation, the analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE) will be conducted. The MPKI processes (threat-based analysis) are instrumental in the predicting the potential and probability for encountering detainees in an operation. The UNIBAT should always plan for the possibility of handling detainees. The key components of the AOE that can be helpful in this area are human terrain, actor evaluation and situation integration.

Apprehension is the act through which an individual is placed under the effective control or custody of United Nations personnel.

Processing- During this phase more detailed records and reports are compiled. Also, this phase includes a longer-term task such as guarding, the monitoring of the detainees, a more thorough medical examination conducted by medical professionals, and transportation to alternate sites.

Transfer / handover-Transfer is the act of passing a detained person from one designated place of detention to another. An example could be a UNIBAT transferring a detainee to a UN Military Police unit / UNPOL unit or to a sector HQs detention facility. Handover is

the act of passing a detained person from the effective control of the United Nations field operation to that of the host State authorities or any other authority.

For all these phases, there are unique planning considerations, tasks and logistical / administrative resources required. When planning detention operations we must consider how to task, organise and incorporate the number of sections, platoons, or companies required based on estimates of the apprehension rate.

The most important factor in detainee operations for a UNIBAT is the quick and easy transfer / handover of the detainee to the proper authority. If the time frame increases, the risks of incidents increase.

Slide 6

Planning Considerations - Apprehension

- Task organisation -dedicated teams, search, guards, processing, recording
- Isolate- protected site for initial processing
- Logistical- kits, cameras, restraints, food, water
- Language assistance available
- Forms / records kits -seizure of property
- Check for injuries / initial medical screening / first aid
- Site survey of the area

Here are some tactical planning considerations for when apprehending an individual:

- Conduct an initial search of the detained person and seize items which may be used to cause harm or damage to property, as well as communications and information technology devices
- Detainee shall be photographed for identification, conduct initial screening, and record any injury or matter relating to his/her wellbeing, if medical personnel on hand have them do the screening, if not, provide first aid
- If necessary, apply instruments of safe restraint to prevent the detained person from escaping or from harming themselves or others
- Conduct a site survey at the place of apprehension to collect any relevant items that might be useful as evidence in any criminal proceedings
- Question the detained person for identity, age and whether they need medical treatment (communicate in the detainee's language, may need language assistant)
- Inform the Unit Commander of the apprehension, ask whether the apprehended person should be released or continue to be detained
- Complete and submit the detention forms, reports

- Package and inventory seized items- name of detainee, date, and time of the collection, take photos (Detained Persons Property Register); dangerous items may be destroyed upon the approval of the commanding officer; personal items not confiscated or ordered destroyed will be returned

The UNIBAT / COY must tasks organise the unit / teams to be able to conduct these tasks efficiently and effectively. Plan to have dedicated search, guard, questioning and recording / reporting teams. Plans should include the selection of temporary tactical initial detention / processing sites.

Logistical support- Apprehension kits need to be issued to units to assist in the proper identification, securing, and transporting of detainees. These kits may include biometric collection devices, buccal swabs for DNA ([deoxyribonucleic acid] collection), latex gloves, surgical masks, flex-cuffs, earmuffs, cameras, tags, and property bags along with property custody documents. There should be food / water kits available for that are separate from the unit stores. Each apprehended individual / detainee must have a completed record / tag and the required information that can be found in a tagging kit.

Slide 7

Processing

- Medical examination – medical personnel
- Questioning; detainee’s responses recorded
- Identity verified
- Transported to a detention site
- Reporting and records maintained
- Chain of custody maintained for seized items
- Coordination with interlockers

This phase is designated once the commanding officer has decided that an apprehended individual is to be detained. Here are some of the tactical planning considerations for the UNIBAT staff. It is important that records and reports from the apprehension are maintained, and the chain of custody monitored. The detainee should be examined by medical personnel. A person designated by the detainee shall be notified of the detention as soon as possible.

The initial identification of the detainee may be based on unsupported statements or documentation. Additionally, questioning by leadership can be done and recorded. Standard Operating Procedures may guide the questioning of the detained persons, as applicable, for the purposes of ascertaining identity, age, medical state; conducting medical examinations and providing medical treatment; conducting risk assessments; or otherwise informing the individual of the process. Detained persons may not be compelled to answer questions.

Units should plan locations close to the area of actual operations for quick detainee evacuation, but also situated in a safe, secure location for both detainees and the force. Detainees should be taken to a holding area as soon as practicable. This area is normally

located in a secure location that provides safety and is easily accessible for receipt and evacuation of detainees.

Prior planning, coordination, and synchronization of assets with all resources used for the transportation of detainees are required. Planning considerations should include logistic support, and medical support. Units should have report formats from their higher HQs and a list of interlocutors / agencies that they are required to coordinate with / keep informed.

Slide 8

Transfers / Handover

- Security
- Resources and task organisation
- Records and personal property
- Notification / coordination

Here are planning considerations for the transfer and/or handover of detainees.

Transfer is the act of passing a detained person from one designated place of detention to another.

Handover is the act of passing a detained person from the effective control of the United Nations field operation to that of the host State authorities or any other authority.

Security and safety are principal concerns when planning a transfer or handover to authorities, Security must include safeguards for the detainees. Further considerations include contingency plans for and prevention of escape attempts, attacks upon the detainee movement, delays enroute due to threat actions, weather, and mechanical failures. Ensure that the staff plans for the proper resources, transport, and task organisation.

Transfer- detainee records and reports shall be available to the receiving unit / authority at time of transfer / handover and provided to other mission components, as appropriate. Based on operational requirements a detainee may be transferred from one Commanding Officer to another Commanding Officer with due considerations to place

of residence, access to family, etc. with appropriate documentation copied to the Detention Focal Point and Chief of the Human Rights component. Items of the detained person (other than those confiscated) shall be transferred along, and records updated to reflect the transfer.

For transfer, an order informing the detainees of the impending action is given so that they may notify family / designated persons of their new location. Caution should be exercised to ensure sensitive detainee information is not released to the general public or local officials. Verify that detainees possess their authorised clothing and equipment. Account for and prepare seized personal property for transfer. Ensure logistic resources are adequate (food and water). Maintain coordination with higher headquarters and specified interlocutors.

Handover- Once a decision to hand over a detained person has been made, and the host State authorities have agreed to take the detained person into custody the UNIBAT should have plans on taking steps to comply with the Mission SOP. Some of these steps will include:

Liaise with Sector / Force HQs, the Detention Focal Point to ensure that the host State authorities have signed a written declaration of assurances, obtained legal authority, and ensured that the handover of the detained person occurs in a humane manner. Turnover all items seized from the detained person (unless destroyed), items collected at the scene of the apprehension, and records to the host State authorities. The authorities shall sign a receipt. After handover has taken place, inform the higher HQs

When a handover takes place, communicate to the national authorities the identity; date, time, place of detention; reasons for detention; place of handover and identity of national authority who received the handover. Also, a copy of the UN Detention, Handover Form will be submitted to the HOM, DFP and Chief of HR Component, and the Detained Persons Register and the Detained Persons Property Register updated accordingly. A copy of the statement of handover with contents explained in a language understood by the detainee shall be provided to them at the time of handover.

Slide 9

Female Detainees

- Female present during all contact
- Keep separate from males
- Females search females
- Considerations for pregnant / nursing females

Special procedures and safeguards shall be implemented for processing female detainees. Here are 4 areas concerning female detainees that the UNIBAT should plan for prior to an operation.

Slide 10

Child Detainees

- **Last resort, an extreme measure**
- **Protect from harm, separate from adults**
- **Immediately notified- higher HQs and Child Protect Advisor**

Special procedures and safeguards shall be implemented for children apprehended and detained by United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. In all actions and decisions concerning children, the best interest of the child is the primary consideration. The apprehension and detention of a child shall only be used as a measure of last resort, for the shortest possible period of time, and in accordance with international norms and standards relating to the deprivation of child liberty. Here are key procedures that the UNIBAT should plan for:

- Children associated with armed groups or involved in conflict-related violence shall be primarily treated as victims
- UN personnel must act in the best interest of the child and to protect children from harm
- Unit Commander must immediately inform and consult the mission Child Protection Adviser and upon consultation with the Apprehending Officer, shall make the initial determination whether to release the child on-scene or to detain them based on the best interest of the child
- Any child detained by UN personnel should be handed over to the Host State child protection authorities or, if this is not possible, to humanitarian child protection actors for interim care within 48 hours from the moment of apprehension

Slide 11

Coordination

- Brief plans to higher HQs
- Plan to liaise and give access to UN and international organisations / agencies
- Report to higher HQs
- Seek guidance from higher HQs; DFP is key to the process

During the handling of detainees, the UNIBAT will encounter representatives of UN / international organisations that have an interest to help safeguard detainees. Such representatives will often seek access to detainees, and/or offer their services to assist in the care and maintenance of detainees. Effective planning will establish a mechanism for interaction with such organisations in order to maximize the benefit of potential contributions to the UN effort. Commanders should seek guidance through the sector / Force HQs and the DFP. All operational plans (including the handling of detainees) should be briefed and endorsed by the Sector or Force HQs.

Slide 12

Take Away

- Always plan for detainees in every operation; use phases as a tool
- Key to success- (UNIBAT) transfer / handover detainees as soon as possible
- Document and record all aspects of the process; use forms provided in SOPs
- Special considerations for females and children
- Report and coordinate with the appropriate HQs, DFP, agencies and organisations

Summary

The UNIBAT should anticipate operational and logistical requirements well in advance of handling detainees. Site selection must incorporate a wide range of factors including logistical supportability, security, and safeguarding detainees. Consideration should be given to reporting, recording, and processing detainees from apprehension to transfer/handover.

Battalion commanders have the overall responsibility for the planning and conduct of detainee handling. Commanders will ensure detainee operations in their AOR comply with the UN DPO SOP, UN Mission SOPs, and international human rights.

Other planning considerations for the handling of detainees include task organised teams; logistics; property safekeeping and accountability; transportation; administrative processing; language assistance; coordinating mechanisms with UN components / international agencies / organisations. Guidance should be given by Sector, Force HQs and the UN Mission DFP.

Learning Activities

3.9

RESOURCES

Situations- Slide Handouts (map, situations); chalk board or butcher paper and markers

TIME

Suggested time 15 min (dependant on the discussions).

PREPARATION

Provide the students with the Handout below. Divide the class into groups and give them the necessary time to review the questions. Ask the students to discuss and report back to the plenary

Handout- Questions:

- Which UN agencies should you coordinate with when it comes to detainee operations?
- What are the items to be searched?
- What are the points to be kept in mind while searching a female detainee?
- What are options to assist the unit in providing food and water to detainees?
- What is a detainee kit? What should be in it?
- What should be available in a temporary detainee holding area?
- How might you task organise a UNIBAT COY to for establishing a temporary detainee holding area?
- What should be the security arrangement of holding area?

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

- Introduce the activity and its focus on the standard layout of the holding area. Recall and discuss a holding area of Detainees
- Ask participants to reflect on the content on standard layout of Detainee holding area. Participants must brainstorm and discuss about desired standard layout of holding area They should be able to find out important aspects and other related issues of detainee holding area
- Invite responses from participants. Begin discussing yourself. Use a diagram of a standard layout of detainee holding area.
- Reinforce your key points to bridge-in to Lesson 1.8 on standard layout of detainee holding are. Highlight the important aspects of holding
- Integrate into the discussion the key points in the two detainee lessons

Handout

- Which UN agencies should you coordinate with when it comes to detainee operations?
- What are the items to be searched?
- What are the points to be kept in mind while searching a female detainee?
- What are options to assist the unit in providing food and water to detainees?
- What is a detainee kit? What should be in it?
- What should be available in a temporary detainee holding area?
- How might you task organise a UNIBAT COY to for establishing a temporary detainee holding area?
- What should be the security arrangement of holding area?

Lesson 3.10



Tactical Planning Considerations for the UNIBAT and ISR Operations

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson



For an interactive start to the Lesson engage participants to describe how they might use patrols and the ISR platoon to support operations. Have them explain how unmanned aerial systems (UAS) might be used prior to a future operation.

Slide 1



Lesson 3.10
Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) Tactical
Planning Considerations

1

The next lesson is focused on acquisition and PKISR tactical planning considerations. These considerations will hopefully provide the general guidance to assist UNIBAT leaders and staff in the development of their UNPKO plans. During this lesson you will understand the basics and learn to describe the key elements and considerations of PKISR Planning.

As UN mandates and the operating environment have evolved over the years, there is a need for the UNIBAT to understand how best to employ PKISR assets.

Slide 2

Lesson Contents

- ISR / acquisition planning
- Tactical planning considerations and factors
- Employment of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in support of ISR

ISR planning is crucial managing the acquisition process and in balancing the PKISR resources available in the mission. Solid acquisition and PKISR planning can make it possible to help the planners get information in a timely manner, using the best possible sensor. It is therefore an important part of the MPKI cycle. Here are the items we will cover in this lesson.


Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Describe key elements of ISR acquisition planning
- Explain ISR planning considerations and factors
- Explain the considerations for the employment of UAS in support of ISR / acquisition

Let us review the learning outcomes before we start this lesson. Please take a moment to read and understand what you are expected to be able to do at the end of the lesson. At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on this slide.

Slide 4



The basics of PKISR Planning

- The planning environment
- The resources available

The planning environment for acquisition and assigning PKISR assets depends on the level of military operations and the activity being conducted (i.e., tactical / operational / strategic). Force and Sector HQs often have specialised MPKI cells and PKISR capabilities to support the MPKI cycles. At the UNIBAT level, this often comes down to limited organic PKISR assets.

Slide 5

UNIBAT ISR Assets

- Infantry COY (patrols)
- Engagement Platoon
- Class 1 unmanned aerial systems (UAS)
- ISR Platoon



ISR Platoon



The main PKISR asset that the UNIBATs have are their own soldiers / COYs conducting patrols. The UNIBAT has a designated special PKISR asset that is usually structured in the support company, specifically the IRS platoon. Additionally, the UNIBAT has an engagement platoon that can be tasked to support the UNIBAT acquisition and engagement plans. In some UNIBAT structures, the PKISR platoon may have a Surveillance Section with level 1 tactical unmanned aerial systems (UAS).


Slide 6

UNIBAT ISR Platoon

- Trained in reconnaissance and surveillance
- May have a tactical UAS section
- Surveillance section coordinates employment of other sensors, including ground surveillance radar
- Normally S2 coordinates ISR platoon activities

Let us explore into more detail the UNIBAT PKISR platoon. The PKISR platoon has a specially trained reconnaissance section, which may also have a surveillance section with a tactical Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). The surveillance section can coordinate the employment of other sensors to include ground surveillance radar. Normally, the S2 Staff Section manages all the UNIBAT acquisition assets. The S2 is responsible for coordinating the PKISR platoon activities and the additional IRS assets / capabilities outside the battalion in support of the commander's collection / acquisition plan.

Slide 7



Acquisition Planning

- Short-term 72 to 24 hours
- Medium-term beyond 72 hours
- Strategy
- Avoid redundancy

ISR acquisition planning focuses on a time span of 72hrs to 24hrs. This is referred to as short term planning. For MPKI, everything beyond 72 hours is referred to a medium-term planning. Everything shorter than 24hrs is seen as current operations and is the responsibility of PKISR Operations (Ops).

ISR planning is tied to and associated with the acquisition strategy. An acquisition strategy is a systematic plan to optimize the tasking and requesting of capable, available, and appropriate acquisition assets and/or resources against requirements. As part of the acquisition strategy, it is essential to avoid redundancy in tasking.

Slide 8

ISR Acquisition Planning Elements

Short- & medium-term overview

1. Intelligence Acquisition List (IAL) planning horizon is 72 hours; flexible to accommodate new time-sensitive tasking
2. ISR planners use:
 - 72-hour point
 - 48-hour point
 - 24-hour point

As the IAL gets to the 24-hour mark, it is more accurate & refined; it is ready to pass to ISR Ops for execution

ISR acquisition planning focuses on a time span between 72hrs and 24hrs. For planning purposes, the Intelligence Acquisition List's (IAL) are used to as a tool to process and track PKISR requirements and taskings. The IAL is a dynamic portion of the Intelligence Acquisition Plan (IAP) but it is limited to and focuses on the intelligence requirements between 72hrs and 24hrs. At the 72 hour point a broad review of where the PKISR assets will be tasked is considered against what should be established. This is communicated to the units to determine feasibility. As the time frame closes, the plan becomes more mature. At the 24-hour point the plan is passed to the PKISR Ops to be executed.


The PKISR Planner has three "living" IALs: one at the 72-hour point, one at the 48-hour point and one at the 24-hour point. The planner uses the IAP for planning activities beyond the 72-hour mark. The planner must be able to manage the impact of the dynamic tasking process and adjust plans to ensure deadlines are met. As the management of the IAL gets to the 24-hour point, the more accurate and refined it becomes. The PKISR Planner's job is never complete. The PKISR Planner must have a good understanding of the IAP and routinely assign tasks to the PKISR assets / units to fill information requirement gaps.

Slide 9

ISR Acquisition Planning Elements

Acquisition Strategy

1. Systematic plan: optimize taskings, request available, appropriate acquisition assets
2. ISR assets:
 - a) 1st organic
 - b) 2d adjacent, higher HQs
 - c) Other available sources



*Requires close cooperation between PKI analysts and
ISR assets managers / units*

As said before, planning to employ PKISR assets requires an acquisition strategy. Let us take time to highlight the key elements of an acquisition strategy. Without an acquisition strategy we are not able to optimize the tasking of PKISR assets in the Mission area. The IAL is the core product of this strategy. An acquisition strategy integrates the tasking of multidisciplinary assets that include organic PKISR assets of the unit, adjacent and higher HQs assets, and other assets that may be available.

For a UNIBAT, requesting adjacent and higher-level assets is a standard practice, along with providing their PKISR other units or the higher HQs requests. Requesting other available sources, such as NGO's or the Host Nation resources can also be an option. The strategy consists of a wholistic approach to find the right sensor / PKISR asset to collect information requirements.

When developing the strategy, we should ensure that all concerned (staffs and leadership) have a close cooperative working relationship with each other. The relationships that are developed between the UNPKI / MPKI cells, the Ops / intel planners, and the PKISR asset manager / unit leaders, are key for developing a solid acquisition strategy. This close cooperation improves the understanding of the acquisition assets as to what to collect.

Slide 10

ISR Acquisition Planning Elements (03)

Avoid **redundancy in tasking ISR capabilities and consider:**

- Convergent
- Sequential
- Swarm
- Probing
- Queuing

10

Avoiding redundancy is one of the key elements of PKISR planning. Redundancy has a direct connection to the acquisition strategy; the planning and tasking of PKISR assets needs to be timely and efficient. As such, the plan must be free of redundancy. An example of redundancy is when you task two assets to support an information requirement when one asset could suffice.

The following methods will help avoid redundancy in tasking PKISR assets:

- Convergent- Conduct acquisition operations with different types of sensors to acquire different types of information
- Sequential- Trigger a sensor to start acquisition by the information that is collected by another sensor
- Swarm- Use all means available for a period to intensively cover the area (good for countering actor-counterintelligence measures)
- Probing- Trigger “target” behaviour to allow acquisition on a “target”
- Queuing- Plan multiple sensors subsequently to ensure continuous coverage

Slide 11

Key Considerations and Factors affecting ISR Planning

- What gaps / RFIs need closing
- Which ISR capabilities to use
- Where are the ISR capabilities
- Is the ISR capabilities able to answer my question

Here are tactical planning considerations addressing PKISR capabilities:

- Take a short- and medium-term view on the information requirement gaps or what requests need closing (or are outdated). The UNIBAT staff must have a working relationship with the Intelligence Acquisition Plan manager. The IAP manager will provide an understanding of the existing information gaps. Also, a good working relationship with the MPKI Plans officer will be necessary. The UNIBAT staff needs to have an understand of what the Force and Sector HQs are planning and what priorities they may have. This will provide a broad view on the line of effort and will help to align the battalions PKISR planning activities with the operational needs of all customers
- ISR capabilities are available. For this, we need to understand the availability of **the mission's** PKISR capabilities – that is, are they available, when will they be available, how long will they be available for, and what are their limitations?


- We need to know where the PKISR assets are; particular if assets are stationed at location A and only have a limited reach – and thus will not be able to physically get to location B (where acquisition is needed)
- Are the assets able to answer the questions in a timely, relevant, and efficient manner? If we need to know if a particular building is in use, we could decide to send a UAV to observe an activity in and around the building, but it might be easier to task a patrol to recon that area

Slide12

Deployment and tactical
planning considerations
for unmanned aerial
systems (UAS)

10

Slide 13



A variety of factors can impact the ability to successfully employ a UAS asset to meet the operational requirements of the mission. The following should be considered when determining if the UAS is able to meet the needs of the UNIBAT.

An operational context to understand the task: That is the need to understand the context in which the UAS will be employed. The context is important as it lays the foundation for many of the following considerations. Therefore, understanding why a UAS is being deployed to acquire information and the intended outcome of the mission.

Airspace Considerations: UAS tasking will be regulated by host nation and international bodies. For example, the host nation will dictate airspace considerations, including whether the UAS will be operating in segregated or unsegregated airspace. The rules and regulations surrounding the use of UAS in a Mission area will be managed by the Mission's Aviation Section.

Command and Control (C2): The overarching principle of command at the highest appropriate level and control at the most effective level should guide UAS planning. For example, UAS will be commanded at mission level and controlled at Force level, with tasking and control being delegated to lower formations when appropriate to do so. However, there is no reason why a Class III UAS could not be employed to support a company level operation. In this circumstance, control of the tasking and sensors must

be delegated to the battalion level to gain maximum benefit. UAS command and control will be supported by the Chief Aviation Officer (CAVO) and Chief ISR. The command-and-control relationship is likely to be different for contracted UAS assets and those provided by TCCs.


Endurance: In general terms, the further the UAS launch site is from the area of operations, the less time the aircraft will have on-task over the named area of interest (NAI). This is due to the fuel it uses to fly the asset to the NAI. Different assets will have different endurance times.

Range: The tasking range of a UAS will be largely influenced by its command and control means. A UAS operating on 'Visual Line of Sight' has a much shorter range than one operating at 'Radio Line of Sight', and both are surpassed by 'Beyond Line of Sight' operations.

Slide 14

Planning Considerations

- Launch / recovery times
- Communications, frequency management / interference
- Logistic footprint
- Data storage and accessibility
- Aircraft safety



This slide is a continuation of the planning considerations for the employment of UAS. Launch and Recovery: Class I UAS usually can be hand launched or operated using vertical take-off and landing techniques, whereas larger UAS will need more space to the extent that Class III UAS will require a prepared runway. Class II UAS sit somewhere in the middle, with some simply requiring a catapult system. Time taken to launch, recover and re-task will vary between aircraft.

Communications: The frequency range used must be taken into consideration during the deployment process because it is essential that frequency deconfliction occurs, for example, Class II and III use VHF radio communications that can interfere with other land and air operators, including civilian activities from the host nation.

Logistic Support: The class of UAS will tend to dictate the deployment footprint required to support the capability; from Class I UAS being organic to a military infantry company, and therefore all logistical support will be embedded within the unit, to a Class III UAS demanding up to 100 support personnel and airport level infrastructure. This is an important consideration should a UAS need to be moved to support operations

elsewhere in a mission area – moving a larger UAS will take time and result in the asset being 'non-operational' for a period.

Data Storage: Data should be retained, stored, and archived in such a way that it is possible to identify and retrieve the data at a future point in time. Any TCCs or commercial companies that seek to introduce proprietary standards that cannot be integrated to the common database should be rejected at the earliest opportunity.

Aircraft Safety: UAS must meet the minimum aviation safety requirements relevant to the mission's airspace as demanded by the host nation. Therefore, Class II and III UAS must be fitted with a Traffic Collision Avoidance System. Tactical systems (typically Class I) must operate within a Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ) to limit the risk of collision between UAS and other flying platforms, for example, helicopters.

Slide 15

Tasking

- Commander's intent (mission goals)
- Clear reporting lines
- Command and control

Certain information is essential when tasking a UAS - the following 3 pieces of information are mandatory:

- **Commander's intent (mission goals)** – the PKISR objective must be clear to the operator. A briefing on the situation and real time communication should be provided to assure that the UAS controller understands the PKISR analyst's needs. For example, surveillance on UN Base Villa perimeter from 1800 to 0400 between D+1 and D+3, identify mooring points on the riverbank between the villages of Mai, etc
- **Clear reporting lines** – the situation may change during the mission and communications between UAS operator and PKISR analyst may not be possible. Therefore, dissemination of information must be explicit in the ATO, for example, reporting that the base perimeter, from the previous scenario, is secure
- **Command and control** – the chain of command and reporting should be defined before the mission, for example, contact between S2 / G2 / U2 and UAS operator is by mobile phone and using radio as an alternative. If communication fails, the

UAS operator should proceed as per the ATO. Everyone should know who has control of the aircraft.

Slide 16

UAS Tasking

- Management:
- Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC)
- Mission Chief Aviation Officer
- Class II & III – U2 (ATO)
- Class I U2 (ATO) / SOP


Most UN Peacekeeping Missions will have a civilian /military coordination system to manage aviation resources, including UAS; this is achieved through the Mission Air Operation Centre (MAOC). The Chief Aviation Officer (CAVO) is responsible for all aspects of air operations and management of aircraft (including UAS).

All operations of the Class II and III UAS will be conducted in direct response to tasking by the U2 and subsequently by an Air Tasking Order (ATO) through the Mission chain of command. The ATO will authorize the flight and provide confirmation of airspace/air traffic management arrangements.

The Information Acquisition List (IAL) and Class II/III UAS assets must be linked to the ATO. A process / standard operating procedure ensures the coordination between the Force HQ and the MAOC so that the tasking can be achieved effectively. Mission Air Ops has the overarching authority regarding the tasking and flight patterns of UAS and the PKISR operator must work within that framework.

The range, endurance and sensor suite will make mini and micro UAS unsuitable for operational level tasking. The Air tasking order contains the task and flight information for all tactical, combat or surveillance missions.

Slide 17



This slide depicts how a mission might approve UAS taskings.

For the UNIBAT the process normally starts with a request from UNIBAT S3/S2 for an PKISR assets in support of a collection plan / PIRs / IRs / named area of interest (NAI) surveillance. This will be sent to the Sector HQs for approval and sent up to the FHQ U2. If the request warrants an UAS asset; the request will be added to the information Acquisition List (IAL) and that compiles the daily taskings of UAS assets in the Mission area. Within the IAL, certain acquisition requirements will have been assigned to UAS units. Those requests will be prioritised and passed to Force DCOS Ops who will provide an initial filter to ensure the effective tasking of UAS assets and that they support current and future military operations, as well as other Mission priority acquisition requirements.

The tasking request will then be sent for approval by the Force Commander and the Director of Mission Support (DMS). Both individuals are likely to delegate this responsibility to a subordinate. For the Force Commander, this is likely to be the DCOS Ops. For DMS, it is likely to be the Mission's Civilian Aviation Officer (CAVO). Finally, once approved, CAVO will include the task in the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO).

Slide 18



Employment of Class II & III UAS

- Through Air Tasking Order (ATO)
- Operate under UN aviation standards
- Understand command-and-control measures
- Mission in coordination with host nation is responsible for airspace management and coordination



The management and employment of UAS within the field Missions will be done in accordance with UN Military Aviation Unit Manual, the UN Department of Operational Support's Aviation Manual, the UN Department of Safety Aviation Manual, the UN Aviation Safety Manual, and the Aviation Risk Management Policy.

Class II and III UAS aviation units will be tasked by the U2 following the mission air assets tasking procedures, coordinated by the Mission's Air Operations Cell (MAOC - Air Ops). So, although the U2 has operational authority over the UAS, its operation must occur inside a broader environment with specific rules and regulations; it is the Air Ops job to ensure the UAS flight operates under UN Aviation Standards.

The command-and-control arrangements for all UAS assets can be complicated. Direction will be found in the UN Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations policy as well as individual Mission standard operating procedures. Aspects that might determine where the responsibility lies, include whether the UAS is available for military and/or civilian use and the conditions agreed between UN HQ and the UAS provider, which could be a military unit or a civilian contractor.

Finally, the mission in coordination with the host nation is responsible for airspace management. A close relationship between the Force HQ and the Mission Air Operations Cell is essential for seamless UAS operations.

Slide 19



Class I UAS Limitations

- Operations within 8 Km from airfield or heliport restricted
- Maximum altitude 400 feet above ground level
- Visual Line of Sight operations only
- Night operations coordinated with Mission's Aviation Section
- Not flown near other aircraft

UNIBAT may have Class1 UAS. All UAS operators in the Mission area are required to abide existing requirements, coordinating all UAS operations with the Mission aviation authorities.

These are the main constraints concerning the tasking and employment of Class I UAS (deployed at the UNIBAT or lower tactical level):

- Operations within 8 Km from an airfield or heliport are restricted. Operations are only allowed with prior coordination with the Mission Aviation Section. If the operations are conducted within the area of an airfield/heliport with no Aviation Section presence, Local Air Traffic Control authorization will be required (if available in Mission area)
- Class I UAS have a maximum operating altitude of 400 feet above ground level (AGL) unless a different Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ) has been previously arranged with the mission authorities
- Class I UAS can only operate under Visual line-of-sight
- Night taskings are to be coordinated by the Mission's Aviation Section
- Finally, Class I UAS must not be flown close to an aircraft, in any case yield right of way to other aircraft

Slide 20



UN military aviation PKISR assets consist of three types of units: rotatory-wing, fixed wing (both manned) and UAS. This slide considers the similarities and differences between UAS and manned aircraft.

Same sensors: regarding to payload, manned aircraft can use the same payload as UAS. But the type of sensor / cameras required is important when considering manned or unmanned

Endurance: This characteristic is related to the inability of aircraft to fly indefinitely, as they need to refuel more often than UAS and change crews. UAS can change the operator without landing, the same is not possible with Manned Aircraft.

Response Time: in general terms, a manned aircraft can travel faster than a UAS. However, this parameter can be affected by the time it takes to prepare a manned aircraft to be launched. As such, the deployment time of a manned aircraft needs to be known before such assets are considered for dynamic tasking.

Human Engagement: Manned aircraft have more flexibility on the mission than UAS, due to the presence of a pilot on board the asset. A UAS will always be dependent on

communication with a ground station to perform its mission, whereas a manned aircraft can operate on radio silence / loss of communication once a crew is briefed on the mission objectives.

In summary, and in general terms, the main difference between manned and unmanned systems are speed (in favour of the manned) and endurance (in favour of UAS). The PKISR Plans team should take this into account when assigning tasking as they are both equally suited to the same tasks.

Slide 21

Take Away

- ISR planning is tied to MPKI and acquisition fundamentals
- UNIBAT acquisition planners incorporate their own ISR assets as well as requesting Sector / Force HQs / Mission assets when available
- UNIBAT acquisition strategy requires cooperation between UNIBAT planners, Intel cells at all levels, ISR assets / elements / units
- Assign the appropriate UAS asset that best supports the requirement; coordination with higher HQs is essential

Summary

- ISR planning in a UNPKO is tied to the MPKI fundamentals
- UNIBAT planners should incorporate both their own ISR assets as well as requesting Sector and Force HQs assets when available into their acquisition planning
- UNIBAT acquisition strategy requires close cooperation between UNIBAT planners, PKI cells at all levels, ISR assets organisations, units
- Assign appropriate UAS asset to the information requirement; coordination between higher HQs is essential

Module 3



Operational Framework Wrap Up

At the conclusion of Module 3, some key elements should have become clear:

- Relevant FP and POC guidance regarding tactical level planning and operations are included in the Mission strategy, Force, and sector commander OPORDs
- In the military decision-making process, military plans required the next higher headquarters approval and support; therefore, all UNIBAT plans need to be briefed and endorsed by the force / sector commander
- At all stages of the military decision-making process, a detailed analysis of the operational environment and the importance of a threat based and risk mitigation approach to all planning in UNPKO cannot be overstated

References annexes can be found in separate folders to aid in the delivery of the modules and TTX:

- Annex A: Lessons- Power Point Slide Presentations
- Annex B: Tabletop Exercise (TTX); Scenario-based Exercise (SBE)
- Annex C: References
- Annex D: Effects Based Operations (MDMP)
- Annex E: IED and Explosive Awareness Training

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